Determining the economic damage suffered by a victim of unlawful discrimination

Determining the economic damage suffered by a victim of unlawful discrimination
Rensselaer County Sheriff's Dept. v New York State Div. of Human Rights, 2018 NY Slip Op 05719, Appellate Division, Third Department

The Appellate Division reviewed a determination of the Commissioner of Human Rights' award of damages to compensate Lora Abbott Seabury for the pension benefits that she lost due to the Rensselaer County Sheriff's Department [Respondent] discriminatory actions.*

Lora Abbott Seabury, a former correction officer employed by Respondent filed a complaint with State Division of Human Rights [SDHR] alleging that she had been subjected to, among other things, sexual harassment by male coworkers. After holding a hearing, a SDHR Administrative Law Judge [ALJ] found that Seabury proved that she had been sexually harassed by her male coworkers and recommended that Petitioner be ordered to pay Seabury nearly $450,000 in economic damages and $300,000 in noneconomic damages. The ALJ also recommended that Seabury "should be made whole with regard to her pension."

The Commissioner of Human Rights adjusted the amount of economic damages to approximately $315,000, but otherwise adopted the ALJ's recommendations and, in addition, included an order directing Seabury "to involve" the Office of the State Comptroller and the New York State and Local Retirement System, "presumably [said the court] to have them provide an actual pension to Seabury based on 25 years of service."

The Appellate Division confirmed the determination that Seabury had been subjected to sexual harassment and then remitted the matter to SDHR for the limited purpose of determining the amount of damages that Seabury sustained due to diminishment of her pension benefits, specifically noting that, for the purposes of such a calculation, [1] Seabury's testimony that she planned to work for 25 years was credited, [2] Seabury provided the relevant portions of her collective bargaining agreement and [3] Seabury provided evidence of her wages for the final three full years of her employment, which allows for the computation of her final average salary.**

On remittal, SDHR requested that Petitioner submit documentation demonstrating the monetary award necessary to compensate Seabury for diminution of her pension.

Contending that Seabury was not entitled to any such damages based on the possibility that she would receive disability benefits in an amount greater than the pension that she would have been eligible to receive upon completing 25 years of service, Petitioner submitted a written report from an economist who estimated the total pension benefits that Seabury would have received based on her years of actual service and after 25 years of service. Seabury submitted documentation in rebuttal to Petitioner's submissions, including a written report from an economist who also estimated Seabury's lost pension benefits.

Ultimately the Commissioner ordered Petitioner to pay Seabury $809,507.97 to compensate her for the reduction in her pension that resulted from Petitioner's discriminatory actions.

Petitioner appealed the Commissioner's determination contending that SDHR's calculation of the damages award was both procedurally improper and incorrect while Seabury contended that the damages awarded by the Commissioner did not fully compensate her for the reduction in her pension.

Seabury then requested that Supreme Court either dismiss the petition or transfer the proceeding to the Appellate Division, whereupon Supreme Court transferred the matter to the Appellate Division, resulting in this proceeding.

Explaining that it had remitted explicitly for the limited purpose of requiring SDHR to determine such damages because it had never made an initial determination of such damages, the Appellate Division rejected the Petitioner's claim that SDHR violated the applicable rules of procedure when it afforded both parties the opportunity to make additional submissions on remittal because SDHR was authorized to reopen the record of the proceeding.

The Appellate Division also rejected Petitioner's contention that SDHR erred by failing to reduce the damages awarded for loss of pension benefits to present value. The Court said that although the question of whether the Human Rights Law requires that awards for future damages be discounted to present value is an issue of first impression in the appellate courts of New York, citing Matter of Aurecchione v New York State Div. of Human Rights, 98 NY2d 21, it noted that the Court of Appeals had observed that federal case law is instructive in the employment discrimination context.

Acknowledging that the award for Seabury's lost pension benefits can only be a "rough approximation" of the amount necessary to restore her to the position that she would have occupied had she not been the victim of sexual harassment because neither her lost income stream nor the effect of future price inflation can be predicted with complete confidence, the Appellate Division opined that "One permissible method for approximating damages that arises from a loss of future income - known as the "total offset" method - is to neither consider future salary increases nor discount the damages to present value based on the presumption that future salary increases are offset by the discount rate used to calculate the present value of a damages award."

Thus, said the court, SDHR did not err by adopting the total offset method to determine the value of Seabury's lost pension benefits and confirmed its determination.

* See Executive Law §298.

