New York Public Personnel Law

Nov 4, 2011

Termination following off duty conduct that violated disciplinary probation settlement agreement.

Termination following off duty conduct that violated disciplinary probation settlement agreement.

Sills v Kerik, Appellate Division, First Department, 5 A.D.3d 247

The Appellate Division sustained a ruling by Supreme Court that rejected a former police officer’s attempt to annul his termination while he was on a disciplinary probation.

Edward Sills, dismissed while serving a one-year dismissal probation period. This probationary period reflected a settlement of disciplinary charges based on allegations of driving while intoxicated and being unfit for duty due to consumption of alcohol. Sills sued the New York City Police Department alleging his termination constituted a violation of the Human Rights Law.

According to the ruling, Sills alleged that he is an alcoholic and thus disabled within the meaning of the Human Rights Law (Executive Law §296 [1] [a]). However, the opinion indicates that Sills did not allege that he was seeking rehabilitation at the time of his termination, nor that his drinking at a party in a parking lot just prior to his termination, and then driving home, provided the Department with a basis to believe that his last attempt at rehabilitation, completed less than four months earlier, was unsuccessful.

In the words of the Appellate Division:

The Human Rights Law does not, as in the case herein, protect an individual who, subsequent to the completion of rehabilitation, suffers a relapse and is found guilty of, and is dismissed for, misconduct.

Supreme Court Justice Heitler approved the termination of Sills’ termination from his position pursuant to a "Terminate Probation Agreement." Sills had signed the agreement in settlement of an earlier disciplinary action. The agreement included the following terms and conditions agreed to by Sills:

The Police Commissioner may impose punishment of dismissal or any lesser penalty he deems appropriate at any time during such period [of probation].

I am fully aware of the fact that I am entitled to a Disciplinary Hearing pursuant to applicable laws of the City and State of New York in which I would be entitled to representation, to confront witnesses against me and to appeal an adverse decision rendered after such hearing to a Court or Administrative Agency of proper jurisdiction.

If this penalty is approved by the Police Commissioner, I accept said decision, and as a condition of accepting such decision of the Police Commissioner, I hereby waive any and all rights granted to me under all applicable laws of the City and State of New York and acknowledge that this acceptance is the same as a finding of guilt after a hearing.

Sills and the Department had entered into the agreement after Sills conceded he was guilty of disciplinary charges alleging that he:

1. Wrongfully operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol or drugs;

2.Wrongfully and without just cause refusing to submit to a Breathalyzer test; and

3.Was unfit for duty due to having consumed an unknown quantity of an intoxicant

rather than proceed to a disciplinary hearing where the penalty sought by the Department was dismissal from the service.

While on disciplinary probation Sills participated in "off duty" beer drinking with some fellow police officers. Citing the terms of the agreement, the Commissioner terminated Sills from his position without a hearing. Sills sued, seeking a court order annulling his termination and reinstating him to his former position with back salary and benefits.

Sills argued that "he did not commit any misconduct and, as such, there was no reason for his termination." He contended that his drinking beer was done on private property and that off-duty police officers are not prohibited from drinking alcohol as long as they remain fit for duty. Sills also claimed employment discrimination, alleging that the Department "sought to rid itself of an employee with a previously admitted drinking problem and used his probation agreement as a pretext for his termination so that he would not be entitled to a hearing.

The Department, on the other hand, argued that at the time it terminated Sills he was under disciplinary probation that provided for his termination "without a hearing and without a statement of reasons absent a constitutional or statutory violation."

Justice Heitler said that a court must consider whether or not Sills termination was unjustified, unduly harsh, arbitrary, capricious or made in bad faith. Justice Heitler concluded that "[a]s long as the dismissal is not made in bad faith, a probationary employee may be dismissed for any reason or for no reason without a hearing or statement of reasons."

According to the decision, Sills had the burden of showing bad faith by the Department and he was unable to meet this burden.

The court also commented that "even in the case of a non-probationary officer, the Commissioner has the right to terminate for purposes of maintaining the integrity of the police department."

The court dismissed Sills petition, stating that as "a policeman with a history of intoxication, ... [he] ignored his history with alcohol; he further didn't appreciate the fact that, despite this history, he was given a second chance ... his being put on probation."

