Employee's unauthorized absences, together with his failure to follow employer's sick leave policy, served as a good-faith basis for employee's dismissal from the position

Matter of Martinez v City of New York

2022 NY Slip Op 04096

Decided on June 23, 2022

Appellate Division, First Department

Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431.

This opinion is uncorrected and subject to revision before publication in the Official Reports.

Decided and Entered: June 23, 2022
Before: Renwick, J.P., Kern, Kennedy, Mendez, Higgitt, JJ.

Index No. 154634/20 Appeal No. 16180 Case No. 2021-01665

[*1]In the Matter of Jermell Martinez, Petitioner-Appellant,

v

City of New York et al., Respondents-Respondents.

Law Office of Caner Demirayak, P.C., Brooklyn (Caner Demirayak of counsel), for appellant.

Sylvia O. Hinds-Radix, Corporation Counsel, New York (D. Alan Rosinus, Jr. of counsel), for respondents.

 

Judgment, Supreme Court, New York County (Arthur F. Engoron, J.), entered on or about April 6, 2021, denying the petition to vacate a determination by respondent New York City Administration for Children's Services (ACS), dated December 3, 2019, which terminated petitioner's employment, and granting respondents' cross motion to dismiss the proceeding brought pursuant to CPLR article 78, unanimously affirmed, without costs.

Petitioner failed to show by competent proof that ACS terminated his employment in bad faith, or for an improper or impermissible reason (see Matter of Che Lin Tsao v Kelly, 28 AD3d 320, 321 [1st Dept 2006]; see also Matter of Patterson v City of New York, 173 AD3d 540, 541 [1st Dept 2019], lv denied 35 NY3d 906 [2020]). Petitioner's unauthorized absences from November 13, 2019 to the date of his termination, along with his failure to follow ACS sick leave policy, served as a good-faith basis for firing him (see e.g. Morgan v Kerik, 267 AD2d 8, 9 [1st Dept 1995]; Simpson v Abate, 213 AD2d 190, 191 [1st Dept 1994]).

The petition also fails to adequately allege that ACS violated the Family Medical Leave Act, as petitioner did not assert that he had worked for ACS for 12 months or 1,250 hours, and thus failed to demonstrate that he was an eligible employee under 29 USC § 2611(2)(A)(ii) (see Donahue v Asia TV USA Ltd., 208 F Supp 3d 505, 512 [SD NY 2016]). Indeed, petitioner admits that he was employed by ACS for only seven months, and he failed to preserve for review his contention that ACS and his previous employer, the Department of Education, constituted a "single employer" (see Green v New York City Police Dept., 34 AD3d 262, 263 [1st Dept 2006]).

Petitioner has failed to set forth a claim under the New York City Human Rights Law (Administrative Code of City of NY § 8-107), as the petition does not plead any facts supporting an inference of discrimination based on petitioner's status as a caregiver (see e.g. Whitfield-Ortiz v Department of Educ. of the City of N.Y., 116 AD3d 580, 581 [1st Dept 2014]; Askin v Department of Educ. of City of N.Y., 110 AD3d 621, 622 [1st Dept 2013]).

THIS CONSTITUTES THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE DIVISION, FIRST DEPARTMENT.

ENTERED: June 23, 2022

The State may not be held liable for the actions of a state-employed judge cloaked with judicial immunity

Moskovits v State of New York

2022 NY Slip Op 04098

Decided on June 23, 2022

Appellate Division, First Department

Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431.

This opinion is uncorrected and subject to revision before publication in the Official Reports.

Decided and Entered: June 23, 2022
Before: Renwick, J.P., Kern, Kennedy, Mendez, Higgitt, JJ.

Appeal No. 16176 Case No. 2022-00715 Claim No. 135693

[*1]Alexander Moskovits, Claimant-Appellant,

v

The State of New York, Defendant-Respondent.

Alexander Moskovits, appellant pro se.

Letitia James, Attorney General, New York (David Lawrence III of counsel), for respondent.

 

Order, Court of Claims of the State of New York (Jeanette Rodriguez-Morick, J.), entered August 3, 2021, which granted defendant's motion to dismiss the claim, unanimously affirmed, without costs.

This action is a byproduct of several state and federal actions commenced by plaintiff, a dual citizen of the United States and Brazil who resides in Brazil. In those actions, which have been dismissed, plaintiff alleged that he was not compensated for his "unique work product," which allegedly resulted in $2 billion in "unprecedented transactions" between the Brazilian states and Bank of America. In this Court of Claims action, claimant pro se sues the Justice who dismissed a state action and the "Court Administration," among others.

The claim, including any cause of action for "fraud on the court," is barred by the doctrines of res judicata (see Rojas v Romanoff, 186 AD3d 103, 108 [1st Dept 2020]) and collateral estoppel (see Conason v Megan Holding, LLC, 25 NY3d 1, 17 [2015]) based on dismissal of the "identical parallel federal court action" and a prior order of this Court affirming the orders that claimant now essentially seeks review of (Moskovits v Bank of Am. N.A., 2021 WL 1299038, 2021 US Dist LEXIS 67477 [SD NY 2021], affd 2022 WL 1150626, 2022 US App LEXIS 10479 [2d Cir 2022]). In any event, the court correctly held the claim is barred by the doctrine of judicial immunity, which "extends to all judges and encompasses all judicial acts, even if such acts are in excess of their jurisdiction and are alleged to have been done maliciously or corruptly" (Sassower v Finnerty, 96 AD2d 585, 586 [2d Dept 1983], appeal dismissed 61 NY2d 756, lv denied 61 NY2d 985 [1984]). The State may not be held liable for the actions of a state-employed judge that are cloaked with judicial immunity (Montesano v State of New York, 11 AD3d 436 [2d Dept 2004]). Claimant's allegation of impropriety amounts to nothing more than an allegation of corruption, which is insufficient to overcome judicial immunity (Rosenstein v State of New York, 37 AD3d 208, 208-209 [1st Dept 2007]; Tarter v State of New York, 68 NY2d 511, 518 [1986]; Sassower, 96 AD2d at 586), and no exception to application of the doctrine (Alvarez v Snyder, 264 AD2d 27, 34 [1st Dept 2000]; see Sassower, 96 AD2d at 586-587) is present here.

