Seeking access to materials claimed to be protected by the Attorney-Client Privilege

The term "Attorney-client privilege" is typically applied to the work product of an attorney that may be claimed to be confidential legal communications between a client and the client's attorney's. The privilege is usually asserted by the client's attorney when confronted with a demand for the communication. Additionally, the "privilege" belongs to the client and may not be waived by the attorney absent the client's consent. 

In this appeal the Appellate Division held that the motion court, following an in camera review,* "providently exercised its discretion in directing various communications to be produced by the defendants [Defendants] and delivered to the complainant [Plaintiff]. The court concluded that the Defendants' internal correspondence concerning the item "at the heart of this litigation are not materials uniquely the product of a lawyer's learning and professional skills, such as those reflecting an attorney's legal research, analysis, conclusions, legal theory, or strategy, and are thus not privileged," citing Gottwald v Sebert, 172 AD3d 445.

Additionally, the court explained, emails between the Defendant in this action and an attorney representing a third party "are not privileged as their substance was clearly in connection with the attorney's representation of the third party, whose position at that time was adverse to defendant."

Secondly, opined the Appellate Division, "correspondence between the public relations manager of [a former client of Defendants and the Defendants] was not in furtherance of either parties' legal positions but in response to a disagreement over a Tweet" and "cannot reasonably be characterized as confidential communications made for the purposes of legal advice."

Addressing Defendants' communications demanded by Plaintiff between Defendants and their public relations firm, the court said that such communications did not "reflect a discussion of legal strategy relevant to the pending litigation but, rather, a discussion of a public relations strategy," and thus are not protected by the attorney-client privilege.

* The term “in camera” refers to a closed and private session of a court or some other tribunal. As used here, it refers to the review of the documents in question by the court in his or her chambers, the public being excluded from that proceeding.

Click HEREto access the Appellate Division's ruling.

 

Arbitration award challenged in a CPLR Article 75 proceeding confirmed

The Appellate Division unanimously reversed a Supreme Court's decision granting Plaintiff's petition challenging an arbitration award and remanding the matter for a new hearing before a different arbitrator. The court then reinstated initial arbitrator's determination and penalty imposed "on the law".

The Plaintiff in the instance action was the subject of a prior disciplinary action involving charges of violating his employer's attendance rules. These charges were resolved by a written stipulation and agreement. The stipulation provided that [1] the charges were sustained; [2] that the Plaintiff would accept a "30 day suspension";  [3] agreement constituted a final warning "on time and attendance violations" and [4] the authority of the arbitrator adjudicating "any time and leave violations occurring within eighteen (18) months of the [date of the] stipulation," would be "limited to review of the charged misconduct, which if sustained would result in dismissal."

Prior to the expiration of this 18 month period Plaintiff was charged with [1] failing to report to work for 12 days and [2] abandonment of his position, in violation of his employer's Time and Leave Rules, which require that employees obtain prior approval for all leaves of absence, "except for such emergencies as death in immediate family and other substantiated unforeseeable occurrences."*

At the hearing which followed the Plaintiff testified that he was absent to care for his daughter who is bipolar and had  attempted suicide on previous occasions.

However, the arbitrator found that the documents offered by the Plaintiff in justification of his absences consisted of [1] a note signed by a physician indicating  that the Plaintiff's daughter sought treatment at an urgent care on the dates of Plaintiff's absence; and [2] did not include a diagnosis or any specific supervision or treatment recommendations other than Plaintiff's daughter should "refrain from going to work and school for a certain number of days."

This, said the arbitrator, neither serve to substantiate the level of care Plaintiff's daughter required nor that she needed his constant presence.

The Appellate Division held that under these circumstances, "there was a plausible basis for the arbitrator's finding that Plaintiff's] excuse for his prolonged absence without prior approval was not sufficiently substantiated, despite the challenging circumstances presented by his daughter's mental health."

* Although Plaintiff "called in" to report he would be absent from work each day, he did not obtain prior approval for any of these absences.

Click HEREto access the text of Appellate Division's ruling.

