Past practice of using seniority in bidding for shift assignment trumps Sabbath observer’s request for work schedule adjustment

Past practice of using seniority in bidding for shift assignment trumps Sabbath observer’s request for work schedule adjustment
Balint v Carson City [Nevada], CA9, 144 F.3d 1225

Lisette Balint had been selected for employment in the detention center of the Carson City, Nevada Sheriff Department and was to start “on a swing shift” effective Friday, March 31, 1995. However, Balint was a member of a church that barred all forms of secular work during the period its members observed as the Sabbath -- Friday night through Saturday night.

After being selected, Balint told the department that she could not work “during her Sabbath” and requested that her schedule be adjusted to accommodate her religious practice. When the head of the detention department informed Balint that there could be no accommodation, she withdrew her employment application.

In her original application for employment Balint said that she “was willing to work swing-shift, graveyard, weekends and holidays.” She did not mention any religious or other objections to working on certain shifts.

As a “past practice,” Carson City deputy sheriffs participate in a semi-annual bidding system in which the twelve or thirteen deputies assigned to the jail bid for shifts in the order of their seniority.

Contending that Title VII required that the department accommodate her religious needs, Balint sued. The U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals, 9th Circuit disagreed, reversing a lower court ruling in Balint’s favor.

The Court commenced its analysis with the observation that Title VII prohibits employers from discriminating on the basis of religion and that the employer has a duty to accommodate a current or prospective employee’s religious practices unless the accommodation would cause “undue hardship on the conduct of the employer’s business,” citing 42 U.S.C. Sect. 2000e(j).

The applicant or employee must establish a prima facie case of unlawful discrimination. If he or she does so, the burden shifts to the employer to prove that it either initiated good faith efforts to accommodate the employee or that any accommodation would create an undue hardship on the employer.

The department argued, and the court agreed, that it had “a legitimate seniority system, enacted without discriminatory intent” and any attempt to accommodate Balint would, as a matter of law, cause undue hardship.

The Circuit Court concluded that because the Sheriff’s Department had followed a nondiscriminatory seniority-based system for assigning shifts, it had no duty to accommodate Balint, “even if such accommodation would have no more than a de minimis [slight] impact. The court ruled that an employer is not required to alter an existing, bona fide seniority-based shift-bidding system to accommodate an employee’s religious needs.

Individual ineligible for unemployment insurance benefits if compensation exceeds the highest benefit rate applicable during relevant “effective days”

Individual ineligible for unemployment insurance benefits if compensation exceeds the highest benefit rate applicable during relevant “effective days”
Robinson v Commissioner of Labor, 2010 NY Slip Op 06272, decided on July 29, 2010, Appellate Division, Third Department

A claimant for unemployment insurance benefits is eligible to be paid for an accumulation of "effective days" of unemployment, provided that no effective days may be accumulated in any week in which he or she is paid compensation exceeding the highest benefit rate applicable.

Jonathon Robinson applied for unemployment insurance benefits but his claim was rejected by the Unemployment Insurance Appeals Board based on its finding that Robinson received an average weekly wage "far above the maximum weekly benefit rate of $405" and, as a result, “he did not accumulate effective days for those weeks.”

Robinson had been employed as a lecturer at Cornell University for the summer sessions in 2006 and 2007, teaching a class two days per week. He received a flat fee of $9,360 for the summer 2006 session, representing an average weekly wage of $1,560, and a flat fee of $9,780 for the summer 2007 session, representing an average weekly wage of $1,630.

Paid on a semimonthly basis, Robinson applied for unemployment benefits for those weeks in which he did not receive a paycheck, certifying that he had earned less than the maximum weekly benefit rate of $405.

Ultimately it was determined that Robinson was ineligible to receive benefits on the basis that he earned over the statutory limitation for those weeks for which he had claimed entitlement to benefits. He was charged with a recoverable total overpayment of $1,504.75 and, in addition, his right to receive future benefits by 64 effective days on the basis that he had made willful false statements to obtain benefits.

Robinson appealed these determinations by the Board.

The Appellate Division sustained the Board’s decision, commenting that “A claimant is eligible to be paid for an accumulation of ‘effective days" of unemployment, provided that no effective days may be accumulated in any week in which a claimant is paid compensation exceeding the highest benefit rate applicable’ … Here, the record reflects, and claimant admits, that he received an average weekly wage far above the maximum weekly benefit rate of $405 and, therefore, the determination by the Board that he did not accumulate effective days for those weeks is supported by substantial evidence and has a reasonable basis in law.”

As to the Board's finding that Robinson “made willful misrepresentations to obtain benefits,” the Appellate Division concluded that the Board’s decision was supported by substantial evidence.

The decisions reports that Robinson had conceded that he had received and read the unemployment insurance benefits handbook. Accordingly, said the court, the Board could reasonably find that, regardless of his communications with representatives of the Department of Labor, the language in the handbook addressing a claimant's ineligibility for benefits was clear and unambiguous.

The decision is posted on the Internet at:
http://www.courts.state.ny.us/reporter/3dseries/2010/2010_06272.htm

The statute of limitations for filing an appeal commences to run on date the individual knew, or should have known, of the event or omission

The statute of limitations for filing an appeal commences to run on date the individual knew, or should have known, of the event or omission
William R. Hayes v The Board of Education of the Saugerties Central School District, Decisions of the Commissioner of Education, Decision No. 16,094

A board member read aloud an anonymous letter in which district employees were criticized at a public board meeting held by the Saugerties Central School District on December 8, 2009. William R. Hayes, who was present at the meeting, asked for a copy of the letter on December 18, 2009. He received the requested copy on January 22, 2010.

Contending that the anonymous letter was disrespectful to teachers and contrary to the Board’s code of ethics and Education Law §1709(18), Hayes filed an appeal with the Commissioner of Education seeking [1] a letter of apology from the School Board to the teaching staff for reading the letter, and [2] the Board's agreement not to read anonymous letters in a public forum in the future. In the alternative, Hayes asked to Commissioner to “chastise” the Board for its alleged unethical behavior.

The Board asked the Commissioner to dismiss the appeal for a number of reasons, including its representation that the appeal is untimely. The Commissioner agreed that Hayes' appeal was untimely and dismissed it.

Noting that an appeal to the Commissioner must be commenced "within 30 days from the making of the decision or the performance of the act complained of, unless any delay is excused by the Commissioner for good cause shown,” the Commissioner explained that the anonymous letter was read at a Board meeting held on December 8, 2009 and Hayes did not file his appeal until January 26, 2010, more than 30 days later.

As the appeal related solely to the Board’s actions on December 8, 2009, the Commissioner ruled that Hayes’ “belated receipt of a copy of the letter does not excuse his delay” in view of the fact that he was present at the December 8 meeting of the Board and "personally heard and observed the alleged misconduct at that time."

The decision demonstrates the general rule that a statute of limitations for filing an appeal with the Commissioner is measured from the date on which the individual knew, or should have known, of the alleged offending event or omission.

Another frequent basis for the Commissioner rejecting an appeal – the failure of the appellant to name and serve a necessary party, i.e., an individual that may be adversely affected were the Commissioner to sustain the appeal, as illustrated in recent decisions by the Commissioner. See, for example, http://publicpersonnellaw.blogspot.com/2010/07/appeal-to-commissioner-of-education.html .

The decision is posted on the Internet at: http://www.counsel.nysed.gov/Decisions/volume50/d16094.htm