Local police officers in New York State require a warrant to arrest an immigrant solely to transfer custody to federal Immigration and Customs Enforcement authorities

Local police officers in New York State require a warrant to arrest an immigrant solely to transfer custody to federal Immigration and Customs Enforcement authorities

People ex rel. Wells v DeMarco, 2018 NY Slip Op 07740, Appellate Division, Second Department

Susai Francis, an Indian national living on Long Island, had overstayed his visa. Arrested for driving under the influence [DUI] in Nassau County, he was transferred to Suffolk County to complete a criminal proceeding. Francis plead guilty to disorderly conduct to dispose of the criminal charge and was sentenced to "time served." Suffolk County police rearrested Francis at the request of Immigration and Customs Enforcement [ICE] and incarcerated in a jail cell in Riverhead rented by ICE.

The Appellate Division ruled that Suffolk police went beyond their authority in violation of State Law when it honored  ICE's request to hold someone as "local law enforcement officers are not authorized to effectuate arrests for civil law immigration violations."

In contrast, said the Appellate Division, local police could do so if ICE produced a warrant "signed by a judge."

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/3dseries/2018/2018_07694.htm

State and subdivisions of state are subject to ADEA regardless of its number of employees in contrast to a private sector employer where the law applies only to "an industry affecting commerce" having twenty or more employees

State and subdivisions of state are subject to ADEA regardless of its number of employees in contrast to a private sector employer where the law applies only to "an industry affecting commerce" having twenty or more employees

Mount Lemmon Fire District Petitioner v John Guido, Et Al., Cite as: 586 U. S.____ (2018)

The Mount Lemmon Fire District laid off its two oldest full-time firefighters, John Guido (then 46) and Dennis Rankin (then 54). Guido and Rankin sued the Fire District, alleging that their termination violated the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA), 81 Stat. 602, as amended, 29 U. S. C. §621 et seq.

The Fire District sought dismissal of the suit on the ground that the District was too small to qualify as an “employer” within the ADEA’s as the controlling definition in 29 U. S. C. §630(b), provides that the term "employer" means a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has twenty or more employees and the Fire District had fewer that 20 employee.  

The Supreme Court ruled that  in accord with the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, that §630(b)’s two-sentence delineation, and the expression “also means” at the start of the second sentence, combine to establish separate categories: persons engaged in an industry affecting commerce with 20 or more employees but with respect to a states or a political subdivision of a state, there is not "numerosity limitation" it matters not whether the Fire District had five employees or five hundered employees insofar as the reach of ADEA was concerned.

The Supreme Court agreed and ruled in favor of Guido and Rankin.

Challenging a disqualification for appointment or continued employment

Challenging a disqualification for appointment or continued employment

Civil Service Law §50.4

§50.4 of the Civil Service Law, Disqualification of applicants or eligibles, provides that the "state civil service department or a municipal commissions [emphasis supplied] may refuse to examine an applicant, or after examination to certify an eligible" for one or more of the following reasons:

"(a) lack of a requirements for admission to the examination or for appointment to the position; or

"(b) has a disability which renders him or her unfit to perform in a reasonable manner the duties of the position or which may reasonably be expected to render him or her unfit to continue to perform the duties of the position in a reasonable manner; or

"(c) Repealed.*

"(d) was found guilty of a crime; or

"(e) was dismissed from a permanent position in the public service upon stated written charges of incompetency or misconduct, after notice and hearing or who has resigned from, or whose service was otherwise terminated from a position in the public service for incompetency or misconduct, provided, however, in cases of dismissal, resignation or termination after written charges of incompetency, the individual is seeking employment in a position that requires the performance of a duty or duties which are the same as, or similar to, the duty or duties of the position from which the individual was dismissed, resigned or terminated on account of incompetency; or

"(f) intentionally made a false statement of any material fact in his or her  application for examination or employment; or

"(g) practiced, or attempted to practice, any deception or  fraud in his or her application, examination, or in securing eligibility or appointment; or

"(h) was dismissed from private employments because of habitually poor performance.