 

A writ of mandamus seeking to compel a public officer to perform a certain act will not be issued if the act is discretionary in nature

Plaintiffs, who are teachers and professional staff employed by a school district [Respondent], commenced this CPLR Article 78 proceeding seeking a writ of mandamus*to compel Respondent to offer courses and sequences in the arts during the school day and equitably throughout the school district "in accordance with regulations promulgated by the New York State Commissioner of Education.

Supreme Court dismissed Plaintiffs' petition and Plaintiffs appealed.

The Appellate Division, noting that a writ of mandamus "is available to compel a governmental entity or officer to perform a ministerial duty, explained that the writ "does not lie to compel an act which involves an exercise of judgment or discretion" and citing Matter of Brusco v Braun, 84 NY2d 674, explained that such a writ is "an extraordinary remedy that is available only in limited circumstances."

In this instance, opined the court, Supreme Court "properly determined that mandamus to compel does not lie" as the regulations relied on by Plaintiffs provide, in relevant part, that a school district "shall offer students the opportunity to complete a three- or five-unit sequence in ... the arts and must provide that opportunity beginning in ninth grade."

In the words of the Appellate Division: "Although the regulations provide that the District must offer students the opportunity for an arts sequence, [Respondent] may exercise discretion in how to do so." The court then explained that "because the actions that [Petitioners] seek to compel are not ministerial in nature but discretionary, mandamus to compel does not apply."

Accordingly, the Appellate Division sustained Supreme Court's ruling.

* A writ of mandamus is one of a number of the ancient “common law” writs and is granted by a court to compel an official to perform acts that such an official is duty-bound to perform. Other such ancients writs include the writ of prohibition, issued by a higher tribunal to a lower tribunal to "prohibit" the adjudication of a matter then pending before the lower tribunal on the grounds that the lower tribunal "lacked jurisdiction"; the writ of "certiorari," compelling a lower court to send its record of a case to the higher tribunal for review by the higher tribunal; and the writ of  “quo warranto,” which requires a person or body to show by what warrant, office or franchise, held, claimed, or exercised, with respect to that individual or entity performing a particular act or omission. New York State's Civil Practice Law and Rules [CPLR] sets out the modern equivalents of the surviving ancient writs.

Click HERE to access the Appellate Division's decision posted on the Internet.

Educator pleads guilty to submitting false time cards

On May 6, 2022, New York State Comptroller Thomas P. DiNapoli and the Onondaga County District Attorney William Fitzpatrick announced that a teacher [Educator] employed in a school district's "after-school program" [The Twilight Program] to assist students in need of support to graduate "on time" plead guilty to corrupting the government in the 3rd Degree, admitting his having submitted submitting false time cards to the school district.*

This investigation was the result of the coordinated efforts of the New York State Comptroller’s Office and the Onondaga County District Attorney’s Office.

“Abuse of public funds should never be tolerated, but is particularly egregious when an educator takes funds meant to improve students’ lives,” said Comptroller DiNapoli.  “I thank District Attorney Fitzpatrick for his continuing partnership in combating public corruption and for holding [Educator] accountable.”

Teachers participating in the district’s Twilight Program receive additional compensation for teaching classes to Twilight participants. As the program coordinator, Educator was in charge of the Twilight teaching schedule and also received additional compensation for his services at Twilight.

From 2016-2018, Educator regularly left his Twilight position early but submitted time cards that inflated the number of hours he had actually worked at Twilight. He also directed certain Twilight teachers to submit false time sheets that reported that  they were at work when they were not. 

Educator was arrested in May of 2021, together with two Twilight teachers. The  cases involving these other Twilight teachers are still pending.

* Educator also agreed to resign from his employment with the school district. 

New York Public Personnel Law Handbooks

The Discipline Book - A concise guide to disciplinary actions involving public officers and employees in New York State set out as an e-book. For more about this electronic handbook, click HERE.

A Reasonable Disciplinary Penalty Under the Circumstances- The text of this publication focuses on determining an appropriate disciplinary penalty to be imposed on an employee in the public service in instances where the employee has been found guilty of misconduct or incompetence. For more information about this e-book click HERE.

 

 

A public retirement system of New York State is required to correct errors made in its administration of retirement benefits

Judgment, Supreme Court, New York County (W. Franc Perry, J.), entered May 11, 2021, denying the petition to annul a determination of respondent Board of Trustees of New York City Employees' Retirement System (NYCERS), which reclassified petitioners from Tier 4 to revised Tier 3/Tier 6 membership, and dismissing the proceeding brought pursuant to CPLR article 78, unanimously affirmed, without costs.

