ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE [AI] IS NOT USED, IN WHOLE OR IN PART, IN PREPARING NYPPL SUMMARIES OF JUDICIAL AND QUASI-JUDICIAL DECISIONS

July 06, 2012

“Tebowing” and other activities by students leading to disciplinary suspensions

“Tebowing” and other activities by students leading to disciplinary suspensions
Source: On Board, a publication of the New York State School Boards Association

“Tebowing” that resulted in hallway congestion and other unusual reasons for initiating student disciplinary actions leading to suspensions are described in an article published in the July 2, 2012 edition of the New York State School Boards Association’s publication On Board.

Among other incidents leading to suspensions: Growing long hair for charity [in violation of the school’s dress code] and “Chivalry” [holding an exterior door open for an adult known to the student in violation of security procedures].

The article is posted on the Internet at:

An administrative decision made in violation of lawful procedure, affected by an error of law, that is arbitrary and capricious or that is an abuse of discretion is fatally defective


An administrative decision made in violation of lawful procedure, affected by an error of law, that is arbitrary and capricious or that is an abuse of discretion is fatally defective
Malverne Volunteer Fire Dept. v New York State Off. of Fire Prevention & Control, 2012 NY Slip Op 05174, Appellate Division, Second Department

The New York State Fallen Firefighters Memorial Appeals Committee denied a request to include former Malverne Volunteer Fire Department firefighter Paul Ryan Brady's name on the New York State Fallen Firefighters' Memorial Wall. Malverne appealed, contending that the Committee’s decision was not made after a quasi-judicial hearing it claimed was required by the Committee’s procedures.

Although Supreme Court dismissed Malverne’s petition, the Appellate Division “reversed, on the law” and remanded the matter to Supreme Court “to direct the New York State Fallen Firefighters Memorial Appeals Committee to include Paul Ryan Brady's name on the New York State Fallen Firefighters' Memorial Wall.”

The Appellate Division explained that in this instance it must consider whether the Committee’s determination was made in violation of lawful procedure, was affected by an error of law or was arbitrary and capricious or an abuse of discretion.

The test applied in such cases: “did the action taken by the agency have a rational basis." Citing Matter of Wooley v New York State Dept. of Correctional Servs., 15 NY3d 275, the Appellate Division said that a court will overturn such action only "where it is taken without sound basis in reason' or regard to the facts'" or where it is "arbitrary and capricious."

In this instance, said the court, the determination of the Committee that the death of firefighter Brady was not a "line of duty death" within the selection criteria for inclusion on the New York State Fallen Firefighters Memorial Wall was arbitrary and capricious and did not have a rational basis in the record.

Indeed, said the court, “The record demonstrates that, under the applicable selection criteria, Paul Ryan Brady died while engaged in an action that was required, authorized or recognized by law, rule, regulation, [or] condition of employment.’"

Accordingly, the Appellate Division ruled that Supreme Court should have [1] granted Malverne’s petition, [2] annulled the Committee’s determination and [3] directed the appeals committee to include Brady's name on the New York State Fallen Firefighters' Memorial Wall

The decision is posted on the Internet at:
http://www.courts.state.ny.us/reporter/3dseries/2012/2012_05174.htm

Statute of limitations no bar to bring disciplinary charges when the allegations claim “continuous incompetency”


Statute of limitations no bar to bring disciplinary charges when the allegations claim “continuous incompetency”
Canna v Town of Amherst, 55 AD3d 1269

Town of Amherst Superintendent of the Wastewater Treatment Facility Anthony R. was terminated from his employment following a hearing conducted pursuant to Civil Service Law §75 (1) based on charges alleging incompetence in the supervision of the operation of the facility.

Canna appealed, contending, among other things, that the Section 75 hearing officer “was biased against him;” that the Town Board’s resolution to terminate his employment was not supported by the required number of valid votes; that the charges were barred by the 18-month statute of limitations set out in Section 75(4) of the Civil Service Law; and that the penalty imposed, dismissal, was “shocking to one’s sense of fairness.”

