Selected items posted on the Internet during the week ending January 9, 2026

Five Ways Government Leaders Boost Transparency and Trust Learn how public-sector agencies strengthen community confidence through improved transparency and accountability. READ NOW 

Where Generative AI Makes Sense in the Public Sector This guide helps government and education leaders identify where generative AI can deliver measurable impact--from improving service delivery to unlocking smarter decision-making. Explore key use cases, data strategies, and practical steps to move beyond pilots and build secure, scalable applications that align with policy, budget, and mission goals. DOWNLOAD 

Future Forward Government A space created for state and local IT leaders and decision-makers who are charting the course of tomorrow's public sector. EXPLORE

How AI-Powered Agents Streamline State and Local Service Delivery Explore how AI agents can help state and local governments handle routine tasks, streamline operations, and give staff more time for complex issues. DOWNLOAD

Navigating H.R. 1: A Checklist for the New SNAP Compliance Landscape H.R. 1 raises the stakes for state SNAP programs. With rising administrative costs and penalties tied to payment errors, this checklist helps agencies pinpoint where automation and data strategies can reduce risk, support new rules, and control costs. DOWNLOAD

How Smart Police Stations Are Redefining Public Service Self-service kiosks are helping law enforcement agencies deliver faster, clearer service by digitizing high-impact workflows and reducing front-desk demands. READ NOW

Preparing Utilities & Local Governments for a Paperless World The paperless future is here. Is your utility or local government ready? From rising postage costs to time-consuming manual processes, the shift to digital billing and payments is no longer optional — it’s essential. This resource explores how utilities can embrace a paperless future to cut costs, improve operational efficiencies, and meet modern demands. DOWNLOAD

Judicial review of an administrative agency's decision made without an evidentiary hearing

The City of New York Reasonable Accommodation Appeals Panel [Panel] sustained a determination of the New York City Fire Department denying a New York City Firefighter's [Petitioner] request for a reasonable accommodation from a vaccine mandate based on his religion. Supreme Court had granted the petition, in effect, annulled the Panel's determination and directed the New York City Fire Department and the City of New York to reinstate the Petitioner to his position as a firefighter with a reasonable accommodation from the vaccine mandate and back pay. Supreme Court also found that Petitioner was entitled to an award of attorneys' fees. The Fire Department and the City appealed the Supreme Court's ruling.

The Appellate Division reversed the Supreme Court's ruling on the law, with costs, and dismissed the proceeding, explaining that "In a CPLR article 78 proceeding to review a determination of an administrative agency made without an evidentiary hearing, the standard of review is whether the determination was made in violation of lawful procedure, was affected by an error of law or was arbitrary and capricious or an abuse of discretion".

The Appellate Division said that Petitioner failed to demonstrate that the Panel's determination to deny him a religious exemption from the vaccine mandate was arbitrary and capricious and "It is not dispositive that the . . . Panel's determination did not set forth any reasoning; a member of the Panel clarified the basis for the determination in an affirmation submitted in [this] proceeding".

The text of the Appellate Division's decision is set out below.

Matter of Hughes v New York City Fire Dept.

2025 NY Slip Op 07007

Decided on December 17, 2025

Appellate Division, Second Department

Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431.

This opinion is uncorrected and subject to revision before publication in the Official Reports.

Decided on December 17, 2025 

SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK Appellate Division, Second Judicial Department

VALERIE BRATHWAITE NELSON, J.P.
PAUL WOOTEN
BARRY E. WARHIT
LOURDES M. VENTURA, JJ.

2024-01225

(Index No. 532524/22)

[*1]In the Matter of Christopher Hughes, respondent,

v

New York City Fire Department, et al., appellants.

Muriel Goode-Trufant, Corporation Counsel, New York, NY (Richard Dearing, Jesse A. Townsend, Geoffrey E. Curfman, and Ingrid R. Gustafson of counsel), for appellants.

Christina Martinez, Staten Island, NY, for respondent.

DECISION & ORDER

In a proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 to review a determination of the City of New York Reasonable Accommodation Appeals Panel dated July 11, 2022, which upheld a determination of the New York City Fire Department dated December 8, 2021, denying the petitioner's request for a reasonable accommodation from a vaccine mandate based on his religion, the New York City Fire Department and the City of New York appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Joy F. Campanelli, J), dated October 18, 2023. The judgment granted the petition, in effect, annulled the determination dated July 11, 2022, directed the New York City Fire Department and the City of New York to reinstate the petitioner to his position as a firefighter with a reasonable accommodation from the vaccine mandate and back pay, and directed that the petitioner was entitled to an award of attorneys' fees.

ORDERED that the judgment is reversed, on the law, with costs, the petition is denied, and the proceeding is dismissed.

