A court's review of a college’s or university’s disciplinary action against a student limited to whether it complied with its own rules in the process

A court's review of a college’s or university’s disciplinary action against a student limited to whether it complied with its own rules in the process
Matter of Hyman v Cornell Univ., 2011 NY Slip Op 01548, Appellate Division, Third Department

A Cornell faculty member alleged that a graduate student exchanged a series of e-mails. The faculty member told the student she should not contact him after the student suggested that they have a sexual affair.

When the student continued to send the faculty member e-mails, he told her that he that he would take formal action against petitioner if she persisted in communicating with him. Although the student agreed to discontinue communication, she subsequently e-mailed Cornell’s president, copying the faculty member, alleging that her "institutional rights" had been repeatedly violated by Department faculty.

The faculty member instituted proceedings against the graduate student and ultimately filed a complaint accusing her of harassment in violation of Cornell’s Code of Conduct.*

The graduate student than filed a complaint against the faculty member, accusing him of sexual harassment and retaliation. Ultimately the Cornell’s Hearing Board sent the student a written reprimand and issued a “no-contact order.”

The student sued, but Supreme Court dismissed her Article 78 petition. Subsequently the Appellate Division dismissed the student’s appeal of the Supreme Court’s ruling, stating that:

It is well settled that in reviewing a college’s or university's disciplinary determinations, "court[s] must determine 'whether the university substantially adhered to its own published rules and guidelines for disciplinary proceedings," citing Matter of Warner v Elmira Coll., 59 AD3d 909.

The court explained that only in the event the college or university “has not substantially complied with its own guidelines or its determination is not rationally based upon the evidence, the determination will be annulled as arbitrary and capricious.”

* Cornell’s Code of Conduct makes it a violation "[t]o intentionally harass another person by . . . acting toward that person in a manner [that] is . . . severely annoying . . . and beyond the scope of free speech."

The decision is posted on the Internet at:
http://www.courts.state.ny.us/reporter/3dseries/2011/2011_01548.htm
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Freedom of information and speech

Freedom of information and speech
Informal Opinions of the Attorney General: 2000-2

The basic principle underlying New York State’s Freedom of Information Law [FOIL] is that all public documents are subject to disclosure upon request unless such disclosure is specifically prohibited by law.

For example, the State’s Public Health Law, Mental Hygiene Law and Education Law prohibit the disclosure of certain documents or information to the public without specific authorization by a court.

FOIL, however, also lists a number of exemptions that authorizes, but does not require, the custodian of the document to withhold particular information or documents if, as a matter of discretion, it elects to do so. Similarly, the State’s Open Meetings Law requires that the public be allowed to attend all meetings held by a public entity, although the public may be excluded from executive sessions held by the entity.

Executive sessions may be held for limited purposes, however. These include sessions in which the body will discuss items that would imperil public safety if disclosed; result in the identification of law enforcement personnel or police informants; concern matters involving criminal investigations; discussions concerning pending legislation or Taylor Law negotiations; personnel matters involving a particular individual; certain economic issues and matters concerning examinations and tests.

Although discussions of matters considered in executive session may be withheld even if they are recorded, both FOIL and the Open Meetings Law require that any formal vote taken during an executive session be made a public record subject to FOIL together with a record of how each member of the body voted.

May a local legislative body adopt a resolution prohibiting a member of that body from disclosing matters discussed in an executive session held by that body? This was the question presented to the Attorney General by Gregory J. Amoroso, the City of Rome’s corporation counsel.

In response, the Attorney General noted the parallels between the exceptions allowed under FOIL and the purposes for which a public body may go into an executive session from which the public is barred. His conclusion:

A governing body of a municipality may withhold any records of discussions properly taking place during an executive session and, further, it may prohibit its members from revealing the content of such discussions to the public.

However, cautioned the Attorney General, while the decision to go into executive session is a matter of properly exercising discretion and nothing in either FOIL or the Open Meetings Law prohibits the barring of the disclosure the nature of the discussions conducted in executive session by a participant, all such prohibitions are subject to federal and state freedom of speech requirements.

