Terminated employee’s work-related dishonest constitutes disqualifying misconduct for the purposed of eligibiity for unemployment insurance benefits

Terminated employee’s work-related dishonest constitutes disqualifying misconduct for the purposed of eligibiity for unemployment insurance benefits

2013 NY Slip Op 05499, Appellate Division, Third Department

The claimant for unemployment insurance was terminated from her position because she [1] took a computer cord from the workplace without permission so that she could use it on her personal computer at home and [2] using the employer's company cellular phone for her personal use in violation of the employer's policy, causing the employer to incur additional charges for the excess minutes.

The Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board disqualified her from receiving benefits, holding that the claimant was terminated from her employment for disqualifying misconduct.

The Appellate Division sustained the Board’s determination, noting that "An employee's apparent dishonesty, including the theft of property, has been held to constitute misconduct disqualifying him or her from receiving unemployment.”

Under the circumstances, said the court, substantial evidence exists in the record supporting the Board's ruling that claimant's employment "ended under disqualifying circumstances."

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://www.courts.state.ny.us/reporter/3dseries/2013/2013_05499.htm

A reprimand “to be expunged” from the employee’s personnel record if he or she does not repeat to offense within a specified period of time is not a penalty authorized by law

A reprimand “to be expunged” from the employee’s personnel record if he or she does not repeat to offense within a specified period of time is not a penalty authorized by law

Decisions of the Commissioner of Education, Decision 10933

A §3020-a disciplinary panel found a teacher guilty of insubordination as the result of her refusal to act as a chaperone at a school event. The penalty imposed by the panel: “… a reprimand, to be expunged from (the teacher’s personnel) records if for the next two years there are no further disciplinary problems of a similar nature”.

The District appealed the penalty imposed by the panel to the Commissioner of Education, contending that such a penalty was not authorized by §3020-a of the Education Law.

The Commissioner agreed, finding that although the penalty to be imposed, a reprimand, was authorized by §3020-a, the disciplinary panel lacked any authority to direct the District to later expunge the reprimand from the teacher’s file for “good behavior.” The Commissioner then exercised his authority to impose an appropriate disciplinary penalty on the employee and ruled that a reprimand would be appropriate under the circumstances.

The Attorney General has considered the question of an employer to remove a reprimand from an employee’s personnel file. In Opinion of the Attorney General 81-28, the Attorney General said that an appointing authority that wishes to clear the record of an employee who had in the past misbehaved but who has since performed well should have that option, observing that “public policy is not served by forever blighting the employee’s personnel file.”

Accordingly, although a §3020-a disciplinary panel may not direct the appointing authority to “remove” any reference to the penalty from the individual’s personnel file, the appointing authority, in the exercise of its discretion, may elect to do so.

Presumably the same rationale would be applied with respect to penalties set out in other statutes providing for initiating disciplinary action against an employee for alleged misconduct such as §75 of the Civil Service Law, §155 of the Town Law, §137 of the Second Class Cities Law and §8-804 of the Village Law.

However, no such limitation would apply with respect to penalties imposed by an arbitrator pursuant to a negotiated alternative to a statutory disciplinary procedure as the arbitrator is generally permitted to impose such penalty as he or she deems appropriate under the circumstances.

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A Reasonable Disciplinary Penalty Under the Circumstances - A 600+ page guide to penalties imposed on public employees in New York State found guilty of selected acts of misconduct. For more information, click on http://nypplarchives.blogspot.com/

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Civil Service Law §106 does not authorize an individual to maintain a private cause of action based on alleged violation of the statute

Civil Service Law §106 does not authorize an individual to maintain a private cause of action based on alleged violation of the statute

Goddard v Martino, 2013 NY Slip Op 23240, Supreme Court, Dutchess County, Justice Peter M. Forman

Donald J. Goddard was appointed as a police officer in the Town of Hyde Park Police Department in 1986 and ultimately was permanently appointed to the position of Lieutenant in 2004. He was subsequently provisionally appointed to serve as Chief of Police pending his passing and qualifying for appointment from a promotion list for Chief.

