Hearsay evidence may be the basis for an administrative disciplinary determination

Hearsay evidence may be the basis for an administrative disciplinary determination
Matter of Hughes v New York State Unified Ct. Sys., Off. of Ct. Admin., 2010 NY Slip Op 07932, Decided on November 3, 2010, Appellate Division, Second Department

Thomas Hughes, an Office of Court Administration [OCA] court officer, was served with disciplinary charges alleging, among other offenses, failing to keep his uniform in proper condition, failing to keep his weapon properly loaded, and keeping an impermissible metal-jacketed round in his weapon.

The disciplinary hearing officer found that Hughes was guilty of “engaging in acts of misconduct and incompetency prejudicial to the good order and efficiency of the New York State Unified Court System and adversely reflecting on his fitness to continue as a court office.” OCA accepted the hearing officer’s recommendation that Hughes be dismissed from his position. Hughes filed a petition pursuant to CPLR Article 78 seeking a court order vacating OCA’s decision to terminate him.

The Appellate Division dismissed Hughes petition noting that “appellate review of an administrative determination made after a hearing required by law is limited to whether that determination is supported by substantial evidence.”

In this instance, said the court, the hearing officer’s findings were supported by substantial evidence.*

Addressing another issue concerning the evidence presented in the course of the disciplinary hearing, the Appellate Division commented that “Hearsay evidence may be the basis for an administrative determination,” citing Gray v Adduci, 73 NY2d 741.

As to the penalty imposed, dismissal, the court said that “termination of employment was not so disproportionate to the misconduct as to shock the conscience.”

* Substantial evidence has been defined as "such relevant proof as a reasonable mind may accept as adequate to support a conclusion or ultimate fact."

The decision is posted on the Internet at:
http://www.courts.state.ny.us/reporter/3dseries/2010/2010_07932.htm
NYPPL

Supervisor’s performing employee’s duties while employee suspended pending a criminal investigation leads to additional disciplinary charges

Supervisor’s performing employee’s duties while employee suspended pending a criminal investigation leads to additional disciplinary charges
Matter of Covert v Schuyler County, 2010 NY Slip Op 07861, Decided on November 4, 2010, Appellate Division, Third Department

Beth E. Covert was served with disciplinary charges pursuant to §75 of the Civil Service Law alleging that she had asked a neighbor to lie to law enforcement officials conducting a criminal investigation of Covert.

Covert was suspended from her duties as a probation officer as a result of the criminal investigation and her supervisor assumed responsibility for her pending probation case files. In the course of the supervisors handling Covert’s cases, the supervisor found a number of irregularities and deficiencies relating to Covert’s record keeping and supervision of probationers

These finding resulted in additional §75 charges being filed against Covert. As a result of these additional charges, Covet was also found guilty of incompetence.

Based on the findings of misconduct and incompetence, together with her prior unsatisfactory service and her failure to take responsibility for her acts and omissions, the Schuyler County Administrator terminated Covert’s employment.

When Covert sued seeking to vacate the Administrator’s determination the Appellate Division dismissed her petition stating that it would not disturb the Administrator's determination made following a hearing pursuant to Civil Service Law § 75 as long as it supported by substantial evidence.

As to the charges alleging Covert had asked a neighbor to lie on her behalf, Covert’s supervisor testified that Covert had admitted to him that she had asked the neighbor to lie for her and then declared that "it's not like asking someone to lie for you is against the law." Covert, in contrast, testified that she had neither made such an admission nor asked anyone to lie.

This conflict in testimony, said the Appellate Division, was resolved against Covert by the Administrator and it will not substitute the court’s own credibility determinations for those of the Administrator,

As for the determination of incompetence, the evidence established that despite Covert's position as the designee responsible for transfers, she was unaware of the travel restrictions and written policies governing interstate transfers. Further, her incompetence with respect to the handling of a convicted sex offender on probation was also documented by evidence reflecting her continued failure to require the probationer to complete sex offender therapy.

Further, said the Appellate Division, charges of incompetence relating to Covert’s failure to properly use the computerized systems and failures in record keeping are also supported by substantial evidence.

Finally, the court rejected Covert’s argument that the statute of limitations barred certain of the charges, holding that “given the continuous nature of the incompetence,” such an argument is “unavailing.”

In the light of the findings in the disciplinary action and the fact that a prior letter of reprimand had been placed in Covert’s personnel file,* the Appellate Division said that the penalty of termination “is not so disproportionate to the offense as to be shocking to one's sense of fairness.”

* In Bigelow v Village of Gouverneur, 63 NY2d 470, the Court of Appeals said that such records could be used to determine the penalty to be imposed if (a) the individual is advised that his or her prior disciplinary record would be considered in setting the penalty to be imposed, and (b) the employee is given an opportunity to submit a written response to any adverse material contained in the record or offer “mitigating circumstances.”

The decision is posted on the Internet at:
http://www.courts.state.ny.us/reporter/3dseries/2010/2010_07861.htm
NYPPLPL

Court rejects attorney’s claim that public funds were wasted because he was qualified and would have done the legal work for substantially less money

Court rejects attorney’s claim that public funds were wasted because he was qualified and would have done the legal work for substantially less money
Matter of Diederich v Lawrence, 2010 NY Slip Op 07850, Decided on November 4, 2010, Appellate Division, Third Department

Attorney Michael Diederich Jr., a resident of Rockland County, sued the Rockland County Solid Waste Management Authority contending that Authority had “wasted taxpayer money” by paying a law firm, Holland & Knight, LLP, a legal fee of $104,000 for preparing an amicus curiae brief submitted to the United States Supreme Court.*

Diederich argued that he, as well as other attorneys, had more relevant expertise and would have completed the legal work for substantially less money.

The Authority and Holland & Knight moved for summary judgment challenging both Diederich's standing to bring the action and his substantive allegations. Supreme Court dismissed Diederich's petition, finding that he had not established standing under the common law or State Finance Law §123-b.**

The Appellate Division sustained Supreme Court’s ruling, noting that “Common-law standing requires a showing of ‘an injury in fact, distinct from that of the general public,’ that falls within the zone of interests promoted or protected by the pertinent regulation or statute.” Diederich, said the court, failed to allege an injury distinct from other taxpayers and, thus, has not met his burden as to common-law standing.

As to Diederich’s argument that the Authority acted ultra vires*** when it spent funds for an amicus brief, the Appellate Division observed that “Common-law taxpayer standing implicates "important governmental actions" that would otherwise evade judicial review, and the doctrine ‘should not be applied . . . to permit challenges to the determinations of local governmental officials having no appreciable public significance beyond the immediately affected parties, by persons having only the remotest legitimate interest in the matter’ [and] this criteria is not satisfied by [Diederich’s] personal interest in providing allegedly less expensive legal services and the apparent slight tax increase reportedly caused by the Authority's decision to use Holland & Knight, a law firm with which it had an ongoing relationship for several years.”

Addressing the merits of Diederich’s ultra vires argument, the court said that “retaining a law firm to prepare an amicus brief for a case pending before the United States Supreme Court that includes an issue of significance to the Authority falls within the powers conferred to the Authority by the Legislature,” citing Public Authorities Law §2053-c [4]; §2053-e [12]..

* The brief amicus curiae [friend of the court] had been prepared by Holland & Knight in for submission to the Supreme Court in United Haulers Assn. v Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgt. Auth, 550 US 330.

** The Appellate Division noted that Diederich had not argued that he has standing under State Finance Law §123-b on appeal and deemed that he had abandoned that claim.

*** Ultra vires - Latin for "beyond its powers," referring to an organization or its officers that exceeds the powers granted it by law.