The clear implication here: neither FOIL nor the Open Meetings Law will serve as a shield in the event a court determines that a limitation placed on revealing matters considered in executive session violates the individual’s constitutional right to free speech. Courts have typically found that limitations placed on a public officer or employee with respect to his or her disclosing matters of public interest violates the individual’s right of free speech.

In contrast, prohibiting an individual from publicly discussing subjects or governmental decisions or actions involving matters of a personal interest rather than a public interest does not violate the individual’s constitutionally protected right of free speech. As the U.S. Supreme Court indicated in Connick v Myers, 461 US 138, constitutional free speech rights are not implicated when only matters of a personal interest to the individual, in contrast to matters of public concern, are involved.
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Vacating or modifying an arbitrator’s award

Vacating or modifying an arbitrator’s award
Matter of Westchester County Correction Officers Benevolent Assn., Inc. v County of Westchester, 2011 NY Slip Op 01482, Appellate Division, Second Department

Article 75 of the Civil Practice Rules provides that an arbitration award may be vacated by the courts upon a finding of:

a. Corruption, fraud or misconduct in obtaining the award; or

b. Partiality of the arbitrator, unless the award was by "confession;" or

c. The arbitrator exceed his or her authority or so imperfectly executed his or her power that no award as to the subject matter submitted was made; or

d. There was a failure to follow the procedures set out in Article 75.

An arbitrator's award may be modified only if there was a miscalculation of numbers or a mistake in the description of a person or thing; an award was made regarding some matter not submitted to the arbitrator for arbitration; or the award was "imperfect as to form" but not involving the merits of the controversy.

The Westchester case involved a proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 75 to vacate an arbitration award. The Appellate Division set out the following guidelines with respect to judicial review of an arbitration award:

1. Judicial review of arbitration awards is extremely limited.

2. An arbitration award must be upheld when the arbitrator offer[s] even a barely colorable justification for the outcome reached.

3. An arbitrator's award should not be vacated for errors of law and fact committed by the arbitrator.

4. Courts should not assume the role of overseers to mold the award to conform to their sense of justice.

In this instance the court held that party seeking to vacate the arbitrator’s award “failed to meet its burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that the arbitrator committed misconduct, and that such misconduct prejudiced its rights or the integrity of the arbitration process.”

Further, said the Appellate Division, an arbitrator exceeds his or her power within the meaning of CPLR §7511(b)(1)(iii) "only where the arbitrator's award violates a strong public policy, is irrational or clearly exceeds a specifically enumerated limitation on the arbitrator's power."

The decision is posted on the Internet at:
http://www.courts.state.ny.us/reporter/3dseries/2011/2011_01482.htm
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Administrative law judge denies employee’s attempt to convert a disciplinary hearing into a “disability proceeding”

Administrative law judge denies employee’s attempt to convert a disciplinary hearing into a “disability proceeding”
NYC Human Resources Administration v Krisilas, OATH Index #931/11

A clerical associate was charged with sleeping on duty, absence without leave, excessive lateness, and discourtesy to a supervisor. The employee’s attorney moved to dismiss the disciplinary charges and convert the matter to a disability proceeding, claiming his client suffered from a disability.

OATH Administrative Law Judge Ingrid Addison denied the motion, ruling that an employer's duty to accommodate an employee's disability is triggered by the employee's request for accommodation and is limited to disabilities known by the employer.

Here, said Judge Addison, the employee never told the agency he suffered from a disability for which he needed accommodation. Nor, said the judge, did the evidence establish that the employee's misconduct was caused by a disability.

The ALJ held that the disciplinary charges were proven in the course of the disciplinary hearing and recommended that the individual be terminated from his position.