THIS CONSTITUTES THE DECISION AND ORDER

OF THE SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE DIVISION, FIRST DEPARTMENT.

ENTERED: June 23, 2022

Probationary employee failing to file a timely written notice of her decision to exercise her retreat rights adversely affected her right to reinstatement to her prior position

Matter of Civil Serv. Employees Assn., Inc., Local 100, AFSCME, AFL-CIO v City of Mount Vernon

2022 NY Slip Op 04023

Decided on June 22, 2022

Appellate Division, Second Department

Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431.

This opinion is uncorrected and subject to revision before publication in the Official Reports.

Decided on June 22, 2022 SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK Appellate Division, Second Judicial Department
FRANCESCA E. CONNOLLY, J.P.
REINALDO E. RIVERA
ROBERT J. MILLER
PAUL WOOTEN, JJ.

2019-03102
(Index No. 663787/18)

[*1]In the Matter of Civil Service Employees Association, Inc., Local 100, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, et al., appellants,

v

City of Mount Vernon, et al., respondents.

Charny & Wheeler P.C., Rhinebeck, NY (Nathaniel K. Charny of counsel), for appellants.

Bond, Schoeneck & King, PLLC, Garden City, NY (Richard S. Finkel and Terry O'Neil of counsel), for respondents City of Mount Vernon and Municipal Civil Service Commission City of Mount Vernon.

Bank, Sheer, Seymour & Hashmall, White Plains, NY (Jay B. Hashmall of counsel), for respondent Deborah Reynolds.

 

DECISION & ORDER

In a proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78, inter alia, in the nature of mandamus to compel the respondents to reinstate the petitioner Jillian Rizo-Brewington to her prior position of employment, the petitioners appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Westchester County (Susan Cacace, J.), dated February 19, 2019. The judgment denied the petition and dismissed the proceeding.

ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed, with one bill of costs.

On or about June 25, 2014, the petitioner Jillian Rizo-Brewington commenced her employment with the City of Mount Vernon in the position of Account Clerk in the Comptroller's Office and, on February 24, 2016, she was permanently appointed to the position of Account Clerk subject to a six-month probationary period. In 2017, Rizo-Brewington was promoted to the position of Senior Account Clerk and, on May 3, 2018, she was terminated from that position for insubordination. On August 31, 2018, Rizo-Brewington and the petitioner Civil Service Employees

Association, Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO commenced the instant proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 against the respondents, City of Mount Vernon, Municipal Civil Service Commission City of Mount Vernon, and Deborah Reynolds, seeking, inter alia, that Rizo-Brewington be reinstated to employment at her prior position of Account Clerk. The City and Municipal Civil Service Commission City of Mount Vernon interposed an answer and opposed the petition. Reynolds also interposed an answer and opposed the petition. In a judgment dated February 19, 2019, the Supreme Court denied the petition and dismissed the proceeding. The petitioners appeal. We affirm.

The challenge to the respondents' actions is not ripe for judicial review. Administrative determinations may be challenged in a CPLR article 78 proceeding only after the determination is final (see CPLR 7801[1]; Matter of Greenberg v Assessor of Town of Scarsdale, 121 AD3d 986, 989). At the time of the commencement of this proceeding, Rizo-Brewington had not made a request to the respondents to be reinstated to her prior position of Account Clerk and they [*2]had not determined that she should not be reinstated. As no determination had been rendered as of the date of the commencement of this proceeding, the controversy is not ripe for judicial review (see Matter of Arcamone-Makinano v Perlmutter, 196 AD3d 479, 481; Matter of Ranco Sand & Stone Corp. v Vecchio, 124 AD3d 73, 86-87, affd 27 NY3d 92; Matter of Greenberg v Assessor of Town of Scarsdale, 121 AD3d at 989).

Further, since Rizo-Brewington failed to file a written notice requesting to exercise her retreat rights to her prior position under Municipal Civil Service Commission of the City of Mount Vernon Rule XVI(2)(b), she was not entitled to reinstatement to her prior position of Account Clerk. Mount Vernon Municipal Civil Service Commission Rule (hereinafter Rule) XVI (2)(b) provides that a "provisional, temporary or contingent permanent appointee may return to his/her permanent position at any time by providing written notice to the appointing authority requesting to be returned to such permanent position. The appointing authority shall return such appointee to his/her permanent position within fifteen days of receipt of such written notice." Rizo-Brewington was a provisional employee who possessed retreat rights to her prior position of Account Clerk. However, Rizo-Brewington failed to file a written notice requesting to exercise her retreat rights under Rule XVI(2)(b). Accordingly, since she did not comply with her obligations pursuant to Rule XVI(2)(b), the Supreme Court correctly determined that the respondents were not required to reinstate Rizo-Brewington to her prior position.

The parties' remaining contentions either are without merit or need not be reached in light of our determination.

CONNOLLY, J.P., RIVERA, MILLER and WOOTEN, JJ., concur.

ENTER:

Maria T. Fasulo

Clerk of the Court