In this decision the United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit, demonstrated the importance of a petitioner meeting all relevant requirements of  the relevant provisions of the relevant adjective law, also referred to as procedural law, before the petitioner is able to proceed with the relevant substantive law which concerns rights, duties, obligations, and causes of action of the parties to be adjudicated in the action, .

 24-2393-cv Maltese v. Brown UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT SUMMARY ORDER RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL. At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the 6th day of January, two thousand twenty-six. Present: WILLIAM J. NARDINI, STEVEN J. MENASHI, EUNICE C. LEE, Circuit Judges. _____________________________________ MARYANN MALTESE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. KEITH BROWN, NEW YORK STATE ASSEMBLYMAN, Defendant-Appellee.* _____________________________________ For Plaintiff-Appellant: For Defendant-Appellee: 24-2393 MARYANN MALTESE, pro se, East Northport, NY KARTIK NARAM, Assistant Solicitor General, Barbara D. Underwood, Solicitor General, Mark S. Grube, Senior Assistant Solicitor General, for Letitia James, * The Clerk of the Court is respectfully directed to amend the caption. Attorney General for the State of New York, New York, NY Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York (Rachel P. Kovner, District Judge). UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED. In three appeals being heard in tandem, Maryann Maltese, proceeding pro se, appeals from the dismissals of her complaints against various New York State officials and agencies in “Maltese I” and “Maltese III” and New York City officials and agencies in “Maltese II.”1 I. Factual Allegations In Maltese I, Maltese asserted claims against New York State Assemblyman Keith Brown.2 In her hand-written complaint, Maltese stated that she was employed by the New York State Legislature from 1992 to 2013, and that after she retired, she was not issued a pension out of negligence. For relief, Maltese sought 31 years of “retroactive corrective earnings with tort interest,” to be awarded a J.D. or master’s degree (or both), and $30,000 in legal fees. Compl. at 6, doc. 1, Maltese I. 1 “Maltese I” is this Court’s case number 24-2393. “Maltese II” is this Court’s case number 24-2381. “Maltese III” is this Court’s case number 24-2378. 2 In this action, Maltese also asserted claims against Ken Morgulles, Brian Shenker, Jeff Izzo, and James Izzo. However, the district court dismissed her claims against these defendants for failure to serve. Because Maltese does not challenge the dismissal of these defendants on appeal, she abandons any related arguments, and we decline to address any claims against these defendants further. See LoSacco v. City of Middletown, 71 F.3d 88, 92–93 (2d Cir. 1995). 2 In Maltese II, Maltese brought claims against New York City Mayor Eric Adams, the New York City Office of Labor Counsel (“OLC”), and OLC Commissioner Renee Campione (collectively, the “City Defendants”). In her complaint, Maltese asserted that between January and March 2020, a New York City Deferred Compensation Plan retirement account she inherited from her former spouse suffered $40,000 in losses because Campione and her employees failed to adhere to a presidential executive order relating to COVID-19. For relief, Maltese sought the return of an alleged $40,000 loss, plus interest and legal fees, as well as “interest and penalties for 3 years of non-accountability.” Compl. at 5, doc. 1, Maltese II. In Maltese III, Maltese asserted various claims against New York State Governor Kathy Hochul, New York State Assemblyman Keith Brown, New York State Senator Mario Mattera (collectively, the “State Defendants”), and the New York State Board of Elections. In her complaint, Maltese alleged that she was intentionally denied access to a judicial election ballot in a 2020 special election due to “gender bias” and a conspiracy between Assemblyman Brown and the New York Independence Party. Compl. at 4–5, doc. 1, Maltese III. In this complaint, Maltese did not specify what relief she is seeking. II. Motions to Dismiss The Office of the New York State Attorney General responded on behalf of Assemblyman Brown in Maltese I, and Governor Hochul, Assemblyman Brown, and State Senator Mattera in Maltese III.3 The State Defendants filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), and lack of subject matter 3Prior to the State Defendants’ filing their motions to dismiss, the district court had already dismissed the New York State Board of Elections as a party after Maltese failed to show cause as to why it should not be dismissed on sovereign immunity grounds. We address whether the Board of Elections was properly dismissed below. 