Selected items from Blogs posted during the week ending May 2, 2026

2026 AI Risk and Readiness Report Most organizations are making decisions about AI security without a full picture of how it’s being used across their environment. Based on new data from over 1,200 cybersecurity professionals, this report highlights where those visibility gaps commonly exist and what they mean for managing data and risk. DOWNLOAD

The H.R. 1 Mandate: Modernizing Medicaid and SNAP H.R. 1 adds substantial administrative obligations to Medicaid and food assistance programs. Learn why automation is essential to handle growing workloads and complexity. DOWNLOAD

The Tech Helping Teams Get Work Done Explore how public sector leaders are adopting AI, automation, and safety technologies to solve today’s workforce challenges. This new research highlights what’s working, what workers want, and where public agencies are seeing real ROI across operations, training, and service delivery. DOWNLOAD

Inside the 2026 ISAC Annual Summit: Cybersecurity Priorities for the Decade Ahead Three days. Nine tracks. Real solutions for modern cybersecurity challenges. Learn More and Register Now 

What’s Next for Your PeopleSoft Environment? See how organizations are planning the future of their PeopleSoft environments in Washington, DC on May 12. Reserve your spot

AI Fraud: Can Your Agency's Defenses Keep Up? This thought leadership paper covers common misconceptions about AI in identity verification and the technology components agencies need to combat to prevent AI-driven fraud. Read more to learn how your agency can enhance its approach to identity verification. DOWNLOAD

AI Is Reshaping Criminal Justice. The Real Question Is How We Govern It AI can improve efficiency and fairness — but only with strong oversight and accountability. READ NOW

From Buzz to Benefit: Making AI Mission-Relevant Public sector leaders are under pressure to turn AI from a promising concept into measurable impact, but many initiatives stall at the pilot stage. This paper explores how agencies can move beyond experimentation by aligning AI investments with mission-driven priorities and address common barriers like cost and governance. DOWNLOAD

Local Data Protections in Automated Enforcement Explore how cities protect data privacy while using automated enforcement systems responsibly. READ NOW

The 2026 State of Digital Government Report Government teams aren’t short on data, they’re short on clarity. This report breaks down how leading agencies are turning fragmented insights into faster services, higher participation, and measurable outcomes. Backed by benchmarks from nearly 1,300 public sector professionals, it outlines what’s working right now and where gaps are quietly costing time, trust, and resources. DOWNLOAD

Navigating H.R. 1 SNAP Challenges It’s no secret that stricter work and income requirements may increase your administrative burden. Download Checklist

Securing the Reset: How Idaho Strengthened Security and Governance This case study explores how transitioning to a FedRAMP-authorized environment enabled greater accountability, streamlined operations and enhanced protection of sensitive data, while reducing the burden of legacy systems. DOWNLOAD

Balancing Security, Staffing, and System Demands Join IT leaders in Washington, DC on May 12 to learn how agencies are balancing security demands with limited resources. Learn More

Second Circuit Court of Appeals held that New York's Volunteer Firefighters’ Benefit Law is not a firefighter's exclusive remedy for an injury suffered while traveling to a reported boat fire aboard a ship owned by the Fire District

A former volunteer firefighter [Firefighter] with the Fire District [District]  appealed the grant of the District's motion for summary judgment by a United States District Court for the Southern District of New York. Firefighter had suffered injury to his foot while traveling aboard a ship owned by the District to the reported site of a boat fire on the Hudson River when Firefighter extended his leg to fend off a collision with another vessel. 

Having previously obtained compensation under New York State’s Volunteer Firefighters’ Benefit Law, Firefighter filed the instant claim in response to the District’s petition in the United States District Court seeking to limit its liability to the value of the vessel pursuant to the Limitation of Liability Act of 1851, 46 U.S.C. §30523, and Rule F of the Supplemental Rules for Admiralty and Maritime Claims.