** Matter of Rensselaer County Sheriff's Dept. v New York State Div. of Human Rights, 131 AD3d 777.

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/3dseries/2018/2018_05719.htm

Employer's termination of a biologically male employee transitioning from male to female held unlawful discrimination on the basis of sex

Employer's termination of a biologically male employee transitioning from male to female held unlawful discrimination on the basis of sex

EEOC v R.G. and G.R. Harris Funeral Home., USCA, 6th Circuit, No. 16-2424

Plaintiff, born biologically male, while living and presenting as a man, worked as a funeral director at R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, Inc. [Funeral Home], a closely held for-profit corporation.

In an unlawful discrimination complaint filed with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission [EEOC] Plaintiff alleged that the Funeral Home terminated her* after she had advised the Funeral Home that she intended to transition from male to female and would commence presenting herself and dress as a woman while at work.

In the course of EEOC investigation of Plaintiff's complaint it found that the Funeral Home provided its male public-facing employees with clothing that complied with the company’s dress code while female public-facing employees received no such allowance.

The EEOC subsequently brought suit against the Funeral Home in which the EEOC charged the Funeral Home with violating Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 [Title VI] by (1) terminating Plaintiff's employment on the basis of her transgender or transitioning status and her refusal to conform to sex-based stereotypes; and (2) administering a discriminatory-clothing-allowance policy.

In its motion for summary judgment, EEOC argued that it was entitled to judgment as a matter of law on both of its claims.

The Funeral Home, in contrast, contended that it had not violate Title VII by requiring Plaintiff to comply with a sex-specific dress code that it asserts equally burdens male and female employees, and, in the alternative, that Title VII should not be enforced against the Funeral Home because requiring the Funeral Home owners to employ Plaintiff while she dresses and represents herself as a woman would constitute an unjustified substantial burden upon the Funeral Home’s owner's sincerely held religious beliefs in violation of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act [RFRA].

The federal district granted summary judgment in favor of the Funeral Home on both claims.

The Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, holding that:

[1] the Funeral Home engaged in unlawful discrimination against Plaintiff on the basis of her sex; and 

[2] the Funeral Home has not established that applying Title VII’s proscriptions against sex discrimination to the Funeral Home would substantially burden its owner's exercise of their religious beliefs and, therefore, the Funeral Home was not entitled to a defense under RFRA.

Further, said the Circuit court, (a) even if the Funeral Home's owner's religious exercise were substantially burdened, the EEOC established that enforcing Title VII is the least restrictive means of furthering the government’s compelling interest in eradicating workplace discrimination against Plaintiff and (b) that the EEOC may bring a discriminatory-clothing-allowance claim in this case because such an investigation into the Funeral Home’s clothing-allowance policy was reasonably expected to grow out of the original charge of sex discrimination that Plaintiff submitted to the EEOC.

The Circuit Court issued a judgment to the EEOC on its unlawful-termination claim, and remanded the case to the district court "for further proceedings consistent with this opinion."

* The Circuit Court used female pronouns in its decision in accordance with the preference Plaintiff expressed through her briefing to this court.

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

https://cases.justia.com/federal/appellate-courts/ca6/16-2424/16-2424-2018-03-07.pdf?ts=1520443817

An individual's General Municipal Law §207-c benefits may be discontinued where the decision to do so is supported by substantial evidence

An individual's General Municipal Law §207-c benefits may be discontinued where the decision to do so is supported by substantial evidence

Matter of Cordway v Cayuga County, 2018 NY Slip Op 04873, Appellate Division, Fourth Department

Petitioner, a deputy sheriff, commenced a CPLR article 78 proceeding challenging the determination that terminated the disability benefits the deputy sheriff had been receiving pursuant to General Municipal Law §207-c. The Hearing Officer issued a report recommending that Petitioner's continued receipt of benefits be terminated. Contrary to Petitioner's contention, the Appellate Division found "no basis to disturb the Hearing Officer's determination terminating the benefits."

Although Petitioner presented evidence supporting his contention that his injuries and ailments were causally related to the work-related, the Hearing Officer was entitled to weigh the parties' conflicting medical evidence and to assess the credibility of the witnesses. Where the evidence is conflicting and there is room for a choice, a court may not weigh the evidence or reject the Hearing Officer's decision where his or her determination is supported by substantial evidence

Citing Matter of Park v Kapica, 8 NY3d 302, the court opined that an employer's "initial award of Section 207-c benefits does not require the continuation of such benefits inasmuch as "[t]he continued receipt of Section 207-c disability payments is not absolute."

