Court granted school district's motion for summary judgment dismissing the petitioner's complaint based on the school district argument that it could not be held liable as the school district did not owe a special duty of care to the petitioner

Villa-Lefler v Department of Educ. of the City of N.Y.

2024 NY Slip Op 02343

Decided on May 1, 2024

Appellate Division, Second Department

Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431.

This opinion is uncorrected and subject to revision before publication in the Official Reports.

Decided on May 1, 2024 SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK Appellate Division, Second Judicial Department
ANGELA G. IANNACCI, J.P.
LINDA CHRISTOPHER
LARA J. GENOVESI
BARRY E. WARHIT, JJ.

2022-02432
(Index No. 1307/11)

[*1]Dianna Villa-Lefler, respondent,

v

Department of Education of the City of New York, et al., appellants.

Sylvia O. Hinds-Radix, Corporation Counsel, New York, NY (Elina Druker and Antonella Karlin of counsel), for appellants.

The Berkman Law Office, LLC, Brooklyn, NY (Kenneth A. Leitner of counsel), for respondent (no brief filed).

 

DECISION & ORDER

In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the defendants appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Katherine Levine, J.), dated February 23, 2022. The order denied the defendants' motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

ORDERED that the order is reversed, on the law, with costs, and the defendants' motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is granted.

The plaintiff, an administrative dean at a high school located in Brooklyn, commenced this action against the defendants to recover damages for personal injuries she allegedly sustained in October 2009 when she was attacked by a student in a hallway at the school. The plaintiff alleged, inter alia, that the defendants were negligent in failing to provide adequate security. The defendants moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint, contending that they could not be held liable as they did not owe a special duty of care to the plaintiff. The plaintiff opposed the motion. In an order dated February 23, 2022, the Supreme Court denied the defendants' motion. The defendants appeal.

"Absent the existence of a special relationship between the defendants and the . . . plaintiff, liability may not be imposed on the defendants for a breach of a duty owed generally to persons in the school system and members of the public" (Morgan-Word v New York City Dept. of Educ., 161 AD3d 1065, 1067; see Vitale v City of New York, 60 NY2d 861, 863). To succeed on a cause of action sounding in negligence, the plaintiff must establish that the defendants owed her a special duty of care (see Ferreira v City of Binghamton, 38 NY3d 298, 317; Wilson v New York City Bd. of Educ., 167 AD3d 820, 820; Destefano v City of New York, 149 AD3d 696, 697).

A plaintiff may demonstrate that a special relationship exists by showing, among other things, that the municipality "voluntarily assume[d] a duty that generate[d] justifiable reliance by the person who benefits from the duty," or that "the municipality assume[d] positive direction and control in the face of a known, blatant and dangerous safety violation" (Wilson v New York City Bd. of Educ., 167 AD3d at 820 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Thomas v New York City Dept. of Educ., 124 AD3d 762, 763). A special relationship based upon a duty voluntarily assumed by the municipality requires proof of the following: "'(1) an assumption by the municipality, through promises or actions, of an affirmative duty to act on behalf of the party who was injured; (2) knowledge on the part of the municipality's agents that inaction could lead to harm; (3) some form [*2]of direct contact between the municipality's agents and the injured party; and (4) that party's justifiable reliance on the municipality's affirmative undertaking'" (Boland v City of New York, 209 AD3d 960, 961, quoting Watts v City of New York, 186 AD3d 1577, 1578; see Koyko v City of New York, 189 AD3d 811, 812; Wilson v New York City Bd. of Educ., 167 AD3d at 820-821).