In the words of Justice Peter M. Forman, “the relationship between [Goddard] and the newly-elected Town Board quickly became toxic” and Goddard subsequently submitted a letter expressing his intent “to retire from the Town of Hyde Park Police Department effective April 10, 2010.”

Goddard sued the Town alleging that:

1. He submitted this retirement letter because (a) he had become aware that the Town Board was contemplating abolishing the position of Lieutenant, and (b) he was advised by a member of the Town Board that he would never be appointed as the permanent Chief of Police, regardless of his performance on the civil service examination and “felt compelled to retire in order to preserve his health benefits, which would be forfeited if his employment ended due to termination rather than retirement;” and

2. The Town Board abolished the Lieutenant position in order to prevent him from being reinstated to that position once the permanent Chief of Police position was filled. 

Although the Town Board asserted that the Lieutenant position was being abolished for financial reasons, Goddard alleges that this financial justification was a pretext, and that "the Town Board was manipulating the civil service system in order to prevent [Goddard] from being reinstated as Lieutenant."

Ultimately Goddard filed a notice of claim with the Town alleging that the Town had “obstructed or defeated his civil service rights in violation of Civil Service Law §106.” Following a hearing conducted with respect to the notice of claim filed pursuant to General Municipal Law §50-h, Goddard commenced the instant litigation asserting a private cause of action based upon Town’s alleged violation of Civil Service Law §106.

Civil Service Law §106, in pertinent part, makes it a misdemeanor to defeat, deceive or obstruct the civil service rights of any person who seeks appointment, promotion, or reinstatement to a covered civil service position. However, notes the opinion, "Civil Service Law §106 does not expressly make a private cause of action available to individuals who believe that their civil service rights have been violated."

Addressing the Town’s motion seeking summary judgment dismissing Goddard’s complaint on the grounds that no private cause of action is available under Civil Service Law §106, Justice Forman said that a petitioner had to satisfy three tests to maintain his or her cause of action based on alleged violations of Civil Service Law §106.

The courts said that “When assessing whether a statute provides an implied right to a private cause of action, "the essential factors to be considered are: (1) whether the plaintiff is one of the class for whose particular benefit the statute was enacted; (2) whether recognition of a private right of action would promote the legislative purpose; and (3) whether creation of such a right would be consistent with the legislative scheme."

Commenting that the first factor is the one that is most easily satisfied, the court noted that “When a statute seeks to deter certain conduct, the second factor will be satisfied upon a determination that a private cause of action for injuries arising from this prohibited conduct would further the statute's deterrent goal.”

Goddard, said the court, clearly falls within the class of people for whose benefit Civil Service Law §106 was enacted. Recognizing a private cause of action under Civil Service Law §106 would also clearly advance the statute's deterrent goal. Therefore, said the court, the first two prongs of this three-prong test were satisfied.

The third factor, generally recognized as the most important factor, is whether a private right of action is consistent with the legislative scheme.

In Justice Forman’s view, there was no clear evidence that the Legislature intended to expose municipalities to the risk of financial liability for a violation of Civil Service Law §106. Rather, said the court, “Civil Service Law §102(3) squarely places the authority for enforcement of Civil Service Law §106 on the appropriate municipal civil service commission,” thus precluding an aggrived individual from bringing a private cause of action seeking redress of his or her grievance.

Justice Forman, upon reading §102(3) and §106 together, concluded that “the Legislature intended to limit enforcement of Civil Service law §106 to criminal proceedings (to punish past violations), and to actions by the appropriate municipal civil service commission seeking injunctive relief (to prevent continued violations).”

Noting the Goddard had a number of other legal remedies available to him regarding his allegations concerning his statutory right to his continued employment in the public service, including his claim that he was forced to retire because the Lieutenant position was being abolished, not for the purpose of economy or efficiency, but as a subterfuge to deprive Goddard of his civil service rights, Justice Forman granted the Town’s motion for summary judgment dismissing Goddard’s complaint.

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/3dseries/2013/2013_23240.htm

A school board’s “essential responsibilities” can’t be negotiated away

A school board’s “essential responsibilities” can’t be negotiated away

Sweet Home Central School District v. Sweet Home Education Association, 90 AD2d 683, affd, 58 NY2d 912 

The collective bargaining agreement [CBA] between the Sweet Home Central School District [District] and the Union permitted the District to "transfer" teachers subject to the teacher involved being advised of the reason(s) for the transfer and being given an opportunity to select from among  “current openings” for which the teacher was qualified. The contract also provided that wishes of the teacher were to be taken into consideration to the extent possible.

