Payment for vacation credits upon resignation

Payment for vacation credits upon resignation
Karp v North Country Community College, 258 AD2d 775

After 15 years of service, Robert Karp resigned from his position with the North Country Community College in 1997. When the college refused to pay him for accrued vacation credits he claimed he accrued between 1982 and 1985, he sued.

Although Karp admitted that the college lacked express authority to pay him for his unused vacation time, he nevertheless claimed that he was entitled to such payments because the college had paid other employees for unused vacation time in the past. Karp argued that this meant that the college was obligated to pay him for such credits as well.

Karp claimed that in 1986 two employees received compensation for their unused vacation time when they resigned. He also referred to a 1986 memorandum written by respondent’s then-Dean of Administration recognizing that the school’s policy respecting unused vacation time needed clarification and that, in the interim, respondent would honor its past practice for vacation time accrued up until August 31, 1985.

Supreme Court said that if not expressly authorized by statute, local law, resolution or pursuant to a contract term, a public employee may not be paid for unused vacation time, citing General Municipal Law Section 92. The court noted that payments made without such authority are deemed public gifts, prohibited by Article VIII, Section 1 of the New York State Constitution.

The Appellate Division agreed, commenting that “the mere fact that [the college] despite lacking authority to do so, may have on prior occasions compensated employees for unused vacation time does not validate [Karp’s] claim. Express authorization being required, prior conduct cannot satisfy the express statutory authorization needed to form a basis for recovery against a public body.”

Also noted was the fact that in 1986 the college advised Karp that he should develop a plan to use any remaining vacation time during that academic year.
NYPPL

Educator terminated before the end of the probationary period

Educator terminated before the end of the probationary period
Strax v Rockland County BOCES, 257 AD2d 578

The Rockland County Board of Cooperative Educational Services dismissed Carol Strax, a probationary administrative assistant, from her position. Strax sued, seeking a court order reinstating her to the position.

The Appellate Division rejected her appeal, commenting that “it is well established that a board of education has an unfettered right to terminate the employment of a teacher or administrator during his or her probationary period, without a hearing, unless that person establishes that his or her employment was terminated for a constitutionally impermissible purpose or in violation of a statutory proscription.”

According to the ruling, Strax did not allege that the BOCES had terminated her probationary employment for a constitutionally impermissible reason nor did she demonstrate that it failed to comply with the procedural requirements of Education Law Section 3031 or otherwise acted in violation of a statutory proscription.

Accordingly, the Appellate Division ruled that under the circumstances the Supreme Court properly ruled that Strax’s termination was neither arbitrary nor capricious.
NYPPL

Employee terminated after refusing to work overtime

Employee terminated after refusing to work overtime
Mack v Comm. of Labor, 257 AD2d 828

One of the requirements of toll collector Tijuana R. Mack’s employment was that she occasionally was needed to work overtime before or after her regular shift. However, she declined to accept a number of overtime assignments and was given a number of written warnings.

After she once again refused to accept an overtime assignment, she was discharged. When she applied for unemployment insurance, her claim was rejected on the grounds that her refusing the overtime assignment constituted disqualifying misconduct.

The Appellate Division affirmed the Unemployment Insurance Appeals Board’s determination, holding that “an employee’s refusal to accept reasonable overtime work assignments when he or she has agreed to do so at the time of hiring can constitute disqualifying misconduct” for the purposes of qualifying for unemployment insurance benefits.
NYPPL