As to Sills claim of unlawful discrimination because of a disability, Justice Heitler said that because "his admitted conduct demonstrates that he is an alcoholic who continues to drink and is not in a rehabilitation program," he cannot claim protection under §296(1) of the Executive Law as that provision only applies in cases of rehabilitated and rehabilitating drug abusers.

Further, said the court, even if [Sills] did fall within the scope of §296, the reason offered by the Police Department for its terminating him "is the maintenance of the integrity of the Police Force, and legitimate and non-discriminatory in nature."

Justice Heitler said that, under the "totality of the circumstances," he found that Sills failed to meet his burden and dismissed his petition in its entirety. As noted above, the Appellate Division dismissed Sills’ appeal in its entirety.

Crediting expert testimony

Crediting expert testimony

Vassello v McCall, App. Div., 296 A.D.2d 815

Firefighter Paul N. Vassello, claimed that he sustained injuries when he fell while descending from a fire truck in August 1998. He filed an application for performance of duty disability retirement benefits and, one month later, his employer filed an employer application for ordinary disability retirement benefits on his behalf.

The New York State Employees' Retirement System [ERS] rejected both applications. Vassello appealed but the ERS Hearing Officer upheld the Department's administrative denial of both applications, finding that Vassello was not permanently incapacitated from the performance of his duties as a firefighter. The Comptroller adopted the Hearing Officer's findings and Vassello filed an Article 78 action challenging the Comptroller's decision.

One of the points made by the Appellate Division was that the Hearing Officer considered the competing medical opinions offered by the experts testifying on behalf of Vassello and on behalf of ERS and resolved the conflict in favor of ERS. The court said that the Comptroller, in adopting the Hearing Officer's findings, was free to credit the testimony of one medical expert over that of another, citing Meegan v New York State Retirement System, 285 AD2d 892.

In the words of the court, if "the testimony offered by the Retirement System's expert constitutes substantial evidence to support [the Comptroller’s] determination, it will not be disturbed."

Nov 3, 2011

PEF announces contract vote count

PEF announces contract vote count

The New York State Public Employees Federation (PEF) at its press conference on Thursday, November 3, at PEF headquarters in Latham, announced that the results of the ballot count for the union’s revised tentative contract agreement with the State.

The vote count announced by AAA was:

27,718 in favor of the proposed contract;

11,645 opposed to the proposed agreement.

PEF is the state’s second-largest state-employee union, representing 55,000 State employees in the Professional, Scientific and Technical Services negotiating unit (PS&T) and other public and private employees.

All ballots were counted by the American Arbitration Association on Thursday morning, November 3, 2011 at the AAA offices in Manhattan.

As a result there will be no layoffs that would have otherwise taken effect on Friday, November 4, 2011.

PEF members rejected the initial propose agreement presented to them on September 27, 2011. The October 15, 2011 four-year revised proposed contract was accepted by the membership.

The text of the contract is posted on the Internet at:
http://www.pef.org/storage/files/tent_contract.pdf

Administrative Law Judge recommended dismissal of employee testing positive for marijuana

Administrative Law Judge recommended dismissal of employee testing positive for marijuana

NYC Fire Department v Rolling, OATH Index #1645/11

OATH Administrative Law Judge Alessandra F. Zorgniotti recommended termination of employment for an Emergency Medical Technician [EMT] who tested positive for marijuana in a random workplace drug test.

Although the EMT claimed that the positive test resulted from his consumption of vitamins that contain hemp-seed oil, there was no proof that he had consumed any substance that could trigger a false positive result.

Noting that “[i]nnocent ingestion is an affirmative defense that [the accused] must prove by preponderance of the evidence,” Judge Zorgniotti said that the EMT “could not identify anything he consumed that contained hemp-seed oil” at any time during the 24-hour period proceeding his being tested.

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://archive.citylaw.org/oath/11_Cases/11-1615.pdf

Counseling memorandum and disciplinary action

Counseling memorandum and disciplinary action

Hoffman v Village of Sidney, 652 NYS2d 346

In a number of instances, counseling memoranda have been challenged on the theory that the employer's issuing a counseling memorandum, in and of itself, constitutes disciplinary action. The courts have rejected the notion that such an effort on the part of the employer to correct employee behavior constitutes discipline. In Hoffman, the Appellate Division ruled that an employee is not entitled to a hearing before a letter critical of his or her performance is placed in his or her personnel file, where no punishment is involved.