Here, the defendants established, prima facie, that they did not owe a special duty of care to the plaintiff (see Koyko v City of New York, 189 AD3d at 812; Morgan-Word v New York City Dept. of Educ., 161 AD3d at 1068; Destefano v City of New York, 149 AD3d at 698). The defendants' submissions demonstrated that they did not voluntarily assume a duty toward the plaintiff. The defendants did not make any promises to the plaintiff or take any actions regarding security protocols in the school that amounted to an affirmative undertaking of protection by them on her behalf, nor could the plaintiff have justifiably relied on any such actions (see Vitale v City of New York, 60 NY2d at 863; Wilson v New York City Board of Education, 167 AD3d at 821; Morgan-Word v New York City Dept. of Educ., 161 AD3d at 1068). Notably, the plaintiff testified at her deposition that she had no reason to fear the student who allegedly assaulted her. The plaintiff also testified that, prior to the incident, the student had never made any threats toward her and she never asked the school to provide her with protection from the student. Moreover, the defendants did not take positive direction and control in the face of a known, blatant, and dangerous safety violation (see Sutton v City of New York, 119 AD3d 851, 852-853).

In opposition, the plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact.

Since the defendants did not owe the plaintiff a special duty of care, we need not consider whether the governmental function immunity defense applies (see Brumer v City of New York, 132 AD3d 795, 797; Sutton v City of New York, 119 AD3d at 853).

Accordingly, the Supreme Court should have granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

IANNACCI, J.P., CHRISTOPHER, GENOVESI and WARHIT, JJ., concur.

ENTER:

Darrell M. Joseph

Clerk of the Court

Holding that substantial evidence supported the New York City Teacher Retirement System's Medical Board's determination that Petitioner's injury "was not caused by an 'accident' within the meaning of the statutory scheme", the Court of Appeals noted that was declining to adopt a rule that "purposeful conduct by coworkers" can never be the basis for an award of Accidental Disability Retirement at this time

 

Matter of Rawlins v Teachers' Retirement Sys. of the City of N.Y.

2024 NY Slip Op 02840

Decided on May 23, 2024

Court of Appeals

Cannataro

Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431.

This opinion is uncorrected and subject to revision before publication in the Official Reports.

Decided on May 23, 2024

No. 47

[*1]In the Matter of Michele Rawlins, Appellant,

v

Teachers' Retirement System of the City of New York, et al., Respondents.

Chester Lukaszewski, for appellant.

Janet L. Zaleon, for respondents.

CANNATARO, J.

Petitioner Michele Rawlins, a member of the respondent Teachers' Retirement System of the City of New York (TRS) and former school principal, commenced this CPLR article 78 proceeding to annul the determination of the TRS Medical Board that she is entitled to ordinary disability retirement benefits (ODR) but not accidental disability retirement benefits (ADR). We hold that substantial evidence supports the Board's determination that petitioner's injury was not caused by an "accident" within the meaning of the statutory scheme. In reaching this conclusion, we decline to adopt a rule that "purposeful conduct by coworkers" can never be the basis for an award of ADR. When a member's disability is alleged to have resulted from the intentional acts of any third party, the relevant question continues to be whether the injury-causing event was sudden, unexpected, and outside the risks inherent in the work performed.

Petitioner was diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and became unable to perform her job responsibilities following a series of incidents at her former school in which a disgruntled food-service worker left her feeling threatened and harassed. The last such incident occurred in April 2019, when the worker entered the school [*2]after having been transferred to another work location and demanded to speak with petitioner, insisting that she had his "belt and wallet." Petitioner, who overheard this encounter from a nearby room, believed the worker's remarks had "sexual overtones" and felt she was being stalked. She fled the school building and never returned to work following the incident.

The Board denied petitioner's initial application for ADR on the ground that she "did not sustain an accident in the work setting." It based this determination on petitioner's description of the events in question, which occurred over the course of at least three months in early 2019. Petitioner subsequently reapplied for ADR and the Board adhered to its prior determination that no qualifying accident occurred, this time adding that "[p]urposeful conduct by coworkers giving rise to a disabling injury is not an accident within the meaning of the pension statute."

Petitioner commenced this CPLR article 78 proceeding to annul the Board's determination. Supreme Court denied the petition and dismissed the proceeding, holding that the Board's determination had a rational basis and noting that "New York Courts have held that intentional harassment or assault by a coworker does not constitute a service-related accident." The Appellate Division affirmed, reasoning that the Board "rationally found that petitioner's injuries resulted not from an accident in the work setting but from '[p]urposeful conduct' by a former coworker, which 'is not an accident within the meaning of the pension statute' " (205 AD3d 629, 630 [1st Dept 2022]). We granted leave to appeal (39 NY3d 914 [2023]) and now affirm.