3 jurisdiction, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1). The State Defendants argued that they were entitled to state sovereign immunity as recognized by the Eleventh Amendment for claims against them in their official capacities, that the claims against Assemblyman Brown and State Senator Mattera were barred by absolute legislative immunity, and that Maltese had otherwise failed to state a claim. The Corporation Counsel of the City of New York responded on behalf of the City Defendants in Maltese II. The City Defendants similarly moved to dismiss Maltese’s complaint on both Rule 12(b)(1) and Rule 12(b)(6) grounds asserting not only that Maltese’s claims were barred by res judicata and collateral estoppel, but also that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. III. District Court’s Order Granting Motions to Dismiss The district court granted the motions to dismiss in Maltese I, II, and III. In Maltese I and III, the district court dismissed the claims against the State Defendants as barred by state sovereign immunity or, in the alternative, for failure to state a claim. The district court dismissed the claims against the City Defendants in Maltese II for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. On appeal, Maltese challenges all three dismissals and makes a motion to “accept evidence,” a motion for financial losses, the return of her financial holdings and personal property, and requests that this Court order the district court to hold a hearing. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the case. 4 IV. Standard of Review We review de novo a district court’s grant of a motion to dismiss. Kellogg v. Nichols, 149 F.4th 155, 159 (2d Cir. 2025).4 A complaint must be construed liberally, with all factual allegations accepted as true, and all reasonable inferences drawn in the plaintiff’s favor. See Clark v. Hanley, 89 F.4th 78, 90–91 (2d Cir. 2023). Even so, a complaint’s “[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level” and contain more than a “formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). Because Maltese “has been pro se throughout, h[er] pleadings and other filings are interpreted to raise the strongest claims they suggest.” Sharikov v. Philips Med. Sys. MR, Inc., 103 F.4th 159, 166 (2d Cir. 2024).5 V. Claims Against the State Defendants To the extent that Maltese asserts claims against the State Defendants in their official capacities, the district court properly dismissed those claims as barred by state sovereign immunity. “[T]he Supreme Court has ‘understood the Eleventh Amendment to stand not so much for what it says, but for the presupposition of our constitutional structure which it confirms: that the States entered the federal system with their sovereignty intact; that the judicial authority in Article III is limited by this sovereignty; and that a State will therefore not be subject to suit 4Unless otherwise indicated, when quoting cases, all internal quotation marks, alteration marks, emphases, footnotes, and citations are omitted. 5 In Maltese III , Maltese brought her claims against the State Defendants pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Construing all of Maltese’s pro se filings to raise the strongest claims they suggest, we interpret her complaints in Maltese I and II to also bring claims under § 1983. Additionally, because Maltese does not specify in any of her three complaints whether the claims she is asserting against the State and City Defendants are in their official or individual capacities, the complaints are liberally construed as asserting claims against all Defendants in both their individual and official capacities. 5 in federal court unless it has consented to suit.’” Baroni v. Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., No. 23-916, 2025 WL 3454810, at *5 (2d Cir. Dec. 2, 2025). “It has long been settled that state sovereign immunity precludes not only actions in which a State is actually named as the defendant, but also certain actions against state agents and state instrumentalities.” Id. at *6. It therefore “generally bars suits in federal court by private individuals against non-consenting states,” Leitner v. Westchester Cmty. Coll., 779 F.3d 130, 134 (2d Cir. 2015), and extends further “to state agents and state instrumentalities that are, effectively, arms of a state,” Woods v. Rondout Valley Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 466 F.3d 232, 236 (2d Cir. 2006). Here, all the State Defendants qualify as state agents and thus may be protected by state sovereign immunity. See Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166 (1985) (finding that a lawsuit against officials of a government entity in their official capacities are “in all respects other than name” treated as a suit against the entity itself). To be sure, “a plaintiff may sue a state official acting in his official capacity— notwithstanding the Eleventh Amendment—for prospective injunctive relief from violations of federal law.” In re Deposit Ins. Agency, 482 F.3d 612, 617 (2d Cir. 2007). But Maltese did not seek prospective injunctive relief or allege ongoing violations of federal law in either Maltese I or III; she instead sought 31 years of retroactive corrective earnings, a J.D. degree, and $30,000 in legal fees. None of that relief can be described as prospective or related to an ongoing violation of federal law. Accordingly, Maltese’s claims against the State Defendants in their official capacities are barred on state sovereign immunity grounds.6 6The district court properly dismissed the New York State Board of Elections on sovereign immunity grounds, as it is a state instrumentality and Maltese failed to allege any facts in her complaint that the Board was committing ongoing violations of federal law. 6 Turning to Maltese’s claims against the State Defendants in their individual capacities, these claims fail to state a cause of action. In Maltese I, Maltese alleged that Assemblyman Brown failed to introduce legislation concerning her pension, and in Maltese III, she appears to assert that she was the victim of discrimination and gender bias and was intentionally denied access to a 2020 election ballot. To successfully advance a claim against the State Defendants in their individual capacities, “a plaintiff must plead that each Government–official defendant, through the official’s own individual actions, has violated the Constitution.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676 (2009). It is not enough to simply name the defendants in the complaint. See Tangreti v. Bachmann, 983 F.3d 609, 612 (2d Cir. 2020); see also Patterson v. County of Oneida, 375 F.3d 206, 229 (2d Cir. 2004) (finding that “a plaintiff must establish a given defendant’s personal involvement in the claimed violation in order to hold that defendant liable in his individual capacity”). Here, Maltese fails to allege that Governor Hochul or Senator Mattera had any involvement with her pension or her access to the ballot; Maltese, therefore, has failed to state a claim against either of them in their individual capacities. And although Maltese does allege that Assemblyman Brown participated in a conspiracy against her, “[i]t is well settled that claims of conspiracy containing only conclusory, vague, or general allegations of conspiracy to deprive a person of constitutional rights cannot withstand a motion to dismiss.” Gallop v. Cheney, 642 F.3d 364, 369 (2d Cir. 2011). The complaint alleges no facts suggesting that Assemblyman Brown participated in any conspiracy, so Maltese similarly fails to state a claim against him. Accordingly, the district court correctly dismissed all claims against the State Defendants in their individual capacities. 7 VI. Claims Against the City Defendants In Maltese II, the district court dismissed the complaint against the City Defendants for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, but because we review de novo the district court’s grant of a motion to dismiss, we may affirm on any ground supported by the record. See Jusino v. Fed’n of Cath. Teachers, Inc., 54 F.4th 95, 100 (2d Cir. 2022). We affirm the district court’s dismissal of the claims against the City Defendants on the ground that Maltese failed to state a claim against them. Maltese offers no facts in her complaint that raise her right to relief above the speculative level. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. The complaint in Maltese II is almost entirely composed of “mere conclusory statements,” which the Supreme Court has consistently held is insufficient to establish a cause of action. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Thus, Maltese has failed to state a claim against the City Defendants, and any such claims against them were properly dismissed. * * * We deny all of Maltese’s pending motions. We have considered all of Maltese’s remaining arguments and find them to be without merit. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court. FOR THE COURT: Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court