The decision is posted on the Internet at:
http://archive.citylaw.org/oath/11_Cases/11-931.pdf
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State Labor Department has proposed to incorporate by reference updates to OSHA standards into the State’s Public Employee OSHA regulations

State Labor Department has proposed to incorporate by reference updates to OSHA standards into the State’s Public Employee OSHA regulations
Source: New York State Register, March 2, 2011

On March 2, 2011 the State Register published a notice that the State Labor Department has proposed to incorporate by reference updates to OSHA standards into the State Public Employee Occupational Safety and Health Standards by amending its regulations. [See 12 NYCRR §800.3.]

The Department states that the amendment is necessary because Section 27-a(4)(a) of the Labor Law directs the Commissioner to adopt by rule, for the protection of the safety and health of public employees, all safety and health standards promulgated under the U.S. Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, and to promulgate and repeal such rules and regulations as may be necessary to conform to the standards established pursuant to that Act. This, says the Department, insures that public employees will be afforded the same safeguards in their workplaces as are granted to employees in the private sector.

The text of proposed rule and any required statements and analyses may be obtained from Michael Paglialonga, New York State Department of Labor, State Office Campus, Building 12, Room 509, Albany, NY 12240, (518) 457-1938, email: michael.paglialonga@labor.ny.gov

Data, views or arguments may be submitted to Mr. Paglialonga.

Public comment will be received until 45 days after publication of this notice.
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Settling a disciplinary action by agreeing to disciplinary probation

Settling a disciplinary action by agreeing to disciplinary probation
Matter of Campbell v State of New York, 37 AD3d 993

The New York State Office of Mental Health [OMH] filed disciplinary charges against Monica A. Campbell. Instead of proceeding with a disciplinary hearing, Campbell and her union, New York State Correctional Officers and Police Benevolent Association [PBA] “settled” the matter by agreeing to have Campbell serve a “one-year disciplinary probationary period.”

The settlement agreement provided that:

Should Ms. Campbell commit any actions or omissions during this one-year period “which rise to the level of misconduct and/or incompetence” she will be terminated from [s]tate service without recourse to Article 8 [of the collective bargaining agreement].

The disciplinary grievance procedure set out in Article 8 provided for arbitration as the final step in a disciplinary action.

Ultimately OMH determined that Campbell was guilty misconduct while in “disciplinary probationary status” and terminated her employment. PBA appealed her termination and demanded arbitration. OMH refused to submit its decision to terminate Campbell to arbitration, contending that arbitration was not available under the terms of the disciplinary settlement agreement. PBA filed a petition pursuant to CPLR Section 7503 seeking a court order compelling arbitration.

Supreme Court found that the disciplinary settlement agreement did not exclude arbitration of the question of whether Campbell was guilty of misconduct and ordered arbitration. OMH appealed.

As the Appellate Division’s decision notes, it is well settled that a right to arbitration, like contract rights generally, may be waived or abandoned. The issue here, said the court, was whether the disciplinary settlement agreement entered into by the parties constituted a waiver of PBA’s right to submit Campbell’s dismissal to arbitration.

According to the record, the settlement agreement initially made Campbell a probationary employee for one year. This language, however, was amended at the request of PBA’s attorney and the phrase “disciplinary evaluation period” [DEP] was substituted in its place in order to “avoid impairment of Campbell's seniority and layoff rights.”

Noting that paragraph 9 of the PBA’s petition seeking to compel arbitration itself confirm that the parties understood that the DEP would be a probationary period, the Appellate Division said that “This clear meaning and understanding of the parties is in complete harmony with the meaning and use of DEPs in similar reported cases,” citing Matter of Miller v Coughlin, 59 NY2d 490, 493; and Matter of McGough v State of New York, 243 AD2d 983, 983-984 [1997], lv denied 91 NY2d 807, among others.

The court said the disciplinary settlement agreement specified the party that would determine whether there was subsequent misconduct by Campbell, – i.e., OMH. Accordingly, said the Appellate Division, Campbell’s sole remedy was to challenge OMH’s determination that resulted in her termination pursuant to CPLR Article 78.