The decision is posted on the Internet at:
http://www.courts.state.ny.us/reporter/3dseries/2010/2010_07850.htm
NYPPL

No “anti-arbitrating” presumption to resolving grievances alleging a violation of a collective bargaining agreement

No “anti-arbitrating” presumption to resolving grievances alleging a violation of a collective bargaining agreement
Watertown CSD v Watertown Education Association
Indian River CSD v Indian River Education Association
Court of Appeals, Nos. 50 & 51, joint decision issued 93 NY2d 132

In numerous decisions, New York State courts have frowned on the use of arbitration to settle disputes between public employers and unions unless the collective bargaining agreement specifically states that the subject matter involved is subject to the contract grievance procedure set out in the agreement. In the combined decision issued for the Watertown and Indian River cases, the Court of Appeals -- New York State’s highest court -- articulated a much more liberal view regarding the use of arbitration to resolve public sector collective bargaining issues. It ruled that there is no anti-arbitration presumption in the Taylor Law or as a matter of public policy, and signaled lower courts to be less strict when deciding if arbitration is required by contracts.

Both cases involved claims regarding the arbitrability of an increase in employees’ health insurance co-payments. Although the relevant collective bargaining agreements were silent regarding whether resolving co-payments complaints was subject to contract grievance procedures, the Court of Appeals found the issue was arbitrable.

Key was the fact that the Taylor Law contracts involved each contained a broad arbitration clause that provided that “any alleged violation of this Agreement, or any dispute with respect to its meaning or application” was arbitrable.

Given the broad arbitration clause in the Watertown and Indian River agreements, and the presence of some language dealing with health insurance benefits, the Court of Appeals ruled that “the reduction of benefits by increasing the employees’ co-payments was an arbitrable issue.”

The dispute arose after Watertown and Indian River, together with a number of other school districts, formed a Municipal Cooperation Agreement to provide health insurance benefits for employees of participating districts. When the Plan raised the employees’ co-payment cap in response to “financial conditions,” the Watertown and Indian River Teacher Associations each filed a grievance alleging that the change in employee contributions constituted an impermissible, unilateral reduction in employee benefits and a violation of their respective collective bargaining agreements.

The grievances were denied. When the Associations sought arbitration, both districts asked for, and obtained, stays on the grounds that the parties had not agreed to arbitrate the dispute at issue.

But the Court of Appeals ruled that it is not necessary for a given issue to be specifically enumerated in the contract grievance portion of a collective bargaining agreement for it to be arbitrable. It ordered the parties in both cases to “proceed to arbitration.”

The court noted that there were two basic arbitration concepts contained in the Taylor Law:

1. Compulsory arbitration: Also referred to as “interest arbitration,” such arbitration is authorized by Section 209 of the Civil Service Law. It is triggered by an impasse in the course of negotiating terms and conditions of employment for police personnel. The decision of the arbitration panel “is final and binding” on the parties. Section 209.4 is a legislatively mandated alternative to striking by police officers or firefighters. This provision will expire June 30, 1999 unless extended by the Legislature.

2. Permissive arbitration refers to the ability of the parties to a collective bargaining agreement to voluntarily agree to arbitrate any subject matter as long as it does not concern a matter of public policy. Court held matters of public policy that are off-limits to arbitration include: (1) tenure decisions, (2) decisions to terminate an employee for violation of the federal Hatch Act, (3) seniority disputes involving academic standards, and (4) accessibility to personnel files. [See the Court of Appeal’s decision in Matter of United Liverpool Faculty Association, 42 NY2d 509]

In the Watertown and Indian River cases, the Court of Appeals clarified its stance on arbitrability of disputes. It said that Liverpool did not expressly create a “presumption” against public sector arbitration. The high court said: “[T]o the extent ... that one may be implied or fairly so characterized, an anti-arbitrational presumption is no longer justified either in law, or in the public sector labor environment.”

To determine if a given subject is arbitrable under permissive arbitration, the court said it would stay with a two-step analysis set out in Liverpool because “it has been workable for over two decades.” The Liverpool tests are:

1. Is the arbitration concerning an area subject to the Taylor Law (i.e., not a matter involving public policy)?

and, if so,

2. Did the parties agree, by the terms of their particular arbitration clause, to refer their differences in this specific area to arbitration?

In regard to the second test, the Court of Appeals sent a message to judges throughout the state that they should not be too strict in evaluating whether the parties had agreed to arbitrate specific types of disputes. “A court confronted with a contest of this kind should merely determine whether there is a reasonable relationship between the subject matter of the dispute and the general subject matter of the collective bargaining agreement,” the Court of Appeals said.

It set out the following guidelines for lower courts to follow:

1. If a court finds that there is no reasonable relationship between the subject matter of the dispute and the general subject matter of the agreement, the issue, as a matter of law, is not arbitrable.

2. If a reasonable relationship is present, the court should rule the matter arbitrable, and the arbitrator will then make a more exacting interpretation of the precise scope of the substantive provisions of the collective bargaining agreement, and whether the subject matter of the dispute fits within them.

The court implied that if an employer seeks a stay of a demand for arbitration, the judicial standard would be “strict scrutiny.” In other words, the employer would have to show compelling governmental interest in avoiding the arbitration. The decision also states that “it is also clear that the merits of the grievance are not the courts’ concern.”

The court noted that “the decisional law reflects the reality of greatly increased public sector arbitration, and its acceptance, compatible with the government’s public policy concerns.” As an illustration, the court listed the following types of disputes as having been ruled subject to resolution by an arbitrator.

1. Union’s use of public office space.

2. Rehiring on basis of seniority.

3. Employee evaluations.

4. Grievance filed by a nonteaching employee under teachers’ collective bargaining agreement.

5. Violation of disciplinary provisions claimed by a probationer.

6. Denial of a sabbatical leave.

7. Failure to submit a change in educational policy to advisory professional council.

8. Compensating a peace officer for an off-duty arrest.

9. Violation of a “no-reprisal clause in agreement.”
NYPPL

Police officer’s association with individuals involved in alleged criminal activity results in dismissal from the position

Police officer’s association with individuals involved in alleged criminal activity results in dismissal from the position
Richardson v Safir, 258 AD2d 328

The Appellate Division upheld the dismissal of New York City police officer Edward Richardson based on a determination that Richardson “knowingly associated with a person he reasonably believed was engaged in criminal activity.”

Richardson was also found guilty of making “false and misleading statements in an official Department investigation.”

The court said that the determination leading to Richardson’s termination was supported by substantial evidence, “including, in particular, [Richardson’s] own testimony in the official investigation.”
NYPPL

Assurance of reemployment of an educator negates his or her eligibility for unemployment insurance benefits between school years

Assurance of reemployment of an educator negates his or her eligibility for unemployment insurance benefits between school years
Huff v Commissioner of Labor, 247 AD2d 734, 257 AD2d 832

In case involving a claim for unemployment insurance benefits, Buffalo City School District teacher’s aide Dennis Huff, Sr. filed an application for unemployment insurance benefits in June 1997 at the end of the 1996-1997 academic year.

Applying the provisions of Section 590.11 of the Labor Law, the Unemployment Insurance Appeals Board ruled that Huff was ineligible for such benefits for the summer of 1997 because the Buffalo City School District had given him a reasonable assurance that he would be rehired on the same terms and conditions of employment for the 1997-1998 school year effective September 1997.

Huff appealed, contending that Section 590.11 did not apply in his situation “because he normally provided services for an educational institution that accepts students year-round.” The Appellate Division, noting that Huff had made the same argument “in prior unsuccessful claims,” observed that the applicable Taylor Law contract covers Huff’s employment only during the academic year -- September through the June next following. The employment of aides for summer school, said the court, “is dictated by entirely different criteria.”
NYPPL

Discontinuation of employer’s cafeteria service a mandatory subject for collective bargaining

Discontinuation of employer’s cafeteria service a mandatory subject for collective bargaining
CSEA Local 1000 & Nassau County, 32 PERB 3005

For at least nine years the Nassau County Medical Center (NCMC) provided food service in its cafeteria between the hours of 2:00 a.m. and 4:00 a.m. When the County unilaterally discontinued providing such service and refused to negotiate its action, CSEA filed an improper practice charge with PERB.