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/3dseries/2018/2018_04873.htm

Audits and reports were issued by New York State Comptroller Thomas P. DiNapoli

Audits and reports were issued by New York State Comptroller Thomas P. DiNapoli during the week ending August 10, 2018

Source: Office of the State Comptroller

Click on text highlighted in color to access the full report

On August 9, 2018 the New York State Comptroller, Thomas P. DiNapoli, announced the following audits and examinations had been issued.

Department of Health (DOH): Medicaid Claims Processing Activity April 1, 2017 through Sept. 30, 2017 (2017-S-23)
Auditors identified approximately $10.2 million in improper Medicaid payments, including: $3.7 million in overpayments for claims that were billed with incorrect information pertaining to other health insurance coverage that recipients had; $3.1 million in overpayments for claims involving Medicare coverage that were incorrectly processed; and $1.3 million in overpayments for improper newborn birth claims. About $4.5 million of the overpayments were recovered by the end of audit fieldwork. Auditors also identified providers in the Medicaid program who were charged with or found guilty of crimes that violated health care programs’ laws or regulations. DOH terminated 42 of 51 providers identified.
       
Department of Health (DOH): Examination of Travel Expenses (2015-BSE1-04B)
In an earlier report, auditors found DOH improperly designated an employee’s official station in calendar years 2013 and 2014, costing the state more than $38,000 in unnecessary travel expenses. After further examination, auditors found DOH paid $22,651.32, $26,556.12 and $6,007.79 in travel expenses for calendar years 2015, 2016 and 2017, respectively, for the employee to commute between his residence and his main work location. DOH could have avoided these costs if officials had properly designated the employee’s main work location as his official station.

Workers' Compensation Board: Annual Audit
The board processed claims totaling nearly $720 million for four sole custody funds in 2017 – the Uninsured Employers Fund, the Special Fund for Disability Benefits, the Second Injury Fund and the Fund for Reopened Cases.  Board staff enter claims data for all special funds claims into the Board’s automated payment system, where the claims are subjected to various system edits and validation checks, approved by the Board and submitted to the Comptroller’s Office for approval prior to payment. Auditors halted inappropriate claims totaling nearly $520,000 that the board approved. 

Brewster-Southeast Joint Fire District – Recordkeeping and Procurement (Putnam County)
The treasurer’s accounting records were not accurate as of Dec. 31, 2017. Cash accounts were incorrectly recorded, the operating bank account balance was understated by more than $377,000 and the capital reserve balance was overstated by $200,790. Also, district officials did not always solicit competition when procuring professional services.

Village of Deposit – Disbursements and Real Property Tax Enforcement (Delaware County)
The board did not ensure all disbursements were approved before payment or for proper purposes. In addition, auditors found the village began to effectively enforce the collection of delinquent real property taxes in March 2016, but $172,900 remains outstanding as of Feb. 28, 2018.

Multiple Dwelling Property Inspections (2018MS-01)
Auditors found all six local governments that were reviewed had properties that had never been inspected. Overall, 59 percent of the preventative maintenance inspections and 52 percent of the fire safety inspections were not performed. The cities of White Plains, Schenectady and Lackawanna had limited or non-existent multiple dwelling inspection programs and the city of Utica did not have a feasible program. Although the town of Greece and the village of Hempstead have developed more effective inspection programs, their programs also have opportunities for improvement.

Orleans County Soil and Water Conservation District – Claims Audit (2018M-105)
Auditors examined 72 claims totaling approximately $524,000 paid during the audit period and determined that all of the claims were for appropriate district purposes and adequately supported. The board, however, has not adopted a cash disbursement policy.

City of Yonkers - Fiscal Agent Act Compliance (Westchester County)
The city’s 2018-19 budget relies on nonrecurring revenue of $59.2 million to balance its budget. Police overtime costs could potentially be over budget by as much as $2.5 million and firefighting overtime costs could be over budget by as much as $949,000. The city plans to borrow up to $15 million for tax certiorari settlements and to issue debt of up to $9.8 million for water fund improvements.

Find out how your government money is spent at Open Book New York. Track municipal spending, the state's 150,000 contracts, billions in state payments and public authority data. 