Firefighter's claim alleged (i) negligence and unseaworthiness pursuant to the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. § 30104; (ii) unseaworthiness under Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85 (1946); and (iii) negligence under general maritime law. 

A Federal District Court had granted the District's motion for summary judgment, holding that the Firefighter was not eligible to bring claims pursuant to the Jones Act or Sieracki, and that Firefighter's exclusive remedy were those provided by New York’s Volunteer Firefighters’ Benefit Law, and that Firefighter was prohibited to bring a general maritime law claim.  Firefighter appealed the District Court’s ruling, with the exception of the District's Court's denial of the Firefighter's Jones Act claim.

The Second Circuit held that the District Court erred in granting the District's motion for  summary judgment after finding that Firefighter was not entitled to the warranty of seaworthiness extended to a Sieracki seaman and in ruling that New York’s Volunteer Firefighters’ Benefit Law barred Firefighter's federal negligence claim under general maritime law.

In the words of the Second Circuit, "Although only a small part of [Firefighter's] employment took place on the navigable waters, and he therefore was not a seaman under the Jones Act, on the occasions when he was engaged in a firefighting mission on the waters aboard the [District's ship] his work was distinctly maritime. This case is unlike the cases of injuries to land workers, whose presence on a ship was only for transportation to their land-based jobs". "If [Firefighter's] job, when joining a firefighting mission on [the District's vessel] was to do waterborne firefighting and rescue, that job was no less maritime while he was doing it than it would have been if he had been permanent crew to a firefighting vessel. [Firefighter] asserts that he was in the bow preparing to secure the vessel and that when he extended his foot, his purpose was to avoid a collision, both tasks being seaman’s jobs carrying seaman’s risks. Neither the Fire District nor the [District Court] has advanced a persuasive reason for granting summary judgment dismissing [Firefighter's] claims."

The Second Circuit said it concluded that the reasons giving effect to the State’s exclusive remedy provision so as to deprive Firefighter of whatever maritime remedies he can prove would “work material prejudice to the characteristic features of the general maritime law, [and] interfere with the proper harmony and uniformity of that law in its international and interstate relations.”

While the Second Circuit said it disavowed any automatic conclusion that “wherever a maritime interest is involved, no matter how slight or marginal, it must displace a local interest, no matter how pressing and significant,” the Circuit Court said it read the Supreme Court precedents "as protecting the applicability of maritime remedies, as against conflicting state law, when, federal maritime tort policy engages sufficiently with the facts, so that displacement of the federal remedy because of a state’s exclusivity provision would impair uniformity of the federal maritime law". 

The Court of Appeals vacated the District Court's judgment and remanded the matter to the District Court for further consideration, stating that "We leave it to the proceedings in the district court on remand to determine whether this evidence should be believed and whether [Firefighter] was doing seaman’s work and incurring a seaman’s hazards".

Click HERE to access the Second Circuit's ruling posted on the Internet.

The intra-military immunity doctrine bars certain lawsuits if the alleged injuries arise out of or are experienced the course of an activity with the State

Plaintiff in this CPLR Article 78 challenging his discharge from the New York Guard [NYG]* and New York Division of Military Affairs' [DMNA] alleged failure to respond to his FOIL request. Plaintiff sought, among other things, records related to the charges he had attempted to file. 

Plaintiff had served as a noncommissioned officer with the NYG. During his service, he was counseled over a series of months regarding various disciplinary incidents, most relevant here allegations that Plaintiff had made unauthorized inquiries into the number and identities of NYG service members who had been awarded State Guard Association of the United States [SGAUS] honors.

After Plaintiff attempted to initiate court martial proceedings by purporting to file formal charges with the New York State Division of Military and Naval Affairs [DMNA] against several officers involved in disciplinary incident in which he had been involved, he was honorably discharged from the NYG.