Petitioner in the CPLR Article 78 action were members of various New York State stage and local had left their previous jobs within the various retirement systems and were hired as uniformed sanitation workers by the City of New York after April 1, 2012. These petitioners became sanitation workers and were placed in Tier 4 of the New York City Employees' Retirement System [NYCERS] based on their prior participation in public employee retirement systems.

In 2016, NYCERS determined that it had made an error, and reclassified Petitioners' memberships in NYCERS from the Tier 4 Sanitation 20-Year retirement plan [SA-20] pursuant to Retirement and Social Security Law Article 15 to the revised Tier 3/Tier 6 Sanitation 22-Year retirement plan [SA-22] pursuant to Retirement and Social Security Law Article 14.

The Appellate Division rejected Petitioners' contention that the doctrine of "equitable estoppel" barred NYCERS placing in SA-22. The court explained that NYCER "is mandated by statute to correct errors in administration of retirement benefits," and held that "estoppel may not be invoked to prevent [NYCERS] from reclassifying Petitioners' memberships in SA-22", noting that reading these provisions together determines whether a sanitation worker is subject to the SA-20 or SA-22 plan, based on the date that he or she becomes a sanitation member.

In the words of the Appellate Division, "The legislative history of the amendment supports the conclusion that "new . . . uniformed sanitation . . . members" such as petitioners, who were not sanitation members before April 1, 2012, would be given the "modified Tier 3 police/fire benefits" provided in SA-22."

Further, said the court, "The Retirement and Social Security Law transfer provision, which applies to two of the five individual petitioners, entitles them to credit for prior service. It does not affect the date that they became uniformed sanitation members...."

Finally, opined the Appellate Division, Petitioners' membership reclassification did not violate Article V, §7 of the New York State Constitution which, in pertinent part, provides that "After July first, nineteen hundred forty, membership in any pension or retirement system of the state or of a civil division thereof shall be a contractual relationship, the benefits of which shall not be diminished or impaired", since "petitioners were never entitled to [SA]-20 benefits to begin with and, thus, did not have a contractual right to those benefits."

Click HEREto access the Appellate Division's posted on the Internet.

 

Audits and reports issued by the New York State Comptroller during the week ending May 6, 2022

New York State Comptroller Thomas P. DiNapoli announced the following audits have been issued during the week ending May 6, 2022:

Click on the text highlighted in colorto access the complete audit report.

Municipal Audits

City of Amsterdam – Budget Review (Montgomery County) City officials did not implement all recommendations in the previous budget review letter when preparing the 2022-23 proposed budget. As a result, certain significant revenue and expenditure projections in the 2022-23 proposed budget continue to be unreasonable. 

 

Chenango County Industrial Development Agency – Project Approval and Monitoring (2022M-10)  Although the board evaluated projects prior to approval, it did not adequately establish and document their evaluation and approval process. In addition, the board did not properly monitor the performance of businesses receiving financial benefits. 

 

Town of Dix – Justice Court Operations (Schuyler County) The justices did not ensure all collections were properly collected, recorded, deposited, reported and remitted in a timely and accurate manner, or that all adjudicated cases were reported. They did not provide adequate oversight of the clerk or ensure she was properly trained. Neither the justices nor the clerk prepared monthly accountabilities to ensure that all collections were accurately accounted for, and discrepancies could be promptly identified. As a result, recording and reporting errors occurred, causing the court to owe the Office of the State Comptroller’s Justice Court Fund (JCF) $21,204, victims $1,701 and defendants $439. 

 

Town of North Greenbush – Town Clerk (Rensselaer County) The clerk did not record, deposit, disburse or report all money collected in a timely and accurate manner. As of Dec. 31, 2015, more than $16,000 in cash was collected but not deposited. In 2016, over $13,500 in cash was deposited but not recorded. Remittances to the supervisor were late ranging from one to four months after due. The clerk also did not perform monthly accountabilities to ensure sufficient assets to cover liabilities.  

