Reducing or discontinuing a NYSHIP participating employer's contributions towards a retired employee's health insurance premium

Reducing or discontinuing a NYSHIP participating employer's contributions towards a retired employee's health insurance premium

Weaver, et al, v Town of N. Castle, 2017 NY Slip Op 05960, Appellate Division, Second Department

On June 27, 2012 the Town Board of the Town of North Castle adopted a resolution establishing a "Compensation and Benefits Manual" [Manual]. The Manual provided that, effective July 1, 2012, the Town would not contribute towards the cost of health insurance benefits on behalf of current or former Board members enrolled in the Town's health insurance plan, the New York State Health Insurance Program [NYSHIP],* although such elected officials could continue their coverage in the NYSHIP by paying 100% of the total cost of the premium for their participation in NYSHIP.

Following the Town's informing the affected individuals of the increased premium rates they would be required to pay in order to continue their participation in NYSHIP, a number of such persons [Petitioners] initiated an Article 78 action challenging the Board's action, seeking a court order declaring the Board's resolution "null and void."

Supreme Court dismissed the Petitioners' complaint, affirmatively declaring that the Town Board's resolution "was not null and void," and, in effect, held that the Petitioners [1] did not have a vested contractual interest in retirement health insurance benefits, [2] that the doctrine of promissory estoppel did not bar the reduction of Town's contribution to the Petitioners' health insurance premiums and [3] the Board's resolution, "insofar as it provides that the Town of New Castle will not contribute toward retirement health insurance benefits of former members of the Town Board of the Town of New Castle who retired prior to July 1, 2012, does not violate Civil Service Law §167(2)."

The Petitioners appealed and the Appellate Division modified the Supreme Court's judgment "on the law," declaring that the resolution, insofar as it provided that the Town of New Castle "will not contribute toward retirement health insurance benefits for former members of the Town Board of the Town of New Castle who retired prior to July 1, 2012, violates Civil Service Law §167(2)."

The Appellate Division said that although Supreme Court properly determined that [1] the Board was entitled to reduce the Petitioner's retirement health insurance benefits granted by its October 13, 1983 resolution,* as "A municipal resolution is, in general, a unilateral action that is temporary in nature and, thus, does not create any vested contractual rights" and [2] the Town was not barred by the doctrine of promissory estoppel from reducing the appellants' retirement health insurance benefits,** Supreme Court erred in determining that the Town was not required to contribute any amount for the retirement health insurance benefits of former Board members who retired prior to July 1, 2012."

The court noted that Civil Service Law §167(2) provides, in relevant part, that participating employers, such as the Town, are required to contribute 50% of the cost of premiums for retired employees, and 35% of the cost of coverage for their dependents. The Appellate Division then ruled as Petitioners were individuals who has become enrolled in [NYSHIP] as an employee and whose coverage is being continued after his or her withdrawal from the active service within the meaning of 4 NYCRR 73.1[e], the Town may not reduce its contribution rates "below the legally mandated minimums set out in §167(2) of the Civil Service Law."

The matter was then remitted to Supreme Court for a determination as to damages for the amounts paid by the retired appellants "which were part of the legally mandated minimums and for the entry of an appropriate amended judgment thereafter."

* Civil Service Law §167(2), in pertinent part, provides that "Each participating employer shall be required to pay not less than fifty percentum of the cost of premium or subscription charges for the coverage of its employees and retired employees who are enrolled in the statewide only or the statewide and comparable supplementary health benefit plans established pursuant to this article. Such employer shall be required to pay not less than thirty-five percentum of the cost of premium or subscription charges for the coverage of dependents of such employees and retired employees. Such employer shall contribute toward the premium or subscription charges for the coverage of each employee or retired employee who is enrolled in an optional benefit plan and for the dependents of such employee or retired employee the same dollar amount which would be paid by such employer for the premium or subscription charges for the coverage of such employee or retired employee and his or her dependents if he or she were enrolled in the statewide health benefit plan, but not in excess of the premium or subscription charges for the coverage of such employee or retired employee and his or her dependents under such optional benefit plan. Such employer shall not be required to pay the cost of premium or subscription charges for the coverage of unpaid elected officials, or unpaid board members of a public authority, or their dependents, provided, however that no unpaid board member of a public authority shall be eligible to participate in such benefit plan until he or she has served in such position for at least six months. Subject to such regulations as the president may prescribe, any participating employer may elect to pay higher rates of contribution for the coverage of employees, retired employees and their dependents ...."

** The Town's 1983 resolution proved that it would pay "either 100% or 85% of the NYSHIP premium for health insurance depending on the amount of years of service set forth in current collective bargaining agreements for retirees."