II.

To qualify for ADR, a TRS member must show that their disability resulted from an "accident" sustained in the performance of their duties (see Retirement and Social Security Law § 605 [f]; Administrative Code of the City of NY § 13-551). Because the term "accident" is not defined by any applicable statute or regulation, this Court has "adopt[ed] the commonsense definition of a 'sudden, fortuitous mischance, unexpected, out of the ordinary, and injurious in impact' " (Lichtenstein v Bd. of Trustees, 57 NY2d 1010, 1012 [1982], quoting Arthur A. Johnson Corp. v Indemnity Ins. Co. of N. Am., 6 AD2d 97, 100 [1st Dept 1958], affd 7 NY2d 222 [1959]). Stated differently, an accident is "a sudden, unexpected event that was not a risk inherent in the work performed" (Matter of Kowal v DiNapoli, 30 NY3d 1124, 1125 [2018]; Matter of Kelly v DiNapoli, 30 NY3d 674, 678, 682, 684-685 [2018]). The Medical Board determines in the first instance whether a TRS member suffers from a disability resulting from a service-related accident (see Retirement and Social Security Law § 605 [f]; Administrative Code of the City of NY §§ 13-519, 13-550 [a], 13-551). On article 78 review, the Board's determination to deny ADR generally will not be disturbed if it is based on substantial evidence; that is, if it is rationally supported by the record viewed as a whole (see Kelly, 30 NY3d at 684; Borenstein v NY City Emples. Retirement Sys., 88 NY2d 756, 760-761 [1996]).

Initially, we disagree with the Appellate Division that the Board's determination can be upheld simply because the accident alleged in this case was caused by the purposeful acts of a coworker (see 205 AD3d at 630). We have so far left open the possibility that injuries caused by the intentional acts of a third party might in some cases satisfy the requirements for ADR, and continue to do so today (see Matter of Walsh v Scoppetta, 18 NY3d 850, 852 [2011]; see also McCambridge v McGuire, 62 NY2d 563, 567 [1984] [the focus of the inquiry is on "the precipitating cause of injury"]; Arthur A. Johnson Corp., 6 AD2d at 100 [observing that "an act, deliberate from the point of view of its initiator, may be considered an accident if seen through the eyes of its victim"]). Indeed, respondents do not urge us to hold that ADR is unavailable as a matter of law when an injury is caused by a coworker's purposeful acts; they instead posit that the Board is permitted to evaluate the underlying facts and circumstances in such a case and "find that the event was unpredictable, sudden, and fortuitous, and also clearly beyond the scope of the duties of the member's job." That measured approach parallels our analysis in Kowal, in which we sustained the denial of ADR to a court security officer who was injured when an assailant armed with 40 shotgun shells began to fire indiscriminately into a crowded courthouse lobby. Rather than rely on the assailant's obvious intent to kill or grievously injure, we reasoned that the officer "failed to establish that his injuries were caused by a sudden, unexpected event that was not a risk inherent in the work performed" (30 NY3d at 1125).

Here, similarly, the record supports the Board's determination that petitioner's injuries did not result from an event that was sudden, fortuitous, and unexpected (see id.; Kelly, 30 NY3d at 678; Lichtenstein, 57 NY2d at 1012; see also Matter of Picciurro v Board of Trustees of the N.Y. City Police Pension Fund, 46 AD3d 346, 348-349 [1st Dept 2007]; Pisani v Kelly, 30 AD3d 297, 298 [1st Dept 2006]; Sinopoli v McCall, 245 AD2d 868, 869 [3d Dept 1997], lv denied 92 NY2d 803 [1998], rearg denied 92 NY2d 921 [1998]; Impellizeri v Teachers' Retirement Sys., 173 AD2d 389, 390 [1st Dept 1991], lv denied 78 NY2d 859 [1991]). Although petitioner claims that her PTSD was brought on by the April 2019 occurrence, that event was merely the latest of a series of incidents in which the food-service [*3]worker trespassed on school property and acted in a confrontational manner toward petitioner, causing her significant stress and anxiety. As early as February 2019, petitioner informed school officials that the employee was continuously disobeying instructions to keep away from the school and that she was "concerned about the students and the building staff that have to endure his confrontational behavior." Following another incident in March, petitioner wrote that she "d[id] not feel comfortable with [the employee] given his behavior in the school." The Board rejected petitioner's initial ADR application on the ground that "based on the description of the events in question that occurred in the work setting on April 18, 2019, as well as the previous events in the work setting in February and March of 2019, [petitioner] has failed to demonstrate that an accident occurred in the work setting." Because that reasoning is supported by the evidentiary record, the Board's determination to deny ADR will not be disturbed on this appeal.

