School District audits released during the week ending October, 16, 2020

New York State Comptroller Thomas P. DiNapoli announced the following school district audits have been issued during the week ending October 16, 2020

Broadalbin-Perth Central School District – Cash Management (Fulton County, Saratoga County and Montgomery County) - District officials did not develop and manage a comprehensive investment program. As a result, officials did not maximize interest earnings for the district. In addition, officials did not formally solicit interest rate quotes or prepare cash flow forecasts to estimate the amount of funds available for investment. Officials earned interest totaling $40,652 during the audit period. However, auditors determined they could have earned another $159,100 had officials used other available investment options.

Mahopac Central School District – Non-instructional Payroll (Putnam County) - The transportation department’s payroll was not adequately approved, supported and documented. In addition, a staff person received overtime pay that was not properly supported by documentation.

Minerva Central School District – Financial Condition Management (Essex County and Warren County) - District officials overestimated appropriations by a total of more than $2.1 million from 2016-17 through 2018-19 and annually appropriated fund balance that was not used to finance operations. Unrestricted fund balance ranged between 18.5 and 31.1 percent of ensuing years’ appropriations, exceeding the 4 percent statutory limit. In addition, district officials did not develop a comprehensive multiyear financial plan.

New York Mills Union Free School District – Procurement (Oneida County) - District officials did not always seek competition for purchases that are not subject to competitive bidding. Officials also did not comply with the district’s procurement policy. Auditors determined the purchasing agent did not effectively perform her procurement duties. In addition, officials did not always seek competition for professional services. No competition was sought for the services procured from five professional service providers totaling $89,421. No written or verbal quotes were obtained for the purchase of goods and services from 13 vendors who were paid $73,032.

 

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10 RBG Takeaways from 2 Lawyers

Ruth Bader Ginsburg’s passing has spurred great memories from across all demographics. She paved the way for women’s equality—from the right to sign a mortgage without a man to the right to have a bank account without a male co-signer, and even the right to have a job without being discriminated against based on gender.   

 

What did the accomplishments of Ruth Bader Ginsburg mean to generations of women in the workforce?  Here, Erica Baird and Karen Wagner, two successful lawyers now retired—and the cofounders of Lustre.net, an online community whose mission is to redefine retirement for modern career women by confronting outdated concepts and defying stereotypes—talk lawyer-to-lawyer as they reflect on 10 RBG Takeaways that can inspire every woman [Ed. Note: " and man"] … young and old: 

 

1. Find a job you love. RBG was rejected, again and again, including by New York law firms. But just think—if she had been employed in a law firm, she likely never would have ascended to the Supreme Court. And that was her dream job.

 

2. Be strategic. Figure out where you want to go, and then, before you start, figure out how best to get there. RBG did that with her litigation strategy. Showing how men were hurt by sex discrimination was a more effective strategy than having only women plaintiffs. 

 

3. Be human. Separate your advocacy from your relationships. And do have relationships. RBG's best friend was her fellow justice Antonin Scalia. She disagreed with him, fiercely, about pretty much every legal point. But they loved each other, and bonded over music, and over dinners prepared by RBG's husband. It was not a transactional relationship; it was a human relationship.

 

4. Work hard. You must earn your victories. RBG started working hard when she was a new lawyer, and she never stopped. Look at the honor guard at the Supreme Court for her memorial, composed of people who worked as her clerks, responding to 2 a.m. faxes and constant demands for more precise analysis, as long as she lived. They undoubtedly loved her for her humanity, but they also surely loved her because she made them better lawyers.

 

5. Be precise. Words matter. The practice of law is a combination of analysis and communication. Communication is more effective when it is spare and clear. RBG's writing was crisp and muscular. Any reader got her point.

 

6. Presence matters. Justice Ginsburg always looked professional and elegant in her Armani suits and her long black robes. She was all brilliant lawyer and all powerful woman. And, like Barbara Bush with her faux pearls, RBG sent signals with her decorative collars.

 

7. Find a good partner. Her “Marty” was legendary—an attorney in his own right, not threatened by a strong woman.

 

8. Advocate with humor. As she did when becoming a little deaf, or remarking that the Supreme Court will have a sufficient number of women only when there are nine.

 

9. Find something outside of your job to love. She found opera, and lost herself in music.

 

10. Work out. RBG, the documentary, showed RBG working out very strenuously. Like everything else she did, she went all out. If you do the same your lives will be richer for it.