A PERB administrative law judge ruled that Nassau County violated the Taylor Law by acting unilaterally with respect to mandatory subjects of negotiations “without a meritorious defense.” PERB sustained the ruling, pointing out that the cafeteria was open for at least nine years to serve the 200 to 300 employees who worked the midnight shift at NCMC. This, said PERB, affected the employees’ term and conditions of employment since its use by employees “is both an economic fringe benefit, as it avoids any need for employees to eat and drink off premises at higher cost, and it is a matter directly affecting their health, personal comfort and convenience.” PERB told Nassau to reinstate the food service it provided before it closed NCMC’s cafeteria and “to make unit employees whole” to the extent that it can be shown that the closing resulted in their incurring additional expense for food and beverages.

A collateral issue involved the County’s directing the employees to discontinue the use of their personal appliances such as electronic ovens and “heat generating electrical appliances” at their workstations. PERB said that the County’s interest in protecting the patient’s safety overcame the employees’ interest in their having such convenience items available to them at their workstation and dismissed this branch of CSEA’s improper practice charge.
NYPPL

Hearing officer recommends employee’s termination based on circumstantial evidence that was corroborated by other evidence

Hearing officer recommends employee’s termination based on circumstantial evidence that was corroborated by other evidence
NYC Department of Sanitation v O’Neill, OATH Index #2632/10

The New York City Department of Sanitation’s General Order No. 2001-19 addressing “trade waste” prohibits its employees from removing material originating from a home renovation performed by a contractor.*

OATH Administrative Law Judge Alessandra Zorgniotti found that circumstantial evidence,** supported by other evidence, proved the charge brought against Brian O’Neill, a sanitation worker employed by the Department.

Significantly, the ALJ found that a telephone tip from a man who called a Department Superintendent on July 30, 2007, was corroborated by other evidence gathered by the agency such as the caller’s description of the two sanitation workers involved. The descriptions matched O’Neill and his partner, and the caller’s reporting that “he saw these men loading construction debris onto a sanitation truck at a location at the end of [O’Neill’s] route in Brooklyn.”

The Department’s Borough Chief went to the location and he saw a house under renovation with signs of recent construction activity.

Additional circumstantial evidence consisted of the contents of O’Neill’s truck when it was “dumped.” The last material loaded came out first and it included construction debris, including carpet the Borough Chief had seen at the house.

In addition, there was testimony by a supervisor that the tonnage reports for July 30, 2007, for the section indicated that “most trucks picked up between nine and ten tons and that [O’Neill’s] truck was the only truck over thirteen tons” if waste,

Although the ALJ found that there was insufficient evidence to prove O’Neill had accepted a gratuity from anyone in connection with the removal of the “trade waste,” she recommended that O’Neill be terminated in view of his “short tenure and the absence of mitigating circumstances.”

* Even if collected materials have not been generated by a contractor for a fee, the trade waste directive can be violated if a sanitation worker services a residential stop which contains construction debris in excess of six bags, bundles, boxes, and cans. If the material exceeds this six-container limit, the sanitation worker is permitted to complete the collection only by notifying and procuring the approval of his or her supervisor.

** A finding of misconduct may be established in a disciplinary proceeding solely by circumstantial evidence. Dep’t of Sanitation v. Guastafeste, OATH Index No. 658/00, at 10, aff’d, 282 A.D.2d 398

The decision is posted on the Internet at:
http://archive.citylaw.org/oath/10_Cases/10-2632.pdf
NYPPL

Contractor to indemnify the agency for the agency's liabilities only if the liability resulted from activities that were among its contractual duties

Contractor to indemnify the agency for the agency's liabilities only if the liability resulted from activities that were among its contractual duties
Ramos v City of New York, 2010 NY Slip Op 07821, Decided on November 4, 2010, Appellate Division, First Department

Tristar provided security services at the premises pursuant to a contract between it and the City whereby Tristar personnel were to check ID’s of people who worked at the premises, scanning people who did not work there, checking bags for weapons, and patrolling the exterior of the building.

The contract between the City and Tristar required Tristar to provide unarmed and armed uniformed guard services at the City's premises and included a provision that Tristar was to indemnify the City for "claims arising out of or in any way related to this Contract . . . resulting or alleged as resulting from the negligence of the Contractor . . . in its performance of this Contract."

Guillermo Ramos was employed by Tristar as a security guard and was injured while working at premises owned by the City of New York. Ramos claimed that he was directed by an employee of the City, who supervised him at the premises, to turn off the heater/fan that was located in a closet on the main floor of the premises and allegedly received a severe electric shock in so doing. Ramos sued the City and the City commenced a third-party action against Tristar for contractual indemnification.

The Appellate Division dismissed the City’s action seeking indemnification from Tristar, noting that although Tristar had a duty to indemnify the City for Tristar's negligence in the performance of its duties, it was not obligated to indemnify the City for the City’s negligence.

Here, said the court, Ramos’ “injuries arose when he attempted to turn off the switch for the heater/fan which was an activity clearly outside of the scope of his duties as a security guard.”

Accordingly, Tristar was not obligated to indemnify the City as a matter of law as there was no proof that Ramos’ injuries arose from Tristar's breach of a duty of care owed to the City or from the work Tristar performed under its contract with the City.

The decision is posted on the Internet at:
http://www.courts.state.ny.us/reporter/3dseries/2010/2010_07821.htm
NYPPL

Employee’s dismissal after refusing to participate in a counseling program held reasonable under the circumstances

Employee’s dismissal after refusing to participate in a counseling program held reasonable under the circumstances
Siciliano v Safir, 259 AD2d 366

Matthew Siciliano, a New York City police officer, was dismissed from his position after he refused to enter the department’s counseling program. Siciliano had been given at least four direct orders to do so within six months.

Siciliano claimed that his refusal to participate in the program (1) “was based upon his good faith reliance on his private psychiatrist’s advice that such would be harmful to his mental health,” and (2) that the Department had never explicitly warned him that he faced termination if he continued to disobey such orders.

The hearing officer concluded that Siciliano’s “proof concerning his precarious mental condition” tended to support rather than undermine his unfitness to serve. Further, the hearing officer noted, Siciliano was suspended after each time he disobeyed the order to participate in counseling, and “that should have made it clear to petitioner that continued disobedience would not be tolerated indefinitely.”

The Appellate Division said that Siciliano was found guilty of charges that “are serious, involving [the] Department’s requirements for order, authority and discipline.” It ruled that the department’s determination to dismiss Siciliano is entitled to “great leeway.” Commenting that the penalty imposed did not shock its sense of fairness, the Court dismissed Siciliano’s appeal.
NYPPL

Designation of the hearing officer in an administrative disciplinary action

Designation of the hearing officer in an administrative disciplinary action
Stein v Rockland Co., 259 AD2d 552

William J. Stein was terminated from his position with the Rockland County Highway Department after he was found guilty of striking another employee. However, during the second day of hearing Stein had protested “the lack of a proper, written designation of the hearing officer” as required by Civil Service Law Section 75(2). Stein argued that omission meant that the hearing officer did not have jurisdiction to hear testimony in the matter.

According to case law, “in the absence of a written delegation authorizing a deputy or other person to conduct the hearing, the removing board or officer has no jurisdiction to discipline an employee” (Wiggins v Board of Educ. of City of New York, 60 NY2d 385).

The Highway Superintendent provided the hearing officer with a “new written designation,” and the hearing continued. However, the hearing officer “specifically stated in his recommendations that he credited the testimony of the two witnesses who testified on the first day of the hearing.

This, said the Appellate Division meant that the hearing officer’s report was “fatally defective.” The Appellate Division annulled the determination and remitted the matter to the county “for a new hearing and determination with respect to the charges.”

In addition, the Appellate Division said that the determination had to be annulled because the Highway Superintendent should have disqualified himself from making the final determination because of his personal involvement in the case.

