FMLA does not cover faith healing trip

FMLA does not cover faith healing trip
Source: Adjunct Law Prof Blog; http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/adjunctprofs/
Reproduced with permission. Copyright © 2011, Mitchell H. Rubinstein, Esq., Adjunct Professor of Law, St. Johns Law School and New York Law School, All rights reserved.

Tayag v. Lahey Clinic, ____F.3d____(1st Cir. Jan. 22, 2011), is both an interesting and important case. The First Circuit held that a company that fired a woman for taking unapproved time off to accompany her husband on a “faith healing” trip did not violate the federal Family and Medical Leave Act. The circuit agreed with a lower court's finding that the trip, a seven-week “healing pilgrimage” was not protected under the statute “because it was effectively a vacation.” Such travel is not “medical care” as defined by the FMLA, 29 U.S.C. §2601.

Mitchell H. Rubinstein

NYPPL Comments: In Sanni v NYS Office of Mental Health [USDC, EDNY, decided February 15, 2000], “faith healing” was one of the issues in a disciplinary action.

Thomas Sanni, then employed in a grade 27 project director position at Kings Park Psychiatric Center, was served with disciplinary charges pursuant to Section 75 of the Civil Service Law.

Ultimately a hearing officer found Sanni guilty of 11 of the 14 charges filed against him. Among the charges for which Sanni was found guilty: “Improperly participating in and supporting the decision to employ the minister of [Sanni’s] church to exorcise a patient 'possessed by spirits.'”
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Employer’s “one-strike rule” denying employment to applicants who test positive for drug or alcohol use did not have an unlawful disparate impact on rehabilitated drug addicts
Source: Posted on the Internet in CCH Workday at http://cch-workday.blogspot.com/ . Reproduced with permission. Copyright© CCH 2011, All rights reserved.

Rejecting disparate treatment and disparate impact claims brought under the ADA and California Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA) by a former drug addict who was denied a longshoreman’s job, a divided Ninth Circuit panel upheld the Pacific Maritime Association’s “one-strike rule,” which automatically eliminates from consideration job applicants who test positive for drug or alcohol use (Lopez v Pacific Maritime Assoc, 09-55698 March 2, 2011). Not only was it lawful for the employer association to eliminate applicants who were using drugs when they applied to be longshore workers, it was also permissible to disqualify those applicants permanently, the appeals court [Judge Pregerson dissented in part] held, affirming summary judgment to the employer association.

While the one-strike rule imposes a harsh penalty, and many people question the rule’s reasonableness in light of the fact that many drug users later rehabilitate themselves, “unreasonable rules do not necessarily violate the ADA or the FEHA,” the majority wrote.

The employer association represents shipping lines, stevedore companies, and terminal operators that run the ports along the west coast, negotiating bargaining agent and administering payroll and hiring policies. One of those policies is the one-strike rule, under which the association rejects outright any job applicant who tests positive for drug or alcohol use during the pre-employment screening process. Applicants are notified at least seven days in advance of administering the drug test. Failing the drug test, even once, disqualifies an applicant permanently from future employment.

The plaintiff first applied for a longshoreman position in 1997 at a Long Beach, California port. At that time, however, he suffered from an addiction to drugs and alcohol, and tested positive for marijuana at the time of his drug test; he was therefore disqualified from further consideration under the one-strike rule. He became clean and sober in 2002 and, in 2004, reapplied to be a longshoreman. However, because of the one-strike rule, his application was rejected. He attempted to appeal, but the employer does not entertain appeals from disqualifications arising from positive drug tests. This action followed, alleging the employer violated the ADA and the FEHA by discriminating against him on the basis of his protected status as a rehabilitated drug addict. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment to the employer.

Disparate treatment. The plaintiff asserted three arguments in support of his disparate treatment claim, none of which prevailed. First, he claimed the one-strike rule facially discriminates against recovering or recovered drug addicts. The appeals court disagreed. “The rule eliminates all candidates who test positive for drug use, whether they test positive because of a disabling drug addiction or because of an untimely decision to try drugs for the first time, recreationally, on the day before the drug test,” the appeals court reasoned. “Conversely, the rule allows a drug addicted applicant who happens to be sober at the time of the drug test to complete pre-employment processing successfully. . . The triggering event for purposes of the one-strike rule is a failed drug test, not an applicant’s drug addiction.” The majority cited the Supreme Court’s 2003 opinion in Raytheon Co v Hernandez in support. There, the Court held that an employer’s policy not to rehire workers who lost their jobs due to drug-related misconduct constituted a neutral, nondiscriminatory reason for refusing to rehire an aggrieved employee.