"However, no person shall be disqualified pursuant to §50.4 unless he or she has been given a written statement of the reasons for such disqualification and given an opportunity to make an explanation and to submit facts in opposition  to such disqualification."

 Further, the state civil service department or appropriate municipal commission  may investigate the qualifications and background of an eligible after  he has been appointed from the list, and upon finding facts which if  known prior to appointment, would have warranted his or her disqualification,  or upon a finding of illegality, irregularity or fraud of a substantial  nature in his application, examination or appointment, may revoke such  eligible's certification and appointment and direct that his employment  be terminated, provided, however, that no such certification shall be  revoked or appointment terminated more than three years after it is  made, except in the case of fraud.

See, also, 4 NYCRR 3.2. Typically local civil service commissions/personnel officers have adopted a similar rule or regulation.

§12-107 of New York City Administrative Code, addressing the publication of notice of appointments, removals, and changes of salaries, provides that "Notice of all appointments and removals from office, and all changes of salaries except those resulting from collective bargaining or original jurisdiction adjustments, shall be transmitted within one week after they are made, by the appointing agency or department head, to and published within thirty days in the City Record, indicating the name, title and salary of each individual appointed, promoted, demoted, removed from office or whose services have otherwise terminated, and whether an appointment is a "provisional appointment." 

Conspicuous by its absence, however, is any reference to "disqualification" of an applicant for employment or an employee. Accordingly, the question of "disqualification" being within the ambit of §12-107 or remaining under the authority of the Department of Citywide Administrative Services consistent with the provisions of §815 of Chapter 35 of the City Charter is worthy of further exploration. 

Further, case law holds that being disqualified pursuant to 50.4 does not trigger a right to a hearing, only the right to submit a written objection to the decision making entity.

For example, the Wayne County Civil Service Commission disqualified an employee and removed him from his position as a police officer with the Village of Palmyrapursuant to Section 50.4 of the Civil Service Law. The Commission had determined that the police officer had "intentionally made false statements of material facts in his application or (had) attempted to practice (a) deception or fraud in his application". The employee sued, claiming he could not be removed from the position without a hearing (Mingo vs Pirnie, 55 NY2d 1019).

The Court of Appeals rejected Mingo's argument, stating that Section 50.4 "requires no more than that the person be given a written statement of the reasons therefore and afforded an opportunity to make explanation and to submit facts in opposition to such disqualification". No hearing is required.

The Commission had found that Mingo had falsified his application with respect to his experience as a police officer and concealed facts related to his separation from previous employment.

In Matter of Ferrine, 75 AD2d 669, the Appellate Division explained that §50.4 of the Civil Service Law requires notice of the reasons for the disqualification of a person by the Civil Service Department, a municipal commission or a personnel officer, be given to the individual, together with an opportunity for the individual to submit a written explanation to the disqualifying entity. In the event the individual is an employee and is not given an opportunity to submit facts in opposition to the disqualification, the dismissal is unlawful. In this instance the entity filed to provide the employee with such an opportunity and the court directed that the individual be reinstated with back salary.

* Repealed, Laws of 1958, Chapter 790. §50.4(c) provided as follows: (c) "who is addicted to the use of narcotics, or who is addicted to the use of intoxicating beverages to excess; or"

An employee alleged not to possess a minimum qualification of his or her position is entitled to notice of the allegation and the opportunity to contest it

An employee alleged not to possess a minimum qualification of his or her position is entitled to notice of the allegation and the opportunity to contest it

Jakubowicz v Village of Fredonia, 2018 NY Slip Op 02059, Appellate Division, Fourth Department

Supreme Court, Chautauqua County directed that Jakubowicz, an employee of the Village of Fredonia,  be "fully reinstated to his former employment with full back pay and benefits retroactive to the date of his termination." The Village appealed.*

The Appellate Division first addressed "Appeal No. 2" in which the Village contended that a commercial driver's license is a minimum qualification for Jakubowicz's position as a Mechanic II in the Village and that "his failure to maintain such minimum qualification required the termination of his employment."

The court rejected the Village's claim, noting that the Mechanic II position in the Village required  possession, "at time of appointment and during service in this classification, of a valid NYS Motor Vehicle Operator's license appropriate for the type of vehicles which the employee may from time to time operate."