The Superintendent was present when the incident leading to disciplinary action against Stein occurred and he made a statement as to what he heard and saw. Furthermore, he conducted the initial investigation, preferred the charges against the Stein, and appointed the hearing officer.

Such “personal involvement in the case,” said the Court, required the Superintendent to disqualify himself from reviewing the recommendation of the hearing officer and acting on any of the charges.
NYPPL

Summary dismissal during a disciplinary probation period

Summary dismissal during a disciplinary probation period
Williams v NYSOMH, 259 AD2d 623

Disciplinary charges were filed against Henry Williams, an employee of the New York State Office of Mental Health, alleging that he was guilty of excessive absenteeism.

The disciplinary action was settled when Williams agreed to serve a disciplinary probation period during which period he could be terminated “without recourse to Article 33 of the State-CSEA Agreement [a negotiated disciplinary grievance procedure] or any other provision of law.”

Williams was absent from work seven times during the six-month period following the execution of the settlement agreement. The department terminated him and he commenced an Article 78 proceeded seeking reinstatement to his former position. The Appellate Division dismissed Williams’ petition, commenting that “a probationary employee may be terminated without a hearing and without a statement of reasons provided that the termination is not in bad faith, or for unconstitutional or illegal reasons.” Further, the decision notes, Williams had the burden of proving that his dismissal was based on bad faith or unlawful conduct.

However, the specific terms of a disciplinary settlement could prove critical if the employee is terminated for his or her alleged failure to satisfy the terms of his or her disciplinary probation.

In Taylor v Cass, 505 N.Y.S.2d 929, a Suffolk County employee won reinstatement with full retroactive salary and contract benefits after a court found that he was improperly dismissed while serving a disciplinary probation. It seems that under the terms and conditions of the probation to which Taylor had agreed, the county could terminate him without any hearing if, in the opinion of his superior, his job performance was “adversely affected” by his “intoxication on the job” during the next six months.

Taylor, while subject to this probationary period, was terminated without a hearing for “failing to give a fair day’s work” and “sleeping during scheduled working hours.” He challenged his dismissal and won reinstatement with back salary. The Appellate Division decided that Taylor’s dismissal was improper because Taylor was not terminated for the sole reason specified in the settlement: intoxication on the job.

In contrast, a state corrections officer, Tina Ramos, agreed to pay a $1,000 fine and be placed on disciplinary probation for one year in settlement of disciplinary charges filed against her alleging improper behavior while escorting a prisoner. She was subsequently observed carrying her weapon in a hospital examination room in violation of departmental rules. The Appellate Division sustained her termination without a hearing, finding that Ramos had violated the terms of her disciplinary probation (Ramos v Coombs, App Div, 237 AD2d 713).
NYPPL

Employee disciplined for alleged acts of misconduct that took place 20 years earlier

Employee disciplined for alleged acts of misconduct that took place 20 years earlier
DeMichele v Greenburgh CSD #7, 167 F.3d 784

Section 3020-a(1) of the New York State Education Law provides that “no charges ... shall be brought more than three years after the occurrence of the alleged incompetency or misconduct, except when the charge is of misconduct constituting a crime when committed.”*

In the DeMichele case, a teacher in the Greenburgh Central School District #7 was found guilty of having inappropriate sexual contact with female students in incidents occurring more than 20 years earlier. The Second Circuit U.S. Court of Appeals sustained the school board’s decision to dismiss the teacher, even though the teacher had not been convicted of any “criminal act.”

Following the same logic as New York State courts that have addressed similar issues involving statutes of limitation under various disciplinary provisions, the federal court observed that the law does not require the individual to be found guilty of a felony in a criminal court for disciplinary charges to be filed after the three-year statute of limitations has expired.

Rather, the law merely characterizes the nature of the allegation. The law says that if a Section 3020-a hearing officer or disciplinary panel finds an individual guilty of an act that fits the definition of a felony under relevant criminal statutes, then a penalty may be imposed even if the disciplinary charges were brought after the three-year statute of limitations has expired (see Re Board of Education of City School District of the City of New York, Opinions of the Commissioner of Education No. 11353.**

The 20-year-old sexual misconduct charges arose after a newspaper reported that Greenburgh #7 teacher Robert DeMichele had been restored to the payroll in 1996 after serving one and one-half year disciplinary suspension. The article noted that the suspension without pay was imposed as a penalty after DeMichele was found guilty of having inappropriate conduct with female students during the 1991-92 and 1992-93 academic years.

After the article appeared, two women contacted district officials and alleged that DeMichele had sexually abused or molested them when they had been students in the district decades earlier -- during the 1972-73 and 1974-75 school years.

There was no dispute that the district was unaware of these allegations prior to its receiving the February 1996 reports. On March 11, 1996, the district initiated a second Section 3020-a disciplinary action against DeMichele. The hearing officer found DeMichele guilty of all but one of seven specifications set out in the charges. As a result, DeMichele was dismissed. The disciplinary determination was reported to the press.

The hearing officers ruled that (1) each instance of misconduct alleged in the second disciplinary proceeding constituted a crime when committed and (2) Section 3020-a does not require that the misconduct actually be the subject of a criminal prosecution. Rather than appeal the hearing officer’s determination, DeMichele sued in federal district court claiming that the second disciplinary action violated his rights under 42 USC. Section 1983. He contended that his rights were violated because:

1. The district forced him to defend charges concerning events that occurred more than 20 years ago, which left him unable to defend himself in violation of his right to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment; and

2. He was deprived of a liberty interest without due process under the Fourteenth Amendment when the district’s prosecutor disclosed the results of the hearing to the media.

In an unpublished decision, a federal district court judge granted the district’s motion for summary judgment and thus dismissed DeMichele’s petition without a hearing on the merits of the complaint. The Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court’s decision.

The Circuit Court said that to show a violation of due process as a result of delay in a hearing, New York State law requires the subject of an administrative disciplinary proceeding demonstrate that delay in initiating proceedings caused “actual prejudice” to his or her ability to defend against the charges. The court suggested that if the school district had known about the 1970s allegations before 1996 but delayed proceeding with discipline, DeMichele might have been able to show that his ability to defend himself had been compromised.

The court also addressed DeMichele’s claim that the dissemination to the media of the results of his second disciplinary hearing stigmatized him and wrongfully deprived him of his liberty interest under the Fourteenth Amendment. The court noted that this argument rested on the assumption that the results of the disciplinary proceeding were not a matter of public record, but instead were part of his “employment history” which could not be released under New York’s Freedom of Information Law, [Public Officers Law, Article 6, (“FOIL”)].

However, the decision noted that New York courts have found that the disposition of misconduct charges does not constitute part of an employee’s “employment history” as that phrase is used in FOIL, citing LaRocca v. Board of Educ. of Jericho Union Free School District, 632 N.Y.S.2d 576. The Circuit Court ruled that under the circumstances, the dissemination of the background and result of the first disciplinary hearing to the press did not deprived DeMichele of any liberty interest and dismissed the appeal.

* Section 75 of the Civil Service Law, a statutory disciplinary procedure covering employees in the classified service, also provides that there is no statute of limitations with respect to bringing disciplinary action against an individual where the charges of incompetency or misconduct “constitute a crime.”

** Section 3020-a(1) of the Education Law also requires that disciplinary charges be filed “during the period between the actual opening and closing of the school year” during which the employee is normally required to serve.
NYPPL

Potential conflict of interest between official duties and private business should be eliminated by appointing authority

Potential conflict of interest between official duties and private business should be eliminated by appointing authority
Informal opinion of the Attorney General 98-39

A part-time village police officer also conducted a towing business. When asked if the officer’s towing business could be included on the village police force’s list of towing companies, the Attorney General said it could be listed, “provided the village takes appropriate steps to eliminate any potential conflicts of interests.”