A music teacher grieved his “involuntary transfer out” as concert band director. The arbitrator directed the District to review the appropriate positions available with him and to permit him to select from among them. He further directed the District to permit the teacher to return to the concert band director position if he wished and the District was to “develop a program, with outside assistance, ‘to assure a smooth functioning’ of the concert band” were he to choose to return.

On appeal the arbitrator’s award was modified by the Appellate Division. The court explained that §1711 of the Education Law gave the Board a non-delegable responsibility to maintain adequate standards in the classroom and the District’s authority to assign and reassign teachers was essential to that responsibility.

“Public policy prevents a school district from bargaining away this responsibility,” said the court. In keeping with this view, the arbitrator was held not to have the power to direct the District to retain the teacher in the position from which he had been reassigned.

The Court then held that the CBA between the District and the Union could (and did) establish procedural rules regulating the District’s right to reassign teachers. That portion of the arbitrator’s award directing the District to comply with the procedural rules to which it had agreed was upheld.

Dismissal of disciplinary charges recommended because superior condoned the employee's alleged failure to follow department policy

Dismissal of disciplinary charges recommended because superior condoned the employee's alleged failure to follow department policy

OATH Index No. 866/13

A New York City juvenile counselor was charged with failing to conduct three inspections during a tour or duty as required. 

At the disciplinary hearing, however, the counselor proved that the ”three inspections” requirement had not been enforced by management for many years. 

OATH Administrative Law Judge Alessandra F. Zorgniotti recommended dismissal of charges.

The counselor admitted that she did not make three tours of inspection and testified that the failure to do so was a regular practice caused by an excessive work load.

Judge Zorgniotti found that the counselor had proved her affirmative defense of condonation and waiver by showing that her not making three inspections each tour of duty was condoned by supervisors. Further, said the ALJ, the employer did not show that it placed the counselor on notice that the “three inspection” during a tour of duty policy would be enforced

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://archive.citylaw.org/oath/13_Cases/13-866.pdf

An alternative to a principal for each school

An alternative to a principal for each school

Matter of Mennella, Decisions of the Commissioner of Education Number 10851

Although the Regulations of the Commissioner of Education provide that each school in a District shall have assigned to it a qualified principal, waivers from that requirement may be obtained under appropriate circumstances.*

An example of this is found in the Commissioner’s decision in Matter of Mennella.

One issue involved Mennella's seeking an order to restore funds for an abolished position of principal. The District had decided to administer its two smallest elementary schools by assigning one principal and two assistant principals to them.

The Commissioner rejected Mennella's claim that the District could not do so, noting that earlier the District had been granted the required exemption each school have a principal. The Commissioner also noted that the assistant principals involved held valid elementary principal certificates and were qualified to perform the duties assigned to them.

* 8 NYCRR 100.2(a), addressing the administration of elementary and secondary schools, provides, in pertinent part, as follows: “The board of education of each school district shall employ and assign to each school under its supervision a full-time principal holding the appropriate certification as required pursuant to section 80.4(b) of this Title. Upon the submission of evidence that there are circumstances which do not justify the assignment of a principal to a particular school, or that another mode of building administration would be more effective, the commissioner may approve an alternative mode of building administration.”

The threshold decision as to the arbitrability of a matter is to be made by the court absent the parties “clear and unmistakable agreement to arbitrate arbitrability”

The threshold decision as to the arbitrability of a matter is to be made by the court absent the parties “clear and unmistakable agreement to arbitrate arbitrability”
In the Matter of the Arbitration of Sherwood (Kirkpatrick), 2013 NY Slip Op 05372, Appellate Division, Third Department

While a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) was in effect, the Dryden Central School District (District) and Dryden Faculty Association (Association) entered into a separate memorandum of understanding (MOU) in which the parties [1] recognized the Association as the bargaining unit representative for all regularly appointed registered professional nurses working in the District, [2] agreed upon the nurses' terms and conditions of employment, and [3] agreed that the terms and conditions set out in the MOU would remain in effect until incorporated into the next collective bargaining agreement following the expiration of the then current CBA

The District subsequently terminated a nurse represented by the Association* and the nurse grieved the District’s action. When the grievance was denied by the District the Association demanded that the matter be submitted to arbitration. In response the District initiated a proceeding to permanently stay arbitration. The Association counterclaimed seeking a court order to compel arbitration.

