Authority of an employer to prohibit an employee's legal use of marijuana permitted by state law

Authority of an employer to prohibit an employee's legal use of marijuana permitted by state law

Lance Carlson v. Charter Communications, LLC, USCA, 9th Circuit, No. 17-35917 

N.B. - In handing down this decision the 9th Circuit said "This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3."

§§50-46-320(4)(b) and 50-46-320 (5) of the Montana Marijuana Act [MMA] neither bars employers from prohibiting their employees from using marijuana nor authorizes wrongful termination or discrimination suits against employers.

After Charter Communications fired one of its employees, Lance Carlson, for his legal marijuana use outside of work, in violation of the company's employment policies set out in its employment handbook, Carlson sued Charter alleging wrongful termination and unlawful discrimination.

A Montana District Court dismissed Carlson's complaint and then refused to certify the question of whether these provisions of the MMA were constitutional to the Montana Supreme Court. Carlson appealed the Montana District Court's ruling.

The United States Circuit Court of Appeals, 9th Circuit, affirmed the Montana District Court's ruling explaining that:

 [1] the MMA does not preclude a federal contractor from complying with all the requirements of the Drug-Free Workplace Act (DFWA), 41 U.S.C. §8102; and 

   [2] the MMA does not violate the Montana constitution.*

The Circuit Court observed that MMA is "rationally related to Montana’s legitimate state interest in providing 'careful regulation of access to an otherwise illegal substance for limited use by persons for whom there is little or no other effective alternative' while avoid[ing] entanglement with federal law.” In addition, the Circuit Court, noting that the United States Congress had adopted an appropriations rider currently restricting the Department of Justice from spending funds to prosecute individuals who comply with state marijuana laws, opined that "this temporary rule does not undercut Montana’s legitimate state interests."

In the words of the Circuit Court, "[t]he district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Carlson’s request to certify the question whether sections 50-46-320(4)(b) and (5) are constitutional to the Montana Supreme Court, because it is not an unclear question of state law appropriate for certification."

Lisa M. Schaffer, Esq., in an article posted on the Internet by FindlLaw,** notes that "A state could have a Marijuana Act that specifically prohibits employers from requiring drug-free employees. For instance, in 2018, Maine became the first state to protect workers and their non-workplace marijuana use by forbidding employers from drug testing for marijuana. Specifically, Maine's Act to Legalize Marijuana forbids employers from discriminating against employees based on their legal marijuana use, though it does allow employers to prohibit the use and possession of marijuana 'in the workplace.'" 

* The Carlson decision is posted on the Internet at:

https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/memoranda/2018/11/19/17-35917.pdf

** See https://blogs.findlaw.com/decided/2018/11/fired-marijuana-user-cant-sue-employer-in-montana.html?DCMP=cons_top:nwl

Rejecting the findings of the hearing officer and the penalty recommended following a disciplinary action conducted pursuant to §75 of the Civil Service Law

Rejecting the findings of the hearing officer and the penalty recommended following a disciplinary action conducted pursuant to Civil Service Law §75 

O'Connor v Cutting, 2018 NY Slip Op 07379, Appellate Division, Third Department

An Essex County deputy sheriff was served four disciplinary charges pursuant to Civil Service Law §75. The appointed Hearing Officer partially sustained two of the four charges and dismissed all the remaining charges. As to the penalty to be imposed, the Hearing Officer recommended that the deputy sheriff be suspended without pay for two months.

The Sheriff then appointed the County Manager to review the §75 Hearing Officer's findings and recommendation and make the final determination. After reviewing the hearing transcripts and exhibits, the City Manager issued a determination that rejected the §75 Hearing Officer's findings, sustained three of the charges and recommended that the deputy sheriff's employment be terminated.

The Sheriff adopted the City Manager's determination and recommended penalty and terminated the deputy sheriff'. The deputy sheriff challenged the Sheriff's decision and sought a court order annulling the City Manager's determination finding her guilty of the disciplinary charges or, in the alternative, an order vacating the penalty of dismissal imposed by the Sheriff. Supreme Court transferred the matter to the Appellate Division, which affirmed the Sheriff's decision.

Citing Matter of Kuznia v Adams, 106 AD3d 1227, the court explained that "The standard of review to be applied in reviewing an administrative determination made pursuant to Civil Service Law §75 is whether the determination is supported by substantial evidence in the record as a whole."

Addressing the deputy sheriff's argument that the City Manager had "improperly substituted his own credibility determinations for those of the Hearing Officer," the Appellate Division said that the credibility determinations of a hearing officer are not binding upon the official charged with making a final determination, "who, in the exercise of his or her duty to weigh the evidence and resolve conflicting testimony, may make different factual findings and conclusions, provided they are supported by substantial evidence."

Finding that the City Manager had provided specific reasons for his credibility determinations that were supported by logical inferences drawn from the testimony and the additional evidence that had been adduced at the hearing and that the deputy sheriff was "the least credible witness," the Appellate Division said it found that the City Manager's "factual findings and conclusions" were supported by substantial evidence.

