Applicant denied accidental disability retirement benefits after failing to show that his disability was causally related to his accident

The Appellate Division introduced its consideration of this appeal by observing that the decision being appealed "was not made pursuant to an administrative hearing, and therefore the proceeding was improperly transferred to this Court" by the Supreme Court. The Appellate Division then decided to address the merits of the appeal "in the interest of judicial economy", citing Matter of DeMonico v Kelly, 49 AD3d 265.

An application for accidental disability retirement [ADR] benefits filed by a New York City firefighter [Applicant] was denied by the Board of Trustees of the New York City Fire Pension Fund [Trustees]. Applicant filed a CPLR Article 78 petition seeking court order vacating the Trustees' decision. The matter was, as noted earlier" improperly transferred to the Appellate Division. After considering the merits of Applicant's appeal the court opined that the Trustees' decision was supported by credible evidence, and was not arbitrary and capricious, citing Meyer v Board of Trustees of N.Y. City Fire Dept., Art.1-B Pension Fund, 90 NY2d 139.

The court said that the finding that Applicant's "disabling hip condition is causally related to a preexisting degenerative condition, rather than his fall while in the performance of his duties, is based upon credible medical evidence ... indicative of a chronic degenerative disease, not an acute injury." Thus the Appellate Division found that the Trustees "properly relied upon the [New York City Fire Pension Fund's] Medical Board's unanimous opinion as to causation, commenting that "in the event there is a conflict in the medical evidence regarding the cause of the disability [that determination] is within the sole province of the Medical Board to resolve."

In contrast, the court observed that Applicant failed to establish, as a matter of law,  that his disability was causally related to his accident, and in particular, that his asymptomatic preexisting degenerative disease was exacerbated by the accident as he claimed. Further, in the words of the Appellate Division, the Medical Board found there was no objective evidence to support that theory of causation alleged solely upon Applicant's subjective claims.

Unanimously confirming the decision of the Trustees', the Appellate Division dismissed Applicant's appeal.

Click HEREto access the full text of the Appellate Division's decision.

 

Arbitrating a grievance alledging the employer failed to fill a vacant position as required by a provision in the collective bargaining agreement

The Appellate Division, noting that the parties in this action were actually involved in two appeals each involving the arbitrability of a grievance alleging that the appointing authority [Employer] failed to fill certain vacancies in accordance with the terms set out in the collective bargaining agreement [CBA], said it was deciding both appeals "herewith."

Essentially the two disputes concerned a CBA provision that required Employer to fill "vacant promotional positions ... from [c]ivil [s]ervice lists within thirty (30) days." One grievance alleged Employer failed to fill two vacant Sergeant positions* and a second grievance alleging Employer failed to fill a vacant Captain position.**

The Sergeant Grievance: One sergeant was promoted to captain and another sergeant retired, leaving two vacant sergeant positions. After the second Sergeant position had been vacant for more than 30 days, the Union filed a grievance alleging that Employer had violated the CBA by failing to timely promote any eligible candidates to the vacant sergeant positions.

The Captain Grievance: Two months after an individual was promoted from the position of captain to assistant chief, leaving a vacant captain position, the Union filed a grievance alleging that Employer violated the CBA when it failed to promote one of the three eligible sergeants to the position of captain within 30 days.

Employer denied the grievances and the Union submitted demands to arbitrate the disputes. Employer then commenced two proceeding pursuant to CPLR §7503 seeking, respectively, court orders permanently staying the arbitrations. Supreme Court denied Employer's applications for the stays of arbitration and granted the Union's cross motions to compel arbitrating the two disputes. Employer appealed the Supreme Court's decisions.

In deciding these appeals the Appellate Division noted:

1. When deciding whether to stay or compel arbitration pursuant to CPLR 7503, courts are "concerned only with the threshold determination of arbitrability, and not with the merits of the underlying claim." 

2. In general, "any doubts as to whether an issue is arbitrable will be resolved in favor of arbitration."

3. Citing Deas v Levitt, 73 NY2d 525 and other decisions, the Appellate Division  opined although "no individual had a vested right to be appointed to a vacant position — not even those whose scores placed them in the top three examinees", in this instance once individuals were appointed, they may have become entitled to damages or other relief based on Employer's alleged contractual breach, i.e., failure to make such appointments within the time frame required by the CBA.