 

 

Ontario County Four Seasons Development Corporation – Procurement (2021M-197) Corporation officials did not always seek competition or maintain adequate documentation of purchasing processes when procuring goods and services. Auditors reviewed payments totaling $305,033 to nine vendors and found officials made purchases from two vendors totaling $58,375 without seeking competition. Auditors reviewed payments totaling $298,044 to 13 professional services vendors and found officials did not follow a competitive process when selecting two professional service providers, paid a total of $40,253, and did not document the rationale for the process that was followed.

 

Village of Port Jefferson – Justice Court Operations (Suffolk County) The justices did not provide adequate oversight of court operations. As a result, errors and irregularities were found in the court’s records. Bank records provided by the senior court clerk were altered and there was a cash shortage of $2,096. The senior court clerk deposited 12 personal checks totaling $2,096 in place of missing cash and deposited receipts totaling $6,525 into a neighboring village’s bank account and transferred it back two months later without notifying the justices. These findings were referred to outside law enforcement for review.  

 

Village of Sherman – Treasurer’s Cash Receipts (Chautauqua County)  The former treasurer did not record and deposit collections in an accurate manner. The board did not provide adequate oversight of the treasurer and did not annually audit the former treasurer’s records and reports. The former treasurer did not deposit more than $20,000 in recorded real property taxes, water, sewer and general fund receipts collected during the period July 1, 2012, through August 3, 2016. The board and village officials did not establish adequate written policies and procedures over the cash receipt collection process.   

 

Village of Suffern – Budget Review (Rockland County) Auditors found that significant revenue and expenditure estimates in the tentative budget were reasonable, and the village’s tentative budget includes a tax levy of $12,029,454, which is within the limit established by law.

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Track state and local government spending at Open Book New York. Under State Comptroller DiNapoli’s open data initiative, search millions of state and local

An employee cannot be found guilty of disciplinary charges not included in the notice of discipline or a timely amendment to such notice

The employee [Petitioner] was terminated from his position following an investigation conducted by the Inspector General's office into his alleged misconduct and ultimately was served with a notice of disciplinary charges pursuant to Civil Service Law §75. The notice of discipline set out nine charges of purported official misconduct in violation of Penal Law §195.00. Petitioner's answer denied all of the charges and Petitioner requested a hearing.

A §75 disciplinary hearing was held, after which the Hearing Officer recommended dismissal of all of the charges preferred against Petitioner. 

The appointing authority [Director] adopted the Hearing Officer's recommendation to the extent of dismissing all charges except Charge 3. The Director sustained Charge 3 and imposed the penalty of dismissal of Petitioner from his position with the employer. 

Petitioner next commenced a CPLR Article 78  proceeding seeking a court order annulling the Director's determination with respect to Charge 3, contending, among other things, that the Director erred as a matter of law and abused her discretion in finding Petitioner guilty of acts of misconduct that were not alleged in the charge.

Supreme Court transferred the matter to the Appellate Division, which said, "we must annul [the Director's] determination as to [Charge] 3" because it believed that the Petitioner's due process rights were violated.

Charge 2 had alleged that Petitioner had "accosted a particular ... employee with unwanted and inappropriate conversation" while at an after-hours social gathering at a restaurant. The language of Charge 3 addressed Petitioner's behavior toward the same employee at "similar after-hours social functions" as set out in Charge 2.

In addition to denying all of the charges in the notice of discipline, Petitioner requested that the charges be particularized and that he be provided with the names of the employees referred to in the charges. In response to the request for particularization, the employer  served Petitioner with an amended notice of discipline which, among other things, amended Charge 3 to specify that, at these same after-hours social functions, Petitioner inappropriately referred to the employee's sexual orientation but the Charge was "otherwise unchanged."

At the disciplinary hearing, the female employee testified that the conversation described in the amended Charge 3 occurred in the workplace rather than at an "after-hours social function." The Director determined that Charge 3 had proven implicitly and "amended by the testimony of [the female employee] during the hearing." The Appellate Division observed that this "implicit amendment" was first pronounced in the Director's decision, well after the close of proof, for the purpose of conforming the Charge 3 to the proof, which in effect changed the location of Petitioner's alleged misconduct conduct from an after-hours social function to the workplace.

