Changing payroll-payment mode a mandatory subject of collective bargaining

Changing payroll-payment mode a mandatory subject of collective bargaining
United College Employees of Fashion Institute of Technology and Fashion Institute of Technology, PERB U-27057

The Board affirmed the decision of the ALJ that FIT violated §209a.1(d) of the Act when it unilaterally changed a past practice of paying day adjunct faculty represented by UCE on the basis of 16 weeks of work, thereby reducing their salaries by one-sixteenth.

Finding that a cognizable past practice of payment for 15 weeks of instruction and one week of registration had existed for almost 30 years established a reasonable expectation that it would continue unchanged, the Board rejected FIT's argument that it had no actual or constructive knowledge of the practice.

The amount in the annual budget represented by the 16th week, the actions of management employees in approving both payroll and the budget along with the longevity of the practice were considered by the Board.

The Board also found that the practice involved wages and the method for calculating the payment of salary, both mandatory subjects of negotiations.

Finally, the Board rejected FIT's argument that the payment for the 16th week, during which little or no duties might be performed, was an unconstitutional gift of public monies.

Discrimination complaint dismissed because law did not require an accommodation at the time the request for an accommodation was made

Discrimination complaint dismissed because law did not require an accommodation at the time the request for an accommodation was made

Rappo v NYS Division of Human Rights, 57 AD3d 217

The New York State Division of Human Rights dismissed Frances V. Rappo’s claim that she had been unlawfully discriminated against by her former employer, the New York City Human Resources Administration (HRA). Rappo alleged that HRA had failed to reasonably accommodate her disability.

The Appellate Division dismissed Rappo’s petition, explaining that at the time she made her request for a reasonable accommodation of her disability Executive Law §292(21) -- New York State’s Human Rights Law -- did not require an employer to provide "reasonable accommodations" of an applicant’s or an employee’s disability.

Further, the court said that substantial evidence supports the determination that HRA was not required to provide Rappo with a job transfer as a reasonable accommodation, since she failed to demonstrate that she could not perform the essential duties of her then present job and that she would be able to perform the essential duties of another job.

The full text of the decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://www.courts.state.ny.us/reporter/3dseries/2008/2008_09447.htm

Failure to designate the §75 disciplinary action hearing officer in writing is a fatal procedural defect

Failure to designate the §75 disciplinary action hearing officer in writing is a fatal procedural defect 

Arthur v  Soares,  2012 NY Slip Op 04255, Appellate Division, 3^rd Dept.

The Albany County District Attorney, P. David Soares,  filed disciplinary charges pursuant to §75 of the Civil Service Law against one of his subordinates, D. Richard Arthur, then serving as the office’s Director of Administration.

The Hearing Officer found Arthur guilty of the charges and recommended that he be terminated from his position. Soares adopted the hearing officer’s findings and recommendation and dismissed Arthur from his position. Arthur file a petition pursuant to Article 78 seeking a court order vacating Soares' action.

The Appellate Division annulled Soares' decision, finding “the record evinces that the Hearing Officer lacked jurisdiction.” and directed that Arthur be reinstated to his former position with back pay and benefits.*

The court noted that Civil Service Law §75(2), provides that a hearing on employee disciplinary charges "shall be held by the officer or body having the power to remove the person against whom such charges are preferred, or by a . . . person designated by such officer or body in writing for that purpose" [emphasis supplied].

It is well settled, said the Appellate Division, that absent "a written delegation authorizing a deputy or other person to conduct the hearing," the hearing officer did not have jurisdiction to conduct the §75 disciplinary hearing,  citing Wiggins v Board of Educ. of City of N.Y., 60 NY2d 385, among other decisions.

Significantly, the Appellate Division, Third Department had earlier ruled that the requirements of Civil Service Law §75(2) could be satisfied by a written record of such designation such as the minutes of a board meeting at which a resolution was adopted appointing the hearing officer or a letter to the hearing officer advising him or her that the official designation has taken place. In contrast, the court observed that “correspondence to the hearing officer that does not reference the official designation is insufficient, as is written notice to the [accused] of the hearing officer's identity.”