The petitioner was a firefighter with the New York City Fire Department (hereinafter the FDNY). By order dated October 20, 2021, the New York City Commissioner of Health and Mental Hygiene issued a mandate requiring all City employees, among others, to submit proof that they had received at least one dose of a COVID-19 vaccine by October 29, 2021 (hereinafter the vaccine mandate). On November 1, 2021, the petitioner was placed on leave, without pay, since he failed to submit proof of vaccination or request a reasonable accommodation by the specified deadline. On November 5, 2021, the petitioner submitted a request to the FDNY's Equal Employment Opportunity Office for a reasonable accommodation from the vaccine mandate based on his religion, which was denied on December 8, 2021. The petitioner then appealed to the City of New York Reasonable Accommodation Appeals Panel (hereinafter the Panel). In a determination dated July 11, 2022, the Panel upheld the FDNY's denial of the petitioner's request for a reasonable accommodation. The FDNY then terminated the petitioner's employment on July 27, 2022.

In November 2022, the petitioner commenced this proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 against the FDNY and the City (hereinafter together the appellants) to annul the Panel's determination, to be reinstated to his position, for back pay, and for an award of attorneys' fees. In [*2]a judgment dated October 18, 2023, the Supreme Court granted the petition, in effect, annulled the Panel's determination, directed the appellants to reinstate the petitioner to his position as a firefighter with a reasonable accommodation from the vaccine mandate and back pay, and directed that the petitioner was entitled to an award of attorneys' fees. This appeal ensued.

"In a CPLR article 78 proceeding to review a determination of an administrative agency made without an evidentiary hearing, the standard of review is whether the determination was made in violation of lawful procedure, was affected by an error of law or was arbitrary and capricious or an abuse of discretion" (Matter of Achille v Laveman, 224 AD3d 744, 746 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see CPLR 7803[3]; Matter of Adirondack Wild: Friends of the Forest Preserve v New York State Adirondack Park Agency, 34 NY3d 184, 191).

Here, the petitioner failed to demonstrate that the Panel's determination to deny him a religious exemption from the vaccine mandate was arbitrary and capricious (see Matter of Smith v New York City Fire Dept., 239 AD3d 870; Matter of Marstellar v City of New York, 217 AD3d 543, 545). "It is not dispositive that the . . . Panel's determination did not set forth any reasoning; a member of the Panel clarified the basis for the determination in an affirmation submitted in [this] proceeding" (Matter of Lee v City of New York, 221 AD3d 505, 506; see Matter of Marstellar v City of New York, 217 AD3d at 544).

Further, pursuant to the New York City Human Rights Law (NYCHRL), it is "an unlawful discriminatory practice" for an employer "to refuse or otherwise fail to engage in a cooperative dialogue within a reasonable time with a person who has requested an accommodation" for, among other possibilities, "religious needs" (Administrative Code of the City of NY § 8-107[28][a][1]). Here, the petitioner failed to demonstrate that the appellants' process for resolving requests for a reasonable accommodation from the vaccine mandate did not meet the requirements of the NYCHRL regarding cooperative dialogue (see Matter of Smith v New York City Fire Dept., 239 AD3d at 872; Matter of Marstellar v City of New York, 217 AD3d at 545). The appellants provided information on the process for reviewing accommodation requests related to the vaccine mandate and informed employees on how to appeal request denials. The record demonstrates that the petitioner availed himself of this process. Moreover, the record shows that there were multiple communications between the petitioner, the FDNY, and the Panel regarding the petitioner's request. The petitioner "failed to establish that, under the unique circumstances present at the time of the vaccine mandate, the NYCHRL required a more robust or individual dialogue" (Matter of Smith v New York City Fire Dept., 239 AD3d at 872).

Since the Panel's determination was not arbitrary and capricious or affected by an error of law, there is no basis to award back pay or court costs as incidental damages (see CPLR 7806; Matter of Rysiejko v City of New York, 232 AD3d 432, 433).

Furthermore, the Supreme Court erred in directing that the petitioner was entitled to an award of attorneys' fees, which was not authorized by agreement between the parties, by statute, or by court rule (see Matter of Smith v New York City Fire Dept., 239 AD3d at 873; Matter of Ferrera v New York City Dept. of Educ., 230 AD3d 772, 774).

The petitioner's remaining contentions are either without merit or improperly raised for the first time on appeal.

Accordingly, the Supreme Court erred, inter alia, in granting the petition and, in effect, annulling the Panel's determination, and the judgment must be reversed.

BRATHWAITE NELSON, J.P., WOOTEN, WARHIT and VENTURA, JJ., concur.