Supreme Court granted the District’s petition and permanently stayed the arbitration. The Association appealed, contending that an arbitrator, rather than a court, should decide whether the parties' dispute was arbitrable.

The Appellate Division disagreed with the Association, noting that the responsibility for this threshold determination lies with the courts unless the parties have "evinced a clear and unmistakable agreement to arbitrate arbitrability.” Here, said the court, neither the CBA nor the MOU contains any such agreement and thus Supreme Court properly addressed this issue.

The court explained that “It is well settled that ‘[a] party cannot be compelled to arbitrate in the absence of an express, direct and unequivocal agreement to do so,’" citing Matter of Massana Central School District, 82 AD3d 521.

While the CBA provides for arbitration as the final step of the grievance process, the MOU neither contains its own arbitration provisions nor explicitly incorporated those provisions as set forth in the CBA. Although the Association argued that the CBA's arbitration provisions apply to covered nurses as the MOU does not expressly exclude them, this argument, said the Appellate Division, is unsupported by the terms of the MOU and the rules governing contract interpretation.

The Appellate Division noted that the MOU specifically identified selected provisions of the CBA to be applied to covered nurses and set out detailed additional provisions on several other subjects, including procedures for discharging nurses and terminating their employment, but did not include the arbitration provisions. Accordingly, said the court, as the MOU neither mentions arbitration nor indicates that any CBA provisions other than those expressly stated will apply to nurses, read as a whole, the MOU “unambiguously reflects the parties' intention to establish independent terms and conditions of employment for nurses that do not include the CBA's arbitration provisions.”

The bottom line: Absent an "express, direct and unequivocal agreement" to arbitrate this dispute, the Appellate Division ruled that Supreme Court had properly granted the District’s application to permanently stay the arbitration. To hold otherwise, said the court, would violate the basic principle that "courts may not by construction add or excise terms, nor distort the meaning of those used and thereby make a new contract for the parties under the guise of interpreting the writing"

* The Appellate Division noted that although the nurse's employment was terminated after the end date specified in the CBA, no new agreement has been negotiated, both the CBA and the MOU remain in effect under the Triborough Doctrine {Civil Service Law §209-a [1] [e]).

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/3dseries/2013/2013_05372.htm

An employee removed from his or her position by a civil service commission pursuant to Civil Service Law §50.4 is not entitled to a pre-termination hearing

An employee removed from his or her position by a civil service commission pursuant to Civil Service Law §50.4 is not entitled to a pre-termination hearing

95 AD2d 1005

Citing Mingo v Pirnie, 55 NY2d 1019, the Appellate Division ruled that "Contrary to the petitioner’s contention, her status as a permanent appointee in the competitive class of the classified civil service did not entitle her to a mandatory pretermination hearing under Civil Service Law § 75(1)(a), where the Nassau County Civil Service Commission relied upon Civil Service Law § 50(4) in revoking her payroll certification and directing the termination of her employment."

In Mingo a county civil service commission disqualified an employee following his permanent appointment and removed him from his position with the village pursuant to §50.4 of the Civil Service Law. The Commission had determined that the individual had “intentionally made false statements of material facts in his application or (had) attempted to practice (a) deception or fraud in his application”. 

The employee sued, contending that the commission could not disqualify him for employment in the position without first providing him with a pre-termination hearing.

The Court of Appeals rejected this argument, stating that §50.4 “requires no more than that the person be given a written statement of the reasons [for his or her disqualification for employment] and afforded an opportunity to make explanation and to submit facts in opposition to such disqualification. No hearing is required.”

The Commission had found that the employee had falsified his application with respect to his experience and had concealed relevant facts related to his separation from previous employment.

