Determining if benefits set out in a collective bargaining agreement survive the expiration of the agreement

Seven villages entered into "Joint Police Protection Contract" [SVC] establishing a joint police protective service. The SVC was valid for a five-year period and provided that, upon its expiration or upon a village's withdrawal therefrom, each village "remain[ed] obligated to pay its respective pro rata share ... after expiration or withdrawal." It was further provided that such "costs, liabilities and obligations shall include earned termination benefits as described in relevant sections of collective bargaining agreements [CBA] ...."  that provided for certain retiree health insurance benefits, hereinafter referred to as the "2006 agreement." 

Subsequently one village [Respondent] withdrew from the arrangement effective May 31, 2012 and formed its own police force while the remaining six villages [Plaintiffs] extended the SVC for one year, and then executed a new Six Village SVC.

Plaintiffs commenced this action against Respondent to recover damages for an alleged breach of contract, seeking, as its first cause of action, to recover the present value of Respondent's pro rata share of future retiree health care benefits incurred prior to the SVC expiration date, but paid or becoming due after the CBA's expiration date. Plaintiffs moved for summary judgment but Supreme Court granted Respondent's cross motion for summary judgment dismissing that portion of Plaintiff's first cause of action that involved future retiree health care benefits for any time period after May 31, 2012. 

The Appellate Division said the Respondent's met its prima facie burden for summary judgment, dismissing so much of Plaintiff's first cause of action as sought to recover future retiree health care benefits "to the extent such costs are attributable for any time period after its withdrawal from the SVC." The court explained that "As a general rule, contractual rights and obligations do not survive beyond the termination of a collective bargaining agreement." In contrast, opined the Appellate Division, "[r]ights which accrued or vested under the collective bargaining agreement will, as a general rule, survive termination of the agreement".

Further, said the court, although a written agreement that is complete, clear and unambiguous on its face must be enforced according to the plain meaning of its terms, in determining whether a CBA creates a vested right to future benefits, "courts should not construe ambiguous writings to create lifetime promises" and when a contract is silent as to the duration of retiree benefits, "a court may not infer that the parties intended those benefits to vest for life."

Here, said the Appellate Division, the primary question was whether, by the terms of the controlling SVC, Respondent obligated itself to contribute to the cost of providing health benefits for retired police officers pursuant to the 2006 CBA. As the 2006 CBA is silent as to the duration of the health benefits promised therein, it must be assumed that those benefits were promised only until the expiration of the 2006 agreement. In the words of the Appellate Division, "[a]lthough the parties and the PBA were certainly free to negotiate for continued, enhanced, or reduced benefits in future CBAs," nothing contained in the text of the subsequent CBAs commits Respondent to the payment of any of the benefits in question upon the termination of the 2006 CBA."

Citing Kolbe v Tibbetts, 22 NY3d at page 353, the Appellate Division noted that CBA language in Kolbe provided for retiree benefits "that continued beyond the expiration of the CBA", explaining that the relevant language in the Kolbe CBA provided that "[t]he coverage provided [in retirement] shall be the coverage which is in effect for the unit at such time as the employee retires". 

As there is no comparable language guaranteeing the same level of benefits beyond the expiration of the 2006 CBA, the health care benefits at issue in the instant litigation did not survive beyond the expiration of the 2006 CBA. Further, the fact that Plaintiffs and the PBA may have bargained for equivalent benefits in future CBAs is irrelevant to the discrete issue of Respondent's liability to Plaintiffs under any subsequent SVC. 

Finding that Respondent established, prima facie, that it was not liable for health care benefits beyond the expiration of the 2006 CBA, the Appellate Division sustained Supreme Court's ruling dismissing so much of Petitioner's first cause of action as sought to recover future retiree health care benefits for any time period commencing after May 31, 2012.

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/3dseries/2020/2020_00453.htm

Appointing authority adopts the recommendation of the hearing officer in part

A volunteer member [Petitioner] of a fire department [Department] was served with disciplinary charges alleging gross misconduct and conduct unbecoming a member of the Department as the result of a physical confrontation between Petitioner and another member of the Department.

Following a disciplinary hearing conducted pursuant to §209-l of the General Municipal Law, the hearing officer found Petitioner not guilty of gross misconduct but guilty of conduct unbecoming a member of the Department. The hearing officer then recommended Petitioner be suspended for 60-days. The Board of Fire Commissioners [Board] determined that Petitioner was guilty of both charges and imposed the penalty of expulsion from the Department and "disqualified [Petitioner] from membership for life." 

