The essentials elements of processing a complaint alleging retaliation constituting unlawful discrimination

The essentials elements in processing a complaint alleging retaliation constituting unlawful discrimination

Troge v State Div. of Human Rights, 2016 NY Slip Op 01337, Appellate Division, Second Department

In the Troge decision the Appellate Division sets out the basics with respect to litigating a complaint alleging retaliation in violation of the State's Human Rights Law where the individual suffered an adverse personnel action because of the individual's engaging in a protected activity .

First, in order to establish a prima facie case of retaliation, the individual is required to show that:

(1) he or she had engaged in protected activity, 

(2) his or her employer was aware that he or she participated in such activity, 

(3) he or she suffered an adverse employment action based upon his or her activity, and 

(4) there is "a causal connection between the protected activity and the adverse [personnel] action" alleged to have suffered by the individual.

Assuming the individual is able to make this initial showing, the burden would shift to the Employer to present legitimate, independent, and nondiscriminatory reasons to support its action[s] or decision[s].

If the Employer meet that burden, the individual would then have to show that the reasons given by the Employer in its defense were "pretext" to camouflage an act of unlawful discrimination.

Darlene Troge was employed by the Town of Southampton as Director of Workplace Policy and Compliance [DWPC], a position that required her to investigate complaints of job discrimination and harassment. After a Deputy Town Supervisor demanded that Troge produce her notes of an investigation of a workplace dispute between two employees, one of whom was Troge’s supervisor, she filed an internal complaint with the Town alleging that the Deputy Town Supervisor had created an "offensive" work environment.

The Town investigated Troge’s complaint and dismissed it. A month later the DWPC position was abolished by unanimous vote of the Town Board and Troge was terminated.  Contending that she had been terminated in retaliation for her filing her “internal complaint” alleging "an offensive work environment," Troge filed a complaint pursuant to Executive Law Article 15 against the Town and Town Supervisor Anna Throne-Holst [the Town].

At a hearing before the State Division of Human Rights [SDHR] the Town submitted proof of the Town's need to reorganize and consolidate different departments within the Town government for financial reasons, leading to the termination of employees. In addition, the Town offered proof of their discontent with the petitioner's job performance. Troge testified that she filed the internal complaint after “opposing requests that she perceived to be in furtherance of discrimination directed against her supervisor” and that she was fired in retaliation of that action.

A Division of Human Rights Administrative law judge [ALJ], following the hearing, found that

[1] Troge failed to establish a prima facie claim for retaliation, and

[2] Even if Troge had established a prima facie claim of unlawful discrimination, the Town had shown that its actions were motivated by "fiscal, non-discriminatory reasons."

Troge filed objections to the ALJ’s findings and determination. The SDHR’s Commissioner issued a final order adopting the ALJ's findings and recommendations and dismissed Troge’s complaint. Troge then filed a CPLR Article 78 petition challenged the Commissioner’s determination.

The Appellate Division said that the review of an administrative determination made after a hearing by a court is limited to considering whether the administrative determination was supported by substantial evidence. Substantial evidence, said the court is “such relevant proof as a reasonable mind may accept as adequate to support a conclusion or ultimate fact."

Notwithstanding Troge’s contention to the contrary, the Appellate Division ruled that there was substantial evidence to support the Commissioner’s determination that the Troge was not subjected to retaliation, explaining that she failed to establish that she had been subjected to an adverse employment action that was taken because of her having engaged in a protected activity.

Essentially the court found that Troge had not been able to demonstrate that the abolishment of her position by the Town constituted a retaliatory firing and the reasons given by the Town in support of its action was “subterfuge.”

