Applying the doctrine of judicial immunity

Plaintiff, acting pro se,* appealed a federal district court’s sua sponte** dismissal of Plaintiff's civil rights complaint. The district court had viewed Plaintiff's action to be asserting claims against a New York Supreme Court Justice under color of 42 U.S.C. §1983.

Plaintiff alleged that the Justice, presiding over domestic relations proceedings involving Plaintiff in state court, violated his constitutional rights in making certain rulings in the course of the state proceedings. The federal district court, sua sponte, dismissed Plaintiff's complaint without providing Plaintiff "notice and an opportunity to be heard" by summarily applying the doctrine of absolute judicial immunity to the court's action. Plaintiff appealed.

The U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals, Second Circuit, dismissed Plaintiff's appeal, explaining:

1. Federal district courts have the inherent authority to dismiss a complaint sua sponte as frivolous even where, as here, the plaintiff has paid the required filing fee, if the claims “lack an arguable basis either in law or in fact,” citing Pillay v. INS, 45 F.3d 14; and

2. Although this Circuit has "repeatedly warned against dismissing a complaint sua sponte without providing notice and an opportunity to be heard, as doing so 'is, at a minimum, bad practice in numerous contexts and is reversible error in others,' this court has nevertheless articulated several exceptions where sua sponte dismissal of a fee-paid complaint may be appropriate," i.e. when it is “unmistakably clear” that the underlying case is frivolous or the court lacks jurisdiction.

The Circuit Court opined that a review of the complaint confirms the district court’s conclusion that Plaintiff’s constitutional claims are barred by judicial immunity. Citing Bliven v. Hunt, 579 F.3d 204, the Circuit Court noted “[J]udges generally have absolute immunity from suits for money damages for their judicial actions” and “even allegations of bad faith or malice cannot overcome judicial immunity.”

Further, the Circuit Court noted that judges enjoy absolute immunity from personal liability for acts committed within their judicial jurisdiction and such "immunity of a judge applies however erroneous the act may have been, and however injurious in its consequences it may have proved to the plaintiff.”

In the words of the Circuit Court, "In sum, the district court properly dismissed the claims sua sponte based on absolute judicial immunity" [citing Deem v. DiMella-Deem, 941 F.3d 618], affirming the sua sponte dismissal of complaint as frivolous based on absolute judicial immunity] "because it is 'unmistakably clear' based on the allegations in the complaint that judicial immunity applies in this particular case and that the claims are thus legally frivolous". Accordingly, the Circuit Court held that the district court "was not required to provide [Plaintiff] with notice and an opportunity to be heard prior to the dismissal" of Plaintiff's appeal.

* Pro se [Latin] meaning for or on one's own behalf. See 28 U.S.C. §1654, which provides as follows: "In all courts of the United States the parties may plead and conduct their own cases personally or by counsel as, by the rules of such courts, respectively, are permitted to manage and conduct causes therein."

** Sua Sponte [Latin]: acting on one's own accord. Used to describe an action where a court has taken notice of an issue on its own motion, without prompting or suggestion from any party, and made a ruling concerning the situation.

Click HERE to access the Circuit Court's decision posted on the Internet.

 

 

Demanding a "name clearing hearing" following termination from employment

Name-clearing hearings typically are provided to probationary employees and others who lack the statutory due process protections of tenured employees* upon request. Such hearings, however, serve only one purpose - to provide the individual with an opportunity to clear his or her “good name and reputation” in situations where he or she alleges that information of a stigmatizing nature has been made public by the employer. Further, prevailing at a name-clearing hearing does not entitle the individual to reinstatement or to reemployment in his or her former position.

In an appeal to the Commissioner of Education the Plaintiff challenged a decision of a Board of Education [Board] denying his request for a name-clearing hearing. 

Plaintiff alleged that the Board disseminated allegations about him based upon an investigation into one of its activities in which he was involved and claimed that he was entitled to a name-clearing hearing because he was “accused of misconduct” that impugned his reputation and integrity. Plaintiff also contended that there was a written document setting out such allegations and the allegations were referred to during a meeting of the Board. Plaintiff sought an admission by the District that it acted improperly and an apology.