The decision is posted on the Internet at:
http://nypublicpersonnellawarchives.blogspot.com/2007/02/disciplinary-probation.html

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The Discipline Book, - a concise guide to disciplinary actions involving public employees in New York State is a 1272 page e-book available from the Public Employment Law Press. Click on http://thedisciplinebook.blogspot.com/ for additional information concerning this electronic reference manual.
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Analyzing out-of-title work grievances determinations

Analyzing out-of-title work grievances determinations
Steen v Governor’s Office of Employee Relations, 271 AD2d 738

Resolving out-of-title work disputes is not something courts typically do.

As the Appellate Division, citing Cove v Sise, 71 NY2d 910, noted in deciding the Steen case: “it is well settled that [a]dministrative determinations concerning position classifications are ... subject to only limited judicial review, and will not be disturbed in the absence of a showing that they are wholly arbitrary or without any rational basis."

But, said the court, where, as here, the record lacks any rational basis upon which to conclude that petitioners are not doing out-of-title work courts will intervene.

In Steen v GOER, the Appellate Division overturned a determination by the Governor’s Office of Employee Relations because it found that in this instance the comparison of petitioners’ duties with the duties of a Treatment Team Leader is inapposite -- i.e., it was neither appropriate nor pertinent to do so.

Why? Because, said the court, [a]n employee need not be assigned the full range of duties of a higher salary grade to be performing out-of-title work. The Appellate Division pointed to Collins v GOER, and Kuppinger v GOER, 203 AD2d 664, as support for its ruling.

Nancy Steen had filed a grievance claiming that she and a number of co-workers were being required to perform out-of-title duties and asked that their positions be reclassified and reallocated to higher-grade positions in recognition of their assignments. After the grievance was denied at all steps of the grievance procedure, she sued.

Steen contended that she and her co-grievants were appointed to positions of Recreation Workers, SG-14, Recreation Therapists, SG-14 or Senior Recreation Therapists, (Filed Mar. 29, 2000.) SG-17 by Pilgrim State Hospital. Following Pilgrim’s instituting a new program known as the Buffalo Model, Steen contended that she and the other employees were given an in-house designation of Treatment Plan Coordinators and were assigned a specific number of patients. Steen’s basic claim: the creation of the in-house title Treatment Plan Coordinators was a subterfuge allowing Pilgrim to assign out-of-title work to them and that their new duties were consistent with the duties of a Treatment Team Leader, SG 25.

According to the Appellate Division, as Treatment Plan Coordinators, each petitioner was responsible for transcribing information from the patient’s chart to a treatment plan worksheet and also interviewing each patient and entering the information from the interview in the second section of the worksheet.

Thereafter, the treatment team met and developed the treatment plan. Steen and her co-workers were then required to conduct a review with respect to each patient after 90 days to evaluate the progress of each patient with respect to the goals and objectives in the plan devised from the worksheets.

The court’s conclusion: [t]he focus of the review should have been whether the duties are appropriate to petitioners’ titles.

Noting that the reviewing officer recognized that the duties at issue are not contained verbatim in the classification standard but concluded they were a logical extension of the responsibility of professional or para-professional members of the treatment team, the court annulled GOER’s ruling denying Steen’s grievance.

Finding that there was no support for the reviewing officer’s conclusion in the record, the Appellate Division decided that the determination did not have a rational basis.

Further, the court specifically commented that a review of a patient’s entire chart containing information from each discipline represented by the team and the interview of the patient is simply not a logical extension of petitioners’ responsibilities to fill out forms and reports concerning patients in their recreational programs.
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Governor Cuomo proposes legislation providing for a statewide, objective teacher evaluation system, based on both performance and seniority

Governor Cuomo proposes legislation providing for a statewide, objective teacher evaluation system, based on both performance and seniority
Source: Office of the Governor

On March 2, 2011, Governor Andrew M. Cuomo announced that he will be submitting a program bill that would expedite and expand ongoing plans to implement a statewide, objective teacher evaluation system, based on both performance and seniority, for school districts to use when making employment decisions.

