Strict compliance with evaluation procedures excused in view of evidence attesting to the terminated probationary teacher’s poor performance in class

Strict compliance with evaluation procedures excused in view of evidence attesting to the terminated probationary teacher’s poor performance in class

Matter of Brown v Board of Educ. of the City School Dist. of the City of New York, 2011 NY Slip Op 07908, Appellate Division, First Department

A probationary teacher served with the New York City School System for three years and was terminated at the end of his third year. Consistent with a review procedure set forth in the collective bargaining agreement between the Board of Education and the teacher’s employee organization, the teacher appealed his temination to the Department of Education's Office of Appeal and Review [OAR].

The teacher’s principal and assistant principal were called as witnesses by the Department of Education at the OAR hearing during which they testified about the teacher’s poor performance in class management and engagement of students. Also introduced in the course of the hearing was the teacher’s Annual Professional Performance Review and Report on Probationary Service of Pedagogical Employee [APPR] that indicated a "U-rating."

In addition to cross-examining the DOE's witnesses, the teacher pointed out that the APPR report was deficient in several respects, namely that no documentation was annexed to the APPR as required by the Chancellor's rating handbook and that sections of the report were left blank. Ultimately the teacher was denied his Certification of Completion of Probation, whereupon he initiated an Article 78 proceeding challenging the determination to terminate him.

Supreme Court found that the Board of Education’s determination that resulted in the teacher’s unsatisfactory performance rating and his being discontinued from service was in violation of lawful procedure in that “the APPR report was not in strict compliance with the procedures set forth in the Rating Handbook promulgated by the Chancellor.”

The Appellate Division, however, unanimously reversed Supreme Court’s ruling “on the law” and reinstated the Board of Education’s decision to terminate the teacher.

The Appellate Division said that the teacher had failed to demonstrate that his termination as a probationary employee was arbitrary and capricious or was made in bad faith, noting that the teacher did not dispute that the evidence adduced at the hearing from the principal and assistant principal. That evidence, said the court,  provided "ample ground for his discontinuance."

The court said that the principal and the assistant principal described teacher's poor performance in class management and engagement of students, which descriptions were based on their personal classroom observations. Under these circumstances, said the Appellate Division, any deficiencies in the APPR report "do not render the determination to discontinue his employment arbitrary and capricious" as the hearing testimony provided ample grounds for terminating the teacher.

Reinstatement following layoff focuses on tenure rights

Reinstatement following layoff focuses on tenure rights

Chauvel v. Nyquist, 55 AD2 76, affd., 43 NY2 48)

Does “greater system-wide service” control situations involving layoff of teachers, or is it seniority in corresponding or similar positions that determines which person is to be offered an open teaching position first?

Where the performance of duties of the open position is unquestionably “similar” to those of the abolished positions, the teacher having the greater seniority in the performance area, not in the employing school district itself, is to receive the appointment.

Standards for such re-employment are more narrow than those dealing with layoff (Ward v. Nyquist, 43 NY2d 57) so as to prevent erosion of the tenure rights of the incumbents of abolished positions and means that the duties required to be performed in the vacant position must be similar to the duties performed by the person in his previous position before it was abolished. A test was stated in Matter of Elkins, 14 Ed Dept Repts 193, to the effect that if more than one-half of the functions to be performed by the incumbent of the new position are those which he performed in his old position, the positions are similar.

Tenured employee protected from political firing

Tenured employee protected from political firing

Branti v. Finkel, U.S. Supreme Court, 445 U.S. 507

The United States Supreme Court upheld a decision of the District Court, Southern District of New York, which ruled that two public defenders could not be removed from their positions because of their political affiliation. Both served in exempt class positions on a part-time basis. 

It was reported that both were Republicans, one having been appointed by a Republican while the other had been appointed earlier by a Democrat. Rejecting the argument that a necessary confidential relationship existed between the Public Defender and his assistants, and that such a relationship could not be had if the Public Defender was of a different political party than his assistants, the Court stated that the crucial point is whether the hiring authority can demonstrate that party affiliation is an appropriate requirement for effective performance. 

The decision in this case suggests that the Court’s views with respect to a political test for appointment might be the same as its views concerning removal from the public service. By indicating that performance was the significant consideration, the Court may well have limited the selection to the public service on the basis of merit and fitness in all but the rarest of situations.

