Determining if an employee is eligible for accidental disability retirement benefits

Determining if an employee is eligible for accidental disability retirement benefits

Daquino v DiNapoli, 2018 NY Slip Op 03201, Appellate Division, Third Department

An employee [Petitioner] appealed the Hearing Officer denial of the Petitioner's application on the ground that the incident did not constitute an accident within the meaning of the Retirement and Social Security Law, which decision was adopted by the State Comptroller.

In this action challenging the denial of Petitioner's application for accidental disability retirement benefits on the ground that the incident did not constitute an accident within the meaning of the Retirement and Social Security Law, the Appellate Division said that Petitioner bore the burden of establishing her entitlement to accidental disability retirement benefits and Comptroller's determination will be upheld if supported by substantial evidence. Further, said the court, in order for an incident to constitute an accident within the meaning of the Retirement and Social Security Law, it must be "a sudden, fortuitous mischance, unexpected, out of the ordinary, and injurious in impact."

The State Comptroller had adopted the findings and conclusions of the Hearing Officer, who found that slipping on the water "was a sudden, fortuitous mischance and undoubtedly unexpected and out of the ordinary" but denied benefits based solely upon Petitioner's failure to demonstrate that the water she had slipped on was not readily observable.

Citing a recent decision by the Court of Appeals, Matter of Kelly v DiNapoli (30 NY3d 674, in which that court stated that "the requirement that a petitioner demonstrate that a condition was not readily observable in order to demonstrate an 'accident' is inconsistent with our prior case law," the Appellate Division annulled the Comptroller determination, explaining that "substantial evidence does not support the determination that the incident was not an accident."

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/3dseries/2018/2018_03201.htm

Employee's resignation after being found guilty of disciplinary charges forfeits his or her right to demand arbitration

Employee's resignation after being found guilty of disciplinary charges forfeits his or her right to demand arbitration

Matter of the Arbitration between Unit 8251, Local 842, CSEA v City of Troy, 169 AD2d 871

 Under the terms of a Taylor Law agreement, an employee against whom disciplinary charges had been filed was entitled to a three step disciplinary proceeding. The third step was arbitration.

In the Matter of the Arbitration between Unit 8251, Local 842, CSEA v City of Troy, the basic issue was the effect of an employee's pre-arbitration resignation on his or her right to demand arbitration.

The employee, Patrick Washington, was found guilty of four acts of misconduct. The hearing officer recommended that Washington be terminated. A few days later Washington submitted his resignation.* On the same day that Washington submitted the resignation the union filed a demand for arbitration. The City refused to submit the issue to arbitration on the grounds that Washington, having resigned from his position, was no longer an employee and thus was not covered by the collective bargaining agreement.

 The Union filed a legal action seeking a court order compelling the City to submit the matter to an arbitrator. The Union alleged that Washington had been coerced into submitting the resignation and thus it was null and void. Accordingly, it argued, Washington, not having lawfully resigned from his position, was still covered by the Taylor Law agreement.

 The Appellate Division rejected the Union's claims regarding coercion. The decision notes that a union official and a city official simultaneously spoke to Washington regarding the ramifications of his decision to resign and that "Washington persisted in this course of action and signed a formal, written notice of resignation, witnessed by both officials."

 Under the circumstances, the Appellate Division found that there was no evidence of coercion and that having resigned from his position, Washington was no longer covered by the Taylor Law agreement.

 As to the issue of a resignation being coerced from an employee or obtained under duress, the courts have concluded that where an appointing authority has the right, if not the duty, to take disciplinary action against an individual, "it was not duress to threaten to do what one had the legal right to do" [Rychlick v Coughlin, 63 NY2d 643].

 Rychlick, in the presence of a union representative, was told that unless he submitted his resignation formal disciplinary charges would be filed against him. Although allowed to confer with his union representative, he was told that he would not be given additional time to confer with an attorney. He was also then advised that unless he resigned, charges would be filed. Rychlick submitted his resignation.

 A few days later Rychlick asked to withdraw the resignation on the grounds that it had be "forced" from him. When his request was denied, Rychlick sued, claiming the resignation had been obtained under duress and thus was void.

 Ultimately the Court of Appeals upheld the agency's refusal to allow Rychlick to withdraw the resignation, indicating that the "threat to file formal charges ... if [Rychlick] did not resign does not constitute duress."

* N.B. The Rules of the State Civil Service Commission, which apply to State officers and employees, provide that "every resignation shall be in writing" [4 NYCRR 5.3]. Most local commissions and personnel officers have adopted a similar rule or regulation.

Determining if a county is obligated to provide for the defense and indemnification a county officer named as a defendant in a lawsuit against the County

Determining if a county is obligated to provide for the defense and indemnification a county officer named as a defendant in a lawsuit against the County 

Dunn v County of Niagara, 2018 NY Slip Op 03271, Appellate Division, Fourth Department

Danny P. Dunn, Sr. and Anita L. Dunn sued the County of Niagara [County] and Russell Jackman [Jackman], then a coroner employed by the County, in "action sounding in negligent infliction of emotional distress."

In his answer, Jackman contended that the County was obligated to defend and indemnify him pursuant to Public Officers Law §18. The County objected but Supreme Court determined that the County must provide Jackman with a defense by an attorney of his choosing and must reimburse him for his legal costs incurred to the date of the order. The County appealed and the Appellate Division ruled that Supreme Court should have denied Jackman's motion.

The Appellate Division explained the County's duty to defend an employee "turns on whether [the employee was] acting within the scope of [his or her] employment," and whether the obligation to defend the employee "was formally adopted by a local governing body." In order to establish its prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law under Public Officers Law §18, the individual seeking indemnification must establish that §18 is applicable in his or her situation.

In this instance the court held that Supreme Court had erred in granting summary judgment to Jackman while still finding that there are issues of fact that bear on the applicability of Public Officers Law §18 to Jackman's claims.*

In any event, the Appellate Division said it agreed with the County that Supreme Court  should have applied County Law§501 in determining whether the County was obligated to defend Jackman.

Finding that the complaint against Jackman "created an inherent conflict between [Jackman] and the County over whether [Jackman's] actions occurred in the scope of his employment," the Appellate Division ruled that the County was absolved of its responsibility to defend Jackman. Accordingly, Jackman's retention of outside counsel was "at his own expense unless the provisions of [Public Officers Law §18] are applicable" in view of the fact that §501[2] of the County Lawprovides that:

 "Whenever the interests of the board of supervisors or the county are inconsistent with the interests of any officer paid his compensation from county funds, the county attorney shall represent the interests of the board of supervisors and the county. In such case the officer may employ an attorney-at-law at his own expense unless the provisions of section eighteen of the public officers law are applicable."

The existence of any such conflict, said the court, cannot be determined in the context of a defendant's motion for summary judgment.

* The Appellate Division noted that the claim that the County had adopted Public Officers Law §18 was raised for the first time in Jackman's reply papers and ruled that issue was not properly before it.

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/3dseries/2018/2018_03271.htm