Governor Cuomo announces estate tax refunds available to qualified spouses of same-sex couples

Governor Cuomo announces estate tax refunds available to qualified spouses of same-sex couples

Source: Office of the Governor

On July 23, 2013, Governor Andrew M. Cuomo announced that Estate Tax refunds are available to qualified spouses of same-sex couples. Refunds may be available as a result of the recent United States Supreme Court decision, United States v. Windsor, in which the Court held that §3 of the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) is unconstitutional. 

Edie Windsor, a New Yorker, sued the federal government after the Internal Revenue Service denied her refund request for the $363,000 in federal estate taxes she paid after her spouse, Thea Spyer, died in 2009. She also had filed a protective claim with the New York State Tax Department asking for a similar Estate Tax refund from New York. Generally, a claim for credit or refund of an over-payment of estate tax must be filed by a taxpayer within three years from the date the original return was filed or two years from the date the tax was paid. 

Taxpayers believing that they may affected by the Windsor ruling should contact the New York State Taxpayer Information Center at 518-457-5387.

Additional information can be found on the Tax Department’s memorandumon estates of same-sex couples.

The Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board may apply the doctrine of collateral estoppel in denying a claimant UI benefits based on a disciplinary arbitration that led to the claimant’s dismissal

The Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board may apply the doctrine of collateral estoppel in denying a claimant UI benefits based on a disciplinary arbitration that led to the claimant’s dismissal

2013 NY Slip Op 05280, Appellate Division, Third Department

A claimant for unemployment insurance benefits challenged his dismissal from his position by the employer but an arbitrator concluded that there was just cause for his termination.

Subsequently the Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board denied the claimant’s application for unemployment insurance benefits, ruling that he was disqualified from receiving such benefits because he was terminated for disqualifying misconduct. The claimant then appealed the Board’s ruling.

The Appellate Division affirmed the Board’s decision explaining that "as there was a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in the prior [arbitration] proceeding, collateral estoppel effect must be given to the arbitrator's factual findings regarding claimant's misconduct."

As the Board had appropriately taken into account the arbitrator's factual findings and made "an independent evaluation as to whether that conduct constitutes 'misconduct' for the purposes of unemployment insurance" the Appellate Division found no basis to overturn the Board's ruling.

Although the individual contended that “at worst, the alleged conduct constituted an excusable error in judgment,” the Board disagreed.

The decision notes that the individual had been counseled by the employer prior to this incident "for various safety violations" and where the misconduct is potentially detrimental to the employer's best interest may, “as in this instance, be sufficient to constitute disqualifying misconduct.”

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/3dseries/2013/2013_05280.htm

Contract provision providing for the temporary appointment of a substitute teachers held a waiver of the educator’s statutory entitlement to a permanent appointment

Contract provision providing for the temporary appointment of a substitute teachers held a waiver of the educator’s statutory entitlement to a permanent appointment

Decisions of the Commissioner of Education, Decision 10918

The relevant collective bargaining agreement provided that a temporary appointment was to be made when a substitute teacher was to be so employed for more than 40 consecutive days.

When the teacher for whom she was substituting died, the School Board, at the request of the Union to fill the position in accordance with the terms of the CBA, “temporarily appointed” the substitute teacher to the vacancy.

The substitute was subsequently notified that she was not under consideration for permanent appointment. She sued contending that she was a probationer in the vacant position “by operation of law”. 

Following a series of administrative and Court proceedings, the question was remanded to the Commissioner of Education for further consideration.

The Commissioner, in considering the merits of the teacher's appeal, held that although the Board has no authority to make other than probationary appointments to fill permanent vacancies, a teacher may waive the statutory entitlement.

The Commissioner then found that the CBA provision, with which the Board had complied at the request of the Union, provided for a “temporary appointment.” Accordingly, the Commissioner concluded that the CBA’s provision constituted such a waiver and the substitute teacher could not challenge the School Board’s appointing her as a temporary teacher rather than as a permanent appointee subject to the satisfactory completion of a probationary period under the circumstances.

Employee terminated after being found guilty of misuse of funds

Employee terminated after being found guilty of misuse of funds

OATH Index No. 494/13

The New York City Department of Educationcharged a custodial engineer with the misuse of funds. 

