Signing an agreement "not to sue" at the time of resignation enforceable unless found to be coerced

Signing an agreement "not to sue" at the time of resignation enforceable unless found to be coerced
Sutherland v Town of Huntington, CA2, #98-9259

In exchange for certain benefits, Patricia Sutherland submitted her resignation and signed a “release agreement.” The release agreement provided that Sutherland would not sue the Town “with respect to, or arising out of [her] employment or the termination of employment.”

Sutherland subsequently decided to sue the Town. A federal district court judge, however, granted the Town’s motion for summary judgment “[b]ecause she signed a release barring litigation of these claims.”

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit [NY] affirmed the lower court’s ruling. The court rejected Sutherland’s argument that her release should not bar her present action, holding that the release was enforceable as its language “unambiguously precludes the instant action in its entirety as all of [Sutherland’s present] claims relate to her treatment as an employee.” As a general rule, courts typically uphold such releases unless it can be shown that the individual was coerced into signing it.

On the issue of coercion, from time to time an appointing authority will offer an employee the opportunity to submit his or her resignation as the only alternative to being served with disciplinary charges.

New York courts have ruled that a resignation submitted in response to such a threat has not been coerced. Why? Because, say the courts, the appointing authority had a legal right, if not the duty, to file disciplinary action against the individual and threatening to exercising a legal right does not constitute coercion.

The leading case addressing this point is Rychlick v Coughlin, 63 NY2d 643. In Rychlick the Court of Appeals ruled that threatening to do what the appointing authority had a right to do -- i.e., file disciplinary charges against Rychlick -- did not constitute coercion so as to make the resignation involuntary.
*

Providing volunteer with benefits deemed sufficient to trigger the Title VII protections available to employees and applicants

Providing volunteer with benefits deemed sufficient to trigger the Title VII protections available to employees and applicants
Pietras v Farmingville Fire District, 180 F.3d 468

Victoria Pietras failed the performance test required by the Farmingville Fire District. She sued, claiming the district’s test violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act.

A federal district court judge agreed, holding that Farmingville’s physical agility test [PAT], which all probationary volunteer firefighters were required to pass in order to become full-fledged volunteer firefighters, had a disparate impact on women.

The U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court’s ruling.

According to the decision, as a probationary volunteer, Pietras was entitled to numerous firefighter benefits under state law and the by-laws of the department. These included: (1) a retirement pension, (2) life insurance, (3) death benefits, (4) disability insurance, and (5) some medical benefits.

Although not a paid employee, providing these benefits was deemed sufficient to trigger the Title VII protections available to employees and applicants for employment.

The district court directed Pietras’ reinstatement as a probationary firefighter and said Farmingville could “develop and administer a non-discriminatory PAT as a precondition to Pietras [and presumably all other applicants for volunteer firefighter] becoming a full-fledged volunteer member.” .
.

Alleged CBA violation must be submitted to arbitration unless both prongs of the two-prong test governing arbitrability of disputes are satisfied

Alleged CBA violation must be submitted to arbitration unless both prongs of the two-prong test governing arbitrability of disputes are satisfied
Matter of County of Orange v Civil Serv. Employees Assn. Local 1000 AFSCME, 2010 NY Slip Op 51647(U), Decided on September 22, 2010, Judge Jeffrey A. Cohen, [Not selected for publication in the Official Reports]

CSEA Local 1000 filed a contract grievance contending that Orange County had violated the relevant collective bargaining agreement [CBA] with it replaced the armed security officer with an unarmed security officer at a County Department of Social Services ("DSS") office. The Orange County Commissioner of Personnel denied the grievance and CSEA demanded that its grievance be submitted to arbitration.

Rather than proceed to arbitration, the County filed a petition with Supreme Court it which it alleged:

1. The new security officer is not an employee of the County and is not therefore covered by the CBA.

2. Determining whether a security officer should be armed or not “is not a matter incorporated in the terms of the CBA and is ‘exclusively a matter of management discretion’".

3. The issue CSEA sought to arbitrate “is prohibited by the terms of the contract between the [County] and the independent security firm” and thus is not a “contractual CBA issue … subject to [the] grievance and arbitration procedures".

CSEA, on the other hand, argued that should the court determines that a valid contract exists, then the "scope of the matters which might be arbitrated there under" must be decided by an arbitrator.

Judge Cohen said that "Under the two-prong inquiry governing arbitrability of disputes, courts must ascertain whether the parties may arbitrate their dispute and, if so, whether they agreed to do so," citing In re New York State Correctional Officers and Police Benev. Ass'n, Inc. (New York State Dept. of Civil Service), 70 AD3d 240.”

Explaining that arbitration of the grievance is not prohibited by any statutory, constitutional or public policy rule of law, the County’s petition will not be granted based on the first prong of the analysis.

As to whether these parties agreed to arbitrate the matters contained in the Grievance, in determining whether or not a particular claim sought to be arbitrated lies within the scope of the parties' arbitration agreement, Judge Cohen said that case law holds that "the courts are not to engage in a penetrating analysis of the scope of the substantive provisions of a CBA"

Rejecting the County’s argument that its contract with the independent security firm prohibits arbitration, the court commented that while the CBA does not preclude the County from entering into other independent contracts, in doing so it cannot ignore its own contractual obligations under the CBA.*

Holding that the County “cannot absolve itself of its contractual obligations under the CBA” by entering into a subsequent agreement with another party containing incompatible terms, Judge Cohen dismissed the County’s petition and directed that the matter be submitted to arbitration.

* Judge Cohen said that “It is worth noting that the CBA was in existence long before the independent contract for security became effective. It is axiomatic that a party who enters into separate contracts with different parties must manage its contracts so that its obligations under its first contract are not impaired by its obligations under subsequent agreements.”

The decision is posted on the Internet at:
http://www.courts.state.ny.us/reporter/3dseries/2010/2010_51647.htm
.

All about New York State’s Taylor Law

All about New York State’s Taylor Law
Summary of Taylor Law basics

Posted on the Internet is John M. Crotty’s Introduction to the Taylor Law.

Mr. Crotty, an attorney and arbitrator, explains the key elements of the Taylor Law and its application and administration, its history, collective bargaining under its provisions and a number of landmark PERB and court rulings interpreting its provision.

The text of this 29 page outline is posted on the Internet at:
http://www.nysdeputy.org/Archives,%20Wage%20Comparisons/Taylor%20Law%20Overview.pdf
.