4. "The threshold determination of whether a dispute is arbitrable is well settled. Proceeding with a two-part test, [courts] first ask whether the parties may arbitrate the dispute by inquiring if there is any statutory, constitutional or public policy prohibition against arbitration of the grievance. If no prohibition exists, [courts] then ask whether the parties in fact agreed to arbitrate the particular dispute by examining their collective bargaining agreement".

5. A public employer's promotional practices may lawfully be the subject of collective bargaining and, if agreed upon, may be the subject of arbitration when a related grievance is filed.

6. Article XXV of the CBA at issue, addressing promotions to newly-created and vacant positions, provides that "vacant promotional positions shall be filled from [c]ivil [s]ervice lists within thirty (30) days; provided, however, that if any list would expire prior to that time, the positions will be filled before the expiration of the list in existence at the time the vacancy occurs, or the new position is created."

Employer asserted that Article XXV was contrary to Civil Service Law §61(1). The Appellate Division disagreed, explaining that this is not a situation where the CBA mandates appointing the highest scoring person on the list willing to accept a police officer position rather than applying the "rule of three" - selecting a candidate from among the "top three eligibles" certified for appointment to the position. The court noted that here the Employer retained the discretion to choose from among the top three candidates, but voluntarily agreed to make such choice within a certain period. As Civil Service Law §61 contains no time requirements for making an appointment, the CBA's provision did not violate that statute or any related public policy.

As to the appointing authority exercising discretion in selecting an eligible individual for promotion, while in Matter of Professional, Clerical, Tech. Empls. Assn. (Buffalo Bd. of Educ.), 90 NY2d 364, the Court of Appeals held that a public employer could, without violating public policy, agree to forgo its statutory authority to choose any one of three candidates for promotion to clerical and secretarial positions, in  Matter of Buffalo Police Benevolent Assn. [City of Buffalo], 4 NY3d 660, the high court ruled that "[p]ublic policy requires that police departments retain the authority given them by Civil Service Law §61(1) to select one of three candidates for such promotions," thus barring an appointing authority from agreeing, in the course of collective bargaining, to limit its discretion in selecting a candidate for promotion by requiring the appointing authority to follow the so-called "the rule of the list."***

Considering "budget arguments" advanced by the Employer, the Appellate Division opined that although Article XXV would allow Employer to eliminate an open captain position**** and thereby save the expenses related to that position, Employer had "bargained away its ability to keep the position as a line item in the budget but not fill it when it becomes vacant." This "partial limit" on a municipality's power to control its budget, which limit was voluntarily agreed upon by the Employer in the CBA, was not viewed as against public policy by the Appellate Division.

Finding that "[n]o constitutional provision prohibits arbitration here", the Appellate Division concluded its rulings by observing that "considering the broad scope of the CBA's arbitration clause, any argument concerning compliance with the grievance process, including any time limitations thereunder, is likewise a matter for the arbitrator to decide."

An historical note: Prior to 1900 New York State civil service appointments from eligible lists were based on the rule of one, also referred to as "the rule of the list." This rule mandated the appointment of the candidate standing highest on the eligible list certified by the responsible civil service commission. In 1900 the "rule of one" was struck down by the Court of Appeals as unconstitutional. The Court held that "if the civil service commissioners have power to certify to the appointing officer only one applicant of several who are eligible and whom they have, by their own methods, ascertained to be fitted for a particular position, and their decision is final ... then the civil service commission becomes and is the actual appointing power" [People v Mosher, 163 NY 32]. This decision prompted establishment of the so-called "rule of three," currently set out in Section 61.1 of the Civil Service Law and held valid by the Court of Appeals in People v Gaffney, 201 NY 535. 

* See Matter of City of Troy (Troy Police Benevolent & Protective Assn., Inc.), 2021 NY Slip Op 01172, posted on the Internet at http://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/3dseries/2021/2021_01172.htm

** See Matter of City of Troy (Troy Police Benevolent & Protective Assn., Inc.), 2021 NY Slip Op 01170, posted on the Internet at http://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/3dseries/2021/2021_01170.htm

*** The Rule of One, also known as the "Rule of the List." is mandated by Civil Service Law §§81.2 and 81.3 in situations involving an appointment from a preferred list and in situations involving an appointment from a similar list such as a Special Eligible List established pursuant to §243.7 of the State's Military Law while §243.12 of the Military Law provides that appointments from a Military Re-employment List may be made without regard to the selected individual's position on said list.