https://ww3.ca2.uscourts.gov/decisions/isysquery/ed5768ec-e9c2-4e67-9ad7-c9e0226435e2/6/doc/24-2393_so.pdf#xml=https://ww3.ca2.uscourts.gov/decisions/isysquery/ed5768ec-e9c2-4e67-9ad7-c9e0226435e2/6/hilite/

Anti-union animus found to have motivated the employer's taking disciplinary action against an employee resulting in the employee being suspended and demoted

Supreme Court, New York County, denied a petition filed by the City of New York [City] seeking to annul the determination of the Board of Collective Bargaining of the City of New York [Board] granting the improper practice petition filed by the Marine Engineers' Beneficial Association, AFL-CIO (MEBA). The City appealed the Supreme Court's ruling.

The Appellate Division unanimously affirmed the Supreme Court's ruling, explaining that  Supreme Court had properly [1] denied the City's petition and [2] granted the Board's cross-motions to dismiss the proceeding, as the Supreme Court's decision was rational and was supported by the evidence in the record.

Pointing out that the Board had a rational basis to conclude that anti-union animus motivated the employee's suspension and demotion, the Appellate Division's decision also  noted that the testimony in the record from multiple witnesses indicated that the discipline imposed was disproportionate to the offenses and similarly situated employees who engaged in the same conduct received no discipline. 

The Appellate Division's decision also reported that "the witness testimony and documentary evidence established a temporal relationship between the union activity the employee engaged in and the disciplinary action taken" by the City.

The Appellate Division opined that it was also proper "for the Board to reinstate the employee based on the Board's finding that anti-union animus was the substantially motivating cause of his dismissal, and not merely one of the reasons therefor".

Click HERE to access the decision of the Appellate Division posted on the Internet.

The scope of the public policy exception to an arbitrator's power

A New York State Supreme Court granted the State of New York - Unified Court System's [UCS] petition seeking to permanently stay arbitration sought by UCS and denied the cross-motion of the Civil Service Employees Association [CSEA] to compel arbitration.  The Appellate Division unanimously reversed the  lower court's ruling "on the law", dismissed UCS's petition, granted CSEA's motion, and then directed the parties to proceed to arbitration.

CSEA had filed a grievance on behalf of a member [Grievant] in the collective bargaining represent by CSEA challenging USC's summarily removing the Grievant from his position of Principal Law Clerk after the Grievant had successfully completed the required probationary period. 

UCS told Grievant that he was "in the wrong job title, job grade, and salary", contending that a recent audit of its employee records revealed that Grievant was improperly in the title of the position, Principal Law Clerk, as his judicial assignment did not meet the appropriate criteria of a Principal Law Clerk to two "multi-bench judges" and this error would be corrected by "redesignating" the title of Grievant's position to Associate Court Attorney. 

USC's letter also indicated that although Grievant's designation as a Principal Law Clerk resulted in a payment of a salary greater than the salary due him by reason of his serving in the position of  Associate Court Attorney, UCS would not seek to recoup any salary overpayment but his future compensation would be "adjusted prospectively" to the lower salary payable to an Associate Court Attorney.

The Appellate Division held that Supreme Court erred when it permanently stayed CSEA's demand for arbitration of this matter "as public policy does not preclude arbitration of the narrow issue underlying CSEA's grievance": did UCS's actions  constituted a reclassification of Grievant's title from Principal Law Clerk to the title of Associate Court Attorney, resulting in a reduction of his salary grade, violate the parties' collective bargaining agreement.

The Appellate Division noted that the grievance did not challenge UCS's authority to classify, reclassify, allocate, or reallocate UCS positions as authorized by 22 NYCRR 25.5(a), opining that CSEA sought an interpretation of Articles 19 and 20 of the collective bargaining agreement then in force to determine whether UCS's actions "violated the parties' contractual rights and responsibilities". In the words of the Appellate Division, "[in] light of the narrow scope of the public policy exception to an arbitrator's power, the matter is arbitrable, especially because it concerns a public employment collective bargaining agreement".

Click HERE to access the Appellate Division's decision posted on the Internet.

An appeal of a school board's decision submitted to the Commissioner of Education dismissed because it had not been properly served on the school board

New York State Commissioner of Education Betty A. Rosa dismissed an appeal challenging a School Board's [Board] decision denying the parent's [Petitioners] request for afterschool transportation for the Petitioners' two children because the appeal had not been properly served. 