The Governor noted that both the State Senate and the State Assembly have acknowledged that the New York State must move forward on improving performance in the classroom as well as improving teacher evaluations. The real question, said the Governor, is what is the alternative to "last in, first out," the current statutory standard used in layoff situations involving personnel in both the classified service and the unclassified service.

The Governor said that the current so-called "last in, first out" policy “lacks objectivity by maintaining teachers simply based on years of service without factoring in classroom effectiveness, performance, or need.”

"It is time to move beyond the so-called 'last in, first out' system of relying exclusively on seniority," Governor Cuomo said. "However, we need a legitimate evaluation system to rely upon. This will help make a statewide evaluation system ready and allow us to replace 'last in, first out.'"

According to the Governor, his proposed program bill would "accelerate the new standards to cover all grades and subjects for the 2011-2012 school year." In addition, the Governor said that his bill would set clear standards and enhanced transparency requirements, including the posting of guidelines on all school districts' Web sites. Parameters of the new teacher evaluation system include a new rating system including "highly effective," "effective," "developing," or "ineffective."

The Governor’s announcement also states that the evaluations will also play a significant role in a wide array of employment decisions, including professional development, tenure determinations, selection for leadership opportunities, and termination. Teachers and principals with a pattern of ineffective teaching or performance could be charged with incompetence and considered for termination through an expedited hearing process.

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The Layoff, Preferred List and Reinstatement Manual - a 645 page e-book reviewing the current relevant laws, rules and regulations, and selected court and administrative decisions is available from the Public Employment Law Press. Click On http://nylayoff.blogspot.com/ for additional information about this electronic reference manual.
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Unfunded Mandate Relief [revised summary]

Unfunded Mandate Relief [revised summary]
Sources: NYSBA Municipal Law Section, Special Committee on Mandate Relief; Office of the Governor

On February 28, 2011 the New York State Bar Association’s Municipal Law Section’s Special Committee on Mandate Relief sent its comments* concerning the need for relief of certain mandates imposed on political subdivisions of the State, i.e., counties, cities, towns, villages and school districts, to the Governor’s Office.

The Governor’s Office reports that on March 2, 2011 Governor Cuomo accepted a preliminary report issued by the Mandate Relief Redesign Team** on ways to curb the proliferation of unfunded and underfunded mandates.

The Special Committee said that:

“Municipal officials have long been managing mandates handed down by the state government, whether the mandate is funded, under-funded or unfunded.1 As there is no uniformly accepted definition of what constitutes an “unfunded mandate,” there is no recognized, comprehensive inventory of the unfunded mandates that are placed on municipalities. Nevertheless, there are a number of laws and regulations that are universally recognized as such due to their prevalence and associated costs on municipal affairs.

“Some require that certain services or programs be offered to the public by the municipality for the benefit of the public at large. Others establish procedural or administrative parameters within which a municipality must operate, but do not provide any identifiable benefit to the municipality or the public at large. Often, this latter mandate category is designed to promote a legislatively determined public policy of the state, benefiting a narrow class of individuals, at the cost of the municipality. It is from this latter category of mandate that the need for fiscal relief is greatest”.

Noting that its comments “are not intended to question the validity or wisdom of the various public policies underlying mandates; rather, these comments are intended to identify those mandates that have the greatest impact on municipal expenses and to highlight the inequity of having municipalities bear the financial burden of carrying out these policies.”

The Special Committee addressed the following issues:

Disability Benefits for Law Enforcement and Firefighters (GML §§ 207-c; 207-a)

Public Pensions

Wicks Law (Gen. Mun. Law 101)

Prevailing Wage (Labor Law § 220)

Triborough Amendment to the Taylor Law [Civil Service Law § 209-a.1(e)]


The Mandate Relief Redesign Team details findings in three key areas.