**** The Attorney General has opined that there must be an actual abolishment of the position in question in contrast to merely “creating a vacancy as the result of a layoff” in order to trigger the relevant statutory layoff procedures [1976 Opinions of the Attorney General 7].

Audits issued by the New York State Comptroller during the week ending March 5, 2021

New York State Comptroller Thomas P. DiNapoli announced the following audits were issued during the week ending March 5, 2021.

Click on the text highlighted in color to access the complete audit report.

Department, Authority, Program and Foundation Audits

Department of Health (DOH) Improper Fee-for-Service (FFS) Payments for Services Covered by Managed Care (Follow-Up) (2020-F-8)A prior audit identified over $36 million in improper Medicaid FFS payments for services that should have been covered by the recipients’ managed care plans. In a follow-up audit, auditors found DOH made some progress in addressing the problems identified. However, auditors still identified nearly $7 million in new improper payments.

Department of Health: Improper Payments for Sexual and Erectile Dysfunction (ED) Drugs, Procedures, and Supplies Provided to Medicaid Recipients, Including Sex Offenders (Follow-Up) (2020-F-15) An audit released in June 2019 identified $933,594 in improper payments for drugs, procedures and supplies to treat ED. Of that amount, Medicaid paid $63,301 for 47 sex offenders. Medicaid also made payments of $13.5 million for ED drugs that are approved to also treat other medical conditions. About $11.6 million of the $13.5 million in payments were made without verifying recipient sex offender status through DOH’s system, as required – consequently, auditors found Medicaid paid $285,641 on behalf of 14 sex offenders. In a follow-up, auditors found DOH made some progress in addressing the problems identified in the initial audit report; however, more improvements are needed.

Department of Health: Medicaid Program - Improper Medicaid Payments for Individuals Receiving Hospice Services Covered by Medicare (2018-S-71) Auditors identified about $50 million in actual and potential Medicaid overpayments, cost-savings opportunities, and questionable payments for services provided to certain patients enrolled in Medicare-covered hospice. Among the cost savings, auditors recommended DOH review the $5.9 million in actual and potential overpayments and ensure proper recoveries are made. They also recommended DOH improve controls to prevent improper payments in the future. Another $39.8 million was identified as questionable because these expenses may have been eligible for coverage by Medicare.

Homes and Community Renewal - Division of Housing and Community Renewal (DHCR): Administration of Mitchell-Lama Waiting Lists (Follow-Up) (2020-F-19) An initial report issued in August 2017 found that DHCR needed to improve its monitoring of the Mitchell-Lama developments to ensure that affordable units were awarded in compliance with New York Codes, Rules and Regulations. In a follow-up, auditors found DHCR has made some progress in addressing the problems identified in the initial audit report.

Department of Motor Vehicles: Enforcement of Article 19-A of the Vehicle and Traffic Law (Follow-Up) (2020-F-6) An audit issued in February 2019 identified deficiencies in DMV’s policies and procedures that could result in motor carriers operating out of compliance with requirements for school bus drivers with the associated risk that under or unqualified drivers were operating vehicles and potentially jeopardizing safety. In a follow-up, auditors found DMV has implemented four of the five recommendations from the initial audit report, and has partially implemented one recommendation.

New York State Health Insurance Program: CVS Health – Accuracy of Drug Rebate Revenue Remitted to the Department of Civil Service (Follow-Up) (2020-F-24) An audit issued in June 2019 found that CVS Health did not always invoice drug manufacturers for all rebates, collect all rebates from the manufacturers, or remit all rebate revenue to Civil Service. As a result, Civil Service was due $2,240,798 in rebates. In a follow-up, auditors found CVS Health addressed most of the problems identified in the initial audit.

Niagara Frontier Transportation Authority (NFTA): Use of Vendor-Supported Technology (Follow-Up) (2020-F-28) An initial audit determined that NFTA maintained its technology systems at vendor-supported levels. However, auditors identified unsupported systems used on 66 devices. NFTA officials did not develop policies and procedures to ensure that their systems were regularly reviewed and kept up to date, nor did they maintain a single clear inventory of IT assets to aid in tracking their systems. In a follow-up, auditors found NFTA officials have made significant progress in addressing the problems identified in the initial audit.