DMNA cross-moved to dismiss the Plaintiff's Article 78 petition on the grounds that Plaintiff's "challenge to his discharge was nonjusticiable and ... that he had failed to exhaust his administrative remedies as to his FOIL claims". Supreme Court granted DNMA's cross-motion and dismissed the proceeding explaining that Plaintiff's challenge to his discharge was barred by the intra-military immunity doctrine and Plaintiff's FOIL challenge was moot. Plaintiff appealed the Supreme Court's ruling.

Addressing the doctrine of intra-military immunity, which applies to both the federal armed forces and a state organized militia, the Appellate Division noted that the doctrine "bars a lawsuit if 'the injuries [for which a plaintiff seeks to recover] arise out of or are in the course of activity incident' involving the plaintiff's military service". However, opined the court, civilian judicial review of internal personnel matters of the military "are subject always to the civilian control" and that of the legislative and the executive branches of State government.

Finding that Plaintiff's challenge was nonjusticiable under the intra-military immunity doctrine, the Appellate Division held Plaintiff's "unsupported assertion that his discharge was retaliatory does not necessitate a contrary conclusion" and, contrary to Plaintiff's contentions, the status of SGAUS as a nonmilitary organization is of no moment inasmuch as Plaintiff's misconduct underlying his honorable discharge stems from his actions related to his service with the NYG.

The Appellate Division then held that Supreme Court properly dismissed Plaintiff FOIL claims as moot, inasmuch as the record reflects that he received responses to his requests.

Addressing Plaintiff's claim that the disclosures were inadequate, the Appellate Division found that Plaintiff had failed to exhaust his administrative remedies by first pursuing an administrative appeal.

* Akin to the New York National Guard, the New York Guard is authorized by Article VIII of New York State's Military Law and maintained at the Governor's discretion (See Military Law §165 [1]). The New York Guard is made up of unpaid volunteers and "augments and supports the New York National Guard," but they "are not federal military reservists as are members of New York State's Army National Guard, the State's Air National Guard" and the State's "Naval Militia".

Click HERE to access the Appellate Division's decision posted on the Internet.

Courts do not choose between differing professional opinions as that is the function of the administrative authority as long as it acts reasonably and responsibly

In a proceeding pursuant to CPLR Article 78 filed by a candidate for appointment as a police officer [Plaintiff] seeking judicial review of the determination of the Suffolk County Department of Civil Service [Department], affirming its earlier determination, that the Plaintiff was not qualified for employment as a police officer, Supreme Court dismiss the Plaintiff's petition. Plaintiff appealed. The Appellate Division affirmed the Supreme Court ruling, with costs.

Plaintiff had sought employment as a police officer with the Suffolk County Police Department. Candidates for such employment are required to undergo a background investigation and pass a psychological evaluation, among other things. Petitioner was not recommended for the position and the Civil Service Department notified Plaintiff that he had not been found qualified for the appointment. 

Plaintiff appealed the Department's determination, submitting an independent evaluation by a psychologist who disagreed with the conclusion of the Department's evaluator. Ultimately the Department concluded that there was no significant evidence to support reversing its disqualification of Plaintiff and affirmed its prior determination that the Petitioner was not qualified for employment as a police officer. 

Petitioner commenced the instant CPLR Article 78 proceeding seeing judicial review of the Department's determination. Suffolk County, pursuant to CPLR 3211(a) and 7804(f), moved to dismiss the Plaintiff's petition. In an order and judgment, Supreme Court, in effect, granted the County's motion, denied the Plaintiff's petition, and dismissed the proceeding. The Plaintiff appealed the Supreme Court's ruling. 

The Appellate Division found that Supreme Court had properly granted the County's motion to dismiss Plaintiff's petition, explaining that "An appointing authority has wide discretion in determining the fitness of candidates, and this discretion is particularly broad in the hiring of law enforcement officers, to whom high standards may be applied". The court also observed that "So long as the administrative determination is not irrational or arbitrary and capricious, this Court will not disturb it". 

