The Doctrine of Maintenance and Cure provides seamen with a workers’ compensation type of benefit

The Doctrine of Maintenance and Cure provides seamen with a workers’ compensation type of benefit

Messier v Bouchard Transp., USCA, 2^nd Circuit, Docket #10-5181

The Doctrine of Maintenance and Cure has been compared to workers’ compensation benefits in that the duty arises from employment and “does not rest upon negligence or culpability on the part of the owner or master.” As the Second Circuit said in Weiss v. Cent. R.R. Co. of N.J., 235 F.2d 309, maintenance and cure has been called “a kind of nonstatutory workmen’s compensation” benefit.

Under the Doctrine, the owner of the vessel is obligated to provide food, lodging, and medical services to a seaman while in he or she is in service. The Doctrine entitles an injured seaman to three remedies —maintenance, cure, and wages. The general rule is that “maintenance and cure” is available for any injury or illness that occurs during a seaman’s service.

A seaman filed a complaint in federal district court asserting claims for negligence under the federal Jones Act* and for "maintenance and cure under general maritime law."** Ultimately he withdrew all claims other than those for “Maintenance and Cure.”

Reversing the district court’s dismissal of the seaman’s petition, the Circuit Court of Appeals said that “Maintenance” compensates the injured seaman for food and lodging expenses during his medical treatment. “Cure” refers to the reasonable medical expenses incurred in the treatment of the seaman’s condition while lost wages are provided in addition to maintenance on the rationale that “maintenance compensates the injured seaman for food and lodging, which the seaman otherwise receives free while on the ship.”

“The obligation to provide maintenance and cure payments,” however, “does not furnish the seaman with a source of lifetime or long-term disability income.” An eligible seaman is entitled to maintenance and cure only “until he [or she] reaches maximum medical recovery,” i.e., “until such time as the incapacity is declared to be permanent.”

Citing Farrell v. United States, 336 U.S. 511, the Circuit Court noted that the Supreme Court ruled that … “where a seaman has reached the point of maximum medical cure and maintenance and cure payments have been discontinued, the seaman may nonetheless reinstitute a demand for maintenance and cure where subsequent new curative medical treatments become available."

The Circuit Court than cautioned: “The analogy to workers’ compensation, however, can be misleading, because maintenance and cure is a far more expansive remedy. First, although it is limited to 'the seaman who becomes ill or is injured while in the service of the ship,' it is not restricted to those cases where the seaman’s employment is the cause of the injury or illness. '[T]he obligation can arise out of a medical condition such as a heart problem, a prior illness that recurs during the seaman’s employment, or an injury suffered on shore'.”

Further said the court, “the doctrine is ‘so broad’ that ‘negligence or acts short of culpable misconduct on the seaman’s part will not relieve the shipowner of the responsibility.’” Accordingly, the doctrine may apply even if a seaman is injured or falls ill off-duty or while on shore leave, so long as the seamen is “in the service of the ship,” which means he is “generally answerable to its call to duty rather than actually in performance of routine tasks or specific orders.”

Another difference pointed out by the court: a seaman may be entitled to maintenance and cure even for a preexisting medical condition that recurs or becomes aggravated during his or her service.

Accordingly, the Circuit Court remanded the matter to the district court to “proceed to trial on the amount of maintenance and cure due” the seaman.

* 46 United States Code 883.[See, in particular, 46 USC 30104, Personal injury to or death of seamen.]

** A seaman who is required to sue a shipowner to recover maintenance and cure may also recover attorney fees [Vaughan v. Atkinson, 369 U.S. 527].

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://www.ca2.uscourts.gov/decisions/isysquery/cd687548-b977-4833-8f81-7edb94f3058a/2/doc/10-5181_opn.pdf#xml=http://www.ca2.uscourts.gov/decisions/isysquery/cd687548-b977-4833-8f81-7edb94f3058a/2/hilite/

Retired teacher ruled entitled to enroll new spouse in the District’s health insurance plan under the terms of the collective bargaining agreement

Retired teacher ruled entitled to enroll new spouse in the District’s health insurance plan under the terms of the collective bargaining agreement

Bower v Board of Educ., Cazenovia Cent. School Dist., 53 AD3d 967

Retired from his teaching position with Cazenovia Central School District, at which time he was enrolled as an individual participant in the district's group health insurance plan, the retired teacher subsequently married and asked the District to change his health insurance to family coverage so that his wife would be covered. The district refused, contending that a retired teacher is not permitted to change his or her health insurance coverage.

The retiree sued, arguing that (1) the applicable collective bargaining agreement permitted him to change his coverage and (2) the district's refusal violated the statutory moratorium against reducing health insurance benefits of retirees unless there was a corresponding reduction for active employees.

Supreme Court held that retiree had the right under the terms of the collective bargaining agreement to change his health insurance coverage to include his new spouse. The District appealed, only to the Appellate Division affirm the lower court’s ruling.