The Board argued that the appeal must be dismissed on procedural grounds because [1] it was untimely and [2] was not properly served. With respect to the merits of Plaintiff's petition, the Board contended that [1] Plaintiff was not entitled to a name-clearing hearing and [2] the Commissioner lacks authority to direct a school district or its employees to admit to wrongdoing.

The Commissioner found that Plaintiff's petition was untimely served and must be dismissed.  Citing citing 8 NYCRR 275.16, the Commissioner explained that "[a]n appeal to the Commissioner must be commenced within 30 days from the decision or act complained of, unless any delay is excused by the Commissioner for good cause shown". The Commissioner opined that Plaintiff failed to "identify any good cause for the delay."

Addressing the merits Plaintiff's appeal, the Commissioner said that "[e]ven if the appeal was not dismissed on procedural grounds, it would be dismissed on the merits". A public employee is entitled to a name-clearing hearing only in the event her or his employer creates and disseminates a false and defamatory impression about the employee in connection with the termination, citing Codd v. Velger, 429 US 624.

In response to Plaintiff's allegation that "district officers or employees made defamatory statements" concerning him at the Board meeting, the District contended that it did not “publicly disclose” any information about Plaintiff or Plaintiff's]termination" but  during a “privilege of the floor” session of a Board meeting an individual who spoke “in [Plaintiff's] defense”, publicly disclosed certain information about the Plaintiff. Noting that Petitioner did not submit any evidence to the contrary, the Commissioner concluded that Petitioner's appeal must be dismissed on its merits.

* There is an exception to the general rule that employees are not entitled to a "pre-termination" hearing during their probationary period. In York v McGuire, 63 NY2d 760, the Court of Appeals set out the basic rule concerning the dismissal of probationary employees as follows: “After completing his or her minimum period of probation and prior to completing his or her maximum period of probation, a probationary employee can be dismissed without a hearing and without a statement of reasons, as long as there is no proof that the dismissal was done for a constitutionally impermissible purpose, or in violation of statutory or decisional law, or the decision was made in bad faith.”

Click HERE to access the Commissioner's decision posted on the Internet.

 

Current New York State Civil Service Examinations for appointment to position with the State as the employer open to the public

The open-competitive examinations for positions with the State of New York as the employer listed below are open to anyone who meets the qualifications set out in the examination announcement. You may file an application for open-competitive examinations online. Clicking on each examination title listed below highlighted in color will take you to the relevant examination announcement, which provides information on how and where to apply. Listed below is the tentative schedule of upcoming examinations.*

 Announcements for examinations as of January 16, 2024

Exam Number	Exam Title	Salary	Last Date to Apply
21-041	Addictions Program Specialist 1	$63,108	February 07, 2024
21-042	Addictions Program Specialist 2	$81,703	February 07, 2024
21-048	Addictions Program Specialist 2 (Gambling)	$81,705	February 07, 2024
26-998	Aging Services Representative	$73,641	February 07, 2024
26-999	Aging Services Representative (Spanish Language)	$73,641	February 07, 2024
26-994	Computer Operator Trainee	$38,073	February 07, 2024
21-031	Identification Examiner 2	$44,957	January 17, 2024
26-995	Long-Term Care Systems Specialist 1	$63,108	February 07, 2024
21-045	Long-Term Care Systems Specialist 1 (Health)	$63,108	February 07, 2024
26-996	Long-Term Care Systems Specialist 2	$81,705	February 07, 2024
21-046	Long-Term Care Systems Specialist 2 (Health)	$81,705	February 07, 2024
26-997	Long-Term Care Systems Specialist 3	$90,806	February 07, 2024
21-047	Long-Term Care Systems Specialist 3 (Health)	$90,806	February 07, 2024
21-029	Mental Health Program Specialist 2	$81,705	January 17, 2024
21-030	Mental Health Program Specialist 2 (Clinical)	$81,705	January 17, 2024
21-034	Mental Health Program Specialist 2 (DOCCS)	$81,705	January 17, 2024
21-019	Ocean & Lakes Policy Analyst 1	$81,705	February 07, 2024
21-000	Park Manager 1	See Announcement	January 17, 2024
21-004	Park Manager 2	$73,836	January 17, 2024
21-005	Park Manager 3	$81,792	January 17, 2024
21-002	Park Supervisor 1	$44,957	January 17, 2024
21-003	Park Supervisor 2	$53,262	January 17, 2024
21-001	Senior Computer Operator	$53,262	February 07, 2024
26-774	Supervising Janitor	$44,957	February 07, 2024
28-474	Vocational Rehabilitation Counselor Trainee 1	$53,546	February 07, 2024
28-475	Vocational Rehabilitation Counselor Trainee 1 (Manual Communications)	$53,546	February 07, 2024
28-476	Vocational Rehabilitation Counselor Trainee 1 (Spanish Language)	$53,546	February 07, 2024