Explaining that due process and fundamental fairness require that a qualification or requirement for employment must be expressly stated in order for an employer to bypass the protections afforded by the Civil Service Law or a collective bargaining agreement and summarily terminate an employee, the Appellate Division said that in this instance the  requirement of a commercial driver's license is not "expressly stated."

In addition, said the court, quoting Matter of Carr v New York State Dept. of Transp., 70 AD3d 1110, while "an employee charged with failing to possess a minimum qualification of his or her position is only entitled to notice of the charge and the opportunity to contest it", the Village in this instance offered Jakubowicz a hearing "to afford [him] the opportunity to present information to the Village why [he] should not be administratively terminated from employment." However, there is no dispute that a hearing was never held.

Accordingly, the Appellate Division concluded that Supreme Court was correct in determining that Jakubowicz's termination was arbitrary and capricious.

* The Village submitted two appeals, denominated Appeal 1 and Appeal 2, but dismissed Appeal 1 as academic in view of its ruling with respect to Appeal 2.

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/3dseries/2018/2018_02059.htm

Judicial review of an administrative determination made after an adversarial hearing is limited

Judicial review of an administrative determination made after an adversarial hearing is limited

Buccieri v County of Westchester, 2018 NY Slip Op 07305, Appellate Division, Second Department

A Westchester County employee [Petitioner] was served with disciplinary charges and specifications pursuant to §75 of the Civil Service. The appointing authority, the Commissioner of the Westchester County Department of Parks, Recreation and Conservation [Commissioner], suspended Petitioner without pay for 30 days while the §75 disciplinary action was pending.*

The §75 hearing officer found Petitioner guilty of a number of the specifications set out in the charges and recommended a penalty: a 30-day suspension without pay. The Commissioner adopted the findings of the hearing officer and imposed the penalty recommended, suspension with out pay for 30 days.**

Petitioner filed a CPLR Article 78 petition seeking judicial review of the Commissioner's determination, contending that the Commissioner was not a qualified decision maker.

Supreme Court agreed, finding that the Commissioner had actively participated in the underlying events leading up to the disciplinary proceeding. Thus, said the court, the Commissioner should have recused herself from reviewing the hearing officer's findings and recommendation and rendering a final determination.

Accordingly, Supreme Court remanded the matter the Commissioner to appoint a duly qualified, impartial decision maker to review the hearing officer's findings and recommendation and to render a new determination.

The Commissioner appointed a Westchester County Department of Human Resources Deputy Commissioner to review the hearing officer's findings and recommendation and to render a new final determination, and if Petitioner was found guilty of any of the charges and specification filed against Petitioner, the to be imposed.

The Deputy Commissioner adopted the findings and the penalty recommended by the §75 hearing officer, suspension of Petitioner's for 30 days without pay. Petitioner then commenced this proceeding pursuant to CPLR Article 78 seeking a judicial review the Deputy Commissioner's determination.

The Appellate Division set out the following guidelines followed by courts in reviewing a challenge to an administrative determination such as one made after a §75 disciplinary hearing:

1. Judicial] review of an administrative determination in an employee disciplinary case made after a hearing pursuant to Civil Service Law §75 is limited to considering whether the determination was supported by substantial evidence.

2. It is the duty of the administrative tribunal, not the reviewing court, to weigh the evidence or assess the credibility of witnesses and determine which testimony to accept and which to reject.

3. A court may set aside the penalty imposed by an appointing authority only if it found to be so disproportionate to the offense as to be shocking to one's sense of fairness, thus constituting an abuse of discretion as a matter of law.

* An employee so suspended without pay pursuant to §75 must be respored to the payroll after 30 days pending a final disciplinary determination by the appointing authority.

** The time during which an officer or employee is suspended without pay may be considered as part of the penalty at the discretion of the appointing authority. If he or she is found not guilty of all charges and specifications, he or she shall be restored to his or her position with back pay for the period of his or her suspension without pay less the amount of any unemployment insurance benefits he or she may have received during such period.

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/3dseries/2018/2018_07305.htm