Alternative disciplinary procedures

Alternative disciplinary procedures

2014 NY Slip Op 04293, Appellate Division, Fourth Department, Motion for leave to appeal granted, Motion No: 2013-804, 2013 NY Slip Op 88892. 

A tenured teacher [Teacher] filed a petition in Supreme Court pursuant to CPLR Article 78 seeking a court order annulling two disciplinary actions taken against her by the school district that resulted in her being suspended without pay for two days with respect to one disciplinary action and suspended for five days without pay for the other.

The Appellate Division held that Supreme Court erred in denying Teacher’s petition to annul the school district's actions, explaining that Teacher “was entitled to choose whether to be disciplined under the procedures set forth in the [collective bargaining agreement] or those set forth in [Education Law §] 3020-a," as the school district incorrectly denied Teacher's written request for a §3020-a hearing," citing it’s earlier ruling in Kilduff v Rochester City School District, 107 AD3d 1536.

This will not be the first time that the Court of Appeals will be asked to address the issue of an employee choosing between alternatives disciplinary procedures. In Antinore v State, 40 NY2d 6, the Court sustained a ruling by the Appellate Division* holding that a union could bargain away the employee’s statutory disciplinary rights in favor of an alternative disciplinary procedure as long as the alternate disciplinary procedure provided administrative due process protections at least equivalent to those provided by the statutory procedure.

The initial collective bargaining agreements negotiated by the State as an employer and the Civil Service Employees Association with respect to employees in negotiating units represented by CSEA, provided that an individual in the negotiating unit served with administrative disciplinary charges could elect either the “contract disciplinary procedure,” whereby the charges would be heard by an arbitrator, or, in the alternative, elect to have the matter considered pursuant to the relevant statutory disciplinary procedure, in this instance Civil Service Law §75.

The issue in Antinore: Antinore initially elected the contract disciplinary procedure and when he was found guilty by the arbitrator, claimed that he was now entitled to administrative due process which required that he now be given another disciplinary hearing pursuant to Civil Service Law §75. The Appellate Division rejected Antinore’s theory, which decision was sustained by the Court of Appeals, holding that if the negotiated alternative to the §75 disciplinary procedure afforded the accused individual the at least equivalent administrative due process, his or her Constitutional right to due process was satisfied.

* Donald Antinore v. State New York et al, 49 A.D.2d 6.

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Notices required to be given to probationary employees

Notices required to be given to probationary employees

A NYPPL reader asks: “Is there a requirement (law or rule) that requires a specific action on part of the Appointing Authority to notify a recently promoted employee he/she completed or failed to complete a probationary period?”

NYPPL’s response: Yes and no, depending on the circumstances.

As to the notice that the appointing authority is required to give to a probationary employee, Subdivision 2 of §63 of the Civil Service Law, Probation, provides as follows: “The state civil service commission and municipal civil service commissions shall, subject to the provisions of this section, provide by rule for the conditions and extent of probationary service.” These rules typically set out the “notice requirements” to be provided to probationary employees by the appointing authority.

With respect to employees of the State as the employer and employees of public entities for which the New York State Department of Civil Service administers the Civil Service Law, 4 NYCRR 5.3(b)(5)(i) provides: “(5)(i) An appointment, promotion or transfer shall become permanent upon the retention of the probationer after his or her completion of the maximum period of service or upon earlier written notice following completion of the minimum period that his or her probationary term is successfully completed or, in the case of a transferee, upon written notice that the appointing authority has elected to waive the serving of the probationary term.”

Clearly written notice that the probationary employee has attained tenure in the position is required only in the event the appointing authority elects to grant the probationer tenure after he or she has completed the minimum period of probation and prior to his or her completion of the maximum period of probation for the position or the appointing authority elects to waive the probationary period for a “transferee.

Requiring such a writing to validate an appointing authority's exercising its discretion to waive or truncate an employee's probationary period avoids the situation considered by the court in Snyder v Civil Service Commission, 72 NY2d 981, a case involving a temporary appointee's claim to contingent permanent appointment status pursuant to Civil Service Law Section 64.4. The court ruled that an individual must specifically appointed as a contingent permanent employee by the appointing authority, which status is granted solely at the discretion of the appointing authority. A writing would clearly demonstrate such an action on the part of the appointing authority.


In any event, it is good personnel practice to notify the probationary employee that he or she has successfully completed his or her probationary period even if not so required by rule or regulation.