Creating new positions

Creating new positions

Civil Service Employees Association v. Town of Harrison, 48 NY2d 66

There is only one way to create a new position, the way the controlling law requires.

The statutory imperatives of Section 22 of the Civil Service Law reflects such a strong public policy with respect to establishing new positions that it may not be ignored nor may it be circumvented under color of an “alternative” to the provisions of Section 22 contained in a collective bargaining agreement negotiated pursuant to the Taylor Law (Section 200 et seq, Civil Service Law).

Failing to comply with the mandates of Civil Service Law §22 is fatal and no new position can come into being unless it is created as prescribed by the section.

While the Court in its decision did not address the “status” of the incumbent of the “new position”, it would appear that the “status” of the individual is not dependent on the “existence” of any position and, presumably, other relevant provisions of the Civil Service Law (i.e., Section 80, Layoff) would control if the incumbent of the “nonexistent new position” could no longer serve as a “position” for payroll purposes.

Decisions of interest concerning Labor and Employment Law

Decisions of interest concerning Labor and Employment Law
Source: Justia November 11, 2011

Field v. Napolitano

Court: U.S. 1st Circuit Court of Appeals

Docket: 11-1339

November 10, 2011

Judge: Lynch

Areas of Law: Government & Administrative Law, Labor & Employment Law

A TSA worker developed a diabetic ulcer on his foot, was unable to work, and, after missing several months of work, was terminated from his position. The district court dismissed claims under the Aviation and Transportation Security Act (ATSA), 115 Stat. 597, and the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. 791. The First Circuit affirmed, concluding that the ATSA clearly eliminates any cause of action under the Rehabilitation Act for TSA screeners.

http://j.st/GmM

Farris v. Shinseki

Court: U.S. 1st Circuit Court of Appeals

Docket: 11-1080

November 10, 2011

Judge: Thompson

Areas of Law: Government & Administrative Law, Labor & Employment Law

Plaintiff, an employee of the VA, was accused of committing fraud with respect to a work-related injury. Her employment was terminated. When mediation failed, plaintiff was notified that she had 15 days to file a complaint with the EEOC. Her attorney failed to comply with the deadline and the EEOC dismissed her complaint. The district court dismissed a complaint of disability discrimination. The First Circuit affirmed. Both the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12112(a) and the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000e, require exhaustion of administrative remedies. Plaintiff did not establish the factors required to toll the time limit: she and her attorney were aware of the limitation period; no motion for appointment of counsel was pending; the court did not lead plaintiff to believe she had done everything required; and no affirmative misconduct by the VA had lulled her into inaction.

http://j.st/GmY

Makowski v. SmithAmundsen LLC

Court: U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals

Docket: 10-3330

November 9, 2011

Judge: Young

Areas of Law: Family Law, Labor & Employment Law

Plaintiff, a law firm marketing director, took leave under the Family Medical Leave Act just before the birth of her child and continuing after the birth. While she was on leave, her supervisors informed her that her position was eliminated as part of an organizational restructuring and terminated her employment. She filed suit, alleging pregnancy discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended by the Pregnancy Discrimination Act; interference with rights under the FMLA; retaliation under the FMLA; and a violation of her right to a bonus under the FMLA. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The Seventh Circuit reversed.Statements allegedly made by the human resources director, fell within the scope of the h.r. director's employment and should have been admitted as nonhearsay under Rule 801(d)(2)(D). Those statements provided direct evidence of discriminatory intent and of a connection between taking leave and termination.

http://j.st/GAw

Overly v. KeyBank Nat'l Ass'n

Court: U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals

Docket: 10-2705

November 10, 2011

Judge: Conley

Areas of Law: Labor & Employment Law

Plaintiff, a financial advisor, sued her employer for allegedly discriminating based on her gender and retaliating against her because of her complaints of gender discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the employer. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. There was no evidence that a realignment of territories or disciplinary action against plaintiff were based on her gender. While both inappropriate and condescending, a supervisor referring to plaintiff as "cutie" 5 to 10 times over the course of two months was not sufficiently severe or pervasive to create a hostile work environment by itself, especially since it is undisputed that he stopped when asked. Plaintiff did not prove constructive discharge. The supervisor's patently offensive response to her resignation, "good riddance bitch," was not direct evidence of gender discrimination.

