A 15-day suspension from employment without pay found reasonable under the circumstances

Supreme Court denied a teacher's [Plaintiff] petition seeking to vacate an arbitration award suspending him for 15 days without pay. The Appellate Division unanimously affirmed the Supreme Court's ruling. 

Citing Lackow v Department of Educ. [or "Board"] of City of N.Y., 51 AD3d 563, the Appellate Division held that the arbitrator's decision has a rational basis and was supported by the evidence. 

The record, said the court, shows that the arbitrator reasonably determined that the Petitioner was guilty of misconduct when he locked a 10-year old student out of the classroom and left him unsupervised in the hallway. 

Even if Petitioner was justified in removing the student from the classroom, said the Appellate Division, his actions in locking the boy out of the room, in a state of distress and leaving him in the hallway without adequate supervision, violated school policy.

The Appellate Division said that imposing a penalty of a 15-day suspension without pay from employment "does not shock our sense of fairness."

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/3dseries/2020/2020_00976.htm

Resolving a dispute that arose in the course of negotiating a collective bargaining agreement

The Detective Association [Plaintiff] alleged that the City of New York [City] made an oral promise in the course of its collective bargaining negotiations with the Plaintiff that in the event it reached a collective bargaining agreement [CBA] with the Plaintiffs before reaching a CBA with another union with which it was then engaged in collective bargaining, the Benevolent Association, it would not then use its contract with the Benevolent Association as leverage to extract additional concessions from Plaintiff.

After negotiating a CBA with the Plaintiff, the  City subsequently entered in a CBA with the Benevolent Association that included a wage increase for incumbent officers 2.25% higher than Plaintiff had received on behalf of its negotiating unit members. This increase was funded by reducing entry level pay and, or, benefits for new officers in the Benevolent Association negotiating unit, a practice known as "selling the unborn." 

Plaintiff contended that it did not represent entry-level members and the City said Plaintiff would have to make concessions such as giving back certain benefits then being enjoyed by Detective Association unit members if it wished to obtain the same 2.25% wage increase for individuals in its negotiating unit as the Benevolent Association had negotiated for its unit members, a practice known as "attrition bargaining."

Plaintiff sued, seeking a declaration that its unit member are entitled to the 2.25% wage increase and the City is estopped from demanding that funds for the increase be achieved through "attrition bargaining". 

Supreme Court denied the City's motion to dismiss Plaintiff's complaint in its entirety, which ruling was unanimously reversed, on the law, by the Appellate Division.

The Appellate Division explained that in this instance Plaintiff was attempting to have the court interpret the CBA between the City and the Plaintiff on grounds of fairness and equity -- impliedly to include a 2.25% wage increase -- places this dispute squarely within the definition of a grievance within the meaning of the CBA, i.e., "a dispute concerning the ... interpretation of the terms of this collective bargaining agreement." 

Accordingly, opined the Appellate Division, the issue must be resolved pursuant to the grievance procedures set forth in the CBA which provides that in the event a matter is not resolved at an earlier stage, it will be arbitrated before the New York City Board of Collective Bargaining (BCB).

The Appellate Division concluded that this dispute was within BCB's primary jurisdiction as Plaintiff alleged  that the City not only failed to "implement" the CBA between the parties, but subverted it by negotiating a CBA with another employee organization that entailed "selling the unborn" and thus had "engaged in conduct antithetical to good faith bargaining as defined in [the New York City] Administrative Code §12-306(c)."

In the words of the Appellate Division, "This is a claim of 'improper practices' that is properly addressed by BCB," citing §12-309[a][4] of the Administrative Code of the City of New York.

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/3dseries/2020/2020_01711.htm

Threatening an employee with disciplinary action if he does not resign from his position

The plaintiff [Petitioner] brought an action in federal district court alleging that the Town of East Haven, Connecticut [Town] discriminated against her because of her age in violation of the federal Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. §§621‐634, and Connecticut state law.

The federal district court granted Town's motion for summary judgment on the sole ground that Petitioner had failed to make out a prima facie case of any adverse employment action because Petitioner chose to retire rather than attend a scheduled disciplinary hearing. This,  in the words of the U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals, Second Circuit, was "the only merits‐based challenge presented in the Townʹs summary judgment motion."

Petitioner appealed the district court's ruling contending that the court erred in failing to view her evidence that her retirement was not voluntary but was coerced by the threat of likely termination as the result of a disciplinary action undertaken by Town against her and thus constituted a constructive discharge.

The Circuit Court agreed, holding that viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Petitioner sufficed to present genuine issues of fact "as to whether a reasonable person in Petitioner's shoes would have felt compelled to retire." Again, in the words of the Circuit Court, "If this case were tried, a factfinder, applying the correct legal standard to the issue of constructive discharge, could rationally find that an employee in [Petitoner's] shoes would have felt compelled to submit her resignation stating that she was retiring, rather than face nearly certain termination."

The Circuit Court vacated the district court's judgment and remanded the matter to the lower court for further proceedings.

In Rychlick v Coughlin, 99 A.D.2d 863, aff'd 63 NY2d 643, the Appellate Division opined that threatening to do what the appointing authority has a right to do – in this instance filing  disciplinary charges against Rychlick if he refused to resign from his position -- did not constitute coercion so as to make Rychlick’s resignation involuntary. 

Further, 4 NYCRR 5.3(b), which applies to officers and employees of the State as the employer, in pertinent part provides that "... when charges of incompetency or misconduct have been or are about to be filed against an employee, the appointing authority may elect to disregard a resignation filed by such employee and to prosecute such charges and, in the event that such employee is found guilty of such charges and dismissed from the service, his termination shall be recorded as a dismissal rather than as a resignation." Many local jurisdictions in New York State have adopted a similar rule or regulation.

The Circuit Court of Appeal's decision is posted on the Internet at:

https://www.leagle.com/decision/infco20200310084