OATH Administrative Law Judge Kevin F. Casey found that the custodian failed to repay more than $43,000 he owed to the Department in excess funds, that he wrote a check to the Department for $43,620, knowing that there were insufficient funds in his account to cover the check, and that he overpaid himself by $14,000

The Department apportions funds to custodian engineers based on the square footage of buildings that they maintain. Funds are kept in a custodial bank account which custodian engineers can access online. Custodian engineers must repay the Department any excess funds that they receive each year. In this instance the custodian acknowledged overpaying himself and his staff.

Judge Casey recommended termination of the employee, which recommendation was adopted by the Chancellor of the New York City Department of Education.

.

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://archive.citylaw.org/oath/13_Cases/13-494.pdf

An administrative agency’s rules and regulations must be consistent with and supplemental to the legislation relied upon by the agency for their promulgation

An administrative agency’s rules and regulations must be consistent with and supplemental to the legislation relied upon by the agency for their promulgation
Kigin v State of N.Y. Workers' Compensation Bd., 2013 NY Slip Op 05360, Appellate Division, Third Department

In this challenge to a determination by the Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board, one of the arguments advanced by the claimant denied certain benefits was that the Board lacked the authority to promulgate the regulations and the “incorporated Guidelines” relied upon by the Board for its ruling, contending that they were inconsistent with the enabling legislation and the workers' compensation statutory scheme.

Addressing this argument, the Appellate Division said that “[a]lthough administrative agencies have no inherent legislative power, they have ‘all the powers expressly delegated to [them] by the Legislature and are authorized to ‘fill in the interstices in the legislati[on]’ by promulgating rules and regulations consistent with their enabling legislation.”

Further, said the court, "[I]t is not always necessary that the Legislature provide precise guidelines to an agency charged with carrying out the policies embodied in a legislative delegation of power. In certain technical areas, where flexibility is required to enable an administrative agency to adapt to changing conditions, it is sufficient if the Legislature confers broad power upon the agency to fulfill the policy goals embodied in the statute, leaving it up to the agency itself to promulgate the necessary regulatory details."

Also, said the Appellate Division, courts will uphold regulations that are consistent with and supplemental to the relevant statute “provided they have a rational basis and [are] not unreasonable, arbitrary, capricious or contrary to the statute under which [they were] promulgated."

The Appellate Division ruled that the Board acted within its legislatively conferred authority in this instance.

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/3dseries/2013/2013_05360.htm

Governor Cuomo announces approval of 2014 health insurance plan rates for New York Health Benefit Exchange

Governor Cuomo announces approval of 2014 health insurance plan rates for New York Health Benefit Exchange

Governor Andrew M. Cuomo announced that the Department of Financial Services (DFS) has approved health insurance plan rates for 17 insurers seeking to offer coverage through New York’s Health Benefits Exchange, including eight new entrants into the market that do not currently offer commercial health insurance plans.

In 2012 Governor Cuomo took action to issue an Executive Order establishing the New York Health Benefit Exchange, which is expected to help more than one million uninsured New Yorkers access quality, affordable health care coverage.

The following companies had health insurance plan rates for the health benefits exchange approved today by DFS. The rates approved are subject to final certification of the insurers’ participation in the exchange.

· Aetna

· Affinity Health Plan, Inc.

· American Progressive Life & Health Insurance Company of New York

· Capital District Physicians Health Plan, Inc.

· Health Insurance Plan of Greater New York

· Empire BlueCross BlueShield

· Excellus

· Fidelis Care

· Freelancers Co-Op

· Healthfirst New York

· HealthNow New York, Inc.

· Independent Health

· MetroPlus Health Plan

· MVP Health Plan, Inc.

· North Shore LIJ

· Oscar Health Insurance Co.

· United Healthcare

Enrollment for the exchange begins on October 1, 2013 for coverage that will be effective January 1, 2014.