http://j.st/Gmw

Sutley v. Alabama Dept. of Pub. Safety

Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Docket: 1100970

November 4, 2011

Judge: Bolin

Areas of Law: Government & Administrative Law, Labor & Employment Law

Petitioner Andrew Sutley petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to direct the Court of Civil Appeals to quash a May 2011 writ. In its nion, the appellate court directed the Montgomery Circuit Court to vacate its December 2010 order that added the Alabama State Personnel Board as a party to Petitioner's administrative appeal. The underlying matter arose from Petitioner's dismissal from his job as an Alabama State Trooper. Petitioner moved to add the Board as respondent to his appeal at the circuit court. The circuit court granted that motion five months after the Board entered its final order upholding Petitioner's dismissal. The Board then petitioned the Court of Civil Appeals for a writ of mandamus to order the circuit court to dismiss Petitioner's case as untimely. Upon its review of the record, the Supreme Court found Petitioner did not have a clear legal right to a writ of mandamus to direct the appellate court to quash its writ of mandamus. Accordingly, the Supreme Court denied his petition.

http://j.st/GNB

Williams v. Plum Creek Timber Co.

Court: Montana Supreme Court

Docket: DA 11-0026

November 1, 2011

Judge: Nelson

Areas of Law: Labor & Employment Law

Employee brought an action under the Wrongful Discharge from Employment Act, alleging that he was wrongfully discharged from employment. Employer moved for summary judgment, contending that it had good cause to terminate Employee. The district court granted Employer's motion. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court erred in granting summary judgment for Employer because disputed issues of material fact still existed as to whether Employer violated the express provisions of its written personnel policy by failing to apply it consistently and equally to all of its employees, whether Employee wrongfully demoted and transferred Employee, and whether this demotion and transfer was directly linked to Employee's discharge.

http://j.st/GfA

Howsden v. Roper's Real Estate Co.

Court: Nebraska Supreme Court

Docket: S-11-174

October 28, 2011

Judge: Gerrard

Areas of Law: Business Law, Injury Law, Insurance Law, Labor & Employment Law

Plaintiff Darlene Howsden was injured on premises that were leased to her employer by a legally distinct entity that was owned and operated by the same shareholders as her employer. Plaintiff sued Defendant, the entity that owned the premises, for negligence. The district court granted summary judgment to Defendant, concluding that Plaintiff's exclusive remedy was under the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Act. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court erred in concluding that the exclusive remedy rule extended to Defendant because (1) Defendant was a legally separate entity from Plaintiff's employer, despite their corporate kinship, and there was no equitable basis to justify piercing the corporate veil between the two entities; and (2) therefore, Defendant was a third party to the employment relationship between Plaintiff and her employer, so Plaintiff's third-party claim against Defendant was not barred by the exclusive remedy provisions of the Act.

http://j.st/GfR

Scottsbluff Police Officers Ass'n v. City of Scottsbluff

Court: Nebraska Supreme Court

Docket: S-10-960

November 4, 2011

Judge: Gerrard

Areas of Law: Government & Administrative Law, Insurance Law, Labor & Employment Law

The City of Scottsbluff implemented changes to police officers' health insurance coverage and related benefits without bargaining with the Scottsbluff Police Officers Association (the Union). The Union filed a petition with the Nebraska Commission of Industrial Relations (CIR), alleging that the City violated Nebraska's Industrial Relations Act (IRA) by unilaterally implementing changes in the health insurance hazardous activities exclusion and by unilaterally changing the group health care benefits. The CIR (1) determined that the City violated the IRA, ordered the City to return the parties to the status quo ante, and ordered the parties to commence good faith negotiations within thirty days; and (2) determined that the Union had not violated the IRA in refusing to execute a previously ratified agreement. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) the portion of the CIR's order requiring the parties to commence good faith negotiations on the health insurance issues was affirmed; and (2) the Union's refusal to execute the previously ratified agreement constituted a prohibited practice under the IRA. Remanded to determine what remedies were available to the City for the Union's violation.

http://j.st/GND

State ex rel. Kingsley v. State Employment Relations Bd.