Olympic Regional Development Authority (ORDA): Compliance With Executive Order 95 (Open Data) (2020-S-36) ORDA did not begin to take steps to meet the requirements of EO 95 until after auditors started their work. Prior to the audit, ORDA did not have any data items published to Open Data. In addition, it did not designate a data coordinator, complete a comprehensive catalogue of publishable data, submit a master schedule of publishable datasets or incorporate Open Data into its ongoing core business planning and strategies. However, since then, ORDA has taken steps to comply with EO 95.

Research Foundation of the State University of New York (SUNY): Technology Transfer Program and Royalty Payments (Follow-Up) (2020-F-32) An audit issued in January 2020, found that the Research Foundation had taken steps to protect SUNY’s interest in the transfer of technology and royalties for projects developed at SUNY schools, but had not developed monitoring to determine whether licensees was accurately reporting net sales and paying the full royalty owed. Additionally, SUNY Downstate had accumulated $1,019,390 in campus royalty revenues, none of which had been reinvested to support SUNY research programs. In a follow-up, auditors found Research Foundation officials have made progress in addressing the findings identified in the initial report.

Rochester - Genesee Regional Transportation Authority (RGRTA): Compliance With Requirements to Maintain Systems at Vendor-Supported Levels (Follow-Up) (2020-F-30) An initial report found that RGRTA maintained its technology systems at vendor-supported levels. However, auditors did identify unsupported systems used on 14 devices. Additionally, RGRTA had not developed policies and procedures to ensure that its systems were regularly reviewed and kept up to date. In a follow-up, auditors found RGRTA made significant progress in addressing the problems identified in the initial audit.

State Education Department: Oversight of School Safety Planning Requirements (Follow-Up) (2020-F-17) An initial audit determined SED was not sufficiently monitoring school districts’ compliance with the requirements for school safety planning, and did not have assurance that the requirements were being met. In a follow-up, auditors found SED has made significant progress in addressing school safety issues. 

 

Recent Articles by Rochester Attorney Niki Black concerning the use of computers in the practice of law available via the Internet

The importance of technology competence when communicating electronically

Round Up: Law Practice Management Software, Clubhouse, Remote Work Ethical Guidance & More

The internet is forever, so behave accordingly

NYSBA provides ransomware guidance for lawyers

Lawyers: Take a look at these two social media platforms

 

Seeking medical treatment under New York's Compassionate Care Act

A police officer [Claimant] had established two workers' compensation claims. Following years of treatment, which included physical therapy, surgeries and various prescription pain medications, and a subsequent diagnosis of chronic regional pain syndrome of the right upper extremity, a Workers' Compensation Law Judge [ALJ] classified Claimant as permanently partially disabled and apportioned liability for indemnity benefits and medications between the two claims. Claimant continued receiving treatment with varying degrees of success, and his use of prescription pain medications continued to increase.

Ultimately Claimant, after years of treatment with opiate pain medications, began being treated by a pain management specialist [Specialist]. Specialist continued Claimant on his regimen of, among other medications, Oxycontin and Oxycodone to treat his pain but subsequently certified Claimant for use of medical marihuana pursuant to Public Health Law Article 33, Title V-a, also referred to as New York's "Compassionate Care Act."

Specialist then filed a NYS Workers Compensation MG-2 variance form requesting authorization to use medical marihuana to treat Claimant's chronic pain resulting from his work-related injuries. The Employer and its workers' compensation carrier [Carrier] denied the request. Although the Workers' Compensation Board [Board] initially sustained the denial, in response to Claimant's request for further action, the Board rescinded its earlier decision and continued the case for a hearing.

Following a hearing the Worker's Compensation Law Judge approved the variance request for medical marihuana treatment as apportioned, and instructed Carrier to pay for such treatment. Upon administrative review, the Board, among other things, sustained the request for the variance. 

Employer and Carrier appealed the Board's decision,  contending that the requirement that Carrier provide insurance coverage for Claimant's medical marihuana expenses under the Compassionate Care Act conflicted with the Controlled Substances Act and, in light thereof, the Compassionate Care Act was preempted by federal law.