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/3dseries/2016/2016_01337.htm

Employee has the burden of proving alleged misconduct by the arbitrator prejudiced his or her rights or the integrity of the process

Employee has the burden of proving alleged misconduct by the arbitrator prejudiced his or her rights or the integrity of the process

Collazo v Suffolk County, 2016 NY Slip Op 01321, Appellate Division, Second Department

Maria Callazo initiated an Article 75 CPLR proceeding in Supreme Court seeking to vacate an arbitration award that recommended certain disciplinary action be taken against her with respect to her employment with the County. The Appellate Division affirmed Supreme Court’s dismissal of Callazo’s petition.

Contrary to the Callazo's contention, the Appellate Division said that Supreme Court correctly determined that Callazo “failed to show by clear and convincing evidence that any misconduct on the part of the arbitrator prejudiced her rights or the integrity of the arbitration process.” In addition, the Appellate Division noted that the disciplinary charges filed against her were timely served within 18 months of her alleged misconduct in connection with her employment.

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/3dseries/2016/2016_01321.htm

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Resolving conflicting medical evidence submitted connection with a Workers’ Compensation Law claim is within the exclusive province of the Workers’ Compensation Board

Resolving conflicting medical evidence submitted in connection with a Workers’ Compensation Law claim is within the exclusive province of the Workers’ Compensation Board

Granville v Town of Hamburg; 2016 NY Slip Op 01373, Appellate Division, Third Department

The Town of Hamburg had employed Patrick Granville as a laborer and light equipment operator from 2003 to 2012. In May 2013, Granville filed for workers' compensation benefits claiming that he had sustained an occupational hearing loss due to exposure to loud occupational noise as a result of his operating such equipment such as heavy-duty sit-down lawn mowers, weed whackers, heavy-equipment tractors, backhoes, zambonis and air jacks.

The Town, a self-insured employer for the purposes of Workers’ Compensation, and its third-party administrator [collectively “the Town”] controverted the claim for benefits filed by Granville. The Workers' Compensation Law Judge [WCLJ] who conducted the hearing concluded that Granville had suffered a causally-related binaural loss of hearing. The Workers' Compensation Board affirmed the WCLJ’s findings.

The Town, conceding that Granville had suffered a hearing loss, appealed the Board’s decision, contending that the record as a whole:

[1] did not establish that Granville was exposed to injurious noise during the course of his employment by the Town; and 

[2] did not establish that Granville’s hearing loss was causally related to his employment.

The Appellate Division rejected the Town’s argument, explaining that Granville had satisfied his burden of establishing, by competent medical evidence, that a causal connection existed between his hearing loss and his employment.

At the workers’ compensation hearing Granville had testified that he had operated heavy and light machinery "at least ninety percent of the time" during a typical workweek, that he had no loud hobbies or activities outside of work and that, prior to his work with the employer, he had worked in the banking industry. He also testified that he was required to undergo a hearing test in 2004, shortly after commencing employment with the Town, and that the results of this test revealed that he had "no effects of hearing loss.* In addition, Granville submitted a report and medical opinion of his treating otolaryngologist, Dr. Sayeed Nabi, who found that Granville's hearing loss was causally related to his employment.**

In contrast, the otolaryngologist who examined Granville on behalf of the Town opined that Granville's hearing loss was neither consistent with injurious noise exposure nor causally related to his employment’

Sustaining the Board’s decision in favor of Granville, the Appellate Division said “The Board found the opinion of [Dr.] Nabi to be more credible and, according appropriate deference to that assessment, substantial evidence supports the determination that [Granville] suffered a causally-related binaural loss of hearing,” explaining that the resolution of conflicting medical opinions, particularly with regard to the issue of causation, is within the exclusive province of the Workers’ Compensation Board.

* The Appellate Division noted that the Town “failed to produce the records of this hearing test.”

** The court said that "[W]here medical proof is relied upon to demonstrate the existence of a causal relationship, it must signify a probability of the underlying cause that is supported by a rational basis and not be based upon a general expression of possibility"

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/3dseries/2016/2016_01373.htm

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Determining when the statute of limitations to file a civil rights action commencesn

Determining when the statute of limitations to file a civil rights action commences

Azor v City of New York, 2016 NY Slip Op 01440, Appellate Division, First Department

Jean Azor alleged that his civil rights were violated in the course of a disciplinary hearing. Azor the filed an action claim a violation of 42 USC 1983.