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Docket: 2011-0441

November 1, 2011

Judge: Per Curiam

Areas of Law: Government & Administrative Law, Labor & Employment Law

The State Employment Relations Board (SERB) appointed Kay Kingsley as an administrative law judge (ALJ), which was a classified position. Several years later, the General Assembly enacted H.B. 1, which changed the position of SERB ALJ from the classified service to the unclassified service. That same year, SERB terminated Kingsley's employment. Kingsley requested a writ of mandamus to declare H.B. 1 unconstitutional as applied to her and to order SERB to recognize her as a classified employee and to reinstate her to her former ALJ position. The court of appeals dismissed Kingsley's mandamus complaint, determining that Kingsley had an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law by way of an administrative appeal. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Kingsley did not set forth a viable claim for the requested extraordinary relief in mandamus as she had an adequate remedy by way of civil-service appeal to raise her claims.

http://j.st/Gfe

Home Paramount Pest Control Cos. v. Shaffer

Court: Virginia Supreme Court

Docket: 101837

November 4, 2011

Judge: Mims

Areas of Law: Contracts, Labor & Employment Law

Employee of a pest control company signed an employment agreement containing a provision stating that he would not engage in similar business within two years after he ceased employment. After resigning and within the two-year period set forth in the provision, Employee became employed by another pest control company. Employer filed a complaint asserting that Employee's subsequent employment violated the provision. Employee filed a plea in bar, asserting that the provision was overbroad and therefore unenforceable. The circuit court granted the plea in bar and dismissed the complaint. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err in ruling the provision was unenforceable.

http://j.st/Gxk

DeLoge v. State ex rel. Workers' Safety & Comp. Div.

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Docket: S-11-0072

November 9, 2011

Judge: Voigt

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Government & Administrative Law, Insurance Law, Labor & Employment Law

Appellant Steven DeLoge, an inmate in the state penitentiary, was working in the kitchen when he was injured in an altercation with another inmate. Appellant filed a workers' compensation claim based on the injuries sustained from a head-butt from the other inmate. The Wyoming Workers' Safety and Compensation Division (Division) denied the claim. The Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) concluded that Appellant's injuries were the result of illegal activity and were therefore not compensable under the Wyoming Worker's Compensation Act. The district court affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because the head-butt was a battery under the criminal statute then existing, and therefore an illegal activity, Appellant was not eligible for workers' compensation benefits.

http://j.st/GWW

Araguz v. State ex rel. Workers' Safety & Comp. Div.

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Docket: S-11-0029

October 28, 2011

Judge: Voigt

Areas of Law: Injury Law, Labor & Employment Law

Appellants, Timothy Araguz and James Elder, were injured in separate incidents while working at the Wal-Mart Distribution Center. After receiving compensation through Wal-Mart's private workers' compensation fund, Appellants filed for benefits under the Wyoming Worker's Compensation Act. The Wyoming Workers' Safety and Compensation Division denied their request, and the Office of Administrative Hearings confirmed the denial. At issue on appeal was whether Appellants were engaged in extrahazardous employment as defined by Wyo. Stat. Ann. 27-14-108. The Supreme Court affirmed the denial of benefits, holding that Wal-Mart was not engaged in extrahazardous employment as defined by the legislature and, therefore, Appellants were not entitled to workers' compensation benefits.

http://j.st/GfH

Bodily v. State ex rel. Workers' Safety & Comp. Div.

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Docket: S-11-0013

November 1, 2011

Judge: Golden

Areas of Law: Government & Administrative Law, Injury Law, Labor & Employment Law

The Wyoming Workers' Compensation Division denied Rick Bodily benefits for medical expenses related to his micro-lumbar discectomy for a herniated disc in his lower back after determining that Bodily's medical treatment was not related to his compensable work-related back injuries. The Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) granted the Division's motion for summary judgment against Bodily. The district court affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed OAH's summary judgment, holding (1) genuine issues of material fact about causation of Bodily's disc herniation existed; and (2) the OAH erroneously acted as the trier of fact at the summary judgment stage in this case by weighing all the evidence and making credibility determinations.

http://j.st/Gf8