Appealing Supreme Court’s denial of a party’s motion

Appealing Supreme Court’s denial of a party’s motion

Hamilton v Alley, 2016 NY Slip Op 06564, Appellate Division, Fourth Department

William E. Hamilton challenged his termination as a tenured school district administrator by bringing a CPLR Article 78 in Supreme Court. Supreme Court denied Hamilton’s motion to amended his petition. He appealed the Supreme Court’s action and the Appellate Division modified the Supreme Court order denying his amended petition in part by granting Hamilton’s motion to amend the petition in part.*

Hamilton next asked Supreme Court “for leave to renew his amended petition.” Supreme Court denied Hamilton’s motion explaining that he had failed to offer new facts “that were unavailable” when the court initially denied the amended petition.

Hamilton then challenged the Supreme Court’s denial of his subsequent motion for leave to renew the amended petition but in this instance the Appellate Division dismissed his appeal.

The Appellate Division explained that Hamilton’s motion, “purportedly seeking leave to renew,” was actually a motion seeking “leave to reargue.” However, said the court, “no appeal lies from an order denying leave to reargue," citing Hill v Milan, 89 AD3d 1458.

* See Matter of Hamilton v Alley, 137 AD3d 1564

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/3dseries/2016/2016_06564.htm

An employer may seek summary judgment in human rights action by offering a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason rebutting allegations of unlawful discrimination

An employer may seek summary judgment in human rights action by offering a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason rebutting allegations of unlawful discrimination  

Tibbetts v Pelham Union Free School Dist., 2016 NY Slip Op 06699, Appellate Division, Second Department

§296(1)(a) of the New York State Human Rights Law provides that "[i]t shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice . . . [f]or an employer . . . because of an individual's . . . disability . . . to discharge from employment such individual."

To establish a prima facieviolation of §296(1)(a), a plaintiff must show that (1) he or she is a member of a protected class; (2) he or she was qualified to hold the position; (3) he or she was terminated from employment or suffered another adverse employment action; and (4) the discharge or other adverse action occurred under circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination.

Jennifer Tibbetts sued the Pelham Union Free School District to recover damages for alleged employment discrimination on the basis of disability in violation of Executive Law §296. Tibbetts, a probationary music teacher, alleged that she was injured in a slip-and-fall accident and was unable to work for approximately a week while she recovered from her injuries. She alleged that the accident left her disabled, and approximately two weeks after she returned to work, she was terminated because of her disability.

Supreme Court, Westchester County granted Pelham’s motion for summary judgment, dismissing Tibbetts’ complaint. Tibbetts appealed the Supreme Court’s ruling.

Sustaining the lower court’s decision, the Appellate Division said that Pelham had submitted evidence that it terminated Tibbetts’ employment “due to an unusually large number of documented complaints from parents about her interactions with students,” which began shortly after she was appointed to her position and continued throughout the course of her employment. Pelham also submitted evidence that it had no notice of Tibbetts’ alleged disability at the time that she was terminated.

Considering Supreme Court’s granting Pelham’s motion for summary judgment, the Appellate Division explained that “… a defendant, upon offering legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for the challenged action, is also required to demonstrate the absence of a triable issue of fact as to whether its explanation for its termination of the plaintiff's employment was pretextual.” In the court’s opinion Pelham had satisfied both requirements.

The Appellate Division found that Pelham had met its burden on its motion for summary judgment of offering legitimate, nonpretextual reasons for terminating Tibbetts’ employment. Rejecting Tibbetts’ contention that “the temporal proximity between the alleged onset of her disability and her discharge” supports an inference of discrimination in this action, the court said that Pelham had demonstrated that it had no knowledge of her alleged disability at the time that she was dismissed from her position.

As Tibbetts failed to raise a triable issue of fact as to whether Pelham’s explanation for her termination "was false, misleading, or incomplete" and her affidavit “was based on speculation and presented what appear to be feigned issues of fact designed to avoid the consequences of her earlier deposition testimony,” the Appellate Division concluded that “Supreme Court properly granted [Pelham’s] motion for summary judgment dismissing the amended complaint insofar as asserted against it.”

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/3dseries/2016/2016_06699.htm

Employee organization leave

Employee organization leave
§46 of Chapter 283 of the Laws of 1972

Providing employees of the State with Employee Organization Leave to participate in "union activities" as an elected or appointed officer of an employee organization certified or recognized for the purposes of collective bargaining has been an issue since the adoption of the Taylor Law.

In response to demands that State employees elected to a leadership position of an employee organization representing state employees be provided with "paid organization leave," the State agreed to provide for “Employee Organization Leave” and enacted §46 of Chapter 283 of the Laws of 1972 to this end.