The Attorney General said that an appearance of impropriety would be created if the police officer’s towing service were called when that officer is at the scene of an accident. Further, a conflict of interest would arise if village police officers recommended their colleagues’ business to individuals in need of towing services rather than resort to the list.
NYPPL

Adverse grievance decision not proof the union failed to provide adequate representation absent proof that the union acted arbitrarily or in bad faith

Adverse grievance decision not proof the union failed to provide adequate representation absent proof that the union acted arbitrarily or in bad faith
Rosioreanu v New York City Off. of Collective Bargaining, 2010 NY Slip Op 07797, Decided on November 4, 2010, Appellate Division, First Department

Upon conclusion of a grievance procedure that resulted in her termination, Cleopatra Rosioreanu filed an improper practices petition with the New York City Office of Collective Bargaining [OCB] contending that her union failed to provide adequate representation throughout the grievance process.

OCB denied the petition and Rosioreanu filed an Article 78 proceeding challenging OCB’s determination.

The Appellate Division said that Rosioreanu’s Article 78 petition advanced the theory that because the grievance process ended with her termination, her union representatives must have acted arbitrarily, capriciously or in bad faith.

The court characterize Rosioreanu’s claim as a “conclusory assertion,” commenting that there was nothing in the record that suggests malfeasance by the union representatives, much less fraud, deceitful action, dishonest conduct or discrimination on the part of union representatives, citing Mellon v Benker, 186 AD2d 1020.

The decision is posted on the Internet at:
http://www.courts.state.ny.us/reporter/3dseries/2010/2010_07797.htm
NYPPL

Retirement System has the burden of rebutting the statutory presumption set out in the so-called “Heart Bill,” RSSL §507-b(c)

Retirement System has the burden of rebutting the statutory presumption set out in the so-called “Heart Bill,” RSSL §507-b(c)
Matter of Rivera v DiNapoli, 2010 NY Slip Op 07852, Decided on November 4, 2010, Appellate Division, Third Department

Although typically an applicant for accidental disability retirement benefits or performance of duty disability benefits has the burden of proof with respect to showing that his or her disability resulted from the performance of his or duties, such is not always the case.

For example, the Retirement and Social Security Law §507-b(c) sets out a rebuttable presumption that where an individual has "successfully passed a physical examination on entry into service as a correction officer" that did not reveal evidence of heart disease and later becomes disabled as the result of a heart condition sustained during employment, it is presumed that the disability was "incurred in the performance and discharge of duty, unless the contrary be proved by competent evidence."

Juan C. Rivera’s had successfully passed his physical examination when he began his employment as a correction officer. He subsequently suffered a myocardial infarction after falling ill while at work.

When it was determined that he could not return to work because of his resulting medical condition, Rivera applied for performance of duty disability retirement benefits.

The New York State and Local Retirement System [ERS], however, denied his application, concluding that although Rivera was permanently incapacitated, his disability "was not sustained as a result of the performance or discharge of his . . . duties."

Ultimately the Comptroller sustained the ERS’s denial of his application for benefits and Rivera filed a petition pursuant to CPLR Article 78 seeking a court order annulling the Comptroller’s determination.

Under the circumstances, said the Appellate Division, ERS had the obligation to rebut the statutory presumption that Rivera's disability occurred as a result of his performance and discharge of his duties as a correction officer.

The Appellate Division concluded that ERS had rebutted the presumption that Rivera’s disability was related to his employment as a correction officer by presenting evidence of risk factors coupled with expert testimony that excludes an applicant's employment as a causative factor" and sustained the Comptroller’s decision.

The court said that considering the record as a whole, it found that ERS had “effectively rebutted” the presumption set out in RSSL §507-b(c) and thus Rivera’s application for benefits was properly denied.

The record indicated that ERS had relied on the opinion of a cardiologist who, after examining Rivera, concluded that while work-related stress "can aggravate the symptoms of coronary artery disease," Rivera's coronary artery disease "was not related to his employment as a correction officer." The cardiologist made reference to the fact that Rivera suffered from a variety of risk factors commonly associated with coronary heart disease, including obesity and hypertension.

The Appellate Division said that it had previously held "the [statutory] presumption is effectively rebutted when evidence of risk factors is coupled with expert testimony that excludes an applicant's employment as a causative factor," citing Bryant v Hevesi, 41 AD3d at 932.

The decision is posted on the Internet at:
http://www.courts.state.ny.us/reporter/3dseries/2010/2010_07852.htm
NYPPL

Independent contractors in the public service

Independent contractors in the public service
Roesch v BOCES, App Div, 259 AD2d 900

The Roesch case is another in a series of actions involving claims for retroactive membership in a public retirement system.

Dorothy E. Roesch claimed that her service as a school psychologist with the Wayne-Finger Lakes BOCES qualified her for retroactive membership in the New York State Teachers’ Retirement System [TRS]. BOCES had rejected Roesch’s application on the grounds that she was a consultant on a per diem basis serving as an independent contractor and therefore she was ineligible to join TRS during the time in question.

The decision indicated that there were neither payroll or personnel records nor any formal appointment action by BOCES to employ her.

In contrast, such types of records were produced concerning others serving in similar positions indicating that such personnel “were formally appointed” to positions as employees of BOCES. Was this sufficient to support the conclusion that Roesch served as an independent contractor rather than as a BOCES employee?

The Appellate Division ruled that it was, sustaining BOCES’ rejection of Roesch’s application. The court said that there was rational basis for this determination, noting that the BOCES’ minutes of board meetings during the relevant period established that BOCES had a pattern and practice of making formal appointments of full and part-time employees.

The court said that the minutes “were devoid of any reference to the appointment of Roesch during this period when other school psychologists were so appointed by BOCES.”

This, coupled with the lack of any [IRS payroll withholding] W-4 forms that were completed by Roesch while others were produced for school psychologists employed near the relevant time period, “provides a rational basis to support the denial of Roesch’s application for retroactive membership in TRS based on her status as an independent contractor.”

The decision is silent as to whether or not BOCES produced copies of “an employment contract” between it and Roesch or copies of IRS Forms 1099, Miscellaneous to support its position that Roesch was an independent contractor rather than an employee. Typically, an individual providing personnel services to a public entity is deemed to be a public employee unless a contract for “personnel services” is authorized under law and a contract providing for such services has actually been executed by the parties.

In another application for retroactive membership in TRS case, Storrar v Mahopac Central School District, 257 AD2d 628, [motion to appeal denied, 93 NY2d 808], that the statement of the school district’s former payroll clerk that she and Barbara Storrar, a former member of TRS, discussed “FICA [Social Security] deductions versus reenrollment” in TRS was sufficient to establish that the district had “procedure that a reasonable person would recognize as an explanation or request requiring a formal decision ... to join a public retirement system” in place.
NYPPL

Appointing authority may imposed a harsher disciplinary penalty than one recommended by a hearing officer if not disproportionate to the offense

Appointing authority may imposed a harsher disciplinary penalty than one recommended by a hearing officer if not disproportionate to the offense
Russo v Wantagh UFSD, 259 AD2d 703

Smoky conditions prompted school officials of the Wantagh school district to evacuate students from a school building. Investigation showed the fire began in the custodians’ area of the school and was caused by cigarettes igniting waste paper in a plastic trash pail that had not been emptied.

The school board dismissed custodian Clement Russo after he was found guilty of “charges of misconduct and incompetence concerning a smoke condition in the school at which he was employed.” Russo appealed.

The Appellate Division sustained the district’s determination, finding that it was supported by substantial evidence in the record.

Russo also protested his dismissal on the grounds that the hearing officer had recommended a lesser penalty. The court said that “under the circumstances of this case, the termination of [Russo’s] employment was not so disproportionate to the offense as to shock one’s sense of fairness,” quoting the Pell standard in imposing a penalty [Pell v Bd. of Ed., 34 NY2D 222].
NYPPL

Employer fined after docking employee’s pay for jury duty absence
People v Rosenbach, Nassau Co. Ct. [Justice DeMaro], [Not selected for publication in the Official Reports]

From time to time a public employee is called to serve on jury duty. The attendance rules for state officers and employees [4 NYCRR 28.1.9], for example, grants employees “leave with pay without charge to leave accruals” when called upon for jury service. Other jurisdictions provide for similar benefits.

