Accidental disability retirement benefits application based on a training-related injury

Accidental disability retirement benefits application based on a training-related injury

Geraci v Hevesi, 37 AD3d 941

Joseph Geraci, a police officer, injured his left knee while participating in training course. Geraci said that his injury occurred when his left foot sank into an exercise mat and his sneaker gripped the mat, thereby causing his left leg to twist as he attempted to move to his right.

Claiming that the injury resulted from an accident, Geraci applied for accidental disability retirement benefits. The Retirement System’s hearing officer found that Geraci failed to establish that the incident resulting in his injury constituted an accident within the meaning of the Retirement and Social Security Law. The State Comptroller accepted the Hearing Officer's findings and conclusions, and disapproved Geraci ’s application for accidental disability retirement benefits.

The Appellate Division confirmed the Comptroller’s determination. The court said that based on its review of the record, “we cannot characterize the subject incident as a “'sudden, fortuitous mischance, unexpected, out of the ordinary, and injurious in impact'“ that would support a finding that Geraci’s injury resulted from an accident.

Rather, said the court, Geraci ’s injury “was the result of a training program constituting an ordinary part of petitioner's job duties and the normal risks arising therefrom,” citing Matter of Felix v New York State Comptroller, 28 AD3d 993, and other rulings.*

For the full text of the opinion, go to:

http://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/3dseries/2007/2007_01046.htm

* The Appellate Division also commented that “regarding [Geraci’s argument concerning] the inappropriateness of his footwear, even if accepted, would not transform the incident into an accidental event.”

Payment of unreimbursed medical expenses permitted by the Internal Revenue Code via a “Health Reimbursement Arrangement Plan” held not the same as health insurance premiums

Payment of unreimbursed medical expenses permitted by the Internal Revenue Code via a “Health Reimbursement Arrangement Plan” held not the same as health insurance premiums

Kathleen Rockwell et al v Broadalbin-Perth Central School District, Supreme Court, Fulton County, Judge Joseph M. Sise, Decision [RJI #27-1-2009-05091. Motion #13, April 18, 2011]

The Broadalbin-Perth Central School District was providing active employees and their dependents represented Broadalbin-Perth Teacher’s Association with health insurance. Upon retirement, the District continued to provide the same level of benefit to Association retirees and their dependents.

The District and the Association then entered into a “memorandum of understanding” that modified the District’s Health Insurance Plan. One of the key components of the new plan, and the focus of this litigation, was the creation of a “District-funded Health Reimbursement Arrangement" [HRA] providing for the payment of unreimbursed medical, dental, and other allowable expenses "permitted by the Internal Revenue Code."

The HRA provided for an annual contribution of $500 by the District for each employee in the negotiating unit to the individual’s HRA. It also featured a “rollover” permitting the HRA account to accumulate up to a $10,000 “maximum balance cap.” Upon retirement the plan provided for a one-time $3,000 HRA contribution. While a retiree could submit qualified medical expenses for reimbursement from his or her HRA fund, no additional contributions would be made to their HRA.

Contending that HRA with respect to retirees violated the mandates set out in Chapter 30 of the Laws of 2009,* Rockwell sued the District seeking a court order to compel the District to reimburse the retirees affected by the change for certain medical care expenses they had incurred as a result of the implementation of the HRA program.

The thrust of Rockwell's argument was that District's HRA contribution for retirees violated Chapter 30 insofar as it provided a different level of benefit for retirees than it did for active employees. Judge Sise disagreed.

The court said that HRA accounts only provide a means for active members to pay their unreimbursed medical and other qualified expenses and that the District’s contributions to an HRA account, or the possibility of underwriting the cost of insurance copayments from an HRA account, were not within the scope of, or in violation of, Chapter 30 as claimed by Rockwell.

Further, said the court, Rockwell failed to show that the retirees had sustained any diminution of health insurance benefits greater than those experienced by active employees as a result of the implementation of the HRA for both active employees and retirees of the District.

Indeed, said Judge Sise, the District demonstrated that “even considering the $500 annual HRA contribution … retirees are each still saving an average of $264.17 more per year [in health insurance costs] than each active employee” and dismissed Rockwell's petition.

* Chapter 30 of the Law of 2009 temporarily** extended the provisions of §1 of Chapter 566 of the Laws of 1967, which Chapter, in pertinent part, provided that BOCES and school districts could not diminish the health insurance benefits and employer contributions for such benefits provided to retirees “unless a corresponding diminution of benefits or contributions is effected from the present level … from the corresponding group of [active] employees….”

** N.B. Part B of §14 of Chapter 504 of the Laws of 2009 made this provision "permanent."

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Guidelines followed in determining if an individual was provided administrative due process in a quasi-judicial hearing

Guidelines followed in determining if an individual was provided administrative due process in a quasi-judicial hearing

Matter of Hildreth v New York State Dept. of Motor Vehicles Appeals Bd., 2011 NY Slip Op 03066, Appellate Division, Second Department

In considering this appeal from an adverse administrative decision that resulted in the  revocation of Wilbur Hildreth’s driver's license pursuant to Vehicle and Traffic Law §1194 for one year as the result of his refusal to submit to a chemical blood-alcohol test, the Appellate Division addressed a number of issues concerning administrative adjudication procedures.

