Settling a disciplinary action subject to compulsory arbitration by entering into a "Last Chance Agreement"

Plaintiff, a tenured teacher employed by a New York State school district [Employer] was served with  disciplinary charges alleging Plaintiff had failed to accurately document speech services during the 2016-2017 and 2017-2018 school years. 

Plaintiff and the Employer subsequently entered into a "Last Change Agreement" [LCA] to settle the disciplinary action whereby the parties mutually agreed that "if, at any time prior to the last day of the 2021-2022 school year following written notice and a 45-day period to cure", Plaintiff was determined by a hearing officer "after a hearing pursuant to Education Law §3020-a to have engaged in similar neglect, the [Employer] would be entitled to terminate the [Plaintiff's] employment."

On April 5, 2021, the Employer notified the Plaintiff that she was not in  compliance with the LCA due to her failure to accurately document speech services during the 2020-2021 school year and directed her to cure the deficiencies within 45 days.

Plaintiff failed to timely to cure alleged failure as required by the terms of the LCA and the Employer filed disciplinary charges against Plaintiff.

In the course of the Education Law §3020-a disciplinary action which followed, Plaintiff contended that the charged misconduct was not substantially similar to the misconduct giving rise to the LCA "because she had been assigned additional duties and responsibilities due to the COVID-19 pandemic and that she did enter the required information to accurately document the services she provided".

The hearing officer permitted the Employer to rebut Plaintiff's assertions by demonstrating that the additional entries submitted by Plaintiff "were entered after the 45-day period to cure and that prior to the COVID-19 pandemic, she had failed to document her sessions during the 2019-2020 school year, which was outside of the charged period". 

The disciplinary hearing officer issued a determination which sustained the charges and specifications alleged by the Employer and authorized the termination of Plaintiff's employment. Plaintiff appealed the hearing officer's decision in an effort to have it vacated, contending that the [disciplinary] arbitration did not conform with Education Law §3020-a. Supreme Court denied the Employer's motion to dismiss Plaintiff's appeal and ultimately granted Plaintiff's petition. The Employer appealed the Supreme Court's judgment.

The Appellate Division reversed the Supreme Court' ruling and granted the Employer's motion to dismiss Plaintiff's petition; explaining:

1. "The standard of review mandated by Education Law §3020-a (5)(a) is that of CPLR article 75, which provides that an arbitration award may be vacated only on a showing of misconduct, bias, excess of power, or procedural defects";

2. Where, as here, the obligation to arbitrate arises through statutory mandate, the hearing officer's determination is subject to closer judicial scrutiny than it would receive had the arbitration been conducted voluntarily;

3. The award in a compulsory arbitration proceeding must have evidentiary support and cannot be arbitrary and capricious; and

4. In addition, CPLR Article 75 reviews questions whether the decision was rational or had a plausible basis.

Citing Matter of Harvey v Board of Educ. of the Uniondale Union Free Sch. Dist., 221 AD3d 899, the Appellate Division then observed that "When reviewing compulsory arbitrations in education proceedings such as this, the court should accept the hearing officer's credibility determinations, even where there is conflicting evidence and room for choice exists" and concluded that the determination recommending the termination of the termination of Plaintiff's employment was rational, had evidentiary support, and was not arbitrary and capricious.

The Appellate Division's decision also observed that a "last chance agreement constituted a valid, binding contract, and the neglect complained of [in the instant action], to wit, the failure to accurately document speech services during the 2020-2021 school year, was identical to the previously charged conduct".

Click HERE to access the Appellate Division's decision posted on the Internet.

Disability included in New York State's Aging Law and Policy

On October 8, 2025, Albany Law School's Government Law Center and the Office of the Chief Disability Officer of the State of New York [OCDO] hosted Albany Law School's Nancy M. Sills 76th Memorial Lecture. 

Leaders and advocates from the OCDO discussed the intersections of disability and aging and efforts being made to include the needs of individuals with disabilities in New York State's aging laws and policies.

Click HERE to access the Podcast of the presentation posted on the Internet.

Amending an application for Workers' Compensation benefits to include alleged consequential injuries

Claimant for Workers' Compensation benefits appealed the Workers' Compensation Board's [Board] decision disallowing Claimant's request to amend his earlier established claim to include consequential injuries.

Claimant had established a claim for workers' compensation benefits based upon an exacerbation of a preexisting chemical sensitivity and Claimant's employer reassigned Claimant to work at a different location. Subsequently, Claimant's treating physician advised Claimant's employer that Claimant's reassignment to the new location had resulted in "a complete resolution" of Claimant's symptoms and requested that the reassignment be made permanent. Claimant continued to work at the new location until January 2020 when he took a leave of absence to care for his ailing mother and commenced working from home. 