Additional information about the New York Health Benefit Exchange is available on the Internet at: www.HealthBenefitExchange.ny.gov

An article, Municipalites Need to be Well Positioned in 2013 to Address the Health Care Reform Act, has been posted on the Internet by NYMuniBlog, a LawBlog published by Harris Beach PLLC, a law firm, as a public service, at http://nymuniblog.com/?p=2869

The U.S. Department of Health and Human Services Internet page dedicated to the Affordable Health Care Act is at: http://www.hhs.gov/healthcare/rights/law/index.html

Selected reports and information published by New York State's Comptroller Thomas P. DiNapoli

Selected reports and information published by New York State's Comptroller Thomas P. DiNapoli

Issued during the week ending July 19, 2013 [Click on text highlighted in bold to access the full report] 

A.G. Schneiderman & State Comptroller DiNapoli Announce Arrest of Not–For–Profit Executive in Five–Year Public Corruption Scheme

Attorney General Eric T. Schneiderman and Comptroller Thomas P. DiNapoli Tuesday announced the arrest of a nonprofit executive accused of pocketing tens of thousands of dollars in taxpayer funds intended for public services in New York City. The joint investigation conducted by the Office of the Attorney General and the State Comptroller–s office revealed that Van R. Holmes —— the president of the Young Leaders Institute, Inc. —— stole more than $85,000 by creating dozens of false records and forged documents which he filed with State and City agencies in order to obtain public money.

DiNapoli: Binghamton Facing Fiscal Challenges, But Outlook Improving

The city of Binghamton is grappling with high rates of unemployment and poverty, but its outlook is improving as it builds up reserve funds, according to a fiscal report issued Thursday by State Comptroller Thomas P. DiNapoli. The report is part of a series of fiscal profiles on cities across the state.

DiNapoli: Lax Board Oversight Allowed Former Village of Old Field Treasurer to Steal Nearly $60,000

Poor oversight by the Board of Trustees of the Village of Old Field allowed its former Treasurer Andrea Brosnan to steal nearly $60,000 in village funds without detection, according to an auditreleased Wednesday by New York State Comptroller Thomas P. DiNapoli. The findings of the audit were shared with Suffolk County District Attorney Thomas J. Spota whose office charged Brosnan with second–degree grand larceny, first–degree falsifying business records, defrauding the government and official misconduct on May 22. Criminal proceedings are pending.

DiNapoli: State Tax Receipts Down in June, but Overall State Fiscal Picture Positive

Personal Income Tax and business tax collections were down in June compared to last year, but the state’s General Fund balance ended the month higher than anticipated, in part because of a $250 million regulatory settlement, according to the June cash report released Wednesday by New York State Comptroller Thomas P. DiNapoli.

DiNapoli Finds Questionable Charges for Rochester Special Education Provider

The Norman Howard School, a Rochester–based special education provider, submitted more than $200,000 in improper charges over a three–year period, mostly for salaries that went to uncertified teachers, according to an auditreleased Tuesday by New York State Comptroller Thomas P. DiNapoli.

DiNapoli Finds Budgeting Problems at East Ramapo Central School District

Poor financial practices by the East Ramapo Central School District, including inaccurate budget estimates, have left the district with operating deficits for the past two years and could jeopardize future district operations, according to an auditreleased Friday by State Comptroller Thomas P. DiNapoli.

DiNapoli: State Improperly Overpaid Oneonta Dentist $66,000

The state Department of Health improperly paid an Oneonta dentist $66,402 for 2,361 inflated or questionable Medicaid claims he submitted for unwarranted services, including “behavior management,” and dentures that were not delivered to the recipients, according to an auditreleased Monday by New York State Comptroller Thomas P. DiNapoli.

DiNapoli Urges President Obama To Direct Federal Agencies To Adopt “Place Of Celebration” Standard For Recognition Of Same–Sex Marriages

New York State Comptroller Thomas P. DiNapoli Friday released a letterto President Barack Obama calling on him, in light of the recent Supreme Court decision overturning the Defense of Marriage Act, to direct all federal agencies under his control to adopt a marriage “Place of Celebration” standard. This would require federal agencies and programs to recognize all valid same–sex marriages, regardless of the current residence of the same–sex spouses.

Comptroller DiNapoli Releases Municipal Audits

New York State Comptroller Thomas P. DiNapoli Friday announced his office completed audits of:

the Jefferson Fire District and

the Town of Lagrange.