 

About Lustre.net
Lustre.net is an online forum founded by Erica Baird and Karen Wagner, two New York City retired attorneys. Together, Baird and Wagner are on a mission to redefine retirement for modern career women by confronting outdated concepts, defying stereotypes and raising our collective voices to ensure that retirement for all of us is shaped by women, for women. Baird and Wagner want women to “tap into our experiences and passions, forge new identities and find new purpose—and pass on what we know to the next generation.” 

 

Posted by NYPPL with the permission of Mouth Digital PR [Justin.loeber@mouthdigitalpr.com].

 

Retiring upon attaining the mandatory age of retirement bars claim for line of duty sick leave benefits

General Municipal Law §92-d provides for sick leave benefits to certain employees with qualifying World Trade Center conditions as defined by §2 of the Retirement and Social Security Law. 

A former fire chief [Chief] commenced this CPLR Article 78 proceeding against his former employer [City] in an effort to have the City's determination denying his application for line-of-duty sick leave pursuant to General Municipal Law §92-d annulled. Supreme Court granted the City's motion to dismiss the Chief's petition, agreeing with the City that the Chief's Article 78 action was moot. The Chief appealed.

The Appellate Division affirmed the Supreme Court's ruling, observing that after the Chief filed his Article 78 petition in this case he attained "the mandatory retirement age pursuant to Retirement and Social Security Law §370 (b) and retired with the maximum amount of accrued sick leave."

The court explained that it is "a fundamental principle of our jurisprudence that the power of a court to declare the law only arises out of, and is limited to, determining the rights of persons which are actually controverted in a particular case pending before the tribunal," referencing Matter of Hearst Corp. v Clyne, 50 NY2d 707, at page 713.

Opining that "[u]nder the circumstances here, Supreme Court properly dismissed the petition as moot," the Appellate Division held that this proceeding is "not of the class that should be preserved as an exception to the mootness doctrine."

The decision is posted on the Internet at http://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/3dseries/2020/2020_05665.htm

 

 

OATH launches citywide text-messaging reminder system for all civil summonses

On September 4, 2020, the New York City Office of Administrative Trials and Hearings [OATH] announced a citywide launch of a text-messaging reminder system to remind respondents about their Hearings Division hearing dates. Respondents can register by simply texting "OATH reminder" to 474747, and then responding to the prompt with their summons number. 

"Every person who receives a summons should know that OATH's goal is to make it as convenient as possible for them to respond to that summons and direct text messages that explain our hearing process, the consequences for not responding to summonses, and remind people of important deadlines is just one way OATH is doing that," said Commissioner and Chief Administrative Judge Joni Kletter. 

For more information, read OATH's press release.

Salaries of undercover police officers not subject to disclosure pursuant to the Freedom of Information Law

§89[3][a] of the New York State (Public Officers Law)*, The Freedom of Information Law [FOIL], provides that "[n]othing in [the statute] shall be construed to require any entity to prepare any record not possessed or maintained by such entity."

In this CPLR Article 78 action the Empire Center for Public Policy [Empire] challenged the denial of its FOIL request seeking the aggregate gross salary of all individuals not included in the NYC Open Data Citywide Payroll Database for fiscal year 2017.

The Supreme Court's decision indicating that the information sought by Empire would include the salaries of "undercover police officers, whether aggregated or individualized," denied Empire's petition request for individualized salary information as to such individuals and Empire appealed.

The Appellate Division unanimously modified, on the law, part of the Supreme Court's order, vacating that part of the order requiring the disclose aggregate salary information, and otherwise affirmed the Supreme Court's ruling, indicating that:

1. Such information is exempt from disclosure under FOIL's public safety exemption;

2. The respondent, the New York City Office of Payroll Administration, met its burden of making a particularized showing that publicly releasing this information would create "a possibility of endangerment" to the public's safety; and

3. The New York City Office of Payroll Administration is not obligated to compile "aggregate data" "from the documents or records in its possession"** (See Matter of Reubens v Murray, 194 AD2d 492).

The Appellate Division opined that in the analysis of Empire's request not only the instant FOIL request for information as to fiscal year 2017 is to be considered but also future requests which could be made for equivalent information as to other years. Citing Matter of Grabell v New York City Police Dept., 139 AD3d 477, the court said that such information would allow members of the public to estimate the increases or decreases in the overall number of undercover officers, which could "undermine their deterrent effect, hamper NYPD's counterterrorism operations, and increase the likelihood of another terrorist attack." The New York City Office of Payroll Administration's past disclosure of salary and other information as to certain public employees not employed by NYPD is not dispositive.