Claimant subsequently complained of certain mental health difficulties to his treating physician, asserting that, while working from home while on leave, he was harassed by his supervisor concerning his work. Claimant's physician diagnosed Claimant with a number of psychological conditions related to those complaints and Claimant then sought to amend his established chemical sensitivity claim claim "to include anxiety, depressed mood, major depressive disorder and insomnia as consequential injuries".

A Workers' Compensation Law Judge [WCLJ] found that Claimant had not demonstrated that his psychological injuries were a direct or natural consequence of his initial chemical related injury and disallowed the claim for "consequential injuries". The Workers' Compensation Board affirmed the WCLJ's findings, and Claimant appealed the Board ruling.

The Appellate Division sustained the Board's determination, noting:

1. Substantial evidence supported the Board's finding that Claimant's alleged psychological injuries did not result from a fear of being assigned to work at his original location;

2. Claimant "has not demonstrated that the asserted psychological injuries resulted directly and naturally from his prior chemical insensitivity disability so as to establish a consequential injury"; and

3. Claimant's allegations with respect to harassment, "were too remote to establish a causal nexus to the prior disability, even if the actions could constitute a separate and distinct claim for work-related stress.

The Appellate Division said its "review of the record as a whole" found no basis to disturb the Board's determination that Claimant failed to demonstrate, "by competent medical evidence, a causal relationship between his established disability and his alleged consequential injuries", and held that the Board's decision to reject Claimant's alleged consequential injuries was supported by substantial evidence.

Click HERE to access the Appellate Division's decision posted on the Internet.

Selected items posted on blogs during the week ending October 17, 2025

How AI-Powered Agents Streamline State and Local Service Delivery Explore how AI agents can help state and local governments handle routine tasks, streamline operations, and give staff more time for complex issues. DOWNLOAD

Preparing Utilities & Local Governments for a Paperless World The paperless future is here. Is your utility or local government ready? From rising postage costs to time-consuming manual processes, the shift to digital billing and payments is no longer optional — it’s essential. This resource explores how utilities can embrace a paperless future to cut costs, improve operational efficiencies, and meet modern demands. DOWNLOAD

Transparency in Motion: Real-Time Data for Safer Streets and Stronger Communities Public safety agencies are under pressure to do more with less -- respond faster, operate more efficiently, and remain accountable to both leadership and the communities they serve. This paper explores how telematics and in-vehicle data are helping agencies meet those expectations and deliver measurable results.   DOWNLOAD

Human-Guided Automation: Smarter, Safer Endpoint Security Autonomous endpoint management keeps humans in control while boosting compliance, speed, and resilience.  READ MORE

Secure by Design: A Plan for Ransomware Defense From real-world examples of emerging extortion tactics to actionable guidance on vulnerability scanning, 24/7 detection, and incident response planning, this paper is a must-read for every government IT leader committed to safeguarding digital infrastructure and public trust. DOWNLOAD

When Disaster Strikes, Coordination Keeps Recovery Moving Who restores critical connections after natural disasters? See the teamwork behind recovery and the need for close coordination to speed recovery efforts. Watch the film.

Natural Disaster, National Attention Public Records Request Management Steps Up in Time of Need READ MORE

Key elements of the Court of Appeals' decision addressing the Even Year Election Law (Laws of 2023, Chapter 741) to consolidate certain elections for county and town offices with even year elections for state and federal offices.

In 2023, the Legislature enacted the Even Year Election Law (Laws of 2023, Chapter 741) to consolidate certain elections for county and town offices with even year elections for state and federal offices. The Plaintiffs, including several counties with charter provisions setting local elections for odd-numbered years, challenge the constitutionality of the Even Year Election Law, claiming the statute violates the home rule provisions of Article IX of the State Constitution. 

The Court of Appels held that "there is no express or implied constitutional limitation on the legislature's authority to enact the Even Year Election Law" [hereinafter EYEL] and affirmed the ruling of the Appellate Division.

[*1]County of Onondaga, et al., Appellants,

v

State of New York, et al., Respondents, et al., Defendant. (And Other Actions.)

Decided on October 16, 2025

No. 66

In the words of the court: 

"The issue for this Court is whether article IX limits the power of the legislature in such a way as to make the EYEL an unconstitutional exercise of legislative authority. We conclude that it does not.