*** The Appellate Division noted that to establish promissory estoppel, a party must prove a clear and unambiguous promise, reasonable and foreseeable reliance by the party to whom the promise is made, and an injury sustained in reliance on that promise.

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/3dseries/2017/2017_05960.htm

Determining an educator's seniority for the purposes of layoff

Determining an educator's seniority for the purposes of layoff

Decisions of the Commissioner of Education, Decision No. 17,140

Education Law §§2510(2) and 3013(2) provide that when a board of education abolishes a position, “the services of the teacher having the least seniority in the system within the tenure [area] of the position abolished shall be discontinued.”  Further, in determining which position within a tenure area is to be abolished "seniority credit shall be awarded for time served in a position for which the teacher did not hold proper certification, at the time, because certification is not controlling in determining seniority credit for this purpose." 

In this appeal to the Commissioner of Education the Petitioner alleged that she was improperly excessed from her position in violation of Education Law §2510 as she had spent at least 50 percent of her time teaching social studies in both the 2008-2009 and 2009-2010 school years and thus she had greater seniority than another social studies teacher and that teacher should have been excessed. Petitioner requested that the Commissioner declare the school board’s actions excessing her null and void and to direct the school board to reinstate her to her former position "with full seniority rights, benefits and pay retroactive to September 1, 2014."*

The school district, in rebuttal, contended that the earliest Petitioner could begin to accrue seniority in the tenure area of social studies was the date upon which she received certification in social studies. Accordingly, the school district argued Petitioner was the least senior teacher in the social studies tenure area and that its decision to terminate her services was proper. In so doing the school board cited the Appellate Division's decision in Abdallah v. Bd. of Educ. of Massena Cent. Schools, 61 AD2d 1096, in support of its action.

In Abdallah the court held that the petitioners in that case, nurse-teachers whose positions were abolished and replaced by registered nurse positions, "were not certified in the tenure area of the position abolished" and thus they “could not possibly have gained tenure and seniority in those tenure areas.” However, the Commissioner opined that this statement by the Appellate Division in Abdullah was not intended to overrule Matter of Lynch v. Nyquist, 41 AD2d 363, affirmed, 34 NY2d 588. In Lynch the court held that an uncertified teacher cannot be given seniority credit towards tenure and thus become tenured even though uncertified.

The Commissioner said "it is unclear" whether the school district ever affirmatively determined the authorized tenure area(s) to which Petitioner’s position should be classified or reclassified and then determined her  seniority within such tenure area(s) as it is required to do. Rather the school district, relying on Abdallha, "erroneously asserted that it could not reclassify Petitioner’s duties because she could not accrue seniority credit in the abolished position for the time period that she did not hold a proper certification." However, noted the Commissioner, the Appellate Division's ruling in Lynch indicated that a school district "may not circumvent Education Law §3020-a by excessing a tenured, certified teacher based on their lack of certification to teach in the tenure area of an abolished position" is still binding precedent.

Accordingly, the matter was remanded to the school board for its determination of Petitioner’s seniority rights with respect to [1] performing duties in the social studies tenure area, and [2] whether she is entitled to back pay and retroactive benefits from September 1, 2014 through October 13, 2014, in accordance with 8 NYCRR 30-1.1 and this decision.

It should be noted that the Education Law and the rules and regulations promulgated thereunder addressing seniority, tenure and layoff with respect to educators apply to those positions in the Unclassified Service as defined in §35(g) of the Civil Service Law.

In contrast, §80 [positions in the competitive class of the Classified Service]** of the Civil Service Law, subject to certain statutory exceptions, provide that "suspension or demotion, as the case may be, among incumbents holding the same or similar positions shall be made in the inverse order of original appointment on a permanent basis in the classified service in the service of the governmental jurisdiction in which such abolition or reduction of positions occurs, subject to the provisions of subdivision seven of section eighty-five of this chapter; provided, however, that the date of original appointment of any such incumbent who was transferred to such governmental jurisdiction from another governmental jurisdiction upon the transfer of functions shall be the date of original appointment on a permanent basis in the classified service in the service of the governmental jurisdiction from which such transfer was made."

Further, as the Appellate Division held in City of Plattsburgh v Local 788, 108 AD2d 1045, the statutory rights set out in §80 of the Civil Service Law may not be abrogated by the terms of a collective bargaining agreement as an individual’s seniority for the purposes of layoff may neither be diminished or nor impaired by the terms of a collective bargaining agreement.

* The record indicated that Petitioner was reinstated to her former position on October 14, 2014 and that she has continued in that position to date with full salary and benefits. Accordingly, said the Commissioner, the only issue to be addressed is "Petitioner’s request for reinstatement with back pay, interest, benefits, seniority, tenure and other emoluments of office for the period September 1, 2014 through October 13, 2014."