First, its report addresses reform and redesign the current system to stop the proliferation of unfunded mandates by:

1. Prohibiting New Unfunded Mandates: Permanently fix the problem of unfunded mandates by advancing a state law and eventual constitutional amendment prohibiting any new state mandate (with very limited exceptions) on local governments or school districts unless the state fully funds the mandate or the local entity votes to comply with the mandate;

2. Requiring Independent Cost Analysis of Mandates: Strengthen the currently ineffective fiscal impact statement process by requiring legislative fiscal committees to determine the need for and prepare such statements. This would involve codifying Executive Order 17's fiscal impact statement methodology and local government consultation requirements and making the reports available to the public; and

3. Enforcing Limits on Unfunded Mandates: Using existing resources, establish an Office of Mandate Reform to act as a clearinghouse that will work with local governments and state agencies to address unfunded mandates.

Second, its report addresses cost-drivers to provide meaningful mandate relief by:

1. Creating a Pension Tier 6: A new Tier will help municipalities and school districts address rapidly escalating pension costs; and

2. Avoiding the Wicks Requirement by Removing Barriers to Project Labor Agreements: In order to reduce the costs that localities and schools face due to Wicks, ease the burdens associated with project labor agreements (PLA) by eliminating the study requirement and developing regionally-negotiated PLA templates that together can reduce the costs of public works projects by 15 percent or more.

Third, its report addresses the current unsustainable burden of state mandates by:

1. Giving Local Governments Greater Flexibility to Administer Existing Mandates: The State Administrative Procedure Act (“SAPA”) §204-a should be streamlined and expanded to allow localities to propose alternatives to current regulations and to request waivers of regulations; and

2. Conducting a Comprehensive Review of All State Mandates: Conduct a full agency review and accounting of state and regulatory mandates that burden school districts and local governments.

* A complimentary copy of the Special Committee’s report is available from NYPPL. E-mail your request to publications@nycap.rr.com

** The Mandate Relief Redesign Team report is posted at: http://governor.ny.gov/assets/documents/finalmandate.pdf .
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Hearing officer recommends termination of Emergency Medical Technician who made a false report after responding to a 911 call

Hearing officer recommends termination of Emergency Medical Technician who made a false report after responding to a 911 call
NYC Fire Department v Prosper, OATH Index #192/11

OATH Administrative Law Judge John Spooner found that an emergency medical technician failed to follow protocol and made false reports when he responded to a 911 call from an elderly man who reported difficulty breathing.

The EMT and his partner arrived at the patient's apartment and argued with the patient about which hospital to go to. The patient, however, refused treatment and the EMTs returned to the ambulance.

Rather than calling a supervisor for help, as required, the EMTs reported “10-90” or unfounded, to the dispatcher.

Believing that there had been no contact with the patient, the dispatcher sent firefighters to gain entry to the apartment. In the meantime, the patient came downstairs and told the EMTs that he was taking a bus to the hospital. The EMT gave firefighters no information about the patient and they entered the empty apartment by breaking the door lock

The decision is posted on the Internet at:
http://archive.citylaw.org/oath/10_Cases/10-2885.pdf

Employer held liable under the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act for adverse action taken against an individual by supervisor

Employer held liable under the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act for adverse action taken against an individual by supervisor
Vincent E. Staub, Petitioner v. Proctor Hospital , USSC, No. 09-400, [March 1, 2011]

While employed by Proctor Hospital, Vincent Staub served as a member of the United States Army Reserve. As such, he was required to attend drills one weekend per month and to train full time for two to three weeks a year.

Both Janice Mulally, Staub's immediate supervisor, and Michael Korenchuk, Mulally's supervisor, were hostile to Staub's military obligations. Mulally scheduled Staub for additional shifts without notice so that he would " 'pa[y] back the department for everyone else having to bend over backwards to cover [his] schedule for the Reserves.’"

