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Feb 1, 2012

Union did not violate its duty of fair representation when it declined to submit a provisional employee’s disciplinary dismissal to arbitration

Union did not violate its duty of fair representation when it declined to submit a provisional employee’s disciplinary dismissal to arbitration
Mahinda v Board of Collective Bargaining, 2012 NY Slip Op 00636, Appellate Division, First Department

After an informal conference and "Step II" hearing, disciplinary allegations against Josephine Mahinda, a provisional employee, were sustained, and her employment with the New York City Department of Transportation was terminated.

Subsequently Mahinda failed to establish that her employee organization, the Organization of Staff Analysts, [OAS], breached its duty of fair representation by failing to advance to arbitration the grievance arising out of her termination. 

Although Mahinda argued that OSA should have processed her grievance to arbitration, the Appellate Division said that she had not established that an agreement providing for provisional disciplinary procedures had been negotiated pursuant to §65(5)(g)* of the Civil Service Law. §65(5)(g) authorizes the City and certain other public employers to enter such agreements in the course of collective bargaining..

After considering other theories advanced by Mahinda to support her argument that she was entitled to submit the matter to arbitration, the Appellate Division ruled that “there was no basis on which to grant [Mahinda’s] request….”

Nor, said the court, was there any basis for granting her request to review the City's underlying decision to terminate her. As a provisional employee, Mahinda could be terminated at any time, "without a hearing, for almost any reason, or for no reason at all," unless such action constituted an unconstitutional or unlawful action.

Finding that Mahinda failed to demonstrate that in terminating her employment the City violated Civil Service Law §65, which governs provisional appointments, or any other constitutional or statutory provision,"nor had  she demonstrated that her employment was terminated in bad faith or that the termination was arbitrary and capricious," the Appellate Division dismissed her appeal

* Civil Service Law §65.5(g) authorizes “The city of New York; and any other entities whose civil service and examinations are administered by the New York City Department of Citywide Administrative Services [DCAS] and an Article 14 [Taylor Law] employee organization, to enter into agreements to provide disciplinary procedures applicable to provisional appointees who have served for a period of 24 months or more in a position which is covered by such an agreement. Further, no such provisional employee is to be deemed to be permanently appointed, nor may such disciplinary procedures be deemed to preclude removal of an employee as a result of the establishment of and appointments from an appropriate eligible list or in accordance with any other provision of law. [N.B. Repealed December 31, 2014]

The decision is posted on the Internet at:
http://www.courts.state.ny.us/reporter/3dseries/2012/2012_00636.htm

Jan 31, 2012

New York State's University Police, Park Police, EnCon Officers and Forest Rangers approve new collective bargaining agreement

New York State's University Police, Park Police, EnCon Officers and Forest Rangers approve new collective bargaining agreement
Source: Office of the Governor

On January 31, 2010 Governor Andrew M. Cuomo and Manuel M. Vilar, President of the Police Benevolent Association of New York State, announced the ratification of a contract agreement between the state and the labor union representing New York State's University Police, Park Police, EnCon Officers and Forest Rangers. The union reports more than 95% of their members voted to ratify the contract.

The ratified contract resolves outstanding wage and contractual issues dating back to 2005, ensures protections against layoffs, and offers health benefits commensurate with other state bargaining units. The contract provides for zero percent wage increases for 2011-2013, a 2% increase in 2014, 9 days of deficit reduction leave, and adjustments to the health insurance premium.

The Agency Law Enforcement Services Unit (ALES) is composed of University police, Park Police, EnCon Officers and Forest Rangers. They have not had a contract since 2005 and were in arbitration for the years 2005-2007.

Key provision of the contract agreement include:

    · Zero percent wage increases for 2011-2013, a 2% increase in 2014. 
    · A $1,000 retention bonus paid out $775 in the third year and $225 in the fourth year. 
    · Deficit Reduction Leave of five days this fiscal year and four days next fiscal year. 
    · Retroactive payments that are scheduled to be paid in two installments -- one this fiscal year and one next fiscal year before the end of the calendar year. 
    · Health insurance premium share increase by 6% for both individual and families, making the share 16% for individuals and 31% for family premiums. 
    · Random drug testing and drug testing for probationary employees in addition to reasonable suspicion testing. 
    · A labor/management committee to review all leave taken by officers, including annual, personal, sick, workers compensation, and the manner of such use. Recommendations will be made to the President of the Union and the GOER Director for implementation. 
    · A health plan opt out so officers can opt out through a spouse/partner to a non-State health plan. Under the opt out, participants would receive $1,000 individual/$3,000 family . 
    · Officers will receive broad layoff protection. Workforce reductions due to management decisions to close or restructure facilities authorized by legislation, SAGE recommendations or material or unanticipated changes in the state's fiscal circumstances are not covered by this limitation.

The provisions in a “memorandum of understanding” that are limited to applying to “employees” do not apply to a “retired employee”

The provisions in a “memorandum of understanding” that are limited to applying to “employees” do not apply to a “retired employee”
Derosa v Dyster, 2011 NY Slip Op 09363, Appellate Division, Fourth Department

Patricia Derosa, a retired employee the City of Niagara Falls, sued the City in an effort to compel it to provide her with “either post-employment health insurance coverage or opt-out payments in lieu of such coverage, contending that she was entitled to such benefits pursuant to the terms of a Memorandum of Understanding [MOU] between the City and the Union.