As to Taylor Law considerations, PERB has recognized the difference between criticism of employee performance and disciplinary action. In Port Jefferson Union Free School District v United Aides and Assistants,U-5713, PERB rejected a union's claim that every written criticism of an employee was a "reprimand."

The absence of the imposition of any punishment on the employee appears to be the key in determining if a counseling memorandum is, in fact, a subterfuge for disciplinary action. Further, courts typically view term "penalty" to mean one of the statutory penalties authorized by §75 of the Civil Service Law or a similar statute.

The issue of whether the employer’s action constituted constructive criticism or discipline was considered by the Commissioner of Education. in Matter of Fusco, Comm. of Ed. Decision 14,396 and in Matter of Irving, Comm. of Ed. Decision 14,373. In the opinion of the Commissioner of Education, the employers "crossed the line" in both the Fusco and Irving cases.

The Fusco Case:

The Commissioner said that while the general rule is that personnel given critical administrative evaluations by a supervisor are not entitled to Section 3020-a protections, a disciplinary reprimand may not be issued without a finding of misconduct pursuant to Section 3020-a.

In Fusco’s case the Commissioner found that despite the board's representation that the challenged evaluation was "intended to encourage positive change" in Fusco's performance, it "contains no constructive criticism or a single suggestion for improvement." Rather, said the Commissioner, the memorandum focused on "castigating [Fusco] for prior alleged misconduct."

Instead of "constructive criticism," the Commissioner concluded that the evaluation "chastised [Fusco] for serious misconduct," including "improper release of confidential information, harassment of staff members, damaging district/union relationships...and poor leadership."

The Irving Case

In deciding Irving’s appeal, the Commissioner said that “The record convinces me that disciplinary action was taken and that Irving, a school principal, was deprived of her rights under Education Law Section 3020-a.

Conceding that Sections 1711 and 2508 of the Education Law authorize a superintendent to transfer personnel, the problem here, said the Commissioner, was that Irving's alleged misconduct. i.e., "staff mistreatment" and "parental mistreatment," were the only reasons for reassigning and demoting Irving set out in the record. The Commissioner pointed out that the several meetings between the Superintendent and Irving, and the Superintendent and the board, and the two letters given to Irving by the Superintendent, "are all part of a single process, and it is inescapable that the sole reason for [Irving's] transfer was her alleged misconduct as a principal."

Considering all of these circumstances as a whole, the Commissioner concluded that Irving was entitled to the protections of Section 3020-a, including the right to contest formal charges, "and those rights have been violated here."

Rejecting the district's argument that Irving's "transfer was for the good of the district" and thus not disciplinary in nature, the Commissioner said this theory "misses the mark." He observed, "one would hope that every school district disciplinary action or proceeding, taken in good faith, is for the good of the district."

Another concern: A "counseling memorandum" is placed in an individual's personnel file and later disciplinary charges involving the same event(s) are served upon the individual. Does including the events set out in the counseling memorandum in the charges constitute "double jeopardy?" No, according to the Court of Appeal's rulings in Holt v Board of Education, 52 NY2d 625 and in Patterson v Smith, 53 NY2d 98.

In these cases the court indicated that in the event an employer includes allegations based on the employee's conduct that earlier resulted in the issuing of a counseling memorandum in the charges or specifications filed against the individual in a statutory or contractual disciplinary proceeding, the inclusion of allegations in the charges and specifications involving such prior conduct does not constitute "double jeopardy."

Filing a FOIL request for personnel records

Filing a FOIL request for personnel records

Feerick v Safir, App. Div., 297 AD2d 212

The basic rule when considering a Freedom of Information Law [FOIL] request is that FOIL provides that all public documents are subject to disclosure. However, the custodian of the records may elect to deny access to documents otherwise subject FOIL if it decides that the document requested may be withheld because it meets one or more of the exceptions set out in the law.

When it comes to FOIL requests concerning personnel records, typically the individual objects to their release. The Feerick case involved a variation concerning FOIL requests for personnel records -- Patricia Feerick submitted a FOIL request to her employer, the New York City Police Department, seeking material contained in her own personnel records. The Department rejected her FOIL request.

Feerick was one of four New York City police officers seeking information concerning an internal police investigation directly related to their involvement in efforts to recover stolen property from suspected drug dealers. The Department's reason for refusing her FOIL request: the information she sought constituted confidential police records and thus fell under one of the exclusion provisions set out in law.