The Appellate Division rejected Canna’s claim the hearing officer was biased, holding that Canna failed to present "a factual demonstration to support the allegation of bias and proof that the outcome [of the hearing officers findings and recommendation] flowed from it."

As to the validity of the Board’s vote, the court rejected Canna’s claim that the Board’s vote was tainted by the statements by one Town Board member to the effect that it would be difficult for Canna to resume his position as superintendent of the Facility after all that had transpired. Further, said the Appellate Division, “The record establishes that he further stated that, although [that member of the Board] did not believe that [Canna] was ‘single handedly’ responsible for all of the problems at the Facility, he believed that the evidence establish that [Canna] was incompetent, and incompetence is a valid basis for termination.”

Addressing the other aspects of Canna’s appeal, the Appellate Division said that the disciplinary proceeding against Canna was not time-barred based on the 18-month limitations period set forth in Civil Service Law §75(4) because his “alleged incompetency was continuous” and that the penalty imposed upon him, dismissal, was not so disproportionate to the offense as to be shocking to one's sense of fairness, citing Pell v Board of Education, 34 NY2d 222.

The full text of the decision is posted on the Internet at


===================
The Discipline Book, - a concise guide to disciplinary actions involving public employees in New York State. This more than 1500 page e-book is now available from the Public Employment Law Press. Click on http://thedisciplinebook.blogspot.com/for additional information concerning this electronic reference manual.
=======================

Rebutting the statutory presumption that an “on-the-job” injury or death was job-related shifts burden of showing job-relatedness to the claimant


Rebutting the statutory presumption that an “on-the-job” injury or death was job-related shifts burden of showing job-relatedness to the claimant
Petrocelli v Sewanhaka Cent. School Dist., 54 AD3d 1143

Section 21 of the Workers’ Compensation Law sets out “a presumptions of compensability when an unwitnessed or unexplained death occurs during the course of one's employment.” The presumptions “in the absence of substantial evidence to the contrary are:

1. That the claim comes within the provision of this chapter;

2. That sufficient notice thereof was given;

3. That the injury was not occasioned by the willful intention of the injured employee to bring about the injury or death of himself or of another;

4. That the injury did not result solely from the intoxication of the injured employee while on duty.

5. That the contents of medical and surgical reports introduced in evidence by claimants for compensation shall constitute prima facie evidence of fact as to the matter contained therein.


However, these are rebuttable presumptions and if there is substantial evidence to the contrary, the claimant has the burden of establishing that the injury or death is causally related to employment.

Denise Petrocelli’s husband died while coaching a high school basketball game. Mrs. Petrocelli filed a claim for workers' compensation death benefits.

The death certificate listed as Mrs. Petrocelli’s husband’s cause of death as “a spontaneous rupture of the splenic artery with hemoperitoneum, due to portal hypertension complicating cirrhosis of the liver and chemotherapy for treatment of a primitive neuroectodermal tumor of the right adrenal gland.” A Workers' Compensation Administrative Law Judge ruled that the Workers' Compensation Law §21 presumption of compensability had been rebutted by the statements of the cause of death set out in the death certificate. Mrs. Petrocelli was directed to produce evidence of causally related death. Once this was done, the employer would have an opportunity to produce a consultant's report on the same issue.

The Workers' Compensation Board affirmed the ALJ’s finding and Mrs. Petrocelli appealed.

The Appellate Division sustained the Board’s determination, ruling that “irrefutable proof excluding all . . . conclusions other than that offered by the employer that the accidental injury was not work related” is not required to rebut a Workers’ Compensation Law Section 21 presumption.

In this instance, said the court, evidence contained in the death certificate indicates that Mrs. Petrocelli’s husband’s death was directly caused by factors not related to his work. Accordingly, the court declined to disturb the Board's finding that the Section 21 presumption was overcome, requiring Mrs. Petrocelli to come forward with proof of a causally related death.