The Appellate Division found that there was no evidence in the record on appeal that the appointing authority had ever designated the Hearing Officer in a writing sufficient to satisfy the statutory requirement. The court specifically noted that reference to the designation of the hearing officer in the notice of charges sent to Arthur is not sufficient in the absence of any evidence of the written designation itself.”**

In addition, the employee’s failure to object to the absence of such written designation “is of no moment, inasmuch as this jurisdictional defect cannot be waived,” said the court, citing Gardner v Coxsackie-Athens Cent. School Dist. Bd. of Educ., 92 AD3d at 1095. This clearly implies that the individual being disciplined has no duty to inform the appointing authority of this procedural defect.

As the Hearing Officer lacked jurisdiction to conduct the hearing, his determination and Soares’ adoption thereof are nullities and Arthur, said the court, “must be restored to his former position with back pay and benefits.”

The court also noted that while courts employ the substantial evidence standard of review in resolving challenges to Civil Service Law §75 determinations, the disciplinary hearing officer does not review an employer's disciplinary actions taken against a public employee "to determine whether those actions were undertaken based upon substantial evidence," as occurred in Arthur's disciplinary proceeding; rather," it remains the responsibility of the hearing officer to weigh the evidence and resolve credibility determinations."

Further, said the court, "administrative findings of fact must be made in such a manner that the parties may be assured that the decision is based on the evidence in the record, uninfluenced by extralegal considerations, so as to permit intelligent challenge by an aggrieved party and adequate judicial review."

* The Appellate Division also held that the hearing officer “did not properly weigh the evidence, and failed to adequately detail the specific factual findings and hearing evidence relied upon.”

** Such notice to the accused has been deemed to satisfy the statutory mandate when the appointing authority separately issues a written resolution incorporating the notice by reference (Scharf v Levittown Union Free School Dist., 294 AD2d 508, lv denied 98 NY2d 613).

The decision is posted on the Internet at:
http://www.courts.state.ny.us/reporter/3dseries/2012/2012_04255.htm

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Employer’s abolishment of a position challenged

Employer’s abolishment of a position challenged
Eugenio v City of Yonkers, N.Y, 2012 NY Slip Op 04006, Appellate Division, Second Department

When the City Council of the City of Yonkers abolished the position of Clerk II Spanish Speaking, the former incumbent filed an Article 78 petition seeking a court order reinstating her to her former position with back pay. Supreme Court denied the petition and the Appellate Division affirmed the lower court’s dismissal of the petition.

The Appellate Division explained that "[A] public employer may abolish civil service positions for the purpose of economy or efficiency." In the event that action is challenged, the challenger “has the burden of proving that the employer did not act in good faith in abolishing the position."

Finding that Supreme Court properly determined that the former incumbent failed to sustain her burden of proving her position was abolished in bad faith, the Appellate Division commented that under the circumstances, the former employee’s request for further inquiry amounted to "no more than an expression of hope insufficient to warrant deferral of judgment"

As to mechanics involved in abolishing a position, the Attorney General has concluded that there must be an actual, official abolishment of a position in order to lawfully remove an employee from his or her position pursuant to these §§80 and 80-a of the Civil Service Law (1976 Opinions of the Attorney General 7).

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://www.courts.state.ny.us/reporter/3dseries/2012/2012_04006.htm

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Changing the employees’ tours of duty and work schedules alleged a violation of the employer’s duty to bargain in good faith

Changing the employees’ tours of duty and work schedules alleged a violation of the employer’s duty to bargain in good faith

Matter of the Town of Fishkill, Decisions of the Public Employment Relations Board, U-27331, U-27568

The Board affirmed a decision of an ALJ dismissing a portion of an improper practice charge filed by PBA alleging that the Town of Fishkill (Town) violated §§209-a.1(d) and (e) of the Public Employees’ Fair Employment Act (Act) when the Town changed the tours of duty and work schedules of two PBA officers thereby reducing their total weekly hours of work.

The Board rejected, as meritless, the PBA’s assertion that the ALJ misconstrued the allegations of the charge with the Board citing to the specific allegations of the charge.

The Board also rejected PBA’s claim that the ALJ erred in her conclusion regarding the number of hours worked by the two PBA officers noting that the evidence presented concerning the respective length of tours and workweeks was incomplete and confusing, at best.

Finally, the Board affirmed the ALJ’s conclusion that the Town had satisfied its duty to bargaining under the Act.

Due to the fact that the relevant contractual terms could reasonably be interpreted to have more than one meaning, the Board considered parol evidence in the record in determining that the Town satisfied its duty to negotiate the at-issue subject.