The Commissioner found that the Petitioners' appeal had not personally served on the Board but was "sent via certified mail with return receipt requested".  This, said the Commissioner, "is not a method of service authorized by 8 NYCRR 275.8 (a)". 

The Commissioner explained that Section 275.8 (a) of the Commissioner’s regulations "requires that the petition be personally served upon each named respondent". Further, the Commissioner observed that "If a school district is named as a respondent, service upon the school district shall be made personally by delivering a copy of the petition to the district clerk, to any trustee or any member of the board of education, to the superintendent of schools, or to a person in the office of the superintendent who has been designated by the board of education to accept service (8 NYCRR 275.8 [a]".

Noting that the petition was not personally served on the Board but was sent via "certified mail with return receipt requested", the Commissioner dismissed the parents' appeal for lack of proper service.

Click HERE to access the decision of the Commissioner posted on the Internet.

New York State Comptroller posts municipal and school audits on the Internet

On January 5, 2026 New York State Comptroller Thomas P. DiNapoli announced the following local government and school audits were issued.

Click on the text in color to access the audit.

School Districts - Lead In Water: Testing and Reporting (Statewide)

Auditors assessed whether the officials at 21 school districts that had 26,099 enrolled students for the 2023-24 school year properly identified, reported or implemented needed remediation to reduce lead exposure in all potable water outlets as required by state law and DOH regulations. For these 21 districts, auditors determined that none sampled and tested or exempted all required potable water outlets for lead contamination, only one developed and maintained a complete sampling plan, only one had a complete remedial action plan in place, and just one reported testing results to all required parties within the required timeframes. Of the 6,431 water outlets identified, 1,867 were either not sampled for testing or properly exempted by officials, and 418 could not be matched to a district test result because records were not available and district officials were not certain whether appropriate remediation was completed. These water outlets were not properly secured against use during auditors’ fieldwork.

Delaware County Industrial Development Agency (DCIDA) – Project Monitoring and Website Transparency

DCIDA officials did not properly monitor projects and maintain a transparent website. Although officials told auditors that the executive director made field visits to project sites to monitor their progress, auditors recommended DCIDA officials improve their monitoring efforts over job performance, sales and use tax exemptions, mortgage recording tax exemptions and capital investments. DCIDA officials did not verify whether project owners met agreed-upon job creation and retention goals or track cumulative sales and use tax exemptions. Officials did not obtain affidavits or other available documentation to substantiate the amount of mortgage taxes abated or verify the actual amounts invested by project owners. Instead, the board discussed the projects on an ongoing basis and relied on the good faith of the project owners to accurately report benefits and comply with project agreements.

Steuben County – Information Technology (IT)

County officials did not limit and monitor access to and properly safeguard computerized data used by employees in the finance and personnel departments and county clerk’s office. Specifically, county officials did not inventory and classify computerized data, including private or sensitive information, or ensure the security of county-owned data in the custody of third-party service providers. Officials also did not update and test IT contingency planning and backup procedures or provide periodic information security awareness training, and ensure network user accounts were properly managed.

West Henrietta Fire Department, Inc. – Treasurer (Monroe County)

The treasurer did not properly deposit, disburse, record and report department funds. The treasurer did not deposit revenues in a department bank account within 10 days of receipt or have supporting documentation for all deposited revenues totaling $225,198. Deposits had incorrect dates, descriptions or amounts and disbursements had incorrect vendor names, check numbers or payment methods. Also, the treasurer did not obtain board approval for 24 disbursements totaling $113,194 or 109 disbursements totaling $42,911.