The decision is posted on the Internet at:


July 05, 2012

Workers’ compensation benefits discontinued upon individual’s retirement based on a finding that he had “removed himself from the labor market”


Workers’ compensation benefits discontinued upon individual’s retirement based on a finding that he had “removed himself from the labor market”
Richardson v Schenectady City School Dist., 2012 NY Slip Op 05230, Appellate Division, Third Department

Dana Richardson objected to a Workers' Compensation determination that he had voluntarily removed himself from the labor market and denied his claim for workers' compensation benefits.

Richardson, a health teacher for the Schenectady City School District, sustained a variety of compensable injuries, including injuries to his head and back, while breaking up a fight between students in February 2006. In December 2008, he submitted a letter to the school district advising it that he would be retiring effective June 2009.

After the effective date of Richardson’s retirement, the school district and its workers' compensation carrier moved to suspend benefits based upon Richardson's “voluntary withdrawal from the labor market”. Ultimately, Workers' Compensation ruled that Richardson had, indeed, withdrew from the labor market and as a result was no longer entitled to awards upon his retirement in 2009.

The Appellate Division affirmed Workers' Compensation’s decision, explaining that “Whether [Richardson’s] retirement constituted a voluntary withdrawal from the labor market presented a factual issue for the Board, and its determination will not be disturbed if supported by substantial evidence.” In this instance Workers' Compensation relied on the report of a physician who performed an independent medical examination and opined that, while Richardson suffered from a moderate to marked disability, he was capable of working in a modified duty capacity.

Another element that was considered: Richardson’s letter informing the school district indicated that “he was taking advantage of a very favorable retirement incentive.” Richardson did not indicated that his physical disabilities played a role in his decision to retire and, in addition, he testified that he never discussed retirement with his doctors, did not advise the employer that he was retiring due to his disabilities and never asked for an accommodation to return to work within his restrictions.

Although there was “evidence that may have supported a different result,” the Appellate Division said that the determination was supported by substantial evidence and thus would not be disturbed.

The decision is posted on the Internet at:
http://www.courts.state.ny.us/reporter/3dseries/2012/2012_05230.htm

CAUTION

Subsequent court and administrative rulings, or changes to laws, rules and regulations may have modified or clarified or vacated or reversed the information and, or, decisions summarized in NYPPL. For example, New York State Department of Civil Service's Advisory Memorandum 24-08 reflects changes required as the result of certain amendments to §72 of the New York State Civil Service Law to take effect January 1, 2025 [See Chapter 306 of the Laws of 2024]. Advisory Memorandum 24-08 in PDF format is posted on the Internet at https://www.cs.ny.gov/ssd/pdf/AM24-08Combined.pdf. Accordingly, the information and case summaries should be Shepardized® or otherwise checked to make certain that the most recent information is being considered by the reader.
THE MATERIAL ON THIS WEBSITE IS FOR INFORMATION ONLY. AGAIN, CHANGES IN LAWS, RULES, REGULATIONS AND NEW COURT AND ADMINISTRATIVE DECISIONS MAY AFFECT THE ACCURACY OF THE INFORMATION PROVIDED IN THIS LAWBLOG. THE MATERIAL PRESENTED IS NOT LEGAL ADVICE AND THE USE OF ANY MATERIAL POSTED ON THIS WEBSITE, OR CORRESPONDENCE CONCERNING SUCH MATERIAL, DOES NOT CREATE AN ATTORNEY-CLIENT RELATIONSHIP.
NYPPL Blogger Harvey Randall served as Principal Attorney, New York State Department of Civil Service; Director of Personnel, SUNY Central Administration; Director of Research, Governor’s Office of Employee Relations; and Staff Judge Advocate General, New York Guard. Consistent with the Declaration of Principles jointly adopted by a Committee of the American Bar Association and a Committee of Publishers and Associations, the material posted to this blog is presented with the understanding that neither the publisher nor NYPPL and, or, its staff and contributors are providing legal advice to the reader and in the event legal or other expert assistance is needed, the reader is urged to seek such advice from a knowledgeable professional.
New York Public Personnel Law. Email: publications@nycap.rr.com