The Appellate Division opined that the Petitioner's due process rights were violated by, in essence, convicting him of uncharged conduct and imposing the severe penalty of termination based on such uncharged conduct. The court noted that the standard of review of such a determination made after a disciplinary hearing is whether it is supported by substantial evidence and the first fundamental of due process is "notice of the charges made." 

This principle, said the court, equally applies to an administrative disciplinary proceeding "for even in that forum no person may lose substantial rights because of wrongdoing shown by the evidence, but not charged," citing Matter of Murrayv Murphy, 24 NY2d 150 and other court decisions. In the words of the court: "Fundamentally, the determination made in a disciplinary proceeding 'must be based on the charges made' and it is error to find a public employee guilty of uncharged specifications of misconduct and impose a penalty thereon."

In some circumstances, however, the Appellate Division noted that amendments of the charges filed against the individual are allowed, calling attention to the fact that "a minor amendment to a charge, made 'part way through [a] hearing, and at a time when [the] petitioner had ample opportunity to respond to the amendment, did not deprive [the petitioner] of due process'."

In contrast, however, the court found that Petitioner was afforded no such opportunity as the amendment was made by the Director in her decision "after the proof was most assuredly closed and the Hearing Officer's determination referred." This was characterized as a "fatal flaw in this argument" as the testimony that was elicited at the hearing essentially amounted to a new charge based on a totally different context: conduct that allegedly took place at an after-hours social functions "was transported to the formal office setting."

Also noted by the court was the fact that the record is void of any request by the employer, "formally or informally, before or during the hearing, to amend the charge to give [Petitioner] notice that the behavior complained of was committed in the workplace."* Further, opined the Appellate Division, "the onus is not upon the employee to make the employer's case for it by objecting when hearing testimony strays from the conduct charged [and the] employee has the right to assume that such testimony will be properly rejected, as the Hearing Officer indicated here."

Accordingly, the Appellate Division found that the portion of the determination sustaining Charge 3 should be annulled.

* The Appellate Division also rejected the employer's argument that the challenged amendment was proper because no objection was made to the "amending" testimony given by the witness at the disciplinary hearing.

Click HERE to access the Appellate Division's posted on the Internet.

New York Public Personnel Law handbooks

The Discipline Book - A concise guide to disciplinary actions involving public officers and employees in New York State set out as an e-book. For more about this electronic handbook, click HERE.

A Reasonable Disciplinary Penalty Under the Circumstances- The text of this publication focuses on determining an appropriate disciplinary penalty to be imposed on an employee in the public service in instances where the employee has been found guilty of misconduct or incompetence. For more information click HERE.

Disability Benefits for fire, police and other public sector personnel - an e-book focusing on retirement for disability under the NYS Employees' Retirement System, the NYS Teachers' Retirement System, General Municipal Law Sections 207-a/207-c and similar statutes providing benefits to employees injured both "on-the-job" and "off-the-job." For more information about this e-book click HERE.

The Layoff, Preferred List and Reinstatement Manual -This e-book reviews the relevant laws, rules and regulations, and selected court and administrative decisions. Click HERE for more information.

 

 

Awarding attorney's fees and costs pursuant to the Freedom of Information Law

In a CPLR Article 78 seeking to compel the production of certain records pursuant to the Freedom of Information Law (Article 6 of the Public Officers Law) and for an award of attorney's fees and litigation costs, Supreme Court denied that branch of the petition that sought such an award, and, in effect, dismissed that portion of the proceeding. Petitioner appealed the Supreme Court's ruling.

Citing Matter of Cook v Nassau County Police Dept., 140 AD3d 1059, the Appellate Division noted that the State Legislature, "[in] order to create a clear deterrent to unreasonable delays and denials of access [and thereby] encourage every unit of government to make a good faith effort to comply with the requirements of FOIL", provided for the assessment of an attorney's fee and other litigation costs in FOIL proceedings.

Reasonable attorney's fees and other litigation costs reasonably incurred by such person "in which such person has substantially prevailed and the court finds that the agency had no reasonable basis for denying access" are typically award such fees pursuant to Public Officers Law §89. Further, a petitioner is deemed to have "substantially prevailed" within the meaning of §89(4)(c) when the commencement of the "CPLR Article 78 proceeding ultimately succeeds in obtaining the records responsive to the FOIL request, whether by court order or by voluntary disclosure."

