Discipinary charges filed against employee for off-duty misconduct

Discipinary charges filed against employee for off-duty misconduct
Cannata v Safir, 269 AD2d 327

The Appellate Division, First Department did not have any difficulty in sustaining the decision of the Police Commissioner to dismiss New York City police officer Michael Cannata based on his finding that Cannata, while off-duty had:

1. Refused to move his illegally parked car when asked to do so by a Yonkers police officer;

2. Acted in a rude and aggressive manner, making racial remarks about the police officer; and

3. Lied about his conduct during the departmental investigation and disciplinary hearing.

Commenting that the commissioner’s determination was supported by substantial evidence, including the testimony of numerous Yonkers police officers, the Appellate Division said that there was no basis to disturb the commissioner’s credibility determinations.

Under the circumstances, the court said that "the penalty of dismissal does not shock our sense of fairness."

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Evidence lawfully obtained may be used to initiate an investigation of an employee even if similar information was received in violation of law

Evidence lawfully obtained may be used to initiate an investigation of an employee even if similar information was received in violation of law
Matter of Lomax v Kelly, 2011 NY Slip Op 01894, Appellate Division, First Department

Richard Lomax, a New York City probationary police officer, was off-duty with a fellow officer when the vehicle he was driving skidded on ice and rear-ended another car. Lomax called 911 to report the accident.

The occupants of the other vehicle, however, attacked the officers resulting in Lomax sustaining serious head injuries.

In the course of prosecuting the assailants, an Assistant District Attorney discovered that Lomax's medical records indicated that he was intoxicated at the time of the accident. This was reported to a NYPD sergeant, who then reported the finding to the Internal Affairs Bureau and ultimately Lomax was terminated.

Lomax challenged his dismissal from his position. In considering Lomax’s appeal, the Appellate Division said that “Even assuming that the Assistant District Attorney violated the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 [HIPPA]* upon disclosing the contents of [Lomax’s] medical records to the NYPD, [NYPD] properly relied on records lawfully obtained from an independent source to conduct the [Internal Affairs] investigation.”

The Appellate Division, sustaining his termination as a probationary employee, ruled that the medical records used by NYPD showing that Lomax was driving while intoxicated provided “a rational basis for his dismissal as a probationary police officer and established that the termination was not made in bad faith.”

* N.B. As to such disclosure by the Assistant Attorney General, HIPPA’s privacy rules require “that health plans, health care clearinghouses, and certain health care providers guard against misuse of individuals' identifiable health information and limit the sharing of such information” [see Public Law 104-191; Title II, Subtitle F; Part C--Administrative Simplification, §1171, Definitions, posted on the Internet at http://www.cms.gov/HIPAAGenInfo/Downloads/HIPAALaw.pdf ].

The Lomax decision is posted on the Internet at:
http://www.courts.state.ny.us/reporter/3dseries/2011/2011_01894.htm
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Compelling arbitration in cases where the grievance is based on the unilateral act or omission of a third party

Compelling arbitration in cases where the grievance is based on the unilateral act or omission of a third party
Remsen CSD v Remsen Teachers Asso., 270 AD2d 796 [Decided with In re Mohawk Central School District, 270 AD2d 798]

In Richfield Springs CSD v Allen, 270 AD2d 734, the Appellate Division, Third Department, held that the fact that a third party provides the employer’s negotiated fringe benefit does not insulate the employer from its duty to negotiate changes in the terms and conditions of employment if third party unilaterally decides to change the benefit.

In Richfield, the union was concerned that a change in a prescription drug plan provided by a new carrier would be inferior to the coverage provided by the old carrier.

The Appellate Division held that the grievance challenging the change in the carrier of the prescription drug plan covering its members was subject to arbitration under the contract grievance procedure set out in the Taylor Law agreement.

A substitute for the carrier of the prescription drug plan specified in the agreement was changed without the Association’s consent. This, said the court, supported the claim of an alleged violation of the Agreement which the parties clearly and unequivocally agreed to arbitrate.

The Appellate Division, Fourth Department, came to the same conclusion in the Remsen case.

Remsen Teachers Association president Nora Revere sued to compel the district to submit a grievance alleging a violation of its collective bargaining agreement. The district said that any change was beyond its control since the alleged violation resulted from the third party replacing its then current insurance carrier for its prescription drug plan with a different carrier.

According to the decision, the fact that the changes were made by an entity that was not a party to the collective bargaining agreement did not justify granting the district’s motion to stay arbitration.

In view of the parties’ broad arbitration agreement and the provisions relating to health insurance benefits, the court ruled that the alleged violation of the collective bargaining agreement resulting from changes in prescription drug benefits presents an arbitrable issue.

The Fourth Department pointed out that whether the district possesses authority or control over the amount or type of health insurance benefits provided to its employees, and whether the district the collective bargaining agreement with respect to maintaining a certain level of benefits, is for the arbitrator to determine.


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Consolidating positions in the public service

Consolidating positions in the public service
Informal opinions of the Attorney General, Informal Opinion 93-2
Opinions of the Commissioner of Education, Opinion 9994

In view of the discussions focusing attaining economies in the public service, the following views of the Attorney General and the Commissioner of Education may be of interest with respect to suggestions involving the consolidation of certain positions in the public service,

The Attorney General has concluded that Section 58.1-c of the Civil Service Law requires municipalities to maintain separate offices of police commissioner and of police chief and thus the City of Schenectady could not combine the positions of police commissioner and chief of police nor abolish the position of chief of police [Informal Opinions of the Attorney General 93-2].

Although the Commissioner of Education earlier ruled that each school must have a principal of its own [Opinions of the Commissioner of Education #9994], which is reflected in 8 NYCRR 100.2(a), whereby “The board of education of each school district shall employ and assign to each school under its supervision a full-time principal holding the appropriate certification as required pursuant to section 80.4(b) of this Title,” the Commissioner may approve modifications in the management of such schools “Upon the submission of evidence that there are circumstances which do not justify the assignment of a principal to a particular school, or that another mode of building administration would be more effective….”
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Agency’s failure to respond to requests for information does not toll the Statute of Limitations for filing a timely petition

Agency’s failure to respond to requests for information does not toll the Statute of Limitations for filing a timely petition
Troeller v Klein, 2011 NY Slip Op 01874, Appellate Division, First Department

Robert J. Troeller sued the New York City Department of Education [DOE] claiming a breach a stipulation of settlement between the Union and DOE.

Troeller contended that the agreement between the parties was "quite different" from the way DOE was interpreting it. However as the petition to deem the notice timely was brought more than one year after the accrual of the cause of action and his petition was dismissed by the court.

One of the arguments advanced by Troeller: DOE should be estopped from asserting a “late notice of claim” defense because DOE did not respond to his requests for certain information. The Appellate Division said that this argument “is unavailing.”

The court explained that "An estoppel cannot be founded upon [a defendant school district’s] failure to communicate with [a plaintiff] in response to . . . bills”, citing Amsterdam Wrecking & Salvage Co. v Greater Amsterdam School Dist., 83 AD2d 654, affd 56 NY2d 828. “A fortiori*,” the court continued, “an estoppel cannot be founded on [DOE’s] delay in responding to [Troeller’s] requests for information."

* Latin: For or with even stronger reason.

The decision is posted on the Internet at:
http://www.courts.state.ny.us/reporter/3dseries/2011/2011_01874.htm
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