* Public Officers Law §89[3][a], with exceptions not raised in this action.

** See Matter of Reubens v Murray, 194 AD2d 492.

The decision is posted on the Internet at: http://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/3dseries/2020/2020_05449.htm

 

With few exceptions, an officer's or an employee's resignation from a position in the classified service must be in writing.

The petitioner [Plaintiff] in this CPLR Article 78 action was employed by the defendant [Town] in a position in the Labor Class of the Classified Service when he was elected to public office in another jurisdiction.

The Petitioner and the Town subsequently disputed whether Plaintiff had orally resigned his position with Town and ultimately the Town sent a letter to Plaintiff reporting that "it had accepted [Plaintiff's resignation]"* effective the December 31. Although Plaintiff sought to retain his position with the Town, the Town refused his request under color of Plaintiff's purported oral resignation.

Plaintiff filed a petition pursuant to CPLR Article 78 seeking a court order directing the Town to reinstate him to his position with back pay, and benefits, contending, among other things, that the Town's action terminating from his position was arbitrary and capricious and in violation of Civil Service Law §75-b.

Supreme Court dismissed Plaintiff claim with respect to the alleged violation of Civil Service Law §75-b, but otherwise granted Plaintiff's petition and directed the Town to reinstate Petitioner to his position with the Town with back pay and benefits. The Town appealed the Supreme Court's ruling.

The Appellate Division rejected the Town's appeal explaining that it was not inconsistent for Supreme Court to dismiss Plaintiff's claim with respect to the alleged violation of Civil Service Law §75-b and then grant him relief pursuant to CPLR Article 78, noting that notwithstanding the Town's argument to the contrary, Plaintiff's to elective office in another jurisdiction did not constitute an automatic resignation of his position as laborer with the Town. Citing People ex rel. Ryan v Green, 58 NY 304, the Appellate Division opined that "[P]hysical impossibility is not the incompatibility of the common law, which existing, one office is ipso factovacated by accepting another." Based upon the record before it, the Appellate Division opined that the two positions in question were not per se incompatible.

Addressing the Town's contention that Supreme Court's granting Plaintiff's petition was erroneous in view of Plaintiff's alleged oral resignation, the court said that the Town's argument was without merit inasmuch as the Town's  employee handbook requires that an employee's resignation be in writing.**

The Appellate Division also rejected the Town's  argument that Plaintiff was not entitled to back pay and benefits. Rather, said the court, CPLR Article 78 allows for damages incidental to "the primary relief sought by the [Plaintiff], i.e., reinstatement to employment and such damages may include full back pay and benefits retroactive to the date of termination."

* Although it is sometimes reported that "a resignation has been accepted," all that is required for a resignation to become operative is its delivery to the appointing authority; approval or acceptance of the resignation is not required for the resignation to take effect (see Hazelton v Connelly, 25 NYS2d 74) unless specific acceptance of a resignation is required by law, rule, regulation or the terms of a controlling collective bargaining agreement. An example of requiring the "acceptance" of the resignation for it to take effect: §2111 of the Education Law, "Resignation of district officers." §2111 states that a school district officer "may resign to a district meeting." §2111 then further provides that officer shall also be deemed to have resigned if he or she filed a written resignation with the district superintendent of his of her district and such superintendent endorses thereon his approval and files the same with the district clerk [emphasis supplied]. See, also, §2110.3 of the Education Law.

** The Town  is located in Seneca County and the County's Civil Service Rule XX, provides, in pertinent part, as follows: 1. RESIGNATION IN WRITING: Except as otherwise provided herein, every resignation shall be in writing.

The decision is posted on the Internet at http://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/3dseries/2020/2020_05312.htm

 

Overcoming the presumption in favor of collective bargaining terms and conditions of employment underlying the Taylor Law

Civil Service Law §71 provides that where an employee has been separated from the service by reason of a disability resulting from occupational injury or disease as defined in the Worker's Compensation Law, "he or she shall be entitled to a leave of absence for at least one year, unless his or her disability is of such a nature as to permanently incapacitate him or her for the performance of the duties of his or her position."