** See §80-a of the Civil Service Law, which provisions control with respect to positions in the non-competitive class of the Classified Service of the state as the employer in the event of a layoff of such personnel.

The decision is posted on the Internet at: 

http://www.counsel.nysed.gov/Decisions/volume57/d17140

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The Layoff, Preferred List and Reinstatement Manual -This e-book reviews the relevant laws, rules and regulations, and selected court and administrative decisions. For more information click on http://booklocker.com/books/5216.html

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New York State Comptroller Thomas P. DiNapoli announced the following report was issued during the week ending August 26, 2017

 
New York State Comptroller Thomas P. DiNapoli announced the following report was issued during the week ending August 26, 2017

Source: Office of the State Comptroller

Click on text highlighted in color  to access the full report

Comptroller DiNapoli and A.G. Schneiderman Announce Sentencing of Former West Ghent Volunteer Fire Company Treasurer Who Embezzled Funds to Bankroll Personal Business

Comptroller Thomas P. DiNapoli and Attorney General Eric T. Schneiderman announced the sentencing of Gail E. Cesternino, the former West Ghent Volunteer Fire Company treasurer, for embezzling fire company money to bankroll her personal business. Cesternino was sentenced to 30 days in jail followed by five years’ probation, and ordered to pay $58,000 in restitution and a $5,000 fine.

Selected reports posted in Employment Law News by WK Workday

 

Selected reports posted in Employment Law News by WK Workday

Source: Wolters Kulwer

Selected reports posted by WK Workday distributed August 25, 2017

Click on text highlighted in color  to access the full report

Sweeping ‘don’t talk about K9 unit’ mandate was prior restraint on troopers’ free speech

Moonin v. Tice, By Lisa Milam-Perez, J.D.

Officer could be fired for derogatory Facebook post and texts about Trayvon Martin

Snipes v. Volusia County, By Kathleen Kapusta, J.D.

Supervisor’s heterosexuality wouldn’t bar jury from finding she sexually desired female subordinate

Watkins v. Illinois Central School Bus, LLC, By Lorene D. Park, J.D.

The Doctrine of Collateral Estoppel bars relitigating an issue raised and decided by a judicial tribunal in a prior action or proceeding involving the same parties

The Doctrine of Collateral Estoppel bars relitigating an issue raised and decided by a judicial tribunal in a prior action or proceeding involving the same parties

2017 NY Slip Op 06264, Appellate Division, Second Department

In an action to recover damages for alleged unlawful discrimination, unlawful retaliation, and maintaining a hostile work environment in violation of Executive Law §296 [NYSHLR] and §8-107 of the Administrative Code of the City of New York [NYCHRL], Supreme Court determined that the plaintiff's claims under color of NYSHRL and NYCHRL were barred by the doctrine of collateral estoppel.

The plaintiff appealed the court's ruling, contending that the court erred in dismissing his claims brought under NYCHRL. The Appellate Division, citing Ryan v New York Tel. Co., 62 NY2d 494, sustained the lower court's decision, explaining that the doctrine of collateral estoppel bars a party from "relitigating in a subsequent action or proceeding an issue clearly raised in a prior action or proceeding and decided against that party or those in privity [to such party], whether or not the tribunals or causes of action are the same."

Noting that a  party seeking to invoke the doctrine of collateral estoppel has the burden to show the "identity of the issues," while the party trying to avoid application of the doctrine must establish "the lack of a full and fair opportunity to litigate," the Appellate Division explained that four conditions must be met to trigger application of the Doctrine:

(1) The issues in both proceedings must be identical;

(2) The issue in the prior proceeding must have been actually litigated and decided;

(3) There was a full and fair opportunity to litigate in the prior proceeding; and

(4) The issue previously litigated was necessary to support a valid and final judgment on the merits.

Further, said the Appellate Division, in the event a federal court declined to exercise jurisdiction over a plaintiff's state law claims, collateral estoppel may still bar litigating those state claims in state court if the federal court decided issues identical to those raised in the plaintiff's state claims.

In plaintiff's earlier federal action, a federal District Court determined that the defendant-employer had legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for its employment actions, it was not motivated by retaliatory animus, its reasons were not a pretext for discrimination, and the plaintiff was not treated differently than other employees. The District Court's determinations in this regard were affirmed by the U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals.

Accordingly, the Appellate Division found that "the determinations rendered by the federal courts are dispositive of the plaintiff's claims under NYSHRL and NYCHRL, even under the broader standard of NYCHRL" and concluded that Supreme Court properly determined that the plaintiff's claims under NYSHRL and NYCHRL were barred by the doctrine of collateral estoppel.

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/3dseries/2017/2017_06264.htm