With respect to employees of the State as the employer and employees of public entities for which the New York State Department of Civil Service administers the Civil Service Law, 4 NYCRR 5.3(b)(5)(iii) in relevant part provides: (iii) “A probationer whose services are to be terminated for unsatisfactory service shall receive written notice at least one week prior to such termination and, upon request, shall be granted an interview with the appointing authority or his representative” [emphasis supplied]. Municipal Civil Service Commissions and Personnel Officers have adopted similar rules or regulations.*

In the event a probationary employee is continued in the position beyond the maximum period of his or her probation and is not given timely notice that he or she has not satisfactorily completed the required probationary period, or that his or her probationary period has been extended as permitted by rule or regulation, he or she is deemed attained tenure by estoppel,** also referred to as “tenure by acquisition.” In the event the appointing authority wishes to terminate the services or otherwise discipline an employee who has attained tenure by estoppel or acquisition, the employee is entitled to administrative due process, including notice and hearing, as provided by §75 of the Civil Service Law or the disciplinary procedure set out in a collective bargaining agreement negotiated pursuant to Article 14 of the Civil Service Law, the “Taylor Law.”

What constitutes “timely notice” that the individual has failed to satisfactorily complete his or her probationary employee? The required notice of the termination is to be delivered to the employee before close of business on the last day permitted by the controlling rule or regulation even if the employee's actual removal from the payroll may be effective after this date. In Mendez v Valenti, 101 AD2d 612, the Appellate Division held that as long as the termination of a probationer in the classified service is effected within a reasonable time after the last day of his or her probationary period, such as set to coincide with the end of the next payroll period, the courts will not deem the probationer to have obtained tenure by estoppel or acquisition because of his or her continuation on the payroll beyond the last day of his or her probationary period.

On occasion the date of appointment to the position becomes a critical issue. Such was the case in Mallon v Parness, 167 A.D.2d 614. “Mallon contended that he had been promoted to Sergeant, subject to a twenty-six week probationary period, effective July 18, 1988. He claimed that he thus completed his probationary period on January 18, 1989. He offered an affidavit from the former Mayor of Suffern supporting his claim of appointment effective July 18. The employer, on the other hand, submitted documentary evidence showing that Mallon had been promoted to the Sergeant position effective October 26, 1988 in support of its claim that he had not yet completed his probationary period when he was terminated from the Sergeant position. To further complicate the matter, the records of the Rockland County Personnel Office indicated that Mallon was appointed Sergeant effective June 1, 1988.***The Appellate Division remanded the matter to Supreme Court for its determination as to which was the “official” effective date of Mallon’s promotion to Sergeant.

* In Vetter v Board of Educ., Ravena-Coeymans-Selkirk Cent. School Dist., 14 NY3d 729, the Court of Appeals observed that Education Law §3019-a requires school authorities to give probationary teachers written notice of termination at least 30 days before the effective date of termination.

** See, for example, Wamsley v East Ramapo Central School District, 281 A.D.2d 633.

*** In the event there is a conflict as to the effective date of appointment to a position in the Classified Service, typically the date of such appointment recorded in the records of the Civil Service Commission, Department or Personnel Officer having jurisdiction would control.

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Motion to dismiss a cause of action based on a defense of collateral estoppel and res judicata rejected

Motion to dismiss a cause of action based on a defense of collateral estoppel and res judicata rejected

2014 NY Slip Op 02999, Appellate Division, Third Department

A former teacher [Teacher] challenged a decision by the Board of Education [Board] reinstating another former teacher whose name was on the preferred list ahead of Teacher to fill a vacant teaching position.

Teacher complained that the Board had improperly calculated her seniority to her detriment with respect the placement of her name on the preferred list. The Board, however, moved to dismiss the proceeding on grounds, among other reasons, collateral estoppel and res judicata, contending that the dismissal of a prior proceeding challenging the earlier reinstatement of a different former teacher rather than Teacher to fill another vacant position barred the instant proceeding.

The earlier proceeding had been dismissed based on, among other things, Teacher's failure to commence the proceeding within four months of the determination to recall the other teacher. Supreme Court granted the Board's motion to dismiss Teacher’s instant action on collateral estoppel grounds and Teacher appealed.

The Appellate Division reversed the lower court’s ruling, explaining that in order for collateral estoppel to apply, there must be an identity of a decisive issue between the present and prior proceedings which was necessarily decided in the prior proceeding, and the party who will be estopped must have been afforded a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in the prior proceeding.

Here, however, although Teacher raised an issue identical to the one she had raised in her earlier action, -- was she is entitled to more seniority credit than the Board gave her -- that issue has never been decided on the merits as it had been dismissed on procedural ground, having been untimely filed.

Citing Town of Oyster Bay v Commander Oil Corp., 96 NY2d 566, the Appellate Division ruled that [b]ecause the issue of whether [Teacher] is entitled to more seniority has not been decided, it is not barred by collateral estoppel and remanded the matter to Supreme Court for further proceedings “not inconsistent with" its ruling.

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Injury suffered on the way to work not typically viewed as “arising out of and in the course of employment”

Injury suffered on the way to work not typically viewed as “arising out of and in the course of employment”

Trotman v New York State Cts., 2014 NY Slip Op 03002, Appellate Division, Third Department

A senior court officer [Officer] was injured shortly before the beginning of his work shift when he slipped and fell on ice. The incident occurred on a public sidewalk that he was traversing to reach the government center after parking his car on the street.