This law provides that a State employee organization may obtain approval for paid full or part-time leaves of absence of its representatives provided it agrees to fully reimburse the State for the salary and other compensation paid to the individual and, in addition, reimburse the State for all employer contributions for fringe benefits made by the State on behalf of the individual, while he or she is on Employee Organization Leave. The individual would be continued as a State employee, on the State’s payroll, during this time. 

A "leaves for union activities" article set out in a Taylor Agreement typically provides  that  in the event an employees is  granted a leave of absence with full salary from his or her regular position for certain employee organization purposes, the employee organization shall reimburse the State the employee's salary and the employer's contributions for employee benefits while he or she is on such leave "consistent with provisions promulgated by the Department of Audit and Control and in accordance with the provisions of Section 46 of Chapter 283 of the Laws of 1972."

Another element affecting State employees on Employee Organization Leave: The State Ethics Commission has advised that “State employees on Employee Organization Leave or State employees on leave without pay who serve as employee organization representatives for CSEA … who have terminated their State service and are now employed by CSEA are subject to the "revolving door" provisions of the Public Officers Law and the corresponding restrictions on post-employment activities” [see Advisory Opinion #90-a ]. Presumably this opinion would be applied with respect to State employees on employee organization leave serving with other employee organizations.

Failure to honor a known policy of the employer can constitute disqualifying misconduct for the purpose eligibility for unemployment insurance benefits

Failure to honor a known policy of the employer can constitute disqualifying misconduct for the purpose eligibility for unemployment insurance benefits

New York City Dept. of Citywide Admin. Servs. (Commissioner of Labor), 2016 NY Slip Op 06526, Appellate Division, Third Department

The New York City Taxi and Limousine Commission [TLC] had a “limited-use policy”  permitting its employees limited personal use of TLC's office and technology resources as long as such use does not interfere with official duties and responsibilities.

TLC received an anonymous complaint that an individual [Employee] was using TLC's resources to conduct his campaign for election to the City Council. TLC requested the New York City Department of Investigation [DOI] to investigate Employee’s campaign-related activities during his employment. Employee then advised TLC that he was taking a leave of absence from his position pursuant to a directive requiring him to do so upon, among other things, publicly declaring his intent to seek elected public office.

Upon completing its investigation, DOI concluded that Employee had misused TLC's resources prior to taking a leave of absence and so advised TLC. TLC terminated Employee, prompting him to apply for unemployment insurance benefits.

The Department of Labor subsequently determined that Employee was disqualified from receiving benefits because his employment was terminated for misconduct and found that Employee had made a willful misrepresentation on his application for benefits insofar as he claimed that he had been discharged for lack of work. The Department charged Employee with an overpayment of $4,050 in benefits, reduced his right to receive future benefits by eight effective days and imposed a civil penalty of $607.50.

Ultimately, the Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board upheld the Department's initial determination and penalties imposed pursuant to that determination. Employee appealed the Board’s decision.

The Appellate Division affirmed the Appeal Board’s decision, explaining "Whether a claimant has engaged in disqualifying misconduct is a factual question for the Board to resolve and its determination will not be disturbed if supported by substantial evidence," noting that “It is well settled that failure to abide by a known policy of the employer can constitute disqualifying misconduct.”

The court’s decision noted that evidence in the record, including the report detailing the findings of DOI's investigation, established the Employee’s use of TLC's resources, such as his work computer and telephone, to further his political campaign efforts “was extensive” and  telephone calls made from his office telephone were unrelated to Employee's employment.

Although Employee denied that he used his work computer and the telephone at TLC to pursue his campaign efforts, including soliciting contributions for his campaign, at the hearing, the Appellate Division observed that this “presented issues of credibility within the exclusive province of the Board” to resolve and the Board was entitled to credit the competing evidence presented at the hearing and reject Employee's exculpatory claims.

In addition, noted the court, Employee inaccurately represented that he was unemployed due to a lack of work when applying for unemployment insurance benefits although he had previously been made aware of DOI's investigation of him.

Accordingly, the Appellate Division said that it found “no reason to disturb the Board's imposition of a recoverable overpayment or forfeiture penalty based upon the [Employee’s] willful misrepresentations.”

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/3dseries/2016/2016_06526.htm

Medical Marijuana in the workplace: what an employer in New York State needs to know

Medical Marijuana in the workplace: what an employer in New York State needs to know

Source: NYMUNIBlOG, Kyle Sturgess

New York’s Compassionate Care Act, Chapter 90 of the Laws of 2014, provided for the use of medical marijuana in New York State.

Harris Beach, PLLCattorneys Roy Galewski and Jim Beyer will conduct a webinar focusing on “Medical Marijuana in the New York Workplace” and addressing “Common Disability Accommodation Issues” on October 27, 2016 at 8:00 a.m.

Harris Beach invites interested readers to click on https://www.harrisbeach.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/LaborSeriesInvite2016.pdfto register for this webinar.