Accordingly, the order of the Appellate Division should be affirmed, with costs.

Order affirmed, with costs. Opinion by Judge Cannataro. Chief Judge Wilson and Judges Rivera, Garcia, Singas, Troutman and Halligan concur.

Decided May 23, 2024

 

Former medical office manager pleads guilty to defrauding New York State Health Insurance Plan

On May 20, 2024, New York State Comptroller Thomas P. DiNapoli and Ulster County District Attorney Emmanuel C. Nneji announced that Gina Bradshaw, an office manager for numerous doctors’ offices in Manhattan, has pleaded guilty to defrauding the New York State Insurance Plan (NYSHIP) out of more than $12,000 by submitting phony medical claims for reimbursement. She was arrested in September 2023 following a joint investigation by Comptroller DiNapoli, the Ulster County District Attorney ’s office, the Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) – Hudson Valley White Collar Crime Task Force, and the New York State Police.

“Ms. Bradshaw thought she could game New York State’s employee benefit system by submitting fake claims for reimbursement for personal gain,” said State Comptroller DiNapoli. “Thanks to my partnerships with District Attorney Nneji, the FBI, and the State Police, her scheme was exposed and she has been held accountable.”

Ulster County District Attorney Emmanuel C. Nneji said, “The collaboration among the various agencies that are part of the Hudson Valley White Collar Crime Task Force, as well as between our Office and the New York State Office of the Comptroller, is essential to the detection and prosecution of fraud against New York and Ulster County taxpayers. I thank all the investigators from across the state whose dedicated service led to accountability for the defendant in this case.”

New York State Police Superintendent Steven G. James said, “This guilty plea is a direct result of the cooperative and interactive efforts of the many agencies involved in this investigation. Ms. Bradshaw knowingly took advantage of the health insurance system to profit at her own expense. Financial crimes of any kind will not be tolerated in New York State. I thank the Comptroller’s Office, Ulster County District Attorney’s Office, FBI and Hudson Valley White Collar Crime Task Force for their partnership in exposing this fraud.”

Gina Bradshaw, 50, of Maybrook, N.Y., worked as an office manager for multiple doctors in Manhattan. Through her husband’s employment with New York state, her family was enrolled in NYSHIP. When a NYSHIP member uses an out-of-network health care provider they can have a portion of the medical costs they paid to a provider reimbursed by a check from NYSHIP sent directly to them. In order to obtain unwarranted payments, Bradshaw used her positions to submit false claims to NYSHIP, purporting that services were provided to her by two medical offices where she worked although they never occurred. She received over $12,000  in reimbursement checks through her scheme.

The investigation into her activities began with a complaint from United Healthcare Special Investigations Unit, who assisted with the investigation.

Bradshaw pleaded guilty to Health Care Fraud in the third degree. 

 ###

Since taking office in 2007, DiNapoli has committed to fighting public corruption and encourages the public to help fight fraud and abuse. New Yorkers can report allegations of fraud involving taxpayer money by calling the toll-free Fraud Hotline at 1-888-672-4555, by filing a complaint online at investigations@osc.ny.gov, or by mailing a complaint to: Office of the State Comptroller, Division of Investigations, 8th Floor, 110 State St., Albany, NY 12236.