Educator terminated for a continuing pattern of inappropriate behavior involving students

Educator terminated for a continuing pattern of inappropriate behavior involving students

Vagianos v City of New York, 2017 NY Slip Op 04779, Appellate Division, First Department

Kristopher Vagianos appealed Supreme Court's dismissal of his Article 75 petition to vacate a disciplinary arbitration award that resulted his termination as a tenured school teacher.

Sustaining the lower court's ruling, the Appellate Division noted that Vagianos had been previously disciplined and found guilty of similar misconduct and had neither taken responsibility for such misconduct that involved his "verbal abuse of one student and corporal punishment of a student confined to a wheelchair" nor was he deterred by that earlier disciplinary action from continuing his pattern of inappropriate behavior.

The record in the current appeal indicated that the hearing officer found that Vagianos, a teacher of special-needs students, made denigrating comments about a students' limitations in the presence of other teachers, including referring to such students as "waste products," made inappropriate comments to a student with autism, and made threatening comments to another teacher.

Under the circumstances, the Appellate Division said that its sense of fairness was not shocked by imposing the penalty of termination in this disciplinary action, explaining that Vagianos' insensitivity to and disrespect for his students "compromised his ability to function as a teacher."

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/3dseries/2017/2017_04779.htm

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Does the public have a right of access to a hearing concerning the removal of a member of a school board for official misconduct?

Does the public have a right of access to a hearing concerning the removal of a member of a school board for official misconduct?

2017 NY Slip Op 04624, Appellate Division, Fourth Department

The Board of Education [School Board] sought to remove one of its members [Member] from her position on the School Board pursuant to Education Law §1709(18).

Subdivision 18 of §1709 sets out the relevant procedures to be followed in the event a school board seeks to "remove any member ... for official misconduct" and requires that a "written copy of all charges made of such misconduct shall be served upon him [or her] at least ten days before the time appointed for a hearing of the same; and he [or she] shall be allowed a full and fair opportunity to refute such charges before removal."

Member challenged the School Board's procedure in holding the hearing concerning her removal from the board, contending that the School Board had violated her First Amendment right of access when it closed the first three days of the Member's removal hearing to general public. Supreme Court denied her motion for summary judgment and Member appealed.

The Appellate Division unanimously affirmed the Supreme Court's ruling and, addressing the School Board's action barring the public from "the first three days" of the hearing, said:

1. "The First Amendment, made applicable to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment, prohibits the government from 'abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances';

2. "[A] trial courtroom ... is a public place where the people generally — and representatives of the media — have a right to be present, and where their presence historically has been thought to enhance the integrity and the quality of what takes place;

3. "The United States Supreme Court has applied a two-part test to determine whether there was a right of access under the First Amendment [see Press-Enterprise Co. v Superior Ct. of Cal., County of Riverside, 478 US 1, 8-10], and the [New York State] Court of Appeals has used that test to determine whether there is a right of access to a professional disciplinary hearing;

4. "The test requires a court to consider 'whether the place and process have historically been open to the press and general public and whether public access plays a significant positive role in the functioning of the particular process in question'; and

5. "Once it has been determined that there is such a right of access, then the proceeding 'cannot be closed unless specific, on the record findings are made demonstrating that closure is essential to preserve higher values and is narrowly tailored to serve that interest.'"

The Appellate Division found that Member failed to submit evidence establishing that, as a matter of law, removal hearings conducted pursuant to Education Law §1709(18) have historically been open to the public and that the public has played a significant positive role in such proceedings.

Accordingly, the court concluded that Supreme Court "properly denied [Member's] motion on the ground that [Member] failed to meet her burden of establishing as a matter of law that there is a First Amendment right of access to an Education Law §1709(18) removal proceeding."

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/3dseries/2017/2017_04624.htm

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A collective bargaining agreement may expand an employer's obligation to provide information to an employee organization not specifically provided for by law

A collective bargaining agreement may expand an employer's obligation to provide information to an employee organization not specifically provided for by law

City of New York v New York State Nurses Assn., 2017 NY Slip Op 04492, Court of Appeals

New York State Nurses Association (Union) filed an improper practice petition with the Board of Collective Bargaining of the City of New York (the Board), alleging that it had a right to certain information pursuant to New York City's Collective Bargaining Law (NYCCBL) §12-306(c)(4), in connection with disciplinary proceedings brought against two nurses employed by the City's Human Resources Administration (HRA).