ENTER:

Darrell M. Joseph

Clerk of the Court

 

Anti-union animus found to have motivated the employer's taking disciplinary action against an employee resulting in the employee being suspended and demoted

Supreme Court, New York County, denied a petition filed by the City of New York [City] seeking to annul the determination of the Board of Collective Bargaining of the City of New York [Board] granting the improper practice petition filed by the Marine Engineers' Beneficial Association, AFL-CIO (MEBA). The City appealed the Supreme Court's ruling.

The Appellate Division unanimously affirmed the Supreme Court's ruling, explaining that  Supreme Court had properly [1] denied the City's petition and [2] granted the Board's cross-motions to dismiss the proceeding, as the Supreme Court's decision was rational and was supported by the evidence in the record.

Pointing out that the Board had a rational basis to conclude that anti-union animus motivated the employee's suspension and demotion, the Appellate Division's decision also  noted that the testimony in the record from multiple witnesses indicated that the discipline imposed was disproportionate to the offenses and similarly situated employees who engaged in the same conduct received no discipline. 

The Appellate Division's decision also reported that "the witness testimony and documentary evidence established a temporal relationship between the union activity the employee engaged in and the disciplinary action taken" by the City.

The Appellate Division opined that it was also proper "for the Board to reinstate the employee based on the Board's finding that anti-union animus was the substantially motivating cause of his dismissal, and not merely one of the reasons therefor".

Click HERE to access the decision of the Appellate Division posted on the Internet.

The scope of the public policy exception to an arbitrator's power

A New York State Supreme Court granted the State of New York - Unified Court System's [UCS] petition seeking to permanently stay arbitration sought by UCS and denied the cross-motion of the Civil Service Employees Association [CSEA] to compel arbitration.  The Appellate Division unanimously reversed the  lower court's ruling "on the law", dismissed UCS's petition, granted CSEA's motion, and then directed the parties to proceed to arbitration.

CSEA had filed a grievance on behalf of a member [Grievant] in the collective bargaining represent by CSEA challenging USC's summarily removing the Grievant from his position of Principal Law Clerk after the Grievant had successfully completed the required probationary period. 

UCS told Grievant that he was "in the wrong job title, job grade, and salary", contending that a recent audit of its employee records revealed that Grievant was improperly in the title of the position, Principal Law Clerk, as his judicial assignment did not meet the appropriate criteria of a Principal Law Clerk to two "multi-bench judges" and this error would be corrected by "redesignating" the title of Grievant's position to Associate Court Attorney. 

USC's letter also indicated that although Grievant's designation as a Principal Law Clerk resulted in a payment of a salary greater than the salary due him by reason of his serving in the position of  Associate Court Attorney, UCS would not seek to recoup any salary overpayment but his future compensation would be "adjusted prospectively" to the lower salary payable to an Associate Court Attorney.

The Appellate Division held that Supreme Court erred when it permanently stayed CSEA's demand for arbitration of this matter "as public policy does not preclude arbitration of the narrow issue underlying CSEA's grievance": did UCS's actions  constituted a reclassification of Grievant's title from Principal Law Clerk to the title of Associate Court Attorney, resulting in a reduction of his salary grade, violate the parties' collective bargaining agreement.

The Appellate Division noted that the grievance did not challenge UCS's authority to classify, reclassify, allocate, or reallocate UCS positions as authorized by 22 NYCRR 25.5(a), opining that CSEA sought an interpretation of Articles 19 and 20 of the collective bargaining agreement then in force to determine whether UCS's actions "violated the parties' contractual rights and responsibilities". In the words of the Appellate Division, "[in] light of the narrow scope of the public policy exception to an arbitrator's power, the matter is arbitrable, especially because it concerns a public employment collective bargaining agreement".

Click HERE to access the Appellate Division's decision posted on the Internet.

An appeal of a school board's decision submitted to the Commissioner of Education dismissed because it had not been properly served on the school board

New York State Commissioner of Education Betty A. Rosa dismissed an appeal challenging a School Board's [Board] decision denying the parent's [Petitioners] request for afterschool transportation for the Petitioners' two children because the appeal had not been properly served. 

The Commissioner found that the Petitioners' appeal had not personally served on the Board but was "sent via certified mail with return receipt requested".  This, said the Commissioner, "is not a method of service authorized by 8 NYCRR 275.8 (a)". 

The Commissioner explained that Section 275.8 (a) of the Commissioner’s regulations "requires that the petition be personally served upon each named respondent". Further, the Commissioner observed that "If a school district is named as a respondent, service upon the school district shall be made personally by delivering a copy of the petition to the district clerk, to any trustee or any member of the board of education, to the superintendent of schools, or to a person in the office of the superintendent who has been designated by the board of education to accept service (8 NYCRR 275.8 [a]".

Noting that the petition was not personally served on the Board but was sent via "certified mail with return receipt requested", the Commissioner dismissed the parents' appeal for lack of proper service.

Click HERE to access the decision of the Commissioner posted on the Internet.