In this action the Supreme Court denied the Petitioner's request for attorney's fees and litigation costs, finding that Petitioner had not substantially prevailed and that the Respondents "demonstrated a reasonable basis on the ground of privilege for denying the [FOIL] request." 

Petitioner appealed the Supreme Court's ruling and the Appellate Division found that the Petitioner had "substantially prevailed" as the result of initiating an Article 78 action. Reversing the Supreme Court's order that "denied that branch of the petition seeking an award of attorney's fees and litigation costs," the Appellate Division held that such fees and costs should have been granted to the Petitioner. The court then remitted the matter to the Supreme Court "for a determination of the amount of an award of reasonable attorney's fees and litigation costs" to the Petitioner.

The Appellate Division explained the Respondents did not timely respond to the Petitioner's FOIL request and its initial response consisted of four pages of materials that failed to address three of the four enumerated categories of material Petitioner sought. "It was not until after the commencement of this proceeding that the Respondents provided a significant number of additional documents responsive to the [Petitioner's] FOIL request" [emphasis supplied by the Appellate Division in it opinion]. Under the circumstances of this case, said the court, "the [Petitioner] was the 'substantially prevailing' party."

The Appellate Division's decision also opined that the Respondents "did not have a reasonable basis for initially denying the [Petitioner] access to the responsive materials." Although a limited amount of material was reasonably withheld based on attorney-client privilege, the "[Petitioner's] legal action ultimately succeeded in obtaining substantial unredacted post-commencement disclosure responsive to h[is] FOIL request."

Click HEREto access the Appellate Division's decision posted on the Internet.

 

Authority to determine that there is "probable cause" to file disciplinary charges pursuant Education Law §3020-a against an individual

The principal of a New York City Department of Education [DOE] school filed disciplinary charges pursuant to Education Law §3020-a against a tenured teacher [Educator] employed at the school alleging Educator was guilty of "various instances" of incompetence, misconduct, and neglect of duty.

At the §3020-a disciplinary hearing Educator moved to dismiss the disciplinary charges on the ground that they were "defective as they fail to adhere to Education Law §3020-a(2)(a)." Educator relied on the fact that the finding of probable cause to file the disciplinary charges was made by the Educator's school principal rather than by the "employing school board."*

The §3020-a hearing officer (1) denied Educator's motion to dismiss the charges; (2) sustained the charges and specifications alleged by the school principal; and (3) determined that the appropriate penalty to be imposed on the Educator was dismissal from the position. 

Educator appealed the hearing officer's determination pursuant to CPLR Article 75 while DOE moved to dismiss Educator's appeal and to confirm the hearing officer's findings, determination and award.

Supreme Court denied DOE's to dismiss Educator's appeal and ultimately granted Educator's petition, explaining that "DOE's failure to submit the charges against [Educator] to the employing board to determine whether probable cause existed [to go forward with the disciplinary action] constitutes a procedural defect depriving [the] Hearing Officer ... of jurisdiction to consider the charges." In the words of the Supreme Court: "[The] Hearing Officer ...  rejected [Educator's] argument, but this Court does not."* DOE appealed the court's ruling.

CPLR 7511(b) sets grounds for vacating an arbitration award. The Appellate Division said that as relevant here, "[t]he award shall be vacated on the application of a party who ... participated in the arbitration ... if the court finds that the rights of that party were prejudiced by ... an arbitrator" who "exceeded his [or her] power."

Rejecting the argument advanced by Educator, the Appellate Division held that "the absence of a vote on probable cause by the 'employing board' (Education Law §3020-a[2]), did not deprive the hearing officer of the jurisdictional authority to hear and determine the underlying disciplinary charges." Rather, as the hearing officer determined, the Chancellor was vested with the authority "[t]o exercise all of the duties and responsibilities of the employing board as set forth in [Education Law §3020-a]."

Further, the Appellate Division determined that "Supreme Court erred to the extent that it concluded, in effect, as an alternative ground for its determination in the order ... that the DOE was required to submit evidence to prove that the Chancellor actually delegated the relevant authority to the principal of [Educator's] school. That issue was not raised before the hearing officer in [Educator's] motion to dismiss, was not asserted in the petition, and was not properly before the Supreme Court."