HRA refused to provide the information the Union sought in connection with its representing the two nurses in the disciplinary action, including the "relevant policies and the HRA Code of Conduct, information on time-keeping, patient treatment records for the relevant dates, witness statements, and a written statement detailing how the nurses violated the HRA Code of Conduct." HRA also refused to permit the Union to question "the witnesses who gave statements and the nurses' supervisors."

The Board, with two members dissenting, ruled that it was an improper practice for the City to refuse to comply with certain of the information requests, finding that §12-306(c)(4) extends to information "relevant to and reasonably necessary to the administration of the parties' agreements, such as processing grievances." The Board, however, found that the Union was not entitled to witness statements or a written explanation regarding the violation or the opportunity to question the identified witnesses or supervisors, concluding that §12-306(c)(4) is limited to information "normally maintained in the regular course of business."

The City filed an Article 78 petition challenging the Board's determination.

Supreme Court granted the City's petition and annulled the Board's determination, concluding that the Board improperly extended the Union's right to obtain information for grievances pursuant to contract administration to disciplinary proceedings, noting that "the agreement does not explicitly require the City to provide information in disciplinary proceedings."

The Appellate Division unanimously reversed, holding that "the Board's decision, which was entitled to 'substantial deference,' had a rational basis" but granted the City leave to appeal on a certified question of whether its order was properly made.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division's ruling, Judge Garcia dissenting, explaining:

1. NYCCBL provides that it is improper practice for a public employer "to refuse to bargain collectively in good faith on matters within the scope of collective bargaining with certified or designated representatives of its public employees" and requires both employers and unions "to furnish to the other party, upon request, data normally maintained in the regular course of business, reasonably available and necessary for full and proper discussion, understanding and negotiation of subjects within the scope of collective bargaining."

2. The Board held that NYCCBL §12-306(c)(4) extended to information "relevant to and reasonably necessary for the administration of the parties' agreements, such as processing grievances, and/or for collective negotiations on mandatory subjects of bargaining."

3. The Appellate Division noted, "... the City and HRA do not dispute the Board's precedent holding that the duty to furnish information already applied to 'contract administration' and 'grievances' (including potential grievances)."

4. Union had bargained for and obtained the right to obtain such information in the context of a disciplinary proceedings and not just "contract" grievances by defining "grievance" to include disciplinary action in the relevant collective bargaining agreement.

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/3dseries/2017/2017_04492.htm

Expulsion of a public employee in a collective bargaining unit from membership in an employee organization recognized or certified for the purposes of the Taylor Law

Expulsion of a public employee in a collective bargaining unit from membership in an employee organization recognized or certified for the purposes of the Taylor Law

Montero v Police Assn. of the City of Yonkers, Inc., 2017 NY Slip Op 02040, Appellate Division, Second Department

Raymond Montero asked the Appellate Division to review a determination by Supreme Court that sustained the Police Association of the City of Yonkers, Inc., also known as Yonkers Police Benevolent Association [YPBA], expulsion of Montero from its membership. The Appellate Division annulled the lower court ruling, on the law, with costs, and granted Montero's petition.

YPBA had notified Montero of charges alleging he was guilty of certain misconduct and of a hearing scheduled to consider such charges. Montero chose not to appear at the hearing. Apparently YPBA conducted Monero's hearing in absentia and made a determination to expel him from membership in the organization.

Citing Matter of Kelly v Northport Yacht Club, Inc., 44 AD3d 858, the Appellate Division set out the standard for assuming jurisdiction in the matter as follows: "[W]here the constitution and by-laws of a voluntary association reasonably set forth grounds for expulsion and provide for a hearing upon notice to the member, judicial review of such proceedings is unavailable, unless the reason for expulsion is not a violation of the constitution or by-laws or is so trivial as to suggest that the action of the association was capricious or corrupt, or unless the association failed to administer its own rules fairly."

Here, said the court, YBPA determined that Montero committed conduct that was "prejudicial to the welfare of the Association," in violation of the bylaws, was arbitrary and capricious.

Montero was charged with providing "information" to the author of articles published online, providing that author with an email from the YPBA's president to the members, publishing that email online himself, with comments, and being involved in an altercation with another member. The court noted that "Other than the single identified email, there is no basis in the record on which to determine what, if any, other information was provided to the author of the articles by [Montero], and whether such unidentified information was detrimental to [YPBA]."