The Appellate Division disagreed, finding that the Board's decision to grant the requested variance to treat Claimant's chronic pain with medical marihuana was supported by substantial evidence and declined to disturb it.

The court explained that the federal preemption doctrine has its roots in the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution, and federal preemption of state laws generally can occur in three ways:

1. Where Congress has expressly preempted state law;

2. Where Congress has legislated so comprehensively that federal law occupies an entire field of regulation and leaves no room for state law; or

3. Where federal law conflicts with state law.

In the eyes of the court, the issue was one of "conflict preemption. Referring to Balbuena v IDR Realty LLC, 6 NY3d 338, the Appellate Division opined that "conflict preemption" occurs "when compliance with both federal and state law is a physical impossibility, or where the state law at issue ... stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress."

Noting that neither the Compassionate Care Act nor Workers' Compensation Law §13(a) requires a workers' compensation carrier to manufacture, distribute or possess marihuana, the Appellate Division indicated that all that is required of the Carrier in this instance is its reimbursing Claimant's monetary costs associated with the medical marihuana obtained from his or her medical practitioner, an activity that is not expressly prohibited under the Controlled Substances Act. 

Moreover, opined the Appellate Division, reimbursing a claimant "does not serve to subvert, in any way, the principal purposes of the Controlled Substances Act in combating drug abuse and controlling 'the legitimate and illegitimate traffic in controlled substances,' particularly where, as here, [Claimant] was validly prescribed and authorized to use medical marihuana by his pain management specialist to both treat his chronic pain and reduce his reliance on opiates."

Addressing another conundrum, the Appellate Division pointed out that "even assuming, without deciding, that [Claimant's] procurement and possession of medical marihuana under the Compassionate Care Act is illegal under the Controlled Substances Act, any such criminal transaction in this regard is necessarily completed prior to any request being made for reimbursement from the carrier; thus, as 'one cannot aid and abet a completed crime' ... the [Carrier] cannot be said to be aiding and abetting a crime and/or engaging in a conspiracy to commit same." 

Holding that Carrier can comply with the State's statutory scheme without running afoul of federal law, the Appellate Divisions concluded that it could not find any conflict between the Controlled Substances Act and either the Compassionate Care Act or Workers' Compensation Law §1(a) with regard to Carrier's obligation to reimburse Claimant for his medical marihuana expenses.

Addressing and disposing of additional arguments raised by Employer and Carrier,  the court cited Public Health Law §3368(2), which provides as follows:

Nothing in this title shall be construed to require an insurer or health plan under [the Public Health Law] or the [I]nsurance [L]aw to provide coverage for medical marihuana. Nothing in this title shall be construed to require coverage for medical marihuana under [Public Health Law article 25 (maternal and child health)] or [Social Services Law article 5 (public assistance)].

However, said the Appellate Division, "[a]ccording to its express terms, the provided exemption from coverage for medical marihuana expenses pertains only to three chapters of law: the Public Health Law, the Insurance Law and the Social Services Law. No reference is made in the text of the statute to an exemption from coverage under the Workers' Compensation Law. 

The Appellate Division then observed that "If the Legislature intended for said exemption to apply to workers' compensation insurance carriers, it certainly could have included such language in the text of the statute; it chose not to."

Finding that the Board properly granted Claimant's request for a variance and that the Public Health Law and its accompanying regulations authorize the use of medical marihuana to treat certain enumerated and serious conditions, including - as relevant here - chronic pain, the court observed that the Workers' Compensation Law also requires that treatment be rendered in accordance with its Medical Treatment Guidelines. 

Citing 12 NYCRR 324.2[a], the court explained that in the event a medical provider determines that medical care that varies from the Medical Treatment Guidelines is warranted, he or she "shall request a variance from the insurance carrier" by submitting such request in the prescribed form. Although "the burden of proof to establish that a variance is appropriate for a claimant and medically necessary shall rest on the treating medical provider requesting the variance," if the Board's decision is supported by substantial evidence, the Appellate Division held that it would not be disturb.

In this instance the court determined that the Board's decision to grant the requested variance to treat Claimant's chronic pain with medical marihuana was supported by substantial evidence and sustained it.

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ClickHEREto access the Appellate Division's decision.