"Plaintiffs first challenge the constitutionality of the statute under section 1, arguing that, because of the rights detailed in section 1 as implemented by the Municipal Home Rule Law, counties have a constitutional right to set the timing of county elections and terms of office. In other words, because counties are authorized to adopt alternative forms of government (NY Const, art IX, §1 [h] [1], and because those counties that do so are instructed by the Municipal Home Rule Law to provide for 'the manner of election' and 'terms of office' of its officials in those charters (Municipal Home Rule Law §33 [3] [b]), that statutory instruction from the Municipal Home Rule Law is transformed into a constitutional right barring the legislature from interfering with the manner of election or terms of office for local officials. Nothing in the text of these provisions, or in our jurisprudence, supports that view. Indeed, only the right to form an alternative form of government is guaranteed by section 1 (h) (1), that right does not implicitly include a right to set terms of office or timing of elections, and the authority delegated to local governments in the Municipal Home Rule Law is statutory. Nothing in the EYEL infringes the rights provided by article IX's 'bill of rights.'

"Next, plaintiffs argue that the EYEL is unconstitutional under article IX, section 2 (b) (2) because the legislature is only empowered to act in this manner pursuant to general law or a duly enacted special law and, in their view, the EYEL is neither. This is incorrect. As defined by article IX, §3 (d) (1), a general law is one 'which in terms and in effect applies alike to all counties, all counties other than those wholly included within a city, all cities, all towns or all villages.' This Court has long held that a statute remains a general law where it is 'cast in general terms' but affects a smaller category of counties, and is "no less general because it classifies the [counties] affected on the basis of population or some other condition and extends its benefits only to" certain counties, so long as 'the classification be defined by conditions common to the class and related to the subject of the statute' (Uniformed Firefighters Assn. v City of New York, 50 NY2d 85, 90 [1980]; see also Rozler v Franger, 61 AD2d 46, 51 [4th Dept 1978], affd 46 NY2d 760 [1978] [that Village Law exempts chartered villages does not 'make it any less a general law,' because the 'exception . . . is based on a reasonable classification and the law applies uniformly to all other villages throughout the state']). The EYEL, as the Appellate Division held, is a general law because it applies to all counties, with reasonable exceptions, and has an equal impact on a 'rationally defined class similarly situated' (238 AD3d at 1540-1541 [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]; see also Hotel Dorset Co. v Trust for Cultural Resources of City of N.Y., 46 NY2d 358, 373 [1978] [where a law 'has an equal impact on all members of a rationally defined class similarly situated, the law is thus a general' law]). While the EYEL contains exemptions, its terms are general, and the category of counties and offices it affects is defined by common conditions and related to the statute's purpose.

"Finally, plaintiffs challenge the EYEL on the basis that it runs afoul of the clause in article IX, §3 (b), which provides that the provisions of article IX 'shall not affect any existing valid provisions of acts of the legislature or of local legislation.' This language simply made clear, as the Appellate Division held, that existing local laws remained in force following the adoption of article IX, and expressly accounts for change through legislative action by stating that existing local provisions continue 'in force until repealed, amended, modified or superseded' (see 238 AD3d at 1541 [article IX, §3 'clarifies that the adoption of Article IX did not itself invalidate then-existing legislation . . . and does not preclude the Legislature from adopting a law such as the EYEL']).

"Nothing in article IX limits, expressly or by implication, the otherwise plenary authority of the legislature to mandate the timing of certain elections, as the EYEL does (see Matter of Burr v Voorhis, 229 NY 382, 388 [1920] ([T)he legislature is free to adopt concerning (voting) any reasonable, uniform and just regulations which are in harmony with constitutional provisions"]). Consequently, without any such constitutional limitation, the EYEL is a proper exercise of that authority.

"The order of the Appellate Division should be affirmed, without costs.

"Opinion by Judge Garcia. Chief Judge Wilson and Judges Rivera, Singas, Cannataro, Troutman and Halligan concur."

Footnotes

Footnote 1: The EYEL exempts offices whose terms are specified in the Constitution, offices for which elections must occur in odd numbered years pursuant to the Constitution, offices with a three-year term before January 1, 2025, offices in towns coterminous with villages, and offices in counties located in New York City (L 2023, ch 741, §§ 1-4; see also NY Const, art XIII, §§ 8, 10, 12, 13, 17).

Footnote 2: Individual voter plaintiffs' complaint alleges that the EYEL's consolidation of local elections with even-year elections "increases the burdens associated with casting a vote, fundraising, and generating support for candidates, among other essential campaigning activities, while contributing to voter fatigue due to higher numbers of issues and/or candidates on the ballot" and that "[w]ith more candidates on the ballot and higher turnout numbers, voters will face longer ballots, longer voting lines, voter fatigue, and 'ballot drop-off' or 'roll-off.' " These are not traditional voter suppression claims.

Click HERE to access the decision of the Court of Appeals posted on the Internet.