Mulally also informed Staub's co-worker, Leslie Sweborg, that Staub's "military duty had been a strain on th[e] department," and asked Sweborg to help her "get rid of him". Korenchuk referred to Staub's military obligations as "a b[u]nch of smoking and joking and [a] waste of taxpayers['] money”' "He was also aware that Mulally was "out to get" Staub.

The Supreme Court held that “if a supervisor performs an act motivated by antimilitary animus that is intended by the supervisor to cause an adverse employment action, and if that act is a proximate cause of the ultimate [adverse] employment action, then the employer is liable under USERRA [Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act of 1994].”
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Removal from the payroll

Removal from the payroll
Kahn v SUNY Health Science Center, 271 AD2d 656

The employer tells the employee that he or she is off the payroll. The employee sues, seeking a court order barring this action pending the trial challenging his or her termination on the ground that he or she would suffer irreparable harm if the injunction were not issued because:

(1) If he or she were removed from the payroll he or she would have no one to support him;

(2) He or she he would be unable to live in the New York metropolitan area; and

(3) He or she would be unable to prosecute the lawsuit challenging the termination.

These were the claims made by Mahmood Khan when the State University of New York Health Science told him it was removing him from his faculty position with the university. Although a State Supreme Court judge issued granted the injunction, the Appellate Division, reversed the lower court and vacated the order.

The standards for granting a preliminary injunction are such situations are clear. The party seeking the order must show that:

(1) He or she is likely to succeed on the merits;

(2) He or she would suffer irreparable injury if the provisional relief is withheld; and

(3) A balancing of the equities weighing in favor of the moving party.

The Appellate Division, assuming that Kahn had indeed made an adequate showing of merit and that the equities balance in his favor, said that he failed to establish irreparable injury, the third element he was required to demonstrate. According to the court, Khan’s contentions were wholly speculative and conclusory, and, therefore, are insufficient to satisfy the burden of demonstrating irreparable injury.

Kahn also argued that if he were to be out of work for an extended period, he would have to return to Australia and would never be able to obtain United States citizenship. As he had not raised this argument before the Supreme Court, the Appellate Division said he was precluded from raising it in the appeal because absent matters that may be judicially noticed, new facts may not be injected at the appellate level.
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Governor Cuomo to propose school superintendent salary cap

Governor Cuomo to propose school superintendent salary cap
Source: Office of the Governor

On February 28, 2011, Governor Andrew M. Cuomo announced that he will submit a program bill to cap the salaries of school superintendents across the state. The cap would be based upon student enrollment and if approved would save a combined $15 million.

The cap would impose salary limits as follows:

if 250 or fewer pupils, $125,000
if 251 to 750 pupils, $135,000
if 751 to 1,500 pupils, $145,000
if 1,501 to 3,000 pupils, $155,000
if 3,001to 6,500 pupils, $165,000
if 6,501 or more pupils, $175,000

The cap will apply only to school superintendents and will be applied prospectively as contracts expire. Local communities will have the ability to vote on overriding the salary cap, limited only to specific contracts. These votes will be held during normal school budget votes.

According to the Governor’s Office, currently, 223, or 33 percent of school district superintendents earn more than $175,000.

There is already a salary cap in place for BOCES district superintendents. The BOCES cap sets a single flat salary level ($166,572).

The Governor's press release is posted on the Internet at:
http://governor.ny.gov/press/salarycap
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Denial of tenure – election of an alternate procedure challenging the board's decision

Denial of tenure – election of an alternate procedure challenging the board's decision
Spadone and Lackawanna CSD, Decision of the Comm. of Education, 14,337

The Commissioner of Education dismissed the appeal filed by Anne G. Spadone challenging the Lackawanna City School Board’s action denying her tenure. Spadone had also filed a contract grievance and an Article 78 protesting the board’s failure to grant her tenure.


Spadone had been appointed as a business teacher subject to a two-year probationary period.* The superintendent recommended that the school board grant Spadone tenure at the end of her probationary period.