Genesee Valley Fire Department, Inc. – Treasurer (Monroe County)

The treasurers did not properly deposit, disburse, record and report department funds. As a result, the board lacked reliable information that was needed to manage the department’s financial activities or determine whether all disbursements were for appropriate purposes. The treasurers did not maintain adequate supporting documentation, such as deposit slips or issue required or obtain any board or membership approval disbursements before the disbursements were paid. The treasurers also did not submit written financial reports to the board or prepare bank reconciliations.

Valley Stream Central High School District – Capital Assets (Nassau County)

District officials did not properly monitor, account for and dispose of capital assets. While the board adopted some policies for monitoring and disposing of capital assets, officials did not ensure the procedures were followed, which led to missing and inaccurate information in the district’s inventory system, assets that could not be located and assets not being properly disposed of.

Great Neck Park District – Capital Assets (Nassau County)

District officials did not properly record and account for all the district’s capital assets. While the finance director and senior accountant shared the responsibilities of the property control manager, the board did not officially appoint one person to serve in that capacity who would be responsible for tracking the district’s capital assets, ensuring the accuracy of asset records and establishing detailed procedures for protecting capital assets. Additionally, the board did not adopt a comprehensive capital asset policy to ensure officials properly recorded and accounted for equipment.

Town of Edinburg – Town Supervisor’s Records and Reports (Saratoga County)

The former supervisor, who resigned in October 2024, did not maintain a central accounting system to track the town’s financial activity, which caused accounting records and reports to be incomplete, inaccurate and outdated. The former supervisor also did not prepare monthly bank reconciliations or maintain check registers with running cash balances for the town’s checking accounts. In January 2025, the town hired a bookkeeper and the current supervisor began working with her to set up a new accounting system and reconstruct the prior years’ accounting records.

Village of Weedsport – Financial Management (Cayuga County)

The board did not effectively manage the village’s fund balance and levied more real property taxes than necessary to fund operations. The board also maintained unrestricted fund balance in the general and sewer funds totaling $696,548 and $336,015, respectively, at the end of the 2024-25 fiscal year. This unrestricted fund balance was sufficient to fund the upcoming fiscal year’s budget appropriations for the general fund by almost half and for the sewer fund almost in full. In addition, officials were unable to demonstrate whether all reserve funding was reasonable or would be sufficient for future needs.

Village of Manlius – Financial Reports (Onondaga County)

The board did not ensure monthly and annual financial reports (AFR) were prepared and provided to board members. As a result, the board lacked the information necessary to adequately monitor financial operations, make informed financial and strategic decisions, assess the village’s financial standing at year-end and did not ensure the village filed an AFR in accordance with state law. The lack of financial reports and AFR filings also impacted the board’s transparency with taxpayers and residents.

County of Oneida – County Clerk

Although the clerk’s staff collected and deposited funds in a timely manner, the clerk did not always remit funds to the commissioner in a timely or accurate manner. Remittances to the commissioner for non-mortgage fees totaling approximately $2.7 million averaged 69 days late from January 2024 through March 2025. The clerk also did not ensure monthly accountability analyses were prepared to reconcile liabilities against available cash throughout the audit period. Had the clerk done so, he may have identified the following errors in recording and remitting funds soon after they occurred: 2,387 federal tax lien filing fees totaling over $95,000 (dating back to 2007) were not remitted to the commissioner,  approximately $94,000 in revenues generated from website subscriptions were overpaid to the commissioner, and as of March 31, 2025, cash exceeded known liabilities by $108,138.

Town of Hornellsville – Distribution of Foreign Fire Insurance (FFI) Tax Proceeds (Steuben County)

Town officials did not properly distribute the 2023 and 2024 FFI tax proceeds in accordance with insurance law and relevant case law because the bookkeeper miscalculated the allocation of FFI tax proceeds. The board did not receive or review the bookkeeper’s allocation calculation to ensure the FFI tax proceeds were accurately and properly distributed to the two fire companies. As a result, the fire district received $2,569 more than it should have received and the fire company and fire department received $2,444 and $125 less than their pro-rata share of the FFI tax proceeds sent to the town.

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