Crediting service for certain benefits base on employment in another jurisdiction

In this CPLR article 78 proceeding, an employee of the City of New York [Plaintiff] sought judicial review of a New York City Department of Environmental Protection [DEP] determination that she was not entitled to leave-time credits based on her 17 years service with the City University of New York [CUNY]. Supreme Court denied Plaintiff's petition and dismissed the proceeding, explaining that “employees in the classified service of the City University of New York have not been employees of an agency of the City of New York but have been employees of a separate civil service jurisdiction, the City University of New York.”

According, the court held that DEP's decision that Plaintiff was not a City employee who was covered by the Leave Regulations during the times that she was employed by CUNY "was legally correct and not arbitrary and capricious."

Nonetheless, opined Supreme Court, "if the Plaintiff could show that CUNY and the City had an agreement or MOU [Memorandum of Understanding] permitting the City to recognize her accrued CUNY leave credits, she might be entitled there such credit, noting that "the State has promulgated regulations recognizing a State employee’s right to the transfer of leave credits accrued in the course of other public employment where the prior public employer entered into a reciprocal agreement or MOU with the State for recognition of such leave credits," citing 4 NYCRR 24.1.* 

Insofar as Plaintiff's claim was concerned, CUNY and the City had not entered into such a reciprocal agreement or MOU. Thus, said the court, DEP rationally concluded that there was no basis for crediting the Plaintiff any of her service as a CUNY employee in connection with her City-service leave benefits, or the rate of accrual of those benefits.** In contrast, where an employee resigns one position with the City that was covered by the Leave Regulations and takes another position with the City also covered by the Leave Regulations, the employee does not lose any leave rights or balances, regardless of whether the new position carries the same or a different title, or is in the same or a different agency.

With respect to Plaintiff's contentions, in the words of the court, "A review of applicable law and the administrative record reflects that, since July 1, 1979, CUNY employees have not been employees of the City, and CUNY and the City never entered into an agreement or MOU covering this subject matter." Accordingly, an employee’s length of City service determines his or her rate of accrual of leave balances and the length of such service also is considered in connection with seniority for layoff purposes, and may affect the level of recurring benefits under a collective bargaining agreement.

In other words, should an employee resigns a position with the City that was covered by the Leave Regulations and takes a position with a public employer other than the City, or a City position not covered by the Leave Regulations, "the employee may indeed lose leave rights, including any favorable rates of leave accrual that were in effect as the time of resignation" nor may the employee carry over leave balances in the event that he or she returns to City service in the future.

Accordingly, Supreme Court held that DEP had properly concluded that the Plaintiff's leave-time credits and rate of accrual must be based on a start date of November 2, 2014, when she began her employment with DEP. 

* 4 NYCRR 24.1 is applicable to employees of State executive agencies as the employer. See, also, 22 NYCRR 24.12, which provision is applicable to nonjudicial employees of the State Unified Court System. 

** See Kaslow v City of New York, 23 NY3d 78.

The decision is posted on the Internet at http://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/pdfs/2020/2020_32931.pdf

Certain teachers employed by the New York City Department of Education seek court order permitting them to "telework remotely"

A number of teachers [Petitioners] employed by the New York City Department of Education [DOE] initiated a CPLR 78 action seeking a court order permitting them to "telework remotely" rather then report to work in person. The Petitioners:

(1) Challenged as arbitrary and capricious the July 15, 2020, DOE's remote teaching policy for the 2020-2021 school year issued in response to the Covid-19 pandemic; and

(2) Sought a court order compelling DOE to allow Petitioners “and all others similarly situated" to telework remotely on full salary or without loss of leave.

Essentially Petitioners’ motion sought a temporary restraining order [TRO] prohibiting DOE from forcing Petitioners to report to work in person, charging their "Cumulative Absence Reserve and sick leave days" as the result of "telework" related absences, if any, and compelling DOE to permit Petitioners to teach remotely.

Supreme Court, after oral argument, opined that "In evaluating the balance of equities on a motion for a preliminary injunction, courts must weigh the interests of the general public as well as the interests of the parties to the litigation,” citing Amboy Bus Co., Inc. v Klein, 2010 NY Slip Op 31356[U]. To obtain an injunction, said the court, a plaintiff is “required to show that the irreparable injury to be sustained is more burdensome to him than the harm that would be caused to the defendant through the imposition of the injunction.”

Explaining that ".... several Petitioners have already been granted leave to work remotely until at least September 21, 2020, or have simply declined to return in-person until further notice," the court held that "the balance of the equities — by an exceedingly thin margin — favors Petitioners."

Supreme Court then granted the TRO solely to the extent that DOE may not, "until further order of the Court:"

a. Compel the named Petitioners to report to work in person;

b. Deny the named Petitioners the ability to work remotely; and

c. With respect to the named Petitioners, deny or deduct salary and/or leave time for remote work.

Supreme Court then ordered the parties to telephone the court to discuss the logistics of an expedited hearing on the preliminary injunction and Petition.

The Supreme Court's decision is posted on the Internet at http://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/pdfs/2020/2020_33016.pdf

 

 

Termination for ordinary disability pursuant to §73 of the Civil Service Law

§73 of the Civil Service Law, "Separation for ordinary disability," in pertinent part provides that in the event an employee on leave for ordinary disability pursuant to §72 of the Civil Service Law has been continuously absent from and unable to perform the duties of his position for one year or more by reason of a disability, other than a disability resulting from occupational injury or disease as defined in the Worker's Compensation Law, "his employment status may be terminated and his position may be filled by a permanent appointment."

The Town terminated a police sergeant [Petitioner] employed by the Town's Police Department pursuant to Civil Service Law §73. Petitioner, contending that the determination to terminate his employment was made in violation of lawful procedure and was affected by error of law, challenged the Town's action. Supreme Court denied Petitioner's CPLR Article 78 petition and dismissed the proceeding.

The Appellate Division subsequently affirmed the Supreme Court's ruling, opining that although an administrative determination may be annulled when it "was made in violation of lawful procedure [or] was affected by an error of law" there were no relevant issues of fact that would have necessitated a post-termination hearing, citing Prue v Hunt , 78 NY2d 364.* 

However, a §73 termination is not pejorative and a former employee may, within one year after the termination of the disability, apply to the civil service department or municipal commission having jurisdiction over the position last held by such employee for a medical examination to be conducted by a medical officer selected for that purpose by such department or commission. 

If the former employee is found medially qualified to perform the duties of his former position he is to be reinstated. In there is no vacancy to which he may be appointed, the former employee's name is to be placed on a preferred list. Further, the individual is eligible for appointment to a vacancy in a similar position or a position in a lower grade in the same occupational field in his former department or agency. 

* NYPPL's summary of the Court of Appeals' decision in Prue is posted on the Internet at https://publicpersonnellaw.blogspot.com/2012/02/pre-termination-hearings-required-when.html 

The decision is posted on the Internet at http://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/3dseries/2020/2020_04944.htm