In contrast, penalizing an employee for performing his or her civic duty by reporting for jury duty can be expensive, as attorney Ann Rosenbach has learned. Rosenbach was fined $1310 for criminal contempt after she docked one and one-half weeks of pay from the salary of an attorney in her employ when the attorney was called for jury duty.*

State Assistant Attorney General Jennifer Brand, who prosecuted the case, said “this may be the first time an employer was held in criminal contempt for ‘penalizing’ an employee called to serve on jury duty.

* Lynn Weit, who worked as an attorney in Rosenbach’s law office, received a jury summons and informed Rosenbach that she would be absent from work for an expected two days to fulfill her civic obligation.
NYPPL

Fitness of a witness determined by the credibility of his or her testimony

Fitness of a witness determined by the credibility of his or her testimony
Goodman v Safir, 259 A.D.2d 344

In the Goodman case, the Appellate Division considered the value of testimony provided by “corrupt former employees” called by the employer as witnesses against another employee in a disciplinary action.

New York City police officer Keith Goodman was terminated from his position after being found guilty of participating in unlawful searches in violation of the Fourth Amendment to the U. S. Constitution on a number of occasions. Goodman challenged his dismissal, contending that there was no substantial evidence supporting the Commissioner’s action because, Goodman alleged, a number of the witnesses testifying against him were corrupt former police officers.

The Appellate Division dismissed Goodman’s appeal, commenting that it found “no reason to disturb [the Commissioner’s] credibility findings rejecting [Goodman’s] version of the events.” The fact that some of the witnesses testifying for the employer were characterized by Goodman as “corrupt former police officers” did not mean that their testimony was not “substantial” insofar as the Appellate Division was concerned.

Finding that the penalty of dismissal did not shock its sense of fairness, the Appellate Division sustained the commissioner’s determination and his terminating Goodman from his position.
NYPPL

Court annuls penalty imposed after finding appointing authority failed to investigate before taking disciplinary action against individual

Court annuls penalty imposed after finding appointing authority failed to investigate before taking disciplinary action against individual
Matter of Titone v Rocky Point Fire Dept., 2010 NY Slip Op 33037(U), October 25, 2010, Supreme Court, Suffolk County, Judge Jeffrey Arlen Spinner [Not selected for publication in the Official Reports]

Joseph A Titone filed a petition “in the nature of mandamus” pursuant to Article 78 of the CPLR challenging his suspension from his position as Captain of Company One of the Rocky Point Volunteer Fire Department and asked the court to direct the Board of Commissioners of the Fire Department to annul its action and to expunge the suspension from his record.

The genesis of Titone’s suspension was a letter he wrote to John Celentano, Chief of Rocky Point Fire Department, in which Titone indicated that a department rescue boat was out of service for “work that should have been performed off season” and a Company One fire truck was allowed to remain in service without operational mechanical or electrical sirens.

Celentano summarily suspended Titone from the Department without notice or hearing, for “for improper conduct.” Twenty-seven days later the Chair of the Board of Fire Commissioners reinstated Titone to active duty as Captain of Company One, but warned him that any further “infractions would result in his dismissal from the Department.”

Titone contending that the Chair’s letter failed to specify the reason for his suspension; failed to state any final determination regarding the suspension; failed to indicate what conduct would be considered “a further infraction;” and failed to address the effects of the suspension, such as possibly preventing him from seeking any Department elective office for the following three years, sued.

Judge Spinner granted Titone’s petition “in all respects,” and denied the Department’s application seeking dismissal of his complaint “in all respects”.

Indicating that it is “indisputable that the standard of review for determinations of Board of Fire Commissioners and Celentano is whether the decision rendered is arbitrary, capricious and, or, unlawful, Judge Spinner said that “Nowhere do Respondents demonstrate that they made any inquiry whatsoever into the facts before rendering their decision to suspend [Titone], making their actions indisputably arbitrary and capricious.”

The court noted that, as Titone’s Counsel “adeptly points out that, rather than investigating the fact that rescue equipment was in need of repair, they rushed to punish [Titone] for abiding by his oath to protect and serve the public.” The opinion then states: “This Court is most perplexed by how legitimate concern for the safety of the firefighters volunteering to respond to emergencies and the taxpayers the Respondents serve comes to be characterized as defamation.”

The decision is posted on the Internet at:
http://www.courts.state.ny.us/reporter/pdfs/2010/2010_33037.pdf
NYPPL

A settlement of a disciplinary action should be memorialize in writing

A settlement of a disciplinary action should be memorialize in writing
Winkler v Kingston Housing Auth., 259 AD2d 819

A public employee who faces disciplinary charges may enter into a settlement agreement that disposes the charges, so long as the waiver is knowingly and intelligently undertaken and serves as the consideration for the curtailment of pending disciplinary proceedings [see Whitehead v State of New York Department of Mental Hygiene, 71 AD2d 653].

The Winkler case teaches the lesson that parties to a settlement can avoid considerable grief if the terms of the negotiated settlement are contemporaneously placed in the record or, in the alternative, signed by all of the necessary parties upon conclusion of settlement negotiations.

Barbara Winkler, a Kingston Housing Authority account clerk/typist, was suspended without pay pending a disciplinary hearing for a period not to exceed 30 days pursuant to Civil Service Law Section 75.3 effective May 12, 1995. She removed her belongings from her desk on May 15, 1995 and demanded a Section 75 hearing. A hearing was scheduled for June 8, 1995.

In the course of the hearing the parties asked for an adjournment to negotiate a settlement in an effort to resolve the disciplinary action. Ultimately, the parties reached an oral agreement resolving the charges filed against Winkler and the Section 75 hearing was “permanently terminated.” Despite the presence of a court reporter, the terms of the settlement were not placed on the record. Subsequent efforts to memorialize the agreement in a written signed document were unsuccessful. Winkler never returned to work, nor did she submit a letter of resignation.

Winkler sued, contending that the matter had not been resolved, that she was still employed by the Authority and that she should have restored to the payroll upon the expiration of the 30-day period of suspension without pay authorized by Civil Service Law Section 75.3.

A state Supreme Court judge dismissed Winker’s petition. The court ruled that Winkler’s employment ended May 15, 1995, notwithstanding the fact that she had not submitted a written resignation.

The court concluded that testimony at the trial indicated that “an agreement was reached to which [Winkler] consented whereby the suspension would be vacated, no finding of guilt on the charges would be made, [Winkler] would receive six months of salary and health insurance benefits for one year, and that [the Authority] would not oppose plaintiff’s efforts to be placed on the Commission’s preferred list, if eligible, and to receive unemployment compensation.”

The Appellate Division affirmed the lower court’s ruling. It said that Winkler had been accorded all the protections of Section 75 to which she was entitled, noting that she had been given a statement of the charges and a hearing was held at which she was represented by counsel. The Appellate Division also said that “after detailed negotiations, the parties entered into a verbal agreement in full satisfaction of all disciplinary charges.”

“[W]hile it would have been preferable for the parties to have recorded the agreement in some fashion,” the Appellate Division said, “an agreement on the record or in writing is not required by Civil Service Law Sections 75, case law or the Statute of Frauds....”

The court said that Winkler’s subsequent refusal to tender the agreed-upon letter of resignation does not entitle her to renegotiate the oral settlement agreement.

The Appellate Division, however, did not appear to be pleased with the handling of the “settlement.” It commented that “clearly, the procedures employed in entering into this [oral] agreement, which did not include a simultaneous recording of the terms, should not serve as a model to guide future settlement negotiations. Indeed, the failure to utilize the available court reporter to make an official record was inexplicable.”
NYPPL

Request for reconsideration of an administrative determination does not extend the statute of limitations for perfecting an appeal

Request for reconsideration of an administrative determination does not extend the statute of limitations for perfecting an appeal
Raykowski v NYC DOT, App. Div., 1st Dept, 259 AD2d 367

Sometimes an individual who has been adversely affected by an administrative decision asks the appointing authority to reconsider its determination. However, as the Raykowski decision indicates, such a request will not excuse the individual’s failing to file a timely challenged to the decision itself.