The resolution to grant Spadone tenure was considered by the school board. The vote: three votes for tenure, two votes against tenure, one abstention. One board member was absent from the meeting. Accordingly, a majority of the board had not approved the resolution.**

The superintendent wrote a letter to Spadone advising her of the board’s action but noted that vote was advisory within the meaning of Section 3031(b) of the Education Law and that the board would take final action at its July 22 meeting. Spadone, however, fared no better at the July meeting: three board members voted to grant her tenure; three voted to deny her tenure; one board member abstained.

Spadone contended that the votes of at least four board members are necessary to take any action and that [the board] could not ‘override’ the superintendent’s recommendation with fewer than four votes. The board, on the other hand, claimed that an affirmative vote of the majority of the board was necessary to grant tenure.

Spadone also argued that (1) she had attained tenure by estoppel and (2) board failed to meet the deadlines set out in Section 3031 of the Education Law. The board contended Spadone had not been continued in service beyond her probationary period and thus did not attain tenure by estoppel. As to it satisfying the time requirements of Section 3031, the board claimed any such failure on its part was harmless error.

The Commissioner first addressed the technical issue of his jurisdiction to consider Spadone’s appeal. He concluded that he did not have jurisdiction because Spadone had commenced a grievance challenging her being denied tenure. Spadone, said the Commissioner, had elected her remedy and it would be contrary to the orderly administration of justice to have multiple tribunals making determinations concerning the same controversy.

Having said this, the Commissioner commented that even if Spadone’s appeal were not dismissed on jurisdictional grounds, it would have been dismissed on the merits. Why? Because, the Commissioner explained, a board of education has broad discretion in granting or denying tenure and need not accept the recommendation of the superintendent to grant tenure.

Section 2509(2)’s clear language states that a majority vote of a school board for tenure is required to grant a probationary teacher tenure. The Commissioner said that Spadone had not advanced any compelling argument that supported her theory that a majority voting against tenure was required to deny her tenure in the district.

The Commissioner agreed with the board that considering the relevant facts in this case, its failure to fully comply with the 30-day notice requirements set out in Section 3031 was harmless error and, in any event, reinstatement is not the proper remedy for a violation of Section 3031.

* As Spadone had held tenure as a teacher prior to her appointment by Lackawanna, she was given two-year rather than a three-year probationary period in accordance with Section 2509(1) of the Education Law.

** As New York State School Board General Counsel, Jay Worona, observed, “Under New York State law, a quorum is a simple majority of [more than half] the total number of board members, not merely those present. Mr. Worona provides the following example: “If a board has five members and three are present at a meeting, all three would have to vote in favor of a resolution for it to pass, a 2 to 1 vote would not be sufficient.”
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Compelling reason for absence does not excuse misconduct

Compelling reason for absence does not excuse misconduct
Source: Adjunct Law Prof Blog; http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/adjunctprofs/
Reproduced with permission. Copyright © 2011, Mitchell H. Rubinstein, Esq., Adjunct Professor of Law, St. Johns Law School and New York Law School, All rights reserved.

Matter of Rivers v. Commissioner of Labor, ___A.D3d___(3d Dept. Oct. 7, 2010), is a tough unemployment decision. The law is settled that an employee who is terminated for misconduct is not eligible for unemployment. The law is also settled that being absent without leave is misconduct. What if it was for one day to visit your son who just returned from Iraq? That is still misconduct. As the court stated:

An unauthorized absence from work has been held to constitute misconduct, which can disqualify a claimant from receiving unemployment insurance benefits (see Matter of Roe [Commissioner of Labor], 62 AD3d 1105, 1106 [2009]; Matter of Britter [Commissioner of [*2]Labor], 54 AD3d 461 [2008]). Inasmuch as claimant admitted that he had requested leave and been denied, however compelling his reason for the request, we are constrained to find that the Board's decision is supported by substantial evidence (see Matter of Roe [Commissioner of Labor], 62 AD3d at 1106).

Mitchell H. Rubinstein
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