The Appellate Division noted that Article XXII of the agreement provided that "[a]ll bargaining unit personnel currently employed or retired from [the district] who are legally eligible may participate in the . . . health insurance program," and that Appendix G to the agreement, sets forth individual coverage and family coverage as the "two types of enrollment" available, pointed out that a section in the agreement entitled "ENROLLMENT CHANGES" recognized that "[c]hanges in your family status may make it necessary or desirable for you to change the coverage for which you are enrolled," and states, in relevant part, that "[y]ou may request a change from individual coverage to [f]amily coverage . . . [t]o provide coverage for a newly acquired spouse."

As there is nothing in the collective bargaining agreement to indicate that "you" in this provision was not intended to include retired employees, the Appellate Division said that “Reading the relevant provisions as a whole, we agree with Supreme Court that the agreement permitted the retiree to add his spouse to his health insurance.”

The full text of the decision is posted at:

http://www.courts.state.ny.us/reporter/3dseries/2008/2008_06418.htm

Appointing authority’s decision to terminate an employee found guilty of misconduct may not be set aside if supported by substantial evidence

Appointing authority’s decision to terminate an employee found guilty of misconduct may not be set aside if supported by substantial evidence
Guerrero v Scoppetta, 53 AD3d 615

The New York City Fire Commissioner, adopting the recommendation of a hearing officer, found a New York City Fire Department Emergency Medical Technician [EMT] guilty of a number of charges of misconduct and terminating his employment.

The Appellate Division said that the finding that finding that the employee was guilty of the charges was supported by substantial evidence.

Substantial evidence, said the court, is "less than a preponderance of the evidence, overwhelming evidence or evidence beyond a reasonable doubt" and here New York City Fire Department records, the testimony of numerous witnesses and the EMT, and a videotape of the incidents on which the determination was based, provided "such relevant proof as a reasonable mind may accept as adequate"

Judicial review of an administrative determination made after a hearing required by law is limited to whether the determination is supported by substantial evidence. The Appellate Division dismissed the EMT’s appeal, holding that as the Commissioner’s determination was supported by substantial evidence, it may not be set aside.

The full text of the decision is posted at:

http://www.courts.state.ny.us/reporter/3dseries/2008/2008_06375.htm

A factual demonstration to support allegations that an individual was denied a fair hearing by an administrative tribunal is critical to rebutting the presumption of honesty and integrity accorded to administrative bodies

A factual demonstration to support allegations that an individual was denied a fair hearing by an administrative tribunal is critical to rebutting the presumption of honesty and integrity accorded to administrative bodies

Dutrow v New York State Racing & Wagering Bd., 2012 NY Slip Op 05699, Appellate Division, Third Department

One of the issues in this appeal challenging a disciplinary action taken against an individual by the New York State Racing & Wagering Board was a claim that the target of a disciplinary action by the Board was deprived of a fair hearing as a result of the refusal of Board’s chair, John Sabini, to recuse himself from the proceeding.

Sabini, in addition to serving as the Board’s chair, was an unpaid officer of the Association of Racing Commissioners International, an organization devoted to maintaining a multi-jurisdictional database of licensed horse racing professionals' disciplinary histories.Sabini, however, had no prior official involvement with, and made no appearance in, this case stemming from his position with the Association. 

The Association’s president, however, had informed Sabini that a United States Senator's office had inquired about the case. The Association's president also had publicly urged the Board to assess individual’s "suitability to continue his participation in racing." The court, however, observed that [1] Sabini was not bound to follow any suggestions made by the Association or its president and [2] there was nothing in the record indicating that Sabini took any action based upon these communications or otherwise "gave the impression that [he] had prejudged the facts."

The Appellate Division said that such a “bare allegation” that these communications led to bias is insufficient absent "a factual demonstration to support the allegation . . . and proof that the [adverse] outcome flowed from it."

As the accused individual had failed, in the words of the court, "to rebut the presumption of honesty and integrity accorded to administrative bodies," the Appellate Division held “it cannot be said that he was denied a fair hearing.

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://www.courts.state.ny.us/reporter/3dseries/2012/2012_05699.htm

Employee terminated for violating employer’s written policy ineligible for unemployment insurance benefits

Employee terminated for violating employer’s written policy ineligible for unemployment insurance benefits
Pagan v Commissioner of Labor, 53 AD3d 964

The Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board disqualified an applicant for unemployment insurance benefits following his termination for accepting a designation to run as a candidate for the State Assembly, ruling that his employment was terminated due to misconduct.

The individual, employed by the New York City Housing Authority, had violated the Authority written policy prohibiting its staff members from running for political office in a partisan election.*

Noting that “It is well settled that "[v]iolation of an employer's reasonable policies may constitute disqualifying misconduct," the Appellate Division said that the Authority’s guidelines were established “to assure compliance with the Hatch Act (5 USC §1501 et seq.) and the City of New York’s Conflicts of Interest Board Rules.”

As the record indicated that the individual was aware of the Authority's guidelines prior to his termination and that he was afforded an opportunity to comply with the policy before any adverse action was taken against him by it, the court ruled that substantial evidence supported the Board's determination finding him guilty of disqualifying misconduct for the purposes of unemployment insurance benefits.

* A candidate seeking election to a school board is typically deemed to be seeking office in a “non-partisan” election.

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://www.courts.state.ny.us/reporter/3dseries/2008/2008_06414.htm