Feerick filed an Article 78 petition seeking disclosure of her personnel records related to the matter. Supreme Court, agreeing with the Department, dismissed her petition. The Appellate Division, however, reversed and ordered the Department to give Feerick the records she had requested under FOIL.

The Appellate Division noted that Public Officers Law §87(2) allows the denial of a FOIL request if the information sought (1) is specifically exempted from disclosure by statute; (2) amounts to an unwarranted invasion of privacy; or (3) interferes with an ongoing law enforcement investigation or judicial proceeding.

At the time that Feerick submitted her FOIL request, said the court, the only tenable basis for the Department to exercise its discretion and not release her personnel records to her was that the information sought amounted to an "unwarranted invasion of privacy." It was conceded that the information demanded constituted confidential personnel records and thus fell under one of the available exclusions to FOIL. However, said the court, the records demanded by Feerick are her own records in contrast to such records being demanded by a third party.

Noting that the privacy exception is for the protection of individuals named in the documents rather that the public entity holding or creating the records, the court decided that any privacy issues raised by the Department were irrelevant as the information demanded directly concerned the individual submitting the FOIL request.

Filing a FOIL request for personnel records

Filing a FOIL request for personnel records

Feerick v Safir, App. Div., 297 AD2d 212

A public entity must be reasonable when deciding whether or not to release information that falls under one of the limited exclusions available to it when denying a FOIL request. In exercising its discretion as to whether to release documents, the custodian must be guided by the public policy underlying FOIL: all governmental records are available to the public and the denial of a FOIL request is the exception to this general rule.

N.B. The release of some public records is limited by statute [see, for example, Education Law, §1127 - Confidentiality of records; §33.13, Mental Hygiene Law - Clinical records; confidentiality]. Otherwise, an individual is not required to submit a FOIL request as a condition precedent to obtaining public records where access is not barred by statute. A FOIL request is required only in the event the custodian of the public record[s] sought declines to “voluntarily” provide the information or record requested. In such cases the individual or organization is required to file a FOIL request to obtain the information. It should also be noted that there is no bar to providing information pursuant to a FOIL request, or otherwise, that falls within one or more of the exceptions that the custodian could rely upon in denying a FOIL request, in whole or in part, for the information or records demanded.

Union is bound by chief negotiator's representation

Union is bound by chief negotiator's representation

Erie County Water Authority and Local 930, 35 PERB 4560

If the employer relied on the union's chief negotiator's representation that he was authorized to enter into the collective bargaining agreement, the agreement may not later be repudiated by the chief negotiator on the claim that the agreement was contingent on the approval of the union's full bargaining team and the chief negotiator had a duty to advise the employer if he did not have the authority to reach a final agreement or that a final agreement was contingent on the approval of the union's full negotiating committee.

Nov 2, 2011

Part-time paid elected official cannot continue receiving unemployment insurance benefits while serving in office

Part-time paid elected official cannot continue receiving unemployment insurance benefits while serving in office

Cass v Commissioner of Labor, 296 A.D.2d 759

Donald M. Cass applied for and was granted unemployment insurance benefits. While he was collecting unemployment insurance benefits, however, Cass was also serving as a member of the Geneva City Council and received a salary of $208.33 per month. Later Cass was sworn in as the Mayor of the City of Geneva, a part-time position for which he was paid $625 per month. He continued to collect unemployment insurance benefits while serving at Mayor.

The Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board [Board] ruled that Cass was ineligible for benefits because he was not totally unemployed during the time he was receiving unemployment benefits and, in addition, it concluded that he had made willful false statements in order to receive these benefits.

According to the Appellate Division's decision, Cass testified that he had mentioned his status as an elected official when he first applied for benefits and was told, by a clerk at the local unemployment insurance office, not to "worry about it". Thus, he contended, he did not reveal that he had received these payments when he made his weekly certifications for benefits.

In contrast to Cass' testimony, the record before the Board included testimony from the clerk who took Cass' application that if claimant had mentioned his status as an elected official, she would have made a note of it on his application for benefits, and she had not done so. In addition, the record included testimony from another Labor Department representative indicating that she had spoken to Cass concerning his benefits and had specifically instructed him that he was required to report any activities performed by him as an elected official during the benefit period.

The Appellate Division sustained the Board's determination. It concluded that there was substantial evidence in the record to support the Board's finding that Cass was ineligible for benefits because he was not totally unemployed at the time and its further finding that he willfully made false statements in order to obtain benefits.