Although the Workers' Compensation Law Judge established the claim, the Workers' Compensation Board denied his ensuing application for workers' compensation benefits, finding that his injury did not arise out of and in the course of his employment. Claimant now appeals.

The Appellate Division affirmed the Board’s determination explaining that "Accidents that occur on a public street away from the place of employment and outside working hours generally are not considered to arise out of and in the course of employment." As Officer’s accident occurred near his place of employment, his claim falls within "a gray area where the risks of street travel merge with the risks attendant with employment and where the mere fact that the accident took place on a public road or sidewalk may not ipso facto negate the right to compensation." 

In contrast, said the court, in order for such an injury come within the ambit of eligibility for workers' compensation benefits, the injury must result from "(1) a special hazard at the particular off-premises point and (2) a close association of the access route with the premises, so far as going and coming are concerned."

Further, said the court, the fact that Officer was directed to travel to another court facility after he arrived at work on the day in question “does not compel a different result.”
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California Superior Court Judge holds that California's teacher tenure laws are unconstitutional,

California Superior Court Judge holds that California's teacher tenure laws are unconstitutional

Source: Findlaw – Breaking Legal Documents [By Adam Ramirez, June 10, 2014]

“California's laws on teacher tenure, layoffs and dismissals deprive students of their constitutional right to an education, a Los Angeles Superior Court judge ruled Tuesday, June 10, 2014.*

“The ruling is a serious defeat for teachers' unions that overturns several California laws that govern the way teachers are hired and fired. 

“The 16-page decision (see Internet link below) may set off a slew of legal fights in California and other states, where many education reform advocates are eager to change similar laws.

‘There is ... no dispute that there are a significant number of grossly ineffective teachers currently active in California classrooms,’ Judge Rolf M. Treu wrote. ‘Substantial evidence presented makes it clear to this court that the challenged statutes disproportionately affect poor and/or minority students. The evidence is compelling. Indeed, it shocks the conscience’

“Enforcement of the much awaited ruling in Vergara v. California will be delayed pending an appeal by the lawsuit's defendants, the state and California's two major teachers unions.”

Court in New York State have addressed efforts by a number of school districts to “eliminate tenure.”

In Conetta v Patchogue-Medford Union Free School District, 165 Misc2d 329, a New York State Supreme Court Judge ruled that a school board could not refuse to grant tenure to a teacher who had successfully completed his or her probationary period because it believed that "that tenure at the elementary and secondary school level [in contrast to tenure granted to college and university faculty] was essentially guaranteed job security ... coupled with automatic salary increases."

Similarly, in Costello v East Islip UFSD Supreme Court** ruled that a school board could not refuse to grant tenure to a teacher who had successfully completed his or her probationary period. 

Apparently mindful of the Conetta ruling, East Islip decided to take a different tack in an effort to avoid having to give newly hired teachers tenure upon their satisfactory completion of probation by adopting a resolution providing that all new teachers hired by the School District were to be employed under individual contracts providing for specified terms of employment.

To emphasis the point, the contracts included provisions intended to constitute "waivers" of the probation and disciplinary rights provided to teachers in the Education Law. The court noted that the characterization of the waiver as "voluntary" is questionable since there was no indication that any teacher refusing to agree to such a waiver would be hired.

The Appellate Division affirmed, holding although East Islip was correct that a teacher's rights with respect to tenure are waivable when the waiver is "freely, knowingly, and openly arrived at without the taint of coercion or duress," this does not, however, give the Board the authority to eliminate the tenure system altogether. 

Citing Carter v Kalamejski, 255 App Div 694, aff'd 280 N.Y. 803, the Appellate Division explained that “the tenure system is a legislative expression of a firm public policy determination that the interests of the public in the education of our youth can best be served by a system designed to foster academic freedom and to protect competent teachers from the threat of arbitrary dismissal.” In contrast, the court observed that providing tenure by contract terminating automatically at the expiration of the contract period as proposed by East Islip was “the very system sought to be eliminated by the enactment of the tenure statutes of the Education Law and the change to a system of permanence.”***

In Conetta, State Supreme Court Judge Lockman suggested that if a school district wishes to stop granting tenure, it could make such a demand in the course of collective negotiations authorized by Article 14 of the Civil Service Law, the Taylor Law.

* The decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://www.scribd.com/doc/229011497/Teacher-Tenure-Laws-Are-Unconstitutional-Shock-the-Conscience-CA-Judge-Rules

** Costello v East Islip UFSD, Supreme Court [not selected for publications in the official reports] Affirmed 250 A.D.2d 846. See, also, Lambert v Board of Educ. of Middle Country Cent. School Dist., 174 Misc.2d 487,

*** In Yastion v Mills, 229 A.D.2d 775, the Appellate Division decided that a teacher may work on a year-to-year contractual basis and never acquire tenure even after three years of service. Orange-Ulster BOCES had appointed Yastion to a federally funded position and his annual employment contracts specifically indicated that "tenure does not apply to this position."

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