Further, opined the Appellate Division, "If a determination is rational it must be sustained even if the court concludes that another result would also have been rational" and noted that in an Article 78 proceeding, "the reviewing court may not weigh the evidence, choose between conflicting proof, or substitute its assessment of the evidence or witness credibility for that of the administrative factfinder".

Determining that the Supreme Court had properly concluded that the Department's decision disqualifying the Petitioner appoint to the position of police office was neither irrational nor arbitrary and capricious, the Appellate Division stated that "In determining whether a candidate is medically qualified to serve as a police officer, the appointing agency is 'entitled to rely upon the findings of its own medical personnel, even if those findings are contrary to those of professionals retained by the candidate'".

In the words of the Appellate Division, "It is not for the courts to choose between the diverse professional opinions. That is the function of the proper department heads and as long as they act reasonably and responsibly, the courts will not interfere".

Click HERE to access the Appellate Division's decision posted on the Internet.

A writ of prohibition is available to challenge an official or an agency proceeding, or when it is about to proceed, beyond its alleged lawful jurisdiction

An employee [Employee] filed a complaint with the New York State Division of Human Rights [DHR] alleging that a member [Respondent] of the New York State Assembly discriminated against her on the basis of gender and sexually harassed her during her employment. 

DHR found probable cause to proceed to investigate Employee's complaint and then amended the Employee's discrimination complaint by adding the New York State Assembly [NYSA] as a Respondent in the DHR in its investigation of the complaint submitted by Employee.

NYSA, contending that DHR did not give NYSA "constitutional due process notice of the charges against it because there are no specific allegations of wrongdoing on its part", initiated the instant CPLR Article 78 proceeding seeking a Writ of Prohibition* barring DHR from proceeding with the Employee's discrimination claim to the extent it named the NYSA in the DHR proceeding as a Respondent. Supreme Court denied NYSA's application for the Writ of Prohibition and NYSA appealed. 

Citing Matter of Town of Huntington v New York State Div. of Human Rights, 82 NY2d 783, and other New York State court decisions, the Appellate Division affirmed the Supreme Court's ruling, explaining that "The extraordinary writ of prohibition is available to address 'whether [a] body or officer proceeded, is proceeding or is about to proceed without or in excess of jurisdiction' ".

The Appellate Division also opined that "Prohibition will not lie where the party has access to another adequate legal remedy" and that "[E]rrors of law, which of course may be verbalized, but incorrectly, as excesses of jurisdiction or power, are not to be confused with a proper basis for using the extraordinary writ", quoting the Court of Appeals' decision in Matter of State of New York v King, 36 NY2d 59.

Addressing NYSA's argument that DHR acted in excess of its jurisdiction and thus NYSA was not required to exhaust its administrative remedies, the Appellate Division said it rejected that contention because the "[remedy] for asserted error of law in the exercise of [DHR's] jurisdiction or authority lies first in administrative review and following exhaustion of that remedy in subsequent judicial review pursuant to section 298 of the Executive Law", concluded that NYSA "will suffer no irreparable harm . . . by waiting to challenge [DHR's] findings, if necessary, on the merits after [DHR] investigates [the Employee's] complaint".

* A writ of prohibition is one of number of the ancient “common law” writs and is typically issued by a higher tribunal to a lower tribunal to "prohibit" the adjudication of a matter then pending before the lower tribunal on the ground that the lower tribunal "lacked jurisdiction."  Other ancients writs include a writ of mandamus, granted by a court to compel an official to perform "acts that officials are duty-bound to perform;" the writ of injunction, a judicial order preventing a public official from performing an act; the writ of "certiorari," compelling a lower court to send its record of a case to the higher tribunal for review by the higher tribunal; and the writ of “quo warranto” [by what authority do you act]. New York State's Civil Practice Law and Rules [C{LR] set out the modern equivalents of such surviving ancient writs.

Click HERE to access the Appellate Division's decision posted on the Internet.