Although YPBA characterized the email as "confidential," the Appellate Division opined that there is no reason to conclude that the email, which was sent to all of the YPBA's members, was confidential as the email merely contained a statement indicating that the sharing of the email was "discouraged." Further, said the court, while Montero's was alleged to have disseminated "certain misinformation," during a time when YPBA was negotiating a contract with the City of Yonkers complicated the contract negotiations, YPBA failed to explain how the shared email, or the comments made by Montero, had such an effect or was detrimental to the welfare YPBA.

Quoting from Polin v Kaplan, 257 NY 277, the court observed that "If there be any public policy touching the government of labor unions, and there can be no doubt that there is, it is that traditionally democratic means of improving their union may be freely availed of by members without fear of harm or penalty. And this necessarily includes the right to criticize current union leadership. . . . The price of free expression and of political opposition within a union cannot be the risk of expulsion or other disciplinary action. In the final analysis, a labor union profits, as does any democratic body, more by permitting free expression and free political opposition than it may ever lose from any disunity that it may thus evidence."

Lastly, the court said that there was no rational basis for the conclusion that a brief physical altercation between Montero petitioner and another YPBA member "prejudice[d] the welfare" of organization.

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/3dseries/2017/2017_02040.htm

Applying the Doctrine of Abatement in a criminal action

Applying the Doctrine of Abatement in a criminal action

United States v Libous, USCA, 2nd Circuit, Docket#15-3979

Under the Doctrine of Abatement, the government has no right to retain fines imposed pursuant to a criminal conviction that is subsequently vacated.

In this case, the Executrix of the estate of Thomas W. Libous, a former New York State Senator, moved to [1] withdraw his then pending appeal; [2] vacate the underlying judgment of conviction of making false statements to the FBI; and [3] remand the matter to the district court for dismissal of the indictment and a order refunding the fine and special assessment imposed upon Libous' conviction to his estate.

A federal jury had convicted former New York State Senator Thomas W. Libous of making false statements to the FBI in violation of 18 U.S.C. §1001. At sentencing, the district court imposed a two-year term of probation on Libous, whose physicians had determined had less than a year to live, along with a $50,000 fine imposition of the mandatory $100 special assessment.

Although the government consented to the abatement of Libous’ conviction, it opposed the return of the fine and special assessment. Incorrect said the Circuit Court, ruling that the government had no right to retain fines imposed pursuant to a conviction that is subsequently vacated and granted the Executrix's  motion in its entirety.

The court explained that "Under the well-established Doctrine of Abatement, ab initio, when a convicted defendant dies pending an appeal as of right, his [or her] conviction abates, the underlying indictment is dismissed. Further, his or her estate is relieved of any obligation to pay a criminal fine imposed at sentence. In effect, all proceedings in the prosecution from its inception are abated."

To comply with this common law rule, said the court, “[T]he appeal does not just disappear, and the case is not merely dismissed. Instead, everything associated with the case is extinguished, leaving the defendant as if he [or she] had never been indicted or convicted.” In other words, “Under the doctrine of abatement ab initio . . . the defendant stands as if he [or she] never had been indicted or convicted.”

This is so because, in the interests of justice, "a defendant does not stand convicted without resolution of the merits of an appeal and to the extent that the judgment of conviction orders incarceration or other sanctions that are designed to punish the defendant, that purpose can no longer be served.”

As the Supreme Court held in Nelson v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 124, “[w]hen a criminal conviction is invalidated by a reviewing court and no retrial will occur,” the state is required under the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process guarantee “to refund fees, court costs, and restitution exacted from the defendant upon, and as a consequence of, the conviction.”

Once a defendant’s conviction is “erased, the presumption of [his or her] innocence [is] restored,” and the state “has no interest in withholding from [a defendant] money to which the [s]tate currently has zero claim of right.”

The Supreme Court, however, said "We express no view on how abatement operates, if at all, in the event the defendant commits suicide pending an appeal as of right, suggesting that it may distinguish the impact on the Doctrine in cases of suicide from the impact of the Doctrine in the event of death as the result of natural causes, accident, or events other than suicide while such an appeal is pending.

The Circuit Court then granted the Executrix's motion and vacated Libous' judgment of conviction. It also remanded the matter to the federal district court "for the dismissal of the indictment and the return of the fine and special assessment imposed on Libous pursuant to his now-vacated conviction"

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca2/15-3979/15-3979-2017-05-30.html