Under the circumstances, the Appellate Division concluded that "in the absence of any cognizable basis for relief asserted in [Educator's] petition [Supreme Court] should have granted the DOE's motion pursuant to CPLR 404(a) and 3211(a)(7) to dismiss the petition and, pursuant to CPLR 7511(e), to confirm the arbitration award."

* The Appellate Division's decision notes that the hearing officer concluded that a probable cause determination need not be made after a vote by the employing board on probable cause and §2590-h of the Education Law provides the Chancellor of the DOE with "the statutory authority to make a probable cause determination, and to delegate that authority to subordinate individuals within the DOE, including, as relevant here, to the principal of a school."

Click HERE to access the Appellate Division's decision.

 

Employee's complaint alleging constructive dismissal and violation of the Freedom of Information Law dismissed

Plaintiff was employed by the New York City Department of Transportation [DOT] in 1997. In 2014 he resigned from his position and in 2017 commenced this action alleging that [1] he had been constructively discharged from his employment by DOT as the result of his reporting "other employees' misconduct," and [2] that the City of New York had failed to respond to his request to disclose certain records in violation of New York State's Freedom of Information Law [FOIL].

Supreme Court denied DOT's motion to dismiss Plaintiff's causes of action and DOT appealed. The Appellate Division reversed the lower court's order "on the law."

Addressing Plaintiff's complaint alleging constructive dismissal, the Appellate Division, citing Golston-Green v City of New York, 184 AD3d 24, explained that an "employee is constructively discharged when her or his employer, rather than discharging the plaintiff directly, deliberately created working conditions so intolerable that a reasonable person in the plaintiff's position would have felt compelled to resign."

Here, however, the Appellate Division, "accepting the facts as alleged to be true, and according the [Plaintiff] the benefit of every possible favorable inference," opined that Plaintiff's complaint "fails to state a cause of action alleging constructive discharge, as the allegations are either vague and conclusory" or involve events that allegedly occurred after the Plaintiff had resigned from DOT.

Addressing Plaintiff's complaints contending that New York City had violated FOIL, the Appellate Division said that a person alleging the denial of requested information within the meaning of Public Officers Law §89(4)(a), "must appeal the denial in writing to the head of the entity or other designated person within 30 days." Finding that Plaintiff did not submit an appeal within 30 days of the alleged denial, the Appellate Division said that Plaintiff had "failed to exhaust his administrative remedies" and because of this failure "could not resort to a judicial forum to gain relief."

Accordingly, the Appellate Division held that Supreme Court should have granted those branches of the City's motion seeking dismissal of Plaintiff's causes of action to recover damages for constructive discharge and to compel disclosure of certain records pursuant to FOIL.

Click HEREto access the Appellate Division's decision posted on the Internet.

Negligent hiring and, or, retention of employees

One of the issues considered by the Appellate Division in this action was the Plaintiff's allegation that the employer was negligent in its appointment and retention of certain employees.

A majority of the court, Judge Friedman dissenting in part in a separate Opinion, sustained this branch of Plaintiff's cause of action, noting:

1. "A cause of action for negligent hiring and retention requires allegations that an employer knew of its employee's harmful propensities, that it failed to take necessary action, and that this failure caused damage to others;

2. "The cause of action does not need to be pleaded with specificity; and  

3. "Liability for negligent hiring and retention does not require a special relationship between the defendant and the alleged victim."

Further, opined the Appellate Division, "[l]iability for negligent hiring and retention is not limited to employees' actions within their scope of employment," explaining it obtains where the employer's negligence is a proximate cause of a plaintiff's injury.

Click HEREto access the Appellate Division's opinion.

Interested in becoming a New York City police officer?

Below are some of the titles of articles recently posted by Kevin P. Sheerin, Esq. on his Law Blog, Civil Service Disqualification Appeals Attorney.

NYPD Hiring Process

How to Become a NYPD Police Officer

Can I become a NYPD Police Officer without a HS diploma?

Appealing a NYPD Psychological Disqualification

NYPD Psychological Disqualification – Second Interview

Click the title highlighted in COLOR above to access the articles of interest.