The Appellate Division ruled that his action was barred by the three-year statute of limitations as his time to commence the §1983 action began to accrue on the date of the disciplinary hearing determination was delivered.

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

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http://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/3dseries/2016/2016_01440.htm

Negligence in complying with the Open Meetings Law may not be sufficient to vacated decisions made at a meeting subject to its provisions

Negligence in complying with the Open Meetings Law may not be sufficient to vacated decisions made at a meeting subject to its provisions

Cutler v Town of Mamakating, 2016 NY Slip Op 01543, Appellate Division, Third Department

The Town of Mamakatingabolished its position of Parks Maintenance Supervisor.

The then incumbent of the position, Oliver Cutler, challenged the Town’s action. Cutler contended that the Town had “had illegally and in bad faith abolished his position.” Cutler also alleged that the Town violated the Open Meetings Law, Public Officers Law Article 7, when it voted to abolish the Parks Maintenance Supervisor position at a closed executive session and was unrecorded.

Supreme Court dismissed Cutler’s “combined proceeding pursuant to CPLR Article 78 and action for declaratory judgment” to vacate the Town’s action abolishing his position which resulted in his being terminated from employment.

Cutler appealed the Supreme Court’s action but the Appellate Division affirmed the lower court’s rulings. Citing §80 of the Civil Service Law, the court ruled that a public employer may, in the absence of bad faith, collusion or fraud, abolish positions for purposes of economy or efficiency.

Here the record included affidavits of the Town Supervisor and a member of the Town Board indicating that because its “parks maintenance department consisted of only [Cutler] and one part-time laborer, it could achieve greater economy and efficiency by abolishing the supervisory position in favor of hiring additional laborers.” The Town also said that Cutler’s managerial duties were “shifted” to the Town Supervisor and that this reorganization and the employment of two full-time and one part-time laborer provided an overall “cost savings.”

Thus, said the court, the burden was then shifted to Cutler to demonstrate that his position was eliminated in bad faith or as a subterfuge to circumvent his rights under the Civil Service Law. The Appellate Division said Cutler failed to meet his burden, submitting only “conclusory and unsupported assertions” which failed to refute the Town Board's showing that its actions were part of “a good faith effort to reorganize a municipal department for the purposes of reducing costs and increasing efficiency.”

The court explained that the mere reassignment of duties, in and of itself, does not constitute proof of bad faith nor was there any indication in the record of any personal or political animosities that would suggest some deceitful purpose of ousting and replacing Cutler.

Addressing Cutler’s argument in the alternative, that the closed executive session in which the unrecorded vote to abolish his position was taken constituted a violation of the Open Meetings Law, the Appellate Division held that “Supreme Court had good cause to void the Town Board's action.” Although a discussion of the abolishment of Cutler's specific position for reasons of economy and efficiency was a proper subject of an executive session, the court said it agreed with Cutler that the Town Board violated the Open Meetings Law by inadequately describing the purpose for entering into the executive session as, simply, "personnel issues."

The Appellate Division also agreed with Cutler “that it was improper for the Town Board to vote on its decision without recording the vote in the executive session minutes, even though it did not "appropriate public moneys."

Notwithstanding its agreement with Cutler concerning these two “procedural defects,” the court decided that Cutler failed to show the requisite "good cause" for declaring the Town Board's action to be void stating that the record does not suggest that the [Town Board's] failure to comply with the precise requirements of the Open Meetings Law was anything more than mere negligence." Citing Roberts v Town Board of Carmel, 207 AD2d 404; Leave to appeal denied, 84 NY2d 811, the Appellate Division concluded that “mere negligence” does not constitute good cause for invalidating the Town Board's otherwise permissible action.

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/3dseries/2016/2016_01543.htm

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