Selection for appointment - the Rule of Three and the Rule of One

Selection for appointment - the Rule of Three and the Rule of One

UFT v. Board of Education, New York City School District, 298 A.D.2d 60

In United Federation of Teachers [UFT] v Board of Education, an action taken to confirm an arbitration award, the critical issue concerned the degree of discretion enjoyed by an employer in determining the "most qualified applicant to fill a vacancy." In effect the court was asked to determine if the “Rule of Three” set out in Civil Service Law §61 trumped a “Rule of One” set out in a collective bargaining agreement.

Linda Feil, a third grade teacher, applied for one of six "per session" positions in Project Read, an after school program. While Feil did not have an Early Childhood or Reading License, she did have 26 years experience as a primary school teacher, possessed a "common branch" teaching license, and had substituted for the Project Read program in the past. Feil was not selected for the job.

UFT grieved the "non-selection" of Feil for the position, contending that the Board's failure to appoint Feil was arbitrary and capricious. The arbitrator, after noting that there was no provision in the collective bargaining agreement [CBA] that addressed the procedure for filling a Project Read position, awarded the position to Feil, together with back pay. In making the award, the arbitrator relied on a provision of the agreement that barred the Board from acting in an arbitrary and capricious fashion.

Although the Board placed Feil in the position, it did not grant her any back pay. In an attempt to obtain the back pay provided for in the arbitration award, UFT initiated a CPLR Article 75 proceeding seeking an order confirming the arbitrator's award. The School Board cross-moved to vacate the arbitrator's award. Supreme Court granted UFT's motion to confirm the award and the Board appealed.

The Appellate Division reversed the lower court's determination, holding that (1) the arbitrator exceeded her authority when she awarded the position to Feil; and (2) the award violated strong public policy.

The court said that despite the fact that the arbitrator acknowledged that there was no contract provision setting out any procedure for selecting an applicant for the Project Read program, she nevertheless awarded one of the positions to Feil.[1]

Accordingly, the Court said it was necessary to analyze the reasoning behind the arbitrator's decision that the CBA had been violated. The court's conclusion: the arbitrator's ruling was based on the fact that she was not convinced that Feil should have been eliminated from consideration because none of four individuals selected for appointment were any more qualified than Feil. This, in the view of the court, constituted "contract making" rather than "contract interpretation."

In addition, the Appellate Division said that the arbitrator's decision, mandating the employment of the individual in this instance, violated strong public policy. Essentially, said the court, notwithstanding the absence of any contract procedure for selecting applicants for a specific job, the arbitrator took it upon herself to decide who was the best qualified applicant -- and decided that it was Feil.

Citing Honeoye Falls-Lima CSD v Honeoye Falls-Lima Education Association, 49 NY2d 732, the Court said "[i]t is well established that `it is beyond the power of a school board to surrender through collective bargaining a responsibility vested in the board in the interest of maintaining adequate standards in the classroom.'" Clearly the Board cannot be divested of its authority concerning the selection of personnel by an arbitrator's award; not even one promulgated under color of a provision contained in a collective bargaining agreement.[2]

The Appellate Division concluded that for the arbitrator to substitute her judgment for that of the appointing authority, "at least in this case."

In contrast, courts have upheld the right of the employer to give up a right to exercise its discretion in selecting an individual for appointment in the course of collective negotiations under certain circumstances.

In Professional, Clerical, Technical Employees Association v Buffalo Board of Education 90 N.Y.2d 364, the Court of Appeals upheld the validity of a collective bargaining agreement that provided for appointment pursuant to "a rule of one" -- the selection of the highest scoring candidate on a civil service examination for appointment to a vacancy. In effect this contract provision obviated the so-called Rule of Three [Civil Service Law Section 61], which gives the appointing authority the discretion to select from among at least three eligibles on the list when filing a vacancy.

§61, in pertinent part, provides that appointment or promotion from an eligible list to a position in the competitive class shall be made by the selection of one of the three persons certified by the appropriate civil service commission as standing highest on such eligible list who are willing to accept such appointment or promotion.