The Appellate Division ruled that Derosa, as a retired employee, was not eligible to elect the “opting out” provision, explaining that the MOU gave qualified employees a choice of either participating in the health care plan or opting out of that plan. However, said the court, although the MOU permitted retirees to participate in the health care plan upon retirement under the same terms and conditions as employees, it did not contain a similar "opt-out provision" for retirees.

Pointing out that the opt-out paragraph set out in the MOU specifically stated that qualified employees could elect to opt-out of the health care plan, the Appellate Division held that Derosa, as a retiree, and thus no longer an employee, was entitled to enroll in the health care plan at no cost to her but could not elect to "opt-out."

The decision is posted on the Internet at:


Jan 30, 2012

Agency or insurance carrier must provide substantial evidence to rebut presumptions set out in Volunteer Firefighters’ Benefit Law as to cause of death

Agency or insurance carrier must provide substantial evidence to rebut presumptions set out in Volunteer Firefighters’ Benefit Law as to cause of death
Machajewski v Town of Cambria, 89 AD3d 1175

Gerald A. Machajewski, a volunteer firefighter for the Town of Cambria, Niagara County, collapsed while responding to a call and died shortly thereafter.

It was determined that Machajewski suffered an acute coronary artery thrombosis, and the Workers' Compensation Board, applying the rebuttable presumptions contained in Volunteer Firefighters' Benefit Law §§44 and 61*, ultimately approved a claim for workers' compensation death benefits by Machajewski’s widow.

When the Town’s and its workers' compensation carrier’s appealed the Board’s determination, the Appellate Division said that there is no dispute that a heart or coronary artery condition caused Machajewski's death and thus his widow would entitled to death benefits if that condition "resulted from the duties and activities in which [decedent] was engaged" (Volunteer Firefighters' Benefit Law §61[1]).

As the record indicated that Machajewski had never been diagnosed with a heart condition and had been examined by his physician just weeks before his death and was found to be in good health, the Appellate Division ruled that “Inasmuch as that ‘evidence permits reasonable inferences to sustain the finding of the [B]oard that the death was due to unusual strain and effort’ attendant to [Machajewski’s] duties, the Town was obliged to provide substantial evidence to the contrary in order to defeat his widow’s application.

The court held that “the Board properly determined that claimant's demonstration of entitlement to death benefits had not been rebutted.”

* Presumptions regarding death or disability due to disease or malfunction of his or her heart or coronary arteries suffered by a volunteer firefighter alleged to have resulted from the performance of the duties and activities in which the volunteer fireman was engaged

The decision is posted on the Internet at:
http://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/3dseries/2011/2011_07765.htm

Jan 27, 2012

A party's demand to arbitrate a grievance must survive a two-prong test: is the subject of the dispute arbitrable and, if so, did the parties agree to do so

A party's demand to arbitrate a grievance must survive a two-prong test: is the subject of the dispute arbitrable and, if so, did the parties agree to do so
Arbitration between the Town Of Saugerties and the Town of Saugerties Policeman's Benevolent Assn., 2012 NY Slip Op 00458, Appellate Division, Third Department
 
The Town of Saugerties challenged the Supreme Court's denial of its CPLR 7503 petition to stay the arbitration of a grievance filed by the Town of Saugerties Policeman's Benevolent Association [PBA] concerning an order that required a police officer to work in excess of an eight-hour tour.

The Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) stated, among other things, that the Town "agrees to comply with the requirements of §971 of the Unconsolidated Laws of New York."*

Courts, said the Appellate Division, determine arbitrability according to a two-prong test:

1. May the parties arbitrate the dispute and, if so,

2. Whether the parties in fact agreed to do so.

The Town contended that demand to arbitrate fails both tests as the resolution of the dispute:

1. Requires the application or interpretation of the terms of a statute and public policy will not permit an arbitrator to apply or interpret a statute, and

2. The parties did not agree to arbitrate the application or interpretation of the statute at issue here.

The Appellate Davison decided that neither of the Town’s arguments had merit, explaining that the CBA incorporates §971 by reference, making the language of the statute a substantive provision of the CBA.

Further, said the court, the Town had identified any public policy that would preclude the arbitrator from interpreting such language set out in the CBA.

In addition, the court noted that the CBA defines disputes as "[a]ny grievance arising concerning the interpretation or application of the terms of this contract or the rights claimed thereunder and/or working conditions."

As the dispute underlying the PBA’s grievance concerns overtime, which is clearly a working condition, clearly one that the parties intended to arbitrate the Appellate Division concluded that Supreme Court correctly granted the PBA’s cross motion to compel arbitration and dismissed the Town’s petition.

* §971 of the Unconsolidated Law, in relevant part, provides that police officers shall not be assigned to tours of duty exceeding eight consecutive hours of each consecutive 24 hours, with certain exceptions. See, also,  Police Asso. of the City of Mt. Vernon v City of Mt. Vernon, 279 A.D.2d 561, posted on the Internet at: http://caselaw.findlaw.com/ny-supreme-court/1055483.html

The decision is posted on the Internet at:


NYPPL Publisher Harvey Randall served as Principal Attorney, New York State Department of Civil Service; Director of Personnel, SUNY Central Administration; Director of Research, Governor’s Office of Employee Relations; and Staff Judge Advocate General, New York Guard. Consistent with the Declaration of Principles jointly adopted by a Committee of the American Bar Association and a Committee of Publishers and Associations, the material posted to this blog is presented with the understanding that neither the publisher nor NYPPL and, or, its staff and contributors are providing legal advice to the reader and in the event legal or other expert assistance is needed, the reader is urged to seek such advice from a knowledgeable professional.

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