As to the penalty imposed on the deputy sheriff, dismissal from her position, the Appellate Division said that it found that the penalty of termination was "not excessive."

The court said that a penalty imposed by the appointing authority following a §75 disciplinary hearing must the upheld "unless it is so disproportionate to the offense as to be shocking to one's sense of fairness, thus constituting an abuse of discretion as a matter of law," with due consideration given as to "whether the impact of the penalty on the individual is so severe that it is disproportionate to the misconduct, or to the harm to the agency or the public in general."

Finally the Appellate Division observed that it was mindful that great leeway must be accorded in matters concerning police discipline because "a higher standard of fitness and character pertains to police officers than to ordinary civil servants" and, inasmuch as strict discipline is essential for law enforcement administration, "the penalty of dismissal has been routinely upheld for officers who have disobeyed direct orders."

Here, said the court, "we cannot say that dismissing petitioner from her position as a deputy sheriff for disobeying a direct order shocks our sense of fairness."

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/3dseries/2018/2018_07379.htm

Employee terminated for using department vehicle for non-work related purposes

Employee terminated for using department vehicle for non-work related purposes

Dep’t of Transportation v. Mirhosseini, OATH Index No. 916/18

A civil engineer with the New York City Department of Transportation was charged with repeatedly using a Department van for non-work related purposes; altering trip log sheets; misrepresenting his use of the vehicle by omitting entries on the trip log sheets; and failing to follow the directives of his supervisor.

OATH Administrative Law Judge Kara J. Miller did not credit employee’s claim that his supervisor had given him permission to use the van to run his personal errands and sustained those charges.

Judge Miller, however, found that the appointing authority did not prove that the employee falsified his time records or that he fraudulently received compensation for time he did not work.

The ALJ recommended that the employee be terminated from his position, which recommendation was adopted by the appointing authority.

The protections of §75 of the Civil Service Law are triggered only if an individual subject to its provisions is terminated for misconduct or incompetence

The protections of §75 of the Civil Service Law are triggered only if an individual subject to its provisions is terminated for misconduct or incompetence

Michel v City of Lackawanna, 2018 NY Slip Op 02070, Appellate Division, Fourth Department

James L. Michel, Jr. commenced a CPLR Article 78 proceeding in Supreme Court seeking a court order reinstating "the compensation and benefits" to which he claim he was entitled pursuant to a contract between the parties. Subsequently Michel moved for summary judgment on the ground that he was unlawfully denied the procedural protections due to him under §75 of the Civil Service Law.

Section 75 provides that certain civil servants "shall not be removed or otherwise subjected to any disciplinary penalty provided in this section except for incompetency or misconduct shown after a hearing upon stated charges."

Supreme Court denied Michel's motion for summary judgment and he appealed the court's decision. The Appellate Division unanimously affirmed the Supreme Court's ruling.

The Appellate Division explained that "[i]t is well settled" that §75 of the Civil Service Law "prescribes the procedures for removal of a protected employee charged with delinquencies in the performance of his [or her] job."

Citing NYS Office of Children and Family Services v Lanterman, 14 NY 3d 275, the Appellate Division said that it is undisputed that Michel "did not engage in any conduct that would have subjected him to allegations of incompetence or misconduct" and concluded that §75 of the Civil Service Law was inapplicable in his situation.

In Lanterman the Court of Appeals held that the grievances brought by two employees, Lanterman's and Ortiz's, challenging their dismissal from their respective positions were not subject to arbitration because Lanterman's and Ortiz's dismissals were not for disciplinary reasons but because the employees' lacked the qualifications necessary for their respective positions. 

In addition, the  Court of Appeals noted it "approved the distinction made by the Appellate Division in Mandelkern v City of Buffalo, 64 AD2d 279, between issues of 'job performance, misconduct or competency,' which are subject to Civil Service Law disciplinary procedures, and 'a qualification of employment,' which is not."

The Michel decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/3dseries/2018/2018_02070.htm

The Lanterman decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/3dseries/2010/2010_02432.htm

Employee terminated for using department vehicle for non-work related purposes

Employee terminated for using department vehicle for non-work related purposes

Dep’t of Transportation v. Mirhosseini, OATH Index No. 916/18

A civil engineer with the New York City Department of Transportation was charged with repeatedly using a Department van for non-work related purposes; altering trip log sheets; misrepresenting his use of the vehicle by omitting entries on the trip log sheets; and failing to follow the directives of his supervisor.

OATH Administrative Law Judge Kara J. Miller did not credit employee’s claim that his supervisor had given him permission to use the van to run his personal errands and sustained those charges.

Judge Miller, however, found that the appointing authority did not prove that the employee falsified his time records or that he fraudulently received compensation for time he did not work.

The ALJ recommended that the employee be terminated from his position, which recommendation was adopted by the appointing authority.