Under color of Civil Service Law §6[1], the Department of Civil Service promulgated implementing regulations for Civil Service Law §71, setting out procedures for notifying an employee of the right to a one-year leave of absence, notifying an employee of an impending termination following the expiration of that one-year period, the employee's right to a hearing and the procedures to be followed in the event an employee so terminated seeks to return to duty after recovering from the disability.* 

The Long Beach Professional Firefighters Association, IAFF, Local 287 [LBPFA] advised the City of Long Beach [City] that it wished to negotiate the procedure for separating members of LBPFA placed on leave pursuant to §71. City declined to negotiate such a procedure and LBPFA filed an improper practice charge against the City with New York State Public Employment Relations Board [PERB]alleging that the City violated Civil Service Law §209-a(1)(d) by refusing to negotiate the matter with the LBPFA.

An administrative law judge [ALJ] determined that the City had violated Civil Service Law §209-a(1)(d) and PERB affirmed the ALJ's determination. The City then commenced a CPLR Article 78 proceeding challenging PERB's determination. PERB moved to dismiss the petition and the Supreme Court granted its motion. The City appealed the Supreme Court's decision.

The Appellate Division, citing Matter of New York City Tr. Auth. v New York State Pub. Empl. Relations Bd., 19 NY3d 876, observed that "It is well settled that '[t]he Taylor Law requires collective bargaining over all terms and conditions of employment'" and that the Court of Appeals has "'made clear that the presumption ... that all terms and conditions of employment are subject to mandatory bargaining cannot easily be overcome.'"

That said, the court noted that City of Watertown v State of N.Y. Pub. Empl. Relations Bd., 95 NY2d 73 teaches that "The presumption in favor of bargaining may be overcome only in special circumstances where the legislative intent to remove the issue from mandatory bargaining is plain and clear, or where a specific statutory directive leaves no room for negotiation."** 

Finding that the demand to negotiate the issue raised by LBPFA fell within the ambit of Watertown, the Appellate Division opined that it need not defer to PERB's interpretation of Civil Service Law §71 because "[that] question is one of pure statutory construction dependent only on accurate apprehension of legislative intent [with] little basis to rely on any special competence of PERB."

Addressing the issue de novo, the Appellate Division declared that "the presumption in favor of collective bargaining [had been] overcome." The court then reversed PERB's order and judgment holding PERB's decision null and void, granted the City petition, and dismissed the improper practice charge filed by the LBPFA against the City "with prejudice". 

* See 4 NYCRR 5.9. 

** The Appellate Division's decision also notes that [1] "a subject that would result in [the public employer's] surrender of nondelegable statutory responsibilities cannot be negotiated," citing Matter of Board of Educ. of City School Dist. of City of N.Y. v New York State Pub. Empl. Relations Bd., 75 NY2d 660; and [2] "some subjects are excluded from collective bargaining as a matter of policy, even where no statute explicitly says so," citing Matter of City of New York v Patrolmen's Benevolent Assn. of the City of N.Y., Inc., 14 NY3d 46. See, also, https://publicpersonnellaw.blogspot.com/2010/10/prohibited-subjects-of-arbitration.html

The decision is posted on the Internet at http://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/3dseries/2020/2020_05504.htm

 

 

Determining a retirement system member's eligibility for accidental disability retirement

On May 9, 2018 the Board of Trustees of the New York City Police Pension Fund [Board] denied a New York City police officer's [Officer] application for accident disability retirement [ADR]. Officer challenged the Board's decision and Supreme Court granting his CPLR Article 78 petition seeking to vacate the Board's determination and awarded Officer ADR benefits retroactive to December 1, 2010. 

The Board appealed and the Appellate Division unanimously reversed the Supreme Court's ruling "on the law," and dismissed Petitioner's Article 78 action. 

The Appellate Division opined that the Board's denial of Officer's application for ADR benefits was not arbitrary and capricious noting that the relevant date for purposes of disability is at or prior to the applicant's retirement from service, citing Matter of Gullo v Kelly, 50 AD3d 449, leave to appeal denied 11 NY3d 702.

The court noted that the Medical Board's consideration of evidence and reports after Officer's retirement, and its conclusion that Officer was disabled several years after his retirement, "does not change the relevant date for entitlement to ADR" benefits.

Further, said the Appellate Division, the Medical Board was entitled to rely on its own examinations and testing of Officer as well as its review of Officer's medical records. These provided some credible evidence to support the Medical Board's finding that Officer was not disabled at the time of his retirement.

Referring to Matter of Khurana v Kelly, 73 AD3d 497, leave to appeal denied 15 NY3d 715, the court held that the Medical Board "was not bound by the contrary opinions of [Officer's] treating physicians."