* Continuous Recruitment Examinations — applications for most continuous recruitment examinations are accepted anytime.

 Notes on Applying

An application must be submitted online or postmarked by the last date to apply. See examination announcement for details.

An application will not be accepted after the application filing deadline has passed.

Testing accommodations will be made for the following reasons:

    Due to a religious observance or practice

    Reasonable accommodations for individuals with disabilities

Other accommodations - due to pregnancy, for nursing mothers, or for other circumstances that may impact your ability to be tested without accommodation

N.B.: Examination announcements are subject to amendment or cancellation without notice.

 

 

Appealing a federal district court jury's decision that a probationary employee had not been wrongfully terminated from the position

An individual [Probationer] was appointed to a position by the New York and New Jersey Port Authority [Authority] on August 22, subject to the satisfactory completion of a probationary period and was assigned to performing various duties at Newark Airport. On December 23, Probationer was dismissed from the position, having "committed a runway incursion" when she drove a vehicle onto an active runway, causing an airplane to abort its landing on December 22.

Probationer challenged her dismissal from her position, bringing an action in federal district court alleging she was dismissed by the Authority because of her race, national origin, and, or, gender in violation of Title VII.

A jury returned a verdict in favor of the Authority, finding that the Authority "did not wrongfully terminate [Probationer's] employment in violation of Title VII." Probationer appealed the district court jury's decision. The United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit, [Circuit Court], however, sustained the jury's verdict. In so doing:

1. The Circuit Court rejected Plaintiff's argument that a jury could have found in her favor, explaining that such an argument "is not a basis to vacate the judgment or remand for a new trial"; and

2. With respect to Probationer's request for a "judgment as a matter of law" [JMOL], the Circuit Court noted “[i]t is well established that a party is not entitled to challenge on appeal the sufficiency of the evidence to support the jury’s verdict on a given issue unless it has timely moved in the district court for judgment as a matter of law on that issue." 

Finding that Probationer failed to make a pre-verdict motion for a JMOL under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 50(a) or Rule 50(b), the Circuit Court pointed out that a "JMOL may not properly be ... ordered by the appellate court unless that action is required in order to prevent manifest injustice.”

The Circuit Court, in sustaining the district court jury's decision, opined the Probationer "has not shown that it would be manifestly unjust for the jury verdict to stand" and that the jury’s verdict was clearly supported by sufficient evidence in that Probationer committed:

[1] the alleged runway incursion;

[2] did not realize she did so;

[3] did not take immediate corrective steps; and

[4] did not understand the serious safety ramifications of the incursion.

Further, the Circuit Court noted that the authority presented evidence from which a jury could conclude that the circumstances surrounding "the runway incursion of an alleged male comparator who was not fired were substantially different" from the incursion by the Plaintiff. In the words of the Circuit Court, unlike Probationer's incursion, the "comparator’s incursion occurred in the middle of a blizzard, and he immediately reported the incident." 

Click HERE to access the decision of the Circuit Court of Appeals, 2nd Circuit, posted on the Internet.

 

 

Martin Luther King Jr., Day

Martin Luther King Jr., Day, celebrated in the United States, honoring the achievements of the civil-rights leader.

Postings will resume on January 16, 2024.