COBRA notifications must be sent to eligible individuals by employer

COBRA notifications must be sent to eligible individuals by employer

Phillips v Saratoga Harness Racing Inc., USDC, NDNY, 240 F.3d 174

U.S. District Judge Lawrence E. Kahn ruled that the employer did not satisfy the Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985's [COBRA] notification requirements when it relied on its employee, Frank Studenroth, to give his former spouse information concerning her rights under COBRA to continue her health insurance.

In 1994 Studenroth, without his wife's knowledge, obtained an ex parte divorce in the Dominican Republic. He told Saratoga to discontinue his group health insurance plan coverage for his former spouse as a covered dependent and to substitute his newly married spouse as his dependent.

Saratoga Harness gave Studenroth the necessary information advising his former spouse of her right to maintain her health coverage under COBRA. According to Judge Kahn, although Studenroth promised Saratoga that he would have the documents delivered to his former spouse, she did not get these materials. She first learned that she no longer had health insurance coverage when her claims for health insurance benefits were rejected for “lack of coverage.”

Judge Kahn said Saratoga was incorrect when it relied on an employee to transmit COBRA information to an estranged spouse. It is the employer's duty to supply such information and it cannot escape this responsibility by relying on its employee's agreement to give the necessary information to a former spouse.

Judge Kahn said that:

While some married couples are able to dissolve their marriages amicably, it is well known that separations and divorces often turn once-loving spouses into bitter enemies. As such, it is unreasonable to depend on a health care plan beneficiary's former spouse to deliver a COBRA notice to the beneficiary. The very nature of divorce itself forecloses this avenue as a reasonable attempt to comply with the notification requirements.

Judge Kahn held Saratoga liable for the medical expenses incurred by the former Mrs. Studenroth.

The lesson here is that an employer must assure itself that the party who is to be advised of his or her COBRA rights must actually receive such information in a timely manner. The best way to do this is for the employer to provide the information directly rather than to rely on a third party to deliver the information on its behalf. In addition, it would be prudent to obtain proof that the individual actually received the information and the date on which that event took place in order to be able to demonstrate it compliance with COBRA's requirements.

A petition seeking the removal a school official requires specific wording

A petition seeking the removal a school official requires specific wording

Decisions of the Commissioner of Education #14,608

Michelle Knapp filed an appeal with the Commissioner of Education seeking to have the Commissioner remove Freeport Union Free School District Board Member Sunday F. Coward. Her appeal was rejected because she failed to comply with the procedural requirements set out in the Commissioner's Regulations.

Knapp charged that Coward had “violated board policies” and had “threatened her and made racist remarks to her following a board meeting on March 28, 2001.” The Commissioner said that he was compelled to dismiss Knapp's appeal because she had failed to serve Coward with a copy of her petition. The decision notes that with respect to "an application to remove a school officer pursuant to Education Law Section 306, Commissioner's Regulation Section 277.1(b) requires that the notice of petition must specifically advise the [school official] that the application is being made for [his or her] removal from office."

It appears that Knapp used the notice prescribed by Section 275.11(a) for appeals brought pursuant to Education Law Section 310. The Commissioner said that “[a] notice of petition which fails to contain the language required by the Commissioner's Regulations is fatally defective and does not secure jurisdiction over the intended respondent,” citing Appeal of Khalid, Commissioner's decision 14,570).

The reason for this, explained the Commissioner, is that it is “the notice of petition that alerts a party to the fact that he or she is the subject of removal proceedings, and the failure to comply with Section 277.1(b) necessarily results in a jurisdictional failure and requires dismissal” of the appeal.

Employee terminated for failure to “call-in” and physical confrontations with co-workers

Employee terminated for failure to “call-in” and physical confrontations with co-workers

Kampel v Westchester County Health Care, Corp., 286 AD2d 390

Robert Kampel, was served with disciplinary charges alleging excessive absences, failure to comply with the established call-in procedure to report his absences, and two incidents in which he pushed co-workers. Found guilty, Kampel was terminated from his position.

Finding that the disciplinary determination was supported by substantial evidence, the Appellate Division, citing the Pell standard, Pell v Board of Education, 34 NY2d 222, sustained the penalty imposed. The court said that dismissal was not so disproportionate to the offenses for which Kampel had been found guilty as to be “shocking to one's sense of fairness.”