Supreme Court dismissed Petitioner's appeal of the Board's determination, which decision was sustained by the Appellate Division after it rejected Petitioner's argument that the sanction of expulsion and disqualification from membership for life was an abuse of discretion by the Board. 

Citing DeStefano v Incorporated Vil. of Mineola, 167 AD3d 740, and other decisions, the Appellate Division turned to a procedural issue, noting that Petitioner had  raised the question of whether the Board's determination was supported by substantial evidence. Accordingly, said the court, the lower tribunal should have transferred the proceeding to it without deciding that issue. Notwithstanding this procedural defect, "because the complete record" was now before it, the Appellate Division elected to treat the matter as one that had been transferred to it and reviewed the determination de novo. 

The Appellate Division then explained the "Upon judicial review of a determination rendered by an administrative body following a hearing, [the Appellate Division's] function is limited to consideration of whether the determination is supported by substantial evidence". Noting that "substantial evidence" means such relevant proof as a reasonable mind may accept as adequate to support a conclusion or ultimate fact," Appellate Division opined that the Board's determination sustaining the charges of gross misconduct and conduct unbecoming a member of the Department was supported by substantial evidence. 

Although Petitioner argued that the confrontation between himself and the other member of the Department constituted "harmless horseplay," it is undisputed that Petitioner causing an injury to that member, in violation of Department policy.

Noting the "judicial review of an administrative penalty" is limited to whether the measure or mode of penalty or discipline imposed constitutes an abuse of discretion as a matter of law" the Appellate Division, citing Pell v Board of Educ. of Union Free School Dist. No. 1, 34 NY2d 222, concluded that the penalty of expulsion from the Department and disqualification from membership for life is not so disproportionate to the offenses as to be shocking to one's sense of fairness.

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/3dseries/2020/2020_00413.htm

Standing to maintain a proceeding alleging a violation of the Open Meetings Law

Noting that case law addressing the issue of standing to commence a proceeding/action to enforce the provisions of the Open Meetings Law [OML]* is sparse, the Appellate Division, citing Matter of Sanna v Lindenhurst Bd. of Educ., 85 AD2d 157, said in fashioning a remedy for a violation of the OML the reviewing court must focus solely upon the public injury," noting than in Sanna the Appellate Division "expressly centered on the 'public injury' or injury to the 'citizenry' of which Sanna was a member, not on her status as the subject of the board's deliberation.** 

In Friends of Pine Bush v Planning Bd. of City of Albany (71 AD2d 780), Appellate Division, Third Department, found that "[a]s residents of the city, the individual petitioners are persons aggrieved by a decision of the planning board and thus have standing to bring this proceeding", while in Zehner v Board of Educ. of the Jordan-Elbridge Cent. School Dist., 29 Misc 3d 1206[A], the court determined that, as a lawful attendee of the meeting in question, the Zehner was an aggrieved party and had standing to challenge the school board's activities.

Guided by the settled principle that "[w]hen presented with a question of statutory interpretation, a court's primary consideration is to ascertain and give effect to the intention of the Legislature," the Appellate Division opined that the purpose of the OML and the intent of the Legislature in enacting that law dictate that the harm or injury is the alleged unlawful exclusion of the public from a municipal meeting. Citing Public Officers Law § 100, The court said that the OML "plainly confers upon the public the right to attend certain meetings of public bodies."

Accordingly, the harm or injury of being excluded from municipal meetings that should be open to the public is sufficient to establish standing in cases based upon alleged violations of the OML. To require a petitioner to demonstrate an additional personal damage or injury to his or her civil, personal, or property rights in order to assert a violation of the OML would, in effect, interject a counter-intuitive restriction upon the general citizenry's access and participatory freedoms to attend certain meetings of a public body. 

Such a requirement or condition, said the Appellate Division, "would undermine, erode, and emasculate the stated objective of this statute, which was designed to benefit the citizens of this state and the general commonweal, assure the public's right to be informed, and prevent secrecy by governmental bodies."

The Appellate Division the held that the branch of the Village Board's motion to dismiss the Appellants' petition/complaint in this action for lack of standing should be denied. 

The Appellate Division then noted that it found "only that the Appellants established their standing to maintain this proceeding/action" and took no position on the merits of the remaining allegations asserted by the parties, "including whether the Village Board, in fact, violated the Open Meetings Law by excluding the appellants or whether the Village Board properly conducted executive sessions."

* Public Officers Law, Article 7.

** The Court of Appeals later affirmed Appellate Division's decision and order in Sanna, without expressly addressing the issue of standing (Matter of Sanna v Lindenhurst Bd. of Educ., 58 NY2d 626).

The decision is posted on the Internet at:
http://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/3dseries/2020/2020_00864.htm