 

Resolving a challenge to the denial of an application for accidental disability retirement benefits resulting from a tie vote by the pension fund's Board of Trustees

The New York City's Police Pension Fund [Fund] Medical Board [Medical Board] concluded that the disability of an individual's [Applicant] for accidental disability retirement benefits [ADR] "stemmed from an unsuccessful spinal surgery and not from a line-of-duty incident." As the Fund's Board of Trustees [Trustees] review of the Medical Board's decision resulted in a tie vote, Applicant was denied accidental disability retirement [ADR] pension benefits and was awarded ordinary disability retirement [ODR] benefits instead. 

Applicant then filed a CPLR Article 78 petition seeking a Supreme Court order annulling the Trustee's action and the Medical Board's determination. Supreme Court dismissed the proceeding and the Appellate Division unanimously affirmed the lower court ruling.

Citing Meyer v Board of Trustees of N.Y. City Fire Dept., Art. 1-B Pension Fund, 90 NY2d 139, the Appellate Division explained that in the event the Fund's Trustees' determination is the result of a tie vote, the reviewing court may not set aside the denial of ADR benefits "unless it can be determined as matter of law on the record that the disability was the natural and proximate result of a service-related accident."

Accordingly, said the court, in the event that there some credible evidence which supports the Medical Board's findings, a court may not substitute its judgment for that of the Medical Board, noting the decision by the Court of Appeals in Borenstein v New York City Employees' Retirement Sys., 88 NY2d 756 on this point.

Notwithstanding the Applicant's contentions to the contrary, the Appellate Division said that the record shows that the Medical Board reviewed all of the relevant evidence, including Applicant's medical records. Further, said the court, the Medical Board conducted three separate evaluations of the Applicant before reaching its final determination that ultimately resulting in her being awarded ODR benefits. 

Finding that there was credible evidence in the record to support the Medical Board's determination, the Appellate Division opined that the Trustees' denial of the ADR benefits sought by the Applicant should not be disturbed, affirming the Supreme Court's ruling in this matter.

Click HERE to access the Appellate Division's decision.

 

The Freedom of Information Law and Collective Bargaining

The basic concept underlying FOIL is that all government documents and records, other than those having access specifically limited by statute,* are available to the public. The custodian of the records or documents requested may elect, but is not required, to withhold those items that otherwise within the ambit of the several exceptions to disclosure permitted by FOIL. In other words, there is no bar to providing information pursuant to a FOIL request, or otherwise, that falls within one or more of the exceptions that the custodian could rely upon in denying a FOIL request, in whole or in part, for the information or records demanded. 

In Uniformed Fire Officers Association et al. v. de Blasio et al., Nos. 20-2789-cv, 20-3177-cv,  the United States Circuit Court of Appeals, Second Circuit, addressed a number of issues arising after the repeal of §50-a of New York State's Civil Rights Law. §50-a had for decades shielded the disciplinary records of sworn law enforcement personnel from public disclosure.

In addition, the Circuit Court noted the following:

1. Citing Matter of M. Farbman & Sons v. N.Y.C. Health and Hosps. Corp., 62 N.Y.2d 75, the Circuit Court noted that with respect to records that must be disclosed under FOIL, a public employer cannot bargain away its FOIL disclosure obligations; and

2. Citing Trump v. Deutsche Bank AG, 943 F.3d 10 627, vacated and remanded on other grounds, 140 S. Ct. 2019, the Circuit Court commented that a federal district court may grant a preliminary injunction where the moving party "demonstrates irreparable harm and meets either of two standards: (a) a likelihood of success on the merits, or (b) sufficiently serious questions going to the merits to make them a fair ground for litigation, and a balance of hardships tipping decidedly in the movant’s favor”. 

* The release of some public records pursuant to a FOIL request may be limited by statute such as Education Law §1127 - Confidentiality of records and §33.13 of the Mental Hygiene Law - Confidentiality of clinical records. 

Click HERE  to access the full text of the decision by the Circuit Court, which opinion, in particular, contains the two observations set out below.

  

 

An employer may rely on its medical expert's opinion if there are conflicting medical opinions as to an applicant's ability to perform the duties of the position

Supreme Court granted the New York City Fire Department's [NYFD] motion to dismiss Plaintiff's CPLR Article 78 petition challenging NYFD's decision disqualifying him for appointment the position of firefighter for medical reasons. Plaintiff's appeal from the Supreme Court's decision was sustained by the Appellate Division, which found that NYFD's decision was not arbitrary and capricious, or without a rational basis.

