Veteran's rights upon the abolishment of positions for economy or other lawful purpose

Veteran's rights upon the abolishment of positions for economy or other lawful purpose

Fromer v Commissioner of Labor, 268 AD2d 707

An individual’s status as veteran within the meaning of Section 75 of the Civil Service Law may provide an individual with rights and benefits beyond the “disciplinary due process rights” usually claimed, as the Fromer case demonstrates.

Howard A. Fromer was serving as the general counsel to the State Energy Office when the agency was abolished on March 31, 1999. Fromer’s application for unemployment insurance was rejected by the Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board.

The Board ruled that Section 565 of the Labor Law barred Fromer from receiving benefits because he served in a major nontenured policymaking or advisory position that was statutorily excluded as employment for the purpose of qualifying for benefits.”

Fromer appealed, claiming that:

1. The exclusion in Labor Law Section 565 (2) (e) should be construed as containing an exception where the individual is terminated as the result of the abolition of his or her position;

2. Section 75(1)(b) of the Civil Service Law gave him “limited tenure” rights by reason of his status as a veteran.

The Appellate Division rejected Fromer’s first argument, commenting that “the statutory exclusion focuses “solely on the nature of claimant’s position in the governmental agency,” not on the reason for a claimant’s termination.

The court said that the Board decided that Labor Law Section 565(2)(e) does not include the abolishment-of-position exception Fromer claimed. As this conclusion is “neither irrational nor unreasonable in light of the absence of language in the statute to suggest that the Legislature intended any such exception,” the Appellate Division ruled that the Board’s statutory interpretation must be upheld since it was “rational and reasonable.”

The alternative argument presented by Fromer did better as it raised an issue not previously considered by the Board -- Section 75(b)(1) of the Civil Service Law provided him with a “a limited grant of tenure” sufficient to qualify him for benefits.

The Appellate Division said that the Board’s determination had to be reversed and remitted reconsideration, rejecting the Attorney General’s argument that the record provided a rational basis for the Board’s determination.

Why? Because, said the court, the Board had not based its determination, much less considered his claim of “limited tenure status,” in deciding Fromer’s eligibility for unemployment insurance benefits.

Commenting that it is well settled that “judicial review of an administrative determination is limited to the grounds invoked by the agency,” the court said that this issue had to be addressed by the Board as to “its determination of [Fromer’s] entitlement to the limited tenure afforded by Section 75(b)(1).”

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Qualified immunity from civil lawsuits

Qualified immunity from civil lawsuits 

Doninger v. Niehoff, USCA, Second Circuit, Docket Nos. 09–1452–cv (L), 09–1601–cv (XAP), 09–2261–cv (CON) 

Avery Doninger, a high school student, claimed that school administrators violated her First Amendment rights to free speech by (1) preventing her from running for Senior Class Secretary as a direct consequence of her off-campus internet speech, and (2) prohibiting her from wearing a homemade printed t-shirt at a subsequent school assembly.

The United States Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, said that in adjudicating Doninger’s claims it had to determine if the school administrators involved were entitled to qualified immunity.* 

Concluding that the First Amendment claimed by Doninger was not clearly established, the Second Circuit affirmed Federal District court's decision that administrators were entitled to qualified immunity.

Addressing Doninger’s First Amendment claims at issue with respect to the defense based on the “doctrine of qualified immunity” advanced by the school administrators, the court said the in deciding whether to grant a government official's motion for summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds, a court conducts a two-part inquiry.

The first test: considering “the facts" in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, do they show that the [official's] conduct violated a constitutional right.”

If the plaintiff’s cause survives that test, the court then applies a second test: whether the right at issue was ‘clearly established’ at the time of [the official's] alleged misconduct.”

If the court finds that the public officer’s conduct did not violate a clearly established constitutional right, or if it was objectively reasonable for the officer to believe that his or her conduct did not violate such a right, then the official is protected by qualified immunity.

In determining if a right is clearly established, the Second Circuit said that it looks to whether (1) it was defined with reasonable clarity, (2) the Supreme Court or the Second Circuit has confirmed the existence of the right, and (3) a reasonable defendant would have understood that his conduct was unlawful. Significantly, the court said that “The question is not what a lawyer would learn or intuit from researching case law, but what a reasonable person in [the official’s] position should know about the constitutionality of the conduct.”

Further, said the court, “when faced with a qualified immunity defense, a court should consider the specific scope and nature of a defendant's qualified immunity claim. That is, a determination of whether the right at issue was ‘clearly established’ must be undertaken in light of the specific context of the case, not as a broad general proposition.”

Citing Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, the Second Circuit concluded that “it would gravely distort the doctrine of qualified immunity to hold that a school official should fairly be said to ‘know’ that the law forb[ids] conduct not previously identified as unlawful.” In Harlow the U.S. Supreme Court held that “government officials performing discretionary functions are generally shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known."

Another area in which a qualified privilege may be asserted involves communication. For example, an employee's conduct or behavior may be the subject of oral or written communications between administrators or administrators and employees. If the employee objects to the content of such communications, he or she may sue the employer and the individuals involved for defamation, claiming the contents of the communications concerning his or her behavior constitutes slander [if oral] or libel [if written].

The individuals being sued for defamation in such cases will often respond that the statements they made in such communications are privileged and thus they are immune from liability for their actions.

In Herlihy v Metropolitan Museum of Art, 214 A.D.2d 250, the Appellate Division considered such a case.

Summarized below are the views of the Appellate Division, First Department, concerning an administrators' or an employees' claim that their statements are privileged or that they are protected by some form of immunity in making such statements.

The issue arose when a number of individuals serving as volunteers with the Metropolitan Museum of Art complained that their supervisor, Cecile Herlihy, directed racial or ethnic epithets towards them. Herlihy denied the charges.

After what the Appellate Division characterized as "some sort of investigation," Herlihy was directed to "apologize for her remarks."

Ultimately Herlihy was dismissed by the Museum. She sued, claiming, among other allegations, that she had been slandered when charged with directing racial or ethnic epithets towards the volunteers making the complaint.

The defendants, on the other hand, argued that their statements were protected by an absolute or qualified immunity for the following reasons:

1. State and federal human rights laws gave them absolute immunity from retaliation for filing complaints alleging unlawful discrimination.

2. A "common-law privilege absolutely protected them from defamation suits" based on their communicating these allegations to Museum officials.

3. The statements that made concerning Herlihy were protected by a qualified privilege.

A state Supreme Court justice dismissed the action filed by Herlihy against the Museum but denied the volunteers' motion to dismiss Herlihy's action against them in its entirety. The volunteers appealed the Supreme Court's decision. The Appellate Division addressed each of their arguments in turn, holding that the following guidelines apply:

1. Statutory provisions prohibiting retaliation for filing civil rights complaints do not protect "bad faith complainants making false discriminatory related charges" from defamation actions that might arise following the filing of such complaints.

2. Common-law provides absolute immunity from defamation actions "only to those individuals participating in a judicial, legislative or executive function and is based on the personal position of status of the speaker."

3. Under New York law, a "qualified privilege" or a "qualified immunity" applies only in situations involving "good faith communications by a party having an interest in a subject, or a moral or societal duty to speak, ... made to [another] party having a corresponding interest."

With respect to claims of absolute immunity under common-law, the Appellate Division noted a ruling by the Court of Appeals concluded that a private citizen speaking at a public hearing "was not conferred with absolute privilege because, unlike members of the ... Board, the [individual] had no office at the hearing [see 600 West 115th St. Corp. v Von Gutfeld, 80 NY2d 130].

The Appellate Division ruled that the defendants in this action did not enjoy absolute immunity under common-law because "they did not make their statements in an official capacity while discharging a governmental duty, nor were the statements made during, or for, a judicial, quasi-judicial or administrative hearings."

In considering the defendant's claim to a qualified privilege, the Appellate Division said that "the underlying rationale behind a qualified privilege is that so long as the privilege is not abused, the flow of information between parties sharing a common interest should not be impeded." A qualified privilege will be lost, however, if the statements claimed to be defamatory were "published with malice or with knowledge of their falsity or reckless disregard as to their truth or falsity...." 

The decision indicates that "common interest warranting a qualified privilege" has been found to exist between employees of an organization [Loughry v Lincoln First Bank, 67 NY2d 369], members of a faculty tenure committee [Stukuls v State of New York, 42 NY2d 272], and employees of a board of education [Green v Kinsella, 36 AD2d 677].

How did the Appellate Division resolve this case? First it upheld the lower court's ruling dismissing Herlihy's action against the Museum for "emotional distress." It then held that "it would be inconsistent to deny an action for emotional distress caused by [being charged] with the use of ethnic slurs while allowing one for being falsely labeled as a user of such slurs." Accordingly, the Appellate Division concluded that Herlihy's action for slander should be dismissed as well.

The Court said that although the racial or ethnic epithets attributed to Herlihy were "deplorable and ... evidence of a certain narrow-mindedness and mean-spiritedness ... [it] ... does not rise to the level of outrage required to recover under a cause of action that is limited to only the most egregious acts." In other words, the allegations of the defendants were not so egregious as to be sufficient to allow Herlihy to recover for being falsely labeled a user of such slurs.

* In contrast to the Doctrine of Qualified Immunity,” the Doctrine of Absolute Immunity insulates certain public officials from civil lawsuits involving the performance of their official duties. Included among those protected by “absolute immunity” are legislators in connection with their legislative duties and judicial and quasi-judicial officers performing judicial or quasi-judicial functions. 

The Doninger decision is posted on the Internet at: 

http://www.ca2.uscourts.gov/decisions/isysquery/c811c4ed-2d34-4a20-91ca-3c5ccf044757/1/doc/09-1452_opn.pdf#xml=http://www.ca2.uscourts.gov/decisions/isysquery/c811c4ed-2d34-4a20-91ca-3c5ccf044757/1/hilite/ 

The Herlihy decision is posted on the Internet at: 

http://weblinks.westlaw.com/result/default.aspx?cfid=1&cnt=DOC&db=NY-ORCS-WEB&eq=search&fmqv=c&fn=_top&method=TNC&n=1&origin=Search&query=%22CECILE+HERLIHY%22&rlt=CLID_QRYRLT464015158845&rltdb=CLID_DB449175058845&rlti=1&rp=%2Fsearch%2Fdefault.wl&rs=NYOFF1.0&service=Search&sp=NYOFF-1000&srch=TRUE&ss=CNT&sskey=CLID_SSSA579175058845&sv=Split&tempinfo=word&vr=2.0

Discipline penalties

Discipline penalties

Nicastro v Safir, App. Div., First Dept, 266 AD2d 167

Queally v Safir, App. Div., First Dept, 266 AD2d 167
Dillon v Safir, App. Div., First Dept., 265 AD2d 196

Penalties imposed following disciplinary action taken pursuant to Section 75 of the Civil Service Law are frequently challenged by appealing either to the civil service commission having jurisdiction or to the courts pursuant to an Article 78 proceeding [Article 78, Civil Practice Law and Rules].

Although the penalty of dismissal is the one most frequently appealed, lesser penalties are also subject to challenge as the Nicastro, Queally and Dillon cases demonstrate.

In Nicastro case, New York City police officer Ann Nicastro challenged her being found guilty of having been discourteous to individuals in the course of effecting an arrest.

The penalty imposed: the loss of 15 days of vacation time. The Appellate Division sustained both the disciplinary determination and the penalty imposed.

In Queally, decided with Nicastro, the court affirmed the imposition of the penalty of the loss of 10 days of vacation time after New York City police officer Robert Queally was found guilty of using excessive force to effect an arrest.

The Appellate Division referred to Pell v Board of Education, 34 NY2d 222, in support of these rulings.

A similar penalty, 10 days suspension without pay, was imposed on a New York City police officer found guilty of directing ethnically offensive epithets to a garage attendant while off-duty [Police Department v Murray, OATH #111/00, 11/26/99].

The third case, Dillon v Safir, also involved allegations of the use of excessive force.*

Here New York City police officer Bradley Dillon contested his being guilty of using excessive force in effecting an arrest and the penalty imposed: “dismissal probation for one year” and the forfeiture of 30 days of annual leave credit.

The Appellate Division dismissed his petition, holding that the disciplinary determination was supported by the records and that the penalty imposed by the Commissioner was reasonable under the circumstances.

* Dillon was subsequently terminated during his disciplinary probationary period [see 270 AD2d 116 – Here the Appellate Division upheld Dillon’s termination without a hearing and without a statement of reasons while he was serving a one-year disciplinary probation imposed pursuant to Administrative Code of the City of New York § 14-115 (d). This penalty was the one affirmed by 265 AD2d 196, above.

Eligibility for benefits pursuant to the Volunteer Firefighters' Benefit Law

Eligibility for benefits pursuant to the Volunteer Firefighters' Benefit Law

Matter of Weinstein v Somers Fire Dist., 37 AD3d 917

Robert Weinstein, a self-employed real estate agent, sustained a back injury in July 2001 while lifting an oxygen tank into an ambulance in furtherance of his duties as a volunteer firefighter. A Workers' Compensation Law Judge ruled that Weinstein’s injury constituted a permanent partial disability and that he had suffered a 50% loss of earning capacity. Accordingly, Weinstein was eligible for benefits provided by Section 10 of the Volunteer Firefighters' Benefit Law.*

The Fire District and its workers' compensation carrier appealed the Workers’ Compensation Board’s determination.