Initially the Civil Service Law mandated the appointment of “those graded highest” – i.e., “the Rule of the List.” The Court of Appeals, however, ruled that such a requirement, in effect, made the Civil Service Commission the appointing authority [People v Mosher, 163 NY 32 (1900)]. As a result, Rule VIII [1] of the 1909 Rules for the Classified Service provided for the “selection of one of the three persons who are willing to accept [appointment] and are graded highest on the most nearly appropriate eligible list...” -- the so-called Rule of Three.[3]

The Professional, Clerical, Technical Employees Association [PCT] had filed a grievance objecting to the Buffalo City School District's "passing over" Melvin Cross, the highest-scoring candidate on a promotion eligible list for appointment to the position of Associate Account Clerk. Buffalo had appointed three lower ranking eligibles to fill three Associate Account Clerk vacancies.

PCT argued that the School District had agreed to be bound by the "rule of one" under a contract negotiated pursuant to the Taylor Law. The School District, however, contended that such a contract provision should not be enforced because enforcing it would violate strong public policy.

Holding the contract provision enforceable, the arbitrator directed the district to appoint Cross to the position of Associate Account Clerk, with back salary and benefits.

Could the arbitrator require the Board of Education to promote the highest-scoring negotiating unit member on a civil service eligible list based on a finding that a rule of one was mandated under the terms of the parties' collective bargaining agreement?

The Court of Appeals ruled that no strong public policy prohibits an appointing authority from agreeing through collective negotiations to give promotional preference to certain employees on an eligible list where a probationary period precedes the employee's attaining tenure.

Observing that "the public policy exception to the arbitrability of public sector labor disputes is narrow," the Court of Appeals affirmed the arbitrator's award, holding that:

The promotional practices of a public employer constitute a term or condition of employment that may be determined through collective bargaining under the Taylor Law. Thus, the court concluded, public policy is not offended by an appointing authority's agreeing to be bound by the so-called "rule of the list."

The lesson here: in contrast to being mandated to follow the rule of the list or a "rule of one," by law, rule or regulation, an appointing authority may elect to forfeit its right to select from among the candidates standing highest on the eligible list.

This concept was acknowledged by the Appellate Division in deciding Feil. It said that its ruling "is not meant to suggest that a collective bargaining agreement may not require that the most senior qualified teacher within the bargaining unit be given preference in filling an open position. Such seniority provisions are, of course, fully enforceable."

[1] While the arbitrator recognized that the selection of teachers for Project Read was "not covered by the Agreement," she stated that "[t]he exercise of [managerial] discretion [in making such selections] is subject to the general arbitral rule that such an exercise must be undertaken in good faith and not be arbitrary, capricious or discriminatory in nature."

[2] : The Appellate Division, citing Cohoes City School Dist. v Cohoes Teachers Association, 40 NY2d 774, commented that although an arbitrator may render an award based on a school board's failure to adhere to contractually mandated "supplemental procedural steps preliminary to the board's final [action], the school board's ultimate determination on a matter bearing directly on the maintenance of educational standards generally remains immune from arbitral review".

[3] See, also, People v Gaffney, 142 AD 122, affirmed 201 NY 535. In Gaffney the court held that a law or rule limiting the selection for appointment to a single individual on an eligible list unconstitutionally interfered with the right of the appointing authority to select its own officers and employees.

NYPPL Publisher Harvey Randall served as Principal Attorney, New York State Department of Civil Service; Director of Personnel, SUNY Central Administration; Director of Research, Governor’s Office of Employee Relations; and Staff Judge Advocate General, New York Guard. Consistent with the Declaration of Principles jointly adopted by a Committee of the American Bar Association and a Committee of Publishers and Associations, the material posted to this blog is presented with the understanding that neither the publisher nor NYPPL and, or, its staff and contributors are providing legal advice to the reader and in the event legal or other expert assistance is needed, the reader is urged to seek such advice from a knowledgeable professional.

CAUTION

Subsequent court and administrative rulings, or changes to laws, rules and regulations may have modified or clarified or vacated or reversed the information and, or, decisions summarized in NYPPL. For example, New York State Department of Civil Service's Advisory Memorandum 24-08 reflects changes required as the result of certain amendments to §72 of the New York State Civil Service Law to take effect January 1, 2025 [See Chapter 306 of the Laws of 2024]. Advisory Memorandum 24-08 in PDF format is posted on the Internet at https://www.cs.ny.gov/ssd/pdf/AM24-08Combined.pdf. Accordingly, the information and case summaries should be Shepardized® or otherwise checked to make certain that the most recent information is being considered by the reader.