Michael Raykowski was terminated from his position with the City of New York Department of Transportation because he failed to “maintain a city residence.” Although he asked for reconsideration of the decision terminating his employment, the Appellate Division said that asking for reconsideration “did not extend the applicable four-month [Statute of] limitations ....”

The Appellate Division commented that challenges to administrative decision had to be brought pursuant to Article 78 [Article 78, Civil Practice Law and Rules]. Such an action must be commenced within four month of the final administrative determination.

Significantly, the decision notes that a “fresh, complete and unlimited examination on the merits” will revive the Article 78 statute of limitation. However, the Court ruled that the Department’s meeting with Raykowski eight months after his termination did not satisfy this test and therefore his petition had to be dismissed as untimely.

This decision points out the danger of an employer’s agreeing to reconsider an earlier final administrative decision. If the court determines that the agency’s reconsideration is a fresh, complete and unlimited review of the underlying issue, the Statute of Limitations for the purposes of bringing an Article 78 will commence to run from the date the final determination of the agency’s “reconsideration.”
NYPPL

Rescinding a resignation

Rescinding a resignation
Otero v Safir, 258 AD2d 297

After being served with disciplinary charges involving allegations that subjected him to criminal charges, New York City police officer Louis Otero submitted his resignation from the force rather than testify at a disciplinary hearing. Later Otero asked a New York State Supreme Court justice to direct the Department to rescind his resignation. When the Supreme Court dismissed his petition, he appealed.

The Appellate Division denied Otero’s appeal. It said that Otero’s resignation was “strategically motivated and not the result of fraud, overreaching or other misconduct on [Department’s] part, was not improperly obtained and, accordingly, may not be judicially countermanded,” citing Cacchioli v Hoberman, 31 NY2d 287.

This case illustrates the general principle that an individual’s request to withdraw a resignation or to have it rescinded is subject to the discretionary approval of the appointing authority. Generally courts will intervene only in situations where the former employee proves that the resignation was the result of fraud or coercion.

Courts will also direct the rescinding of a resignation for certain types of “mistakes.”

For example, a teacher was told that she was a probationer and would not be recommended for tenure. She submitted her resignation solely to avoid having her personal record indicate that she was terminated for failure to satisfactorily complete her probationary period. It was later determined that the teacher had completed her probationary period and had acquired tenure prior to her submitting the resignation.

In Gould v Sewanhaka CSD, 81 NY2d 446, the Court of Appeals approved the rescinding of Gould’s resignation on the theory that the teacher had submitted her resignation under the mistaken belief that she was a probationer.
NYPPL

Reversal of an employee’s criminal conviction may require reconsideration of a disciplinary action based on the acts or omissions

Reversal of an employee’s criminal conviction may require reconsideration of a disciplinary action based on the acts or omissions
Beard v Newburgh, 259 AD2d 613, motion for leave to appeal denied, 93 NY2d 958

Town of Newburgh police officer Joseph Beard asked a state Supreme Court judge to vacate an arbitration award upholding his dismissal from the department based on various rule violations.

Beard complained that an arbitrator gave “collateral estoppel effect” to Beard’s conviction in a criminal matter related to the same events. Even though the criminal judgment was still under appeal at the time, the arbitrator rule that Beard’s criminal conviction automatically made him guilty of various disciplinary offenses stemming from the same underlying events.

The arbitrator ruled that because Beard was found guilty in the criminal action, the doctrine of collateral estoppel required that he be found guilty in the administrative disciplinary proceeding as well.*

On appeal, Beard persuaded an Appellate Division panel to overturn the arbitrator’s ruling. The Appellate Division said the arbitrator’s determination had to be vacated because Beard’s conviction, which was the sole factual basis for the arbitration award, was reversed on appeal. Accordingly, the court directed that a new hearing of the issues be held by the arbitrator.

The Town of Newburgh also argued that Beard’s termination should stand because Section 30.1(e) of the Public Officers Law mandates removal from public office as the automatic penalty in the event a public officer is found guilty of a felony or the violation of his or her oath of office.

However, observed the Appellate Division, was not terminated pursuant to Section 30.1(e) and therefore its applicability was not an issue raised before the arbitrator. Accordingly, “the applicability of the statute is not properly before this court.”

Had Beard been removed from his public office** by operation of law pursuant to Section 30.1(e) of the Public Officers Law, the under the law Beard could have requested reinstatement following the reversal of his conviction.

Section 30.1(e) provides that a non-elected official may ask the appointing authority for reinstatement upon reversal or the vacating of such conviction where the conviction is the sole basis for the vacancy resulting from the application of Section 30.1(e). The appointing authority is required to hold a hearing to determine whether reinstatement is warranted.

Further, in addition to “the final judgment of the court which reversed or vacated such conviction,” an appointing authority may consider the entire employment history of the individual.

Section 30.1(e) further provides that "Upon its consideration of such information, and any other submissions, the appointing authority may, in its discretion, reappoint the individual to his or her former office, or to a similar office if the former office is no longer available. In the event of such reinstatement, the appointing authority may, in its discretion, award salary or compensation in full or in part for the period from the date such office became vacant to the date of reinstatement or any part thereof."

* In Kelly v. Levin, 440 NY2d 424 the Appellate Division ruled that acquitting an employee in an administrative disciplinary action is a reversible error if the individual has been found guilty of a criminal act involving the same allegations.

** A police officer is a public officer for the purposes of Section 30 of the Public Officers Law.
NYPPL

Obtaining police personnel records pursuant to a Freedom of Information Law [FOIL] demand

Obtaining police personnel records pursuant to a Freedom of Information Law [FOIL] demand
Daily Gazette Co. and Capital Newspapers [Times Union] v City of Schenectady, 93 NY2d 145

The Court of Appeals has resolved a significant question in ruling that the City of Schenectady did not violate the state Freedom of Information Law (FOIL) when it declined to provide journalists with the names of certain police officers who were involved in an off-duty egg-throwing incident. The court ruled that prohibitions on disclosure of personnel records of public safety officers under Section 50-a of the state Civil Rights Law outweighed both the “plain wording” of FOIL and the legislative intent behind FOIL.

Section 50-a, in pertinent part, provides that all personnel records used to evaluate performance toward continued employment or promotion of police officers, correction officers or firefighters “shall be considered confidential and not subject to inspection or review without the express written consent of such [officers] except as may be mandated by lawful court order.” Such a court order is to be issued only after an in camera [private] inspection by the court and after giving the parties affected notice of the demand and an opportunity to be heard.

Both the Albany Times-Union and the Daily Gazette of Schenectady had asked, pursuant to FOIL (Public Officers Law [POL] Sections 84-90), for the records of the disciplinary action taken against 18 officers. The newspapers wanted the names of the officers who allegedly pelted civilian cars from a bus that was used as transportation for a police officer’s bachelor party. According to news reports, the bus stops included bars and a nude dance club.

Schenectady’s chief of police said that “under a promise of confidentiality,” the 18 officers had admitted their participation in the incident in various degrees, and that disciplinary sanctions imposed ranged from written reprimands to loss of vacation days and overtime pay. The chief refused to provide the newspapers with the names of the officers, citing the FOIL exception for certain records; i.e., records “specifically exempted from disclosure by state or federal statute” (POL Section 87[2][a]).

Newspapers sued under FOIL, but a state Supreme Court justice declined to order Schenectady to provide the information.

The Appellate Division reversed that decision, concluding that the records of the disciplinary actions taken against the 18 officers were not exempt from FOIL disclosure under Civil Rights Law Section 50-a. The city appealed and won a reversal of that ruling by the Court of Appeals, New York’s highest court.