According to the ruling, Weinstein suffered "chronic low back pain . . . [which] reduced his ability to work." The record indicated that Weinstein’s employer had indicated that Weinstein’s “average work hours had been lowered from 60 hours per week to 25 hours per week” because of the work-related injury that resulted in Weinstein’s “chronic low back pain.”

This, said the Appellate Division, constituted substantial evidence in support of the Board's decision that claimant's injury resulted in a 50% reduction in earning capacity.

* The Volunteer Firefighters’ Benefit Law provides, in relevant part: “A volunteer firefighter who is injured in the line of duty is entitled to workers' compensation benefits if he or she demonstrates a loss of earning capacity, namely, an inability to continue performing either the employment duties usually and ordinarily performed at the time of injury or those required by a reasonable substitute."

School district’s lawsuit against former members of a school board for alleged fiscal mismanagement held subject to a six-year statute of limitations and thus was timely filed

School district’s lawsuit against former members of a school board for alleged fiscal mismanagement held subject to a six-year statute of limitations and thus was timely filed 

Roslyn Union Free School Dist. v Barkan, 2011 NY Slip Op 03646, Court of Appeals

The issue in this appeal was whether a three or six-year statute of limitations applies to causes of action for negligence and breach of fiduciary duty by a school district against a former member of its school board. The Court of Appeals held the six-year limitations period in CPLR 213(7) is applicable and, therefore, this action was timely commenced by the School District against a former member of the school board.*

The School District’s action against a number of members of the school board stemmed from what the Court of Appeals characterized as a long-running conspiracy to loot the school district's coffers by a number of school district administrators. An extensive forensic audit by the State Comptroller determined that, from 1998 through 2004, approximately $11 million had been misappropriated: Assistant Superintendent for Business Pamela Gluckin had stolen over $4.6 million; Superintendent Frank Tassone had taken more than $2.4 million; and Account Clerk Deborah Rigano had received about $300,000. Various sums had been funneled to more than two dozen people.

The court noted that one of the defendants in this action, Carol Margaritis, was a member of the Board for approximately one year, beginning in 2000 and left the Board before Gluckin's criminal activities came to light. Further, said the court, there are no allegations that Margaritis knew about the ongoing illegal scheme, benefited from the theft of the school district's funds or received any portion of the stolen monies. Her only link to the situation was that she was a member of the Board during a time period that funds were being stolen by school district employees.

In any event, Margaritis moved to dismiss the complaint against her, arguing that the causes of action were time-barred because the school district's claims were subject to the three-year statute of limitations in CPLR 214 (4) and the complaint was filed more than three years after she ceased being a school board member. This argument was rejected by the high court and it ruled that the six-year statute of limitations controlled and thus the lawsuit against her was timely.

The Court of Appeals commented that this was “an unusual case because it is rare for school districts to engage in litigation against the individuals who voluntarily seek election to serve on school boards. Such public service is commendable and a vital component of our state's legal and moral duty to educate its children. The filing of a lawsuit by a school district against the members of its school board is certainly a disincentive for attracting qualified candidates to perform this important civic function.”

The court attributed this action by the district as responding to a particularly egregious set of facts involving severe financial mismanagement — over $11 million was stolen from taxpayers in a criminal conspiracy operated by two high-ranking school district employees and certain members of the Board were allegedly complicit because they may have breached the duties that were entrusted to them to protect the school district's assets.

Although the complaint here was not barred by the statute of limitations, the court agree with the Appellate Division that the school district's allegations did not state a cause of action against Margaritis for an accounting. “This equitable remedy is designed to require a person in possession of financial records to produce them, demonstrate how money was expended and return pilfered funds in his or her possession.”

As the State Comptroller was able to trace countless financial transactions in order to determine how the vast bulk of the stolen monies was used and the identity of the individuals who received the funds, the court ruled that there appeared to be no need for an accounting by Margaritis, but reinstated the causes of action for breach of fiduciary duty, common-law negligence and declaratory judgment as against her as having been timely filed.

* The question before the Court of Appeals was not whether any board member bears a degree of responsibility for the financial losses suffered by Roslyn Union Free School District but whether the case against the former members of the school board was timely filed.

The decision is posted on the Internet at: 

http://www.courts.state.ny.us/reporter/3dseries/2011/2011_03646.htm