Citing Matter of Rivers v New York City Dept. of Sanitation, 49 AD3d 436, the court said that the record indicated that Plaintiff "had profound sensorineural hearing loss in his left ear," which, under the standards promulgated by the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA), was grounds to disqualify him from appointment to the position of firefighter

NYFD's physician had considered Plaintiff's medical submissions and letters from his former colleagues, but ultimately determined that his unequal hearing would interfere with his ability to perform search and rescue operations safely, as well as tasks requiring an ability to localize faint sounds in high-noise environments.

NYFD's physician also opined that Plaintiff's hearing loss in his left ear was progressive and would further impair his ability to serve as a firefighter. 

Although Plaintiff's physicians had reached a different conclusion, the Appellate Division said that these different conclusions on the part of Plaintiff's physicians  "does not render [NYFD's] medical examiner's conclusions arbitrary and capricious."

Click HERE to access the Appellate Division's decision.

 

Terminating the services of an employee during a probationary period

In York v McGuire, 63 NY2d 760, the Court of Appeals set out the basic rule concerning the dismissal of probationary employees before the completion of their required probationary period as follows: “After completing his or her minimum period of probation and prior to completing his or her maximum period of probation, a probationary employee can be dismissed without a hearing and without a statement of reasons, as long as there is no proof that the dismissal was done for a constitutionally impermissible purpose, or in violation of statutory or decisional law, or the decision was made in bad faith.”

Such may not the case where the individual is serving a disciplinary probationary period imposed as part of the "settlement of disciplinary charges" filed against the employee by the appointing authority.

Supreme Court had granted Plaintiff's CPLR Article 78 petition seeking [1] to annul a determination by the appointing authority [Employer] terminating Plaintiff from his position and [2] an order reinstating him to his former position with back pay. The Employer appealed the Supreme Court's ruling and the Appellate Division unanimously reversed the lower court's decision "on the law".

Plaintiff had contended that Military Law §243.9* controlled with respect his status as a probationary employee serving a "disciplinary probationary period" in this instance. The Appellate Division disagreed, holding that Plaintiff was not entitled to receive credit towards his "dismissal probationary period" for the time he was absent on military duty pursuant to §243.9 of the Military Law because "the statute is clear on its face that it applies only to probationary periods related to 'any position' to which [an individual] may ... be appointed or promoted."

Contrary to Plaintiff's argument, the Appellate Division opined that §243.9 does not, by its plain terms, apply to the dismissal of an individual serving a "disciplinary probationary period" imposed as part of a negotiated settlement agreement with an employer to resolve disciplinary charges filed against the individual. Further, said the court, "[i]f the legislature had intended the statute to apply more broadly, it would have so provided."

In addition, the Appellate Division's decision notes that "[b]ecause [Plaintiff] remained on dismissal probation at the time he was terminated, a hearing was not required."

Typically an individual serving a disciplinary probationary period may be summarily terminated from employment in the event a term or condition of the disciplinary probation is violated as demonstrated by the decision in Ramos v Coombe, 237 AD2d 713, leave to appeal dismissed 89 NY2d 981. 

In Ramos the Appellate Division held that an employee serving a disciplinary probationary period may be terminated without a hearing for violating the terms of the disciplinary probation.

In contrast, in Taylor v Cass, 122 AD2d 885, an employee won reinstatement with full retroactive salary and contract benefits after the court determined that the employee had been improperly dismissed while serving a "disciplinary probation."

The terms of the employee's probation provided that he could be terminated without any hearing if, in the opinion of his superior, his job performance was “adversely affected” by his intoxication on the job during the next six months. The employee was subsequently terminated without a hearing for “failing to give a fair day’s work” and for “sleeping during his scheduled working hours.” 

The Appellate Division concluded that the employee's dismissal was improper because the employee had not been  terminated for the sole reason specified in the settlement of the disciplinary action: intoxication on the job.

* §243.9 of the Military Law, probationary service, provides as follows: If a public employee or other person enters military duty before the expiration of the probationary period in any position to which he may have theretofore been appointed, or to which he may thereafter be appointed or promoted pursuant to subdivision six of this section, the time he is absent on military duty shall be credited as satisfactory service during such probationary period.  