The court observed that Civil Rights Law Section 50-a conflicts with the “plain wording” of Freedom of Information Law, and that the limit that Section 50-a places on disclosure “is contrary to its legislative history and is inconsistent with our FOIL precedents.”

Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals pointed out that the statute “was designed to prevent abusive exploitation of personally damaging information” contained in personnel records of law enforcement personnel. Otherwise criminal defense attorneys could always delve into the personnel records of officers to find information to impeach the credibility of police witnesses. FOIL applications by criminal defense attorneys can be used as a means for “harassment and reprisals and for the purposes of cross-examination,” the court said, citing Matter of Prisoners’ Legal Services, 73 NY2d, at page 31.

In making its ruling, the court set out the following test to determine if the refusal to disclose records under the FOIL exception is justified:

In evaluating denying a FOIL request for access to a law enforcement officer’s personnel records that are relevant to promotion or continued employment, nondisclosure will be limited to the extent reasonably necessary to effectuate the purposes of Civil Rights Law Section 50-a -- to prevent the potential use of information in the records in litigation to degrade, embarrass, harass or impeach the integrity of the officer.

In the Schenectady case, the individuals seeking information were journalists, not lawyers. However, “confidentiality under Civil Rights Law Section 50-a will not automatically be defeated solely because the person seeking access is a representative of a news-gathering organization, not contemplating litigation....” the court said.

The court appeared concerned that there was “potential abusive exploitation of the damaging information in personnel records exists irrespective of how, at whose behest or for what purpose the information is released into the public domain.”

In this instance, said the court, if the newspapers were to obtain and publish the identities, misconduct and disciplinary sanctions of the 18 Schenectady police officers involved in the incident, “the information will be fully available for all of the forms and practices of abusive exploitation that Civil Rights Law Section 50-a was designed to suppress.”

Noting that the employer has the burden of demonstrating that its rejection of a FOIL demand falls within the permissible exceptions set out in FOIL, the Court of Appeals said that it is not sufficient merely to show that the recorded data may be “used to evaluate performance toward continued employment or promotion” of the officers” in rejecting a FOIL demand.
NYPPL

Hearing officer finds that employee’s failure to comply with an unlawful order is not misconduct for the purposes of disciplinary action

Hearing officer finds that employee’s failure to comply with an unlawful order is not misconduct for the purposes of disciplinary action
Health and Hospital Corporation v A.S., OATH Index #2742/10

OATH Administrative Law Judge Tynia Richard recommended dismissal AWOL charges brought against A.S.,* an employee at the Health and Hospital Corporation’s Bellevue Hospital Center, after the employee declined to report for a “medical clearance” as directed.

Judge Richard found that Bellevue had “improperly conditioned [the employee’s] return to duty upon presentation of medical clearance.”

Bellevue, said Judge Richard, could not, without following the procedures of its Regulation No.1, which the ALJ characterized as “an analog to Section 72 of the Civil Service Law,” compel the employee to undergo an involuntary psychiatric examination based upon a supervisor's unsubstantiated claim that the employee complained that of being ill and then directed the employee to report the employee’s psychiatric condition to the hospital or be barred from returning to work where the employee had displayed no disruptive behavior or performance related problem.

Having failed to comply with the notice requirements of Regulation No.1, the ALJ concluded that the directive to report to the psychiatric examination was not a lawful order. According, Judge Richard ruled that A.S.'s failure to appear for the examination was not misconduct.

* The decision notes that “Respondent’s full name is being withheld for purposes of publication in order to protect [the employee’s] privacy because this decision discusses [the employee’s] medical records which include matters of a personal nature. This accommodation is being made sua sponte [on the ALJ’s own motion] as the parties have not requested it.”

The decision is posted on the Internet at:
http://archive.citylaw.org/oath/10_Cases/10-2742.pdf
NYPPL

Discontinuing or postponing administrative disciplinary action while criminal action involving the same event is pending and related issues

Discontinuing or postponing administrative disciplinary action while criminal action involving the same event is pending and related issues
Levine v New York City Transit Authority, 70 AD2d 900, affirmed 49 NY2d 747

New York courts have considered discontinuing disciplinary action while criminal action is pending, holding that an appointing authority has no obligation to postpone administrative disciplinary action even if the county district attorney requests that the administrative disciplinary action be postponed. This was the point made by the court in Levine v New York City Transit Authority.

It may, however, sometimes be advantageous for the appointing authority to wait until the criminal matter has been adjudicated. New York courts have ruled that a criminal conviction compels an automatic finding of guilt in an administrative disciplinary hearing involving the same offense.

If an employee is found guilty in a court of law of a crime such as stealing, and disciplinary charges are filed related to that same incident of theft, there is no lawful way for a disciplinary hearing officer to find the employee not guilty of stealing. Probably the leading case illustrating this point is Kelly v. Levin, 440 NY2d 424. In Kelly the court ruled that is a reversible error for an administrative disciplinary body to acquit an employee if the individual has been found guilty of a criminal act involving the same allegations.

The reason this is true is that the standard of proof required in a criminal proceeding is greater than that in an administrative disciplinary proceeding. In a criminal case, the standard is proof beyond a reasonable doubt. In contrast, the standard to be met to find an employee guilty of the charges filed against him or her in administrative disciplinary action is “substantial evidence” or, in some situations, “a preponderance of the evidence.”

Is an employee subjected to "double jeopardy" if the employer proceeds with an administrative disciplinary action at the same time as criminal charges are pending or following the criminal action should the employee be acquitted? Courts have ruled this is not double jeopardy.

In Bermudez v NYC Transit Authority, Appellate Division, upholding a lower court's determination, said that as to the "double jeopardy" issue,[1] "the dismissal of the criminal charges brought against [Bermudez], which were predicated upon the same acts which were the subject of the disciplinary proceeding commenced against him, has no bearing upon the determination terminating his employment."

In Matter of the Haverstraw-Stony Point CSD, 24 Ed. Dept. Rep. 466, the Commissioner of Education ruled that a Section 3020-a hearing panel is not required to adjourn an administrative disciplinary hearing when parallel criminal proceedings are underway.

A claim of double jeopardy is, however, more frequently encountered in efforts to suppress a disciplinary action in situations were the charges reflect the same acts or omissions that were the subject of counseling memoranda or performance evaluations. The courts have rejected this theory.

In Patterson v Smith, 53 NY2d 98 the Court of Appeals said that including charges concerning performance that were addressed in a counseling memorandum was not “double jeopardy.”

The court explained that a “proper counseling memoranda” contains a warning and an admonition to comply with the expectations of the employer. It is not a form of punishment in and of itself. Accordingly, case law indicates that giving the employee a counseling memorandum does not bar the employer from later filing disciplinary charges based on the same event or events.

The employer, however, may not use the counseling memorandum or a performance evaluation to avoid initiating formal disciplinary action against an individual as the Fusco and Irving decisions by the Commissioner of Education demonstrate [Fusco v Jefferson County School District, CEd, 14,396 and Irving v Troy City School District, CEd 14,373].

The point made in Fusco and Irving is that comments critical of employee performance do not, without more, constitute disciplinary action. On the other hand, counseling letters may not be used as a subterfuge for avoiding initiating formal disciplinary action against a tenured individual.

What distinguishes lawful “constructive criticism” of an individual’s performance by a supervisor and supervisory actions addressing an individual’s performance that are disciplinary in nature?

In Holt v Board of Education, 52 NY2d 625, the Court of Appeals decided that performance evaluations and letters of criticism placed in the employee’s personnel file were not “disciplinary penalties” and thus could be placed there without having to first hold a disciplinary proceeding. In other words, the act of placing correspondence critical of the employee’s conduct or performance in his or her personnel file did not constitute discipline.

The basic rule set out in Holt is that a statutory disciplinary provision such as Section 75 of the Civil Service Law does not require that an employee be given a hearