ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE [AI] IS NOT USED, IN WHOLE OR IN PART, IN PREPARING NYPPL SUMMARIES OF JUDICIAL AND QUASI-JUDICIAL DECISIONS

June 18, 2014

New York State Comptroller Thomas P. DiNapoli announced today that his office has identified more than $5 million in unclaimed funds for local governments across the state.



New York State Comptroller Thomas P. DiNapoli announced today that his office has identified more than $5 million in unclaimed funds for local governments across the state.
Source: NEWS From the Office of the New York State Comptroller Thomas P. DiNapoli
Posted June 18, 2014.

After reaching out and alerting officials from counties, cities, towns and villages of this lost money, DiNapoli’s office has returned more than $1.5 million so far. DiNapoli’s office oversees the state’s 31 million unclaimed funds accounts, valued at more than $13 billion.

“Every dollar owed to local governments should be collected and put to good use to help provide essential services for New Yorkers and to relieve the burden on taxpayers around the state,” DiNapoli said. “My office has returned more than $1.5 million in unclaimed funds to local governments in the last few weeks, but $3.5 million is still waiting to be claimed. I encourage local government officials to work with my office so that we can return the money as soon as possible.”

DiNapoli’s office identified nearly 10,000 unclaimed funds accounts valued at $5,023,246 by matching the names of 1,600 local governments against the state’s unclaimed funds database. The search found 6,592 accounts valued at $3.8 million owed to counties (including New York City’s five boroughs), 800 accounts valued at $317,232 owed to cities, 1,552 accounts valued at $636,232 owed to towns and 798 accounts valued at $262,908 owed to villages. 

Representatives from DiNapoli’s office sent letters to financial officers of local governments that appear in the unclaimed funds database and asked them to confirm ownership in order to process the claims and return the money. Ownership is verified by demonstrating a connection to the address or the account associated with the funds. 

Click hereto view a chart showing the number of outstanding accounts in the name of local governments, and the values, by region.

It often requires a bit of imagination to find an entity as the names reported in Comptroller's listing may differ substantially from the agency's or organization's "official name" as the example for “Board of Education” listed 23 jurisdictions while Bd of Ed listed 13 districts and high school listed 29 names.

Using generic names such as the following produced the number of  "hits" indicated:


County of                    108

County Clerk             81

Town of                       411

Town Clerk                 2

Village of                    165

Village Clerk              1

Police Dept                 4

SUNY                          187

BOCES                       31

Central School             8

CSD                            13

Union Free School      5

Employee organizations reported by the Comptroller include the following

Faculty Asso               3

CSEA Local                6

PEF                        6

State and local governments and other organizations can search the Comptroller's site via the “Search for Organization” link on the Office of Unclaimed Funds’ website or by calling the call center toll-free at 1-800-221-9311.

Alternative disciplinary procedures


Alternative disciplinary procedures
2014 NY Slip Op 04293, Appellate Division, Fourth Department, Motion for leave to appeal granted, Motion No: 2013-804, 2013 NY Slip Op 88892. 

A tenured teacher [Teacher] filed a petition in Supreme Court pursuant to CPLR Article 78 seeking a court order annulling two disciplinary actions taken against her by the school district that resulted in her being suspended without pay for two days with respect to one disciplinary action and suspended for five days without pay for the other.

The Appellate Division held that Supreme Court erred in denying Teacher’s petition to annul the school district's actions, explaining that Teacher “was entitled to choose whether to be disciplined under the procedures set forth in the [collective bargaining agreement] or those set forth in [Education Law §] 3020-a," as the school district incorrectly denied Teacher's written request for a §3020-a hearing," citing it’s earlier ruling in Kilduff v Rochester City School District, 107 AD3d 1536.

This will not be the first time that the Court of Appeals will be asked to address the issue of an employee choosing between alternatives disciplinary procedures. In Antinore v State, 40 NY2d 6, the Court sustained a ruling by the Appellate Division* holding that a union could bargain away the employee’s statutory disciplinary rights in favor of an alternative disciplinary procedure as long as the alternate disciplinary procedure provided administrative due process protections at least equivalent to those provided by the statutory procedure.

The initial collective bargaining agreements negotiated by the State as an employer and the Civil Service Employees Association with respect to employees in negotiating units represented by CSEA, provided that an individual in the negotiating unit served with administrative disciplinary charges could elect either the “contract disciplinary procedure,” whereby the charges would be heard by an arbitrator, or, in the alternative, elect to have the matter considered pursuant to the relevant statutory disciplinary procedure, in this instance Civil Service Law §75.

The issue in Antinore: Antinore initially elected the contract disciplinary procedure and when he was found guilty by the arbitrator, claimed that he was now entitled to administrative due process which required that he now be given another disciplinary hearing pursuant to Civil Service Law §75. The Appellate Division rejected Antinore’s theory, which decision was sustained by the Court of Appeals, holding that if the negotiated alternative to the §75 disciplinary procedure afforded the accused individual the at least equivalent administrative due process, his or her Constitutional right to due process was satisfied.

* Donald Antinore v. State New York et al, 49 A.D.2d 6.

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June 17, 2014

Notices required to be given to probationary employees


Notices required to be given to probationary employees

A NYPPL reader asks: “Is there a requirement (law or rule) that requires a specific action on part of the Appointing Authority to notify a recently promoted employee he/she completed or failed to complete a probationary period?”

NYPPL’s response: Yes and no, depending on the circumstances.

As to the notice that the appointing authority is required to give to a probationary employee, Subdivision 2 of §63 of the Civil Service Law, Probation, provides as follows: “The state civil service commission and municipal civil service commissions shall, subject to the provisions of this section, provide by rule for the conditions and extent of probationary service.” These rules typically set out the “notice requirements” to be provided to probationary employees by the appointing authority.

With respect to employees of the State as the employer and employees of public entities for which the New York State Department of Civil Service administers the Civil Service Law, 4 NYCRR 5.3(b)(5)(i) provides: “(5)(i) An appointment, promotion or transfer shall become permanent upon the retention of the probationer after his or her completion of the maximum period of service or upon earlier written notice following completion of the minimum period that his or her probationary term is successfully completed or, in the case of a transferee, upon written notice that the appointing authority has elected to waive the serving of the probationary term.”

Clearly written notice that the probationary employee has attained tenure in the position is required only in the event the appointing authority elects to grant the probationer tenure after he or she has completed the minimum period of probation and prior to his or her completion of the maximum period of probation for the position or the appointing authority elects to waive the probationary period for a “transferee.

Requiring such a writing to validate an appointing authority's exercising its discretion to waive or truncate an employee's probationary period avoids the situation considered by the court in Snyder v Civil Service Commission, 72 NY2d 981, a case involving a temporary appointee's claim to contingent permanent appointment status pursuant to Civil Service Law Section 64.4. The court ruled that an individual must specifically appointed as a contingent permanent employee by the appointing authority, which status is granted solely at the discretion of the appointing authority. A writing would clearly demonstrate such an action on the part of the appointing authority.


In any event, it is good personnel practice to notify the probationary employee that he or she has successfully completed his or her probationary period even if not so required by rule or regulation.

With respect to employees of the State as the employer and employees of public entities for which the New York State Department of Civil Service administers the Civil Service Law, 4 NYCRR 5.3(b)(5)(iii) in relevant part provides: (iii) “A probationer whose services are to be terminated for unsatisfactory service shall receive written notice at least one week prior to such termination and, upon request, shall be granted an interview with the appointing authority or his representative” [emphasis supplied]. Municipal Civil Service Commissions and Personnel Officers have adopted similar rules or regulations.*

In the event a probationary employee is continued in the position beyond the maximum period of his or her probation and is not given timely notice that he or she has not satisfactorily completed the required probationary period, or that his or her probationary period has been extended as permitted by rule or regulation, he or she is deemed attained tenure by estoppel,** also referred to as “tenure by acquisition.” In the event the appointing authority wishes to terminate the services or otherwise discipline an employee who has attained tenure by estoppel or acquisition, the employee is entitled to administrative due process, including notice and hearing, as provided by §75 of the Civil Service Law or the disciplinary procedure set out in a collective bargaining agreement negotiated pursuant to Article 14 of the Civil Service Law, the “Taylor Law.”

What constitutes “timely notice” that the individual has failed to satisfactorily complete his or her probationary employee? The required notice of the termination is to be delivered to the employee before close of business on the last day permitted by the controlling rule or regulation even if the employee's actual removal from the payroll may be effective after this date. In Mendez v Valenti, 101 AD2d 612, the Appellate Division held that as long as the termination of a probationer in the classified service is effected within a reasonable time after the last day of his or her probationary period, such as set to coincide with the end of the next payroll period, the courts will not deem the probationer to have obtained tenure by estoppel or acquisition because of his or her continuation on the payroll beyond the last day of his or her probationary period.

On occasion the date of appointment to the position becomes a critical issue. Such was the case in Mallon v Parness, 167 A.D.2d 614. “Mallon contended that he had been promoted to Sergeant, subject to a twenty-six week probationary period, effective July 18, 1988. He claimed that he thus completed his probationary period on January 18, 1989. He offered an affidavit from the former Mayor of Suffern supporting his claim of appointment effective July 18. The employer, on the other hand, submitted documentary evidence showing that Mallon had been promoted to the Sergeant position effective October 26, 1988 in support of its claim that he had not yet completed his probationary period when he was terminated from the Sergeant position. To further complicate the matter, the records of the Rockland County Personnel Office indicated that Mallon was appointed Sergeant effective June 1, 1988.***The Appellate Division remanded the matter to Supreme Court for its determination as to which was the “official” effective date of Mallon’s promotion to Sergeant.

* In Vetter v Board of Educ., Ravena-Coeymans-Selkirk Cent. School Dist., 14 NY3d 729, the Court of Appeals observed that Education Law §3019-a requires school authorities to give probationary teachers written notice of termination at least 30 days before the effective date of termination.