The court said that:

1. In order to annul an administrative determination made after a hearing, a court must conclude that the record lacks substantial evidence to support the determination;

2. Substantial evidence is "such relevant proof as a reasonable mind may accept as adequate to support a conclusion or ultimate fact;

3. The courts may not weigh the evidence or reject the choice made by an administrative agency where the evidence is conflicting and room for choice exists; and

4. Unlike the constitutional right to confrontation in criminal matters, parties in administrative proceedings have only a limited right to cross-examine adverse witnesses as a matter of due process.

In response to Hildreth’s argument that the administrative proceeding should have been dismissed” for failure to hold a hearing within a reasonable time as required under the State Administrative Procedure Act §301 or within six months from the date the DMV received notice of his chemical test refusal as required under 15 NYCRR 127.2(b)(2),” the Appellate Division said that the time limitations imposed on administrative agencies by their own regulations are not mandatory.

Unless the individual can show the delay caused “substantial prejudice,” he or she is not  entitled to relief for an agency's noncompliance with its own “time limits” controlling the proceeding.

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://www.courts.state.ny.us/reporter/3dseries/2011/2011_03066.htm

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Crediting prior public service upon reemployment by a public employer

Crediting prior public service upon reemployment by a public employer

Cherniak v Office of Court Administration, 269 A.D.2d 680

From time to time an individual will claim that he or she should be given credit for certain benefits, typically for the purpose of determining salary or member service in a retirement system, based on his or her prior service with another public employer. A claim for “service credit for salary” based on prior state service was the basic issue considered by the Appellate Division in the Cherniak case.

Samuel A. Cherniak, then an employee of the Unified Court System [OCA], accepted an appointment as an Assistant Attorney-General [AAG] with the State Law Department and served as an AAG until October 1995. In early 1998 OCA appointed him to the position of Court Attorney. OCA credited Cherniak with his OCA service prior to his employment as an AAG in setting his rate of compensation. However, said OCA, such credit upon reinstatement was allowed only for OCA service and it refused to give him any credit for his AAG service with the New York State Department of Law.

OCA gave Cherniak two reasons for it action. First, OCA’s rules allowed it to grant such credit upon reinstatement of former OCA employees. Second, the Comptroller’s policy allowed non-OCA prior State service to be given only to an employee who returned to public service within one year. Cherniak appealed, challenging the Comptroller’s interpretation of “continuous service” to mean a “break in service for salary determination” of one year or less.

Both the Section 37.8 of the Judiciary Law and Section 131.5 of the Civil Service Law allow for approving salary rates greater then the minimum of the salary grade for the position upon “reinstatement” for individuals having “continuous service.”

Was the Comptroller’s interpretation of the term “continuous service” reasonable?

The Appellate Division thought it was. Pointing out that purpose of these provisions is to encourage employees to remain in State service, the court said that “the Comptroller’s policy promotes that purpose by allowing salary credit for prior service where an employee returns to State service after a brief break in service, but not where there is a substantial break in service.”

Cherniak tried to persuade the Appellate Division that the Comptroller’s interpretation was irrational, contending that there was no particular reason for the Comptroller’s selection of one year as the limit for a break in service.

The court disagreed, holding that it was rational for the Comptroller to construe the statutory phrase “continuously occupying” a position as encompassing “a relatively brief break in service” -- one year -- while no rational construction of the phrase would encompass Cherniak’s 2 1/2 year break in service.

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Eligibility for overtime

Eligibility for overtime

Spradling v City of Tulsa, CA10, 95 F.3d 1492

The U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit has rejected a claim by district fire chiefs employed by Tulsa, Oklahoma, for overtime payments under the Fair Labor Standards Act [FLSA].

The district chiefs claimed that such payments were required by the FLSA. The circuit court disagreed, ruling that the chiefs were “bona fide executive, administrative, or professional employees” within the meaning of FLSA and therefore not subject to its overtime provisions. In other words, they were “exempt” employees.

In Alden v Maine, 527 U.S. 706, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the Eleventh Amendment bars state employees suing their state employer in federal court without the state’s consent.

However, in Alden the court noted an “important limitation” to the principle of sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment -- such immunity does not cover “lesser entities” such as political subdivisions of a state.

In the words of the Supreme Court, “[t]he immunity does not extend to suits prosecuted against a municipal corporation or other governmental entity that is not an arm of the State.”

The City of Tulsa case demonstrates that federal courts will continue to hear claims brought by public employees alleging violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act involving a political subdivision of a state that is not an “arm of the state.”

However, it could be argued that because sworn officers serving with a municipal police department are exercising “the police powers of the state,” their employer is “an arm of the state” and thus the municipality has Eleventh Amendment immunity from law suits in federal court.
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