 

Layoff of seasonal employees constituted a termination of employment for the purposes of Public Authorities Law §2629(2)(a)

Layoff of seasonal employees constituted a termination of employment for the purposes of Public Authorities Law §2629(2)(a)

Civil Serv. Empls. Assn., Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO v Olympic Regional Dev. Auth., 2018 NY Slip Op 04998, Appellate Division, Third Department

The Civil Service Employees Association [CSEA] challenged the Olympic Regional Development Authority [ORDA] determination that certain its employees who had been laid off were no longer members of their previous collective bargaining unit upon their reinstatement. Supreme Court granted CSEA's application, in a combined proceeding pursuant to CPLR Article 78 and action for declaratory judgment, annulling ORDA's action. Supreme Court found that CSEA was "entitled to a declaration that the layoff of seasonal employees [did] not constitute a termination or cessation of their employment resulting in a vacancy for purposes of Public Authorities Law §2629(2)(a)" and granted CSEA's petition, annulling ORDA's determination. ORDA appealed the Supreme Court's decision.

In 2012, the management of the Belleayre Mountain Ski Center was transferred from the Department of Environmental Conservation [DEC] to ORDA, a public benefit corporation.* Pursuant to Public Authorities Law §2629(2)(a), employees then working at Belleayre Mountain, who had been DEC employees and members of CSEA's Operating Services Collective Bargaining Unit [OSU], became employees of ORDA.

In March 2016, ORDA laid off three seasonal employees at Belleayre Mountain who were in OSU. Upon rehiring these employees some two months later to the same positions each had previously held, ORDA determined that each would be placed in ORDA's collective bargaining unit rather than OSU. This resulted in the three seasonal employees experiencing a "significant adverse changes to their benefits" and CSEA brought this action against ORDA contending that ORDA's action was arbitrary and capricious and in violation of §2629(2)(a).

The Appellate Division noted that, as pertinent here, Public Authorities Law §2629(2)(a):

1. Provides that employees affected by the transfer "shall retain their respective civil service classifications, status, salary, wages and negotiating unit, if any...."; and

2.  §2629(2)(a) further provided that "once the employment of any transferred employee ... is terminated or otherwise ceases, by any means, any individual hired to fill such vacancy shall not be placed in the same negotiating unit of the former incumbent but rather shall be placed in [ORDA's] negotiating unit."

ORDA contend that §2629(2)(a) the unambiguous results in the employment of a seasonal employee "terminate[s] or otherwise ceases" when he or she is laid off. Accordingly, ORDA argued, "such an employee may not return to his or her former negotiating unit in the event that he or she is subsequently rehired."

Noting that ORDA's determination was made without a hearing, the Appellate Division said that its review is limited to determining whether ORDA decision was "'arbitrary and capricious, irrational, affected by an error of law or an abuse of discretion." Further, said the court, "We accord no deference to ORDA's statutory interpretation," as the questions raised on appeal depend only upon the "accurate apprehension of legislative intent."

This appeal, said the Appellate Division turns on the meaning of the terms "terminated" and "ceases" within the context of §2629(2)(a) and as neither word is defined in the Public Authorities Law and both are words "of ordinary import," the court said it would interpret them in a manner consistent with "their usual and commonly understood meaning." In the words of the Appellate Division, "terminate" is defined as "to bring to an end," "to discontinue the employment of" or "to form the conclusion of," citing the "Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary."

Rejecting CSEA's contention that a layoff is inconsistent with these definitions and merely constitutes a temporary interruption in a career, the Appellate Division explained that "in light of the express statutory provision that an employee whose employment 'is terminated or otherwise ceases, by any mean'" may not return to his or her prior collective bargaining unit upon subsequent rehire" and interpreting §2629(2)(a) as urged by CSEA "would render the phrase 'by any means' superfluous."

The court also rejected CSEA claim that §2629(2)(a) applies only to new employees, opining that the statute states that it is applicable to "any individual" and makes no distinction between employees who are new hires and employees who may have previously worked at Belleayre Mountain.

On one last point, CSEA's contention that the court should adopt its interpretation of §2629 on the basis that it is a remedial statute, the Appellate Division said that "[E]ven a remedial statute must be given a meaning consistent with the words chosen by the Legislature," and courts must "give effect not only to the remedy, but also to the words that delimit the remedy," commenting that CSEA's "interpretation of §2629 could result in the unintended adverse effect of discouraging the rehiring of seasonal employees after layoffs."

Finding that the plain language of §2629(2)(a) barred ORDA from permitting seasonal employees who were laid off and subsequently rehired to remain in OSU, the Appellate Division ruled that CSEA's "petition/complaint should have been dismissed."

* §45 of the Civil Service Law addresses the status of the employees of a private institution or enterprise upon its acquisition by governmental entity for the purpose of operating the private institution or enterprise as a public function.

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/3dseries/2018/2018_04998.htm