Next, the plaintiff argued that the employer adopted the one-strike rule intentionally to exclude recovering and recovered drug addicts from its workforce. However, the record belies that allegation, the appeals court found. Before adopting the measure, the longshore industry suffered numerous serious accidents and injuries, including several fatalities. These incidents were attributed in part to a workplace culture that permitted drug and alcohol use. Conducting pre-employment drug screening in order to eliminate job applicants who would be more likely to use drugs or alcohol at work was a union-approved approach to these safety concerns. The employer decided to make permanent the disqualification of applicants who tested positive because it thought that applicants who could not abstain from using an illegal drug, even after receiving advance notice of an upcoming drug test, showed less responsibility and less interest in the job than applicants who passed the drug test. As such, there was no evidence that the employer rejected applicants who tested positive based on a calculation that an applicant might test positive because of a drug addiction, rather than because of recreational use.

Finally, the plaintiff contended, summary judgment was in error because the employer only learned of the plaintiff’s drug addiction shortly after disqualifying him. This assertion only served to undermine his claim, however, that he was disqualified from employment due to his protected status as a recovering addict. If it were truly unaware that a disability existed, it would be impossible for the employer’s hiring decision to have been based, even in part, on the applicant’s stated disability, and he could not, ipso facto, have been subject to disparate treatment, the court wrote.

Disparate impact. The plaintiff’s disparate impact claim also failed. While he argued that the one-strike rule disparately affected recovering drug addicts by eliminating anyone who previously tested positive for drug use, the plaintiff offered “only the bald assertion that this result must be so.” However, “as we have noted, the rule does not necessarily screen out recovering drug addicts disproportionately.” The plaintiff must have produced evidence from which a factfinder could reasonably conclude that the one-strike rule results in the employer hiring fewer recovering drug addicts, as compared to the number of qualified recovered drug addicts in the relevant labor market. The record contains neither statistical nor anecdotal evidence to that effect, notwithstanding an affidavit from a forensic economist introduced by the plaintiff in support of this assertion.

Dissent.

Judge Pregerson dissented in part; he would have allowed the plaintiff to advance his disparate impact claim based on the forensic expert testimony that drug addicts are disproportionately affected by the lifetime ban, as well as evidence that at least 27 individuals were subjected to the ban during roughly the same period. “Because the identities of those individuals are protected, the court does not know which, if any, of them were drug addicts rather than casual users, or which of the addicts, if any, were later rehabilitated. It is clear, however, that a significant number of individuals were impacted by the ban. It is also reasonable to infer that at least some of those individuals, like Lopez, were at one time addicted to drugs, but after participating in a drug rehabilitation program, were able to overcome their addiction,” Pregerson argued. He also asserted the district court erred in requiring statistical evidence to support the disparate impact claim. While statistical evidence is generally required to show disparate impact under, for example, the ADEA, such evidence is not required for similar claims under the ADA. Furthermore, the dissent noted, “it is manifestly unreasonable to require statistical data regarding the number of recovering addicts either hired by an employer or screened out by the test. These figures are not kept by employers, and indeed such data likely could not be lawfully acquired.”

“I do not suggest that we now determine whether lifetime employment bars resulting from a positive drug test necessarily violate the ADA,” the dissent noted. Here, however, Pregerson was swayed by the unique nature and scope of the employer association in this case. “Where such a test is mandated by an employer who exercises singular control over an industry spanning the whole west coast of the United States, the potential impact of the policy is broad and pervasive.”

The decision is posted on the Internet at:
http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2011/03/02/09-55698.pdf

Investigation by NYS State Comptroller DiNapoli’s Office results in former town employee pleading guilty to charges of embezzlement

Investigation by NYS State Comptroller DiNapoli’s Office results in former town employee pleading guilty to charges of embezzlement
Source: Office of the State Comptroller

The former bookkeeper for the Towns of Kinderhook and Greenport has pleaded guilty to all charges related to her theft of approximately $300,000 in public funds following an investigation by State Comptroller Thomas P. DiNapoli's office, the New York State Police and Columbia County District Attorney Beth Cozzolino.

Additional information concerning the investigation and prosecution of the bookkeeper is posted on the Internet at: http://www.osc.state.ny.us/press/releases/mar11/030111.htm
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Even if a CBA's arbitration clause is broadly worded, a matter may be excluded from arbitration if the CBA's language clearly shows such an intent

Even if a CBA's arbitration clause is broadly worded, a matter may be excluded from arbitration if the CBA's language clearly shows such an intent
Matter of Massena Cent. School Dist. v Massena Confederated School Employees' Assn., NYSUT, AFL-CIO, 2011 NY Slip Op 01550, Appellate Division, Third Department

A school district employee, Eric Fetterly, was absent from his employment for 11 months after suffering a work-related injury.

When Fetterly returned to work, the School District told him that it had paid health insurance premiums on his behalf during his absence in error and asked for reimbursement. Ultimately the matter was submitted arbitration where the threshold issue was whether the health insurance dispute was arbitrable under the collective bargaining agreement.