** See, for example, Wamsley v East Ramapo Central School District, 281 A.D.2d 633.

*** In the event there is a conflict as to the effective date of appointment to a position in the Classified Service, typically the date of such appointment recorded in the records of the Civil Service Commission, Department or Personnel Officer having jurisdiction would control.
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June 16, 2014

Motion to dismiss a cause of action based on a defense of collateral estoppel and res judicata rejected


Motion to dismiss a cause of action based on a defense of collateral estoppel and res judicata rejected
2014 NY Slip Op 02999, Appellate Division, Third Department

A former teacher [Teacher] challenged a decision by the Board of Education [Board] reinstating another former teacher whose name was on the preferred list ahead of Teacher to fill a vacant teaching position.

Teacher complained that the Board had improperly calculated her seniority to her detriment with respect the placement of her name on the preferred list. The Board, however, moved to dismiss the proceeding on grounds, among other reasons, collateral estoppel and res judicata, contending that the dismissal of a prior proceeding challenging the earlier reinstatement of a different former teacher rather than Teacher to fill another vacant position barred the instant proceeding.

The earlier proceeding had been dismissed based on, among other things, Teacher's failure to commence the proceeding within four months of the determination to recall the other teacher. Supreme Court granted the Board's motion to dismiss Teacher’s instant action on collateral estoppel grounds and Teacher appealed.

The Appellate Division reversed the lower court’s ruling, explaining that in order for collateral estoppel to apply, there must be an identity of a decisive issue between the present and prior proceedings which was necessarily decided in the prior proceeding, and the party who will be estopped must have been afforded a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in the prior proceeding.

Here, however, although Teacher raised an issue identical to the one she had raised in her earlier action, -- was she is entitled to more seniority credit than the Board gave her -- that issue has never been decided on the merits as it had been dismissed on procedural ground, having been untimely filed.

Citing Town of Oyster Bay v Commander Oil Corp., 96 NY2d 566, the Appellate Division ruled that [b]ecause the issue of whether [Teacher] is entitled to more seniority has not been decided, it is not barred by collateral estoppel and remanded the matter to Supreme Court for further proceedings “not inconsistent with" its ruling.

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June 13, 2014

Injury suffered on the way to work not typically viewed as “arising out of and in the course of employment”


Injury suffered on the way to work not typically viewed as “arising out of and in the course of employment”
Trotman v New York State Cts., 2014 NY Slip Op 03002, Appellate Division, Third Department

A senior court officer [Officer] was injured shortly before the beginning of his work shift when he slipped and fell on ice. The incident occurred on a public sidewalk that he was traversing to reach the government center after parking his car on the street.

Although the Workers' Compensation Law Judge established the claim, the Workers' Compensation Board denied his ensuing application for workers' compensation benefits, finding that his injury did not arise out of and in the course of his employment. Claimant now appeals.

The Appellate Division affirmed the Board’s determination explaining that "Accidents that occur on a public street away from the place of employment and outside working hours generally are not considered to arise out of and in the course of employment." As Officer’s accident occurred near his place of employment, his claim falls within "a gray area where the risks of street travel merge with the risks attendant with employment and where the mere fact that the accident took place on a public road or sidewalk may not ipso facto negate the right to compensation." 

In contrast, said the court, in order for such an injury come within the ambit of eligibility for workers' compensation benefits, the injury must result from "(1) a special hazard at the particular off-premises point and (2) a close association of the access route with the premises, so far as going and coming are concerned."

Further, said the court, the fact that Officer was directed to travel to another court facility after he arrived at work on the day in question “does not compel a different result.”
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CAUTION

Subsequent court and administrative rulings, or changes to laws, rules and regulations may have modified or clarified or vacated or reversed the information and, or, decisions summarized in NYPPL. For example, New York State Department of Civil Service's Advisory Memorandum 24-08 reflects changes required as the result of certain amendments to §72 of the New York State Civil Service Law to take effect January 1, 2025 [See Chapter 306 of the Laws of 2024]. Advisory Memorandum 24-08 in PDF format is posted on the Internet at https://www.cs.ny.gov/ssd/pdf/AM24-08Combined.pdf. Accordingly, the information and case summaries should be Shepardized® or otherwise checked to make certain that the most recent information is being considered by the reader.
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NYPPL Blogger Harvey Randall served as Principal Attorney, New York State Department of Civil Service; Director of Personnel, SUNY Central Administration; Director of Research, Governor’s Office of Employee Relations; and Staff Judge Advocate General, New York Guard. Consistent with the Declaration of Principles jointly adopted by a Committee of the American Bar Association and a Committee of Publishers and Associations, the material posted to this blog is presented with the understanding that neither the publisher nor NYPPL and, or, its staff and contributors are providing legal advice to the reader and in the event legal or other expert assistance is needed, the reader is urged to seek such advice from a knowledgeable professional.
New York Public Personnel Law. Email: publications@nycap.rr.com