The decision is posted on the Internet at: http://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/3dseries/2020/2020_05282.htm

 

Diversity training programs

In an article captioned "Diversity Work, Interrupted",* Inside Higher Ed's daily news update dated October 7, 2020, reports that "some institutions have begun to cancel diversity, equity and inclusion programs in response to an Executive Order, "Executive Order on Combating Race and Sex Stereotyping," issued on  September 22, 2020.

Preliminary guidance from the State University of New York notes that the order "makes a passing reference to a carve out for education, stating (in full) that '[n]othing in this order shall be construed to prohibit discussing, as part of a larger course of academic instruction, the divisive concepts listed in section 2(a) of this order in an objective manner and without endorsement.'" Yet it is "unclear how the EO would define its 'objectivity' and 'non-endorsement' requirements." 

The Executive Order is posted on the Internet at https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/executive-order-combating-race-sex-stereotyping/. 

* See https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2020/10/07/colleges-cancel-diversity-programs-response-trump-order?utm_source=Inside+Higher+Ed&utm_campaign=275597c9a5-DNU_2020_COPY_02&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_1fcbc04421-275597c9a5-236506338&mc_cid=275597c9a5&mc_eid=bf9965f865

Employee terminated from employment after progressive disciplinary action taken by the appointing authority

Supreme Court denied the petition filed by the employee [Educator] pursuant to CPLR Article 75 seeking to vacate an arbitration award that, after a hearing pursuant to Education Law §3020-a, found the Educator guilty of the disciplinary charges filed against him and imposed the penalty of dismissal from employment.

Educator appealed but the Appellate Division unanimously affirmed the lower court's ruling.

Citing Cipollaro v New York City Dept. of Educ., 83 AD3d 543, the Appellate Division opined that "[t]]he penalty of termination of [Educator's] employment as a public school teacher does not shock one's sense of fairness."

The court explained that the record shows that Educator failed to instruct students during class time, instead using the time to perform personal tasks on Educator's own laptop computer, noting that the record showed that Educator "had previously been placed on notice that such conduct was not permitted, and prior disciplinary action had failed to remedy [Educator's] misconduct."

The decision is posted on the Internet at http://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/3dseries/2020/2020_05474.htm. 

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A Reasonable Disciplinary Penalty Under the Circumstances - A 442-page e-book focusing on determining an appropriate disciplinary penalty to be imposed on an employee in the public service in instances where the employee has been found guilty of misconduct or incompetence. Now available in two formats - as a large, paperback print edition and as an e-book. For more information click on http://booklocker.com/books/7401.html

 

 

Regulating partisan political activities of certain employees of a federal, state, municipal, educational or research entity

The Hatch Act, 5 U.S.C. §§7321-7326, regulates partisan political activities of most federal executive branch employees.

The Hatch Act [Act] also applies to officers and employees in the executive branch of state and local government whose principal employment involves an activity financed in whole or in part by federal loans or grants. 

However, certain state public officers such as the governor, the mayor of a city, and the elected head of an executive department are exempted from the Act, as are individuals employed by educational or research institutions which are supported in whole or in part by the State or a political subdivision of the State.

The Hatch Act permits public officers and employees to be members of a political party and even serve as officers in that party, but prohibits the use of their official authority or influence for the purpose of interfering with or affecting the results of elections or the nominations of candidates for those elective offices. The Act also bars direct or indirect coercion of public workers to make a loan or to contribute anything of value to an individual or a party or other organization for political purposes.

In Matter of Blackburne, 211 AD2d 13, [motion to appeal denied, 86 N.Y.2d 705], the Appellate Division opined that an individual otherwise entitled to an "administrative due process disciplinary hearing” such as one provided by a Taylor Law collective bargaining agreement [CBA] or by state law may be summarily removed from his or her position under certain conditions.

Blackburne had taken a leave of absence from his employment with a state department [Agency] to seek election to a seat on the City Council even though he had been warned, in writing, by the Agency that in so doing he would be in violation of the Hatch Act and his employment would be in jeopardy. Blackburne's was unsuccessful in his efforts to be elected to the City Council and he returned to his position with the Agency.

The United States Special Counsel subsequently filed a complaint with the Merit Systems Protection Board [Board] charging Blackburne with violating the Act. Following a hearing, the Administrative Law Judge [ALJ] issued a decision sustaining the charge and recommending that Blackburne be removed from his position with the Agency. Blackburne filed exceptions to the ALJ's rulings with the Board. 