When arbitrator ruled that the matter was, indeed, subject to arbitration, the School District appealed seeking a court order vacating the arbitrator’s determination. Supreme Court granted the District’s petition on the ground that it exceeded a specific, enumerated limitation on the arbitrator's power and the Employees’ Association appealed.

The Appellate Division said that “The threshold question of arbitrability is ordinarily a judicial determination, unless the agreement "'clearly and unmistakably'" provides otherwise,” citing Shearson v Sacharow, 91 NY2d 39.

The arbitration provision at issue, said the court, is limited and its “restrictive language cannot be read to manifest a clear and unmistakable intent to permit the arbitrator to enlarge the scope of arbitration in the guise of interpretation.” As the CBA explicitly forbids the arbitrator from "supplement[ing], enlarg[ing], diminish[ing], or alter[ing] the scope of [its] meaning," the Appellate Division said that “in order to determine whether the arbitrator exceeded his power in interpreting the exclusionary language, this Court must exercise its threshold responsibility to determine independently whether the dispute is arbitrable.”

Finding that the collective bargaining agreement provided that “not all grievances are arbitrable, prohibits the arbitrator from addressing issues outside his or her authority or enlarging the scope of the CBA, and specifically excludes "the subject of health insurance" from arbitration, the Appellate Division concluded that “it is evident that the parties did not intend to arbitrate this dispute” and affirmed Supreme Court’s ruling vacating the arbitrator’s determination.

The decision is posted on the Internet at:
http://www.courts.state.ny.us/reporter/3dseries/2011/2011_01550.htm
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Professional consultants are employees and not independent contractors

Professional consultants are employees and not independent contractors
Source: Adjunct Law Prof Blog; http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/adjunctprofs/
Reproduced with permission. Copyright © 2011, Mitchell H. Rubinstein, Esq., Adjunct Professor of Law, St. Johns Law School and New York Law School, All rights reserved.

Matter of Wells v. Commissioner of Labor, 77 AD3d 993, is an interesting unemployment case. Applying the right to control test, the court held that professional consultants were employees, reasoning:

Initially, we note that the existence of an employment relationship is a factual issue for the Board to resolve and its determination will be upheld if supported by substantial evidence (see Matter of Concourse Ophthalmology Assoc. [Roberts], 60 NY2d 734, 736 [1983]; Matter of Brevis Music Inc. [Commissioner of Labor], 54 AD3d 1084, 1085 [2008], lv denied 11 NY3d 712 [2008]). Where professionals are involved, the relevant inquiry is "whether the purported employer retains overall control of important aspects of the services performed" (Matter of Piano School of N.Y. City [Commissioner of Labor], 71 AD3d 1358, 1359 [2010]; see Matter of Concourse Ophthalmology Assoc. [Roberts], 60 NY2d at 736;Matter of Parisi [Commissioner of Labor], 54 AD3d 456, 457 [2008]).

In the instant case, it was established that claimant contacted Madison after hearing about the position from another consultant and that Madison conducted an interview to ascertain if claimant was suited for the job. Madison, in turn, sent claimant a written contract setting his compensation at $350 per day and referred him to the client who performed a background check, provided training and directed his daily work activities.

Under the terms of the contract, claimant was precluded from otherwise working for Madison's client companies or partners during the term of the assignment and for one year thereafter, was subject to client confidentiality agreements and was entitled to reimbursement of certain business expenses. In order to obtain payment, claimant was required to complete a time sheet provided by Madison to be submitted at times it directed. In addition, although Madison did not provide formal training, it supplied claimant with informational booklets on its clients' policies and procedures, had a representative conduct site visits to periodically meet with the consultants and responded to client complaints about consultants' work.

This Court has acknowledged that "'an organization which screens the services of professionals, pays them at a set rate and then offers their services to clients exercises sufficient control to create an employment relationship'" (Matter of Singh [Thomas A. Sirianni, Inc. — Commissioner of Labor], 43 AD3d 498, 499 [2007], quoting Matter of Kimberg [Hudacs], 188 AD2d 781, 781 [1992]; see Matter of Atelek [Head Hunters Hair Design — Commissioner of Labor], 278 AD2d 560, 560 [2000]). The record reveals that Madison did more than this, as indicated by its interaction with the consultants, responsibility for their work and the terms of the written contract. The fact that the contract was entitled an "Independent Consultant Agreement" is not dispositive (see Matter of Kaplan [Tupperware Distrib. — Commissioner of Labor], 257 AD2d 951, 952 [1999], lv dismissed 93 NY2d 920 [1999]).

Accordingly, as substantial evidence supports the Board's decisions, we decline to disturb them, notwithstanding evidence in the record that would support a contrary conclusion (see Matter of DeSantis [Commissioner of Labor], 54 AD3d 1103, 1104-1105 [2008]).

Mitchell H. Rubinstein