Click HEREto access the decision of the Appellate Division in the instant case.

 

Municipal audits issued during the week ending February 26, 2021

New York State Comptroller Thomas P. DiNapoli announced the following municipal audits were issued during the week ending February 26, 2021.

Click on the text highlighted in color to access the complete audit report.

MUNICIPAL AUDITS

Danby Fire District – Claims Audit (Tomkins County)The board did not adequately audit claims. They authorized some unallowable claims to be paid prior to the audit. The district made 14 disbursements totaling more than $9,200 that should not have been paid prior to board approval. The district did not follow its credit card usage policy requiring documentation for four credit card purchases totaling almost $1,000.

 

Delhi Joint Fire District – Cash Receipts and Disbursements (Delaware County) The board ensured that $746,000 in cash receipts were properly deposited, recorded and disbursed. However, the board did not adequately audit claims and a cash receipts log was not maintained. The treasurer’s records were not reconciled to ensure that all receipts were deposited. In addition, $4,700 in fees were waived without evidence of board approval.

 

Sea Breeze Fire District – Board Oversight (Monroe County) The board did not provide adequate oversight of the district’s financial operations, nor comply with mandatory training requirements. The board also did not actively manage district assets and ensure the treasurer maintained basic accounting records including adequate bank and debt obligation records. The board failed to comply with legal mandates to perform an annual audit, file financial reports or audit and approve claims. As a result, the board could not effectively monitor the district’s operations and financial condition.

 

Town of Worth – Audit Follow-Up Letter (Jefferson County)Auditors conducted a follow up review of the town’s progress in implementing recommendations from a prior audit on the town’s financial operations. Auditors found little progress had been made. Of the nine audit recommendations, two recommendations were partially implemented and seven recommendations were not implemented.

 

Boosting economic development in a post-pandemic economy

Government Technology, Oracle, and leaders from the city of Vallejo, California, recently hosted a webinar titled How the City of Vallejo Boosted Economic Development in a Post-Pandemic Economy.*

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Standing to submit an appeal pursuant to Education Law §310 to the Commissioner of Education

The first issue considered in this appeal to the Commission of Education concerning the termination of a probationary teacher addressed a procedural matter: persons or entities having standing to file an Education Law §310 appeal for consideration by the Commissioner of Education. 

To the extent the petitioner [Educator] in this Education Law §310 appeal sought to advance claims on behalf of her co-teacher, the Commissioner ruled that such claims must be dismissed for lack of standing. Citing Appeal of Abitbol, 57 Ed Dept Rep, and other decisions of the Commissioner of Education, the Commissioner noted that an individual may not maintain a §310 appeal "unless aggrieved in the sense that he or she has suffered personal damage or injury to his or her civil, personal or property rights."  

In other words, only persons and entities who are directly affected by the act or omission being appealed have standing to bring the appeal. Accordingly, Educator could only ask the Commissioner to consider claims of being "retaliated against and harassed" that she, herself, alleges she had suffered.

Turning to the merits of Educator's appeal, the decision notes that Education Law §2573(1)(a), provides that the New York City Department of Education [DOE] may discontinue the services of a probationary teacher “at any time and for any reason, unless the teacher establishes that the termination was for a constitutionally impermissible purpose, violative of a statute, or done in bad faith.”* Further, in an appeal to the Commissioner the petitioner has the burden of demonstrating a clear legal right to the relief requested and the burden of establishing the facts upon which petitioner seeks relief.

The Commissioner dismissed Educator's appeal, explaining that:

1. Educator had neither alleged nor proven that her discontinuance of probationary employment was for a constitutionally impermissible reason or that it violated any statute; and

2. Although Educator attributed several inappropriate or inflammatory statements to her principal, Educator offered "no proof in support of these contentions beyond her own assertions."

Citing Matter of Hawkins v. Fariña, 171 AD3d 624, the Commissioner opined that Educator "failed to carry her burden of proving that [DOE] discontinued her probationary employment for a constitutionally impermissible purpose, in violation of a statute, or in bad faith.

* See Matter of Frasier v. Board of Educ. of City School Dist. of City of N.Y., 71 NY2d 763.

Click HERE to access this decision of the Commissioner of Education.