Ultimately the Board adopted the ALJ's findings and recommendation and ordered the Agency to remove Blackburne from his position or be faced with the loss of Federal funds equal to two years of Blackburne's annual salary. The Agency summarily terminated Blackburne under color of the Board's determination.

Blackburne challenged the Agency's action, contending he could not be removed or be subjected to any disciplinary penalty absent his being accorded administrative due process mandated by the disciplinary grievance procedure set out the relevant Taylor Law CBA and demanded that the matter be submitted to arbitration as mandated by the CBA.

The Appellant Division disagreed, noting that although Blackburne's violation of the Act had not occurred during the performance of his job-related duties, such misconduct could be considered to be within the ambit of Article 33 of the CBA "since a public employee may be disciplined for off-duty misconduct." 

The court then opined that it need not decide that issue since, in its view, Blackburne's grievance was precluded by the CBA's exclusionary clause set forth in §34.1 of the CBA which bars arbitration of matters where "other means of resolution are provided ... by statute ... applicable to the State".

Finding that the Hatch Act accords a full evidentiary hearing to an accused violator and further provides for judicial review of Board orders through a proceeding in federal district court, the Appellate Division concluded that the parties to the CBA had not expressly, directly and unequivocally agree to submit the subject grievance to arbitration.

Further, said the court, "the arbitration of this grievance would offend public policy," citing Matter of Board of Education [Ramapo] 41 NY2d 527. The Appellate Division explaining that the only penalties for violating the Act are either [1] removal from office or employment, or [2] the subsequent loss of Federal funds otherwise available to the employer. In contrast, observed the court, under the CBA an arbitrator has a range of disciplinary options that may be imposed on the wrongdoer that are much less severe than termination of employment.

Consequently, the Appellate Division held that "to permit this matter to proceed to arbitration would significantly lessen the efficacy of the Hatch Act and frustrate its purpose and scope."

The Blackburne decision is posted on the Internet at https://www.leagle.com/decision/1995224211ad2d131221. 

 

Determining if an employee's injury sustained "in the line of duty" was an accident for the purposes of eligibility for accidental disability retirement benefits

The NYC Administrative Code §13-252 requires providing Accident Disability Retirement (ADR) benefits to an injured police officer when a medical examination shows that the officer is "physically or mentally incapacitated for the performance of city-service as a natural and proximate result of  [1] an accidental injury received in such city-service while a member" of the Pension Fund and [2] the "disability was not the result of willful negligence" on the part of the officer and [3] the officer "should be retired."

If the Medical Board so finds, the Police Pension Fund Board of Trustees [Board] then makes the final determination regarding the officer's entitlement to ADR and if it finds that ADR should be approved, it becomes effective after the last day a member is on the active NYPD payroll.

Responding to a family disturbance call, Petitioner [Police Officer] was exiting "the passenger side of his patrol van in haste" when his service firearm got caught on the seatbelt, and Police Officer fell to the ground, suffering spine and shoulder injuries. Police Officer's application for ADR benefits was rejected by the Board and Police Officer appealed the Board's determination. Supreme Court granted Police Officer's CPLR Article 78 petition and remanded the matter to the Board "for an award of [ADR] benefits." The Board appealed.

The Appellate Division unanimously reversed the Supreme Court's decision "on the law," denied Police Officer's petition and dismissed Police Office's CPLR Article 78 action.

The Appellate Division explained that Supreme Court erred in granting the Police Officer's petition and in annulling the Board's determination that Police Officer's injury did not arise from an unexpected accident or from a risk inherent in the job of being a police officer. Rather, said the court, "[t]he board correctly determined that [Police Officer's] injury was not caused by an accident as defined in the New York City Administrative Code and applicable case law.

Citing Lichtenstein v Board of Trustees of Police Pension Fund of Police Department of City of New York, 57 NY2d 1010, the Appellate Division observed that "not every line-of-duty injury will support an award of accidental disability retirement [and] an injury which occurs without an unexpected event as the result of activity undertaken in the [police officer's] performance of ordinary employment duties ... is not an accidental injury," sustaining the Board's conclusion that Police Officer's injury was not the result of "a sudden, unexpected event".

Quoting from Pratt v Regan, 68 NY2d 746, the Appellate Division observed that "the catching one's heel on a running board [of a motor vehicle] and thus losing balance may be a risk of the work performed [by an employee], but coming down hard upon the other foot in a pothole is not."

The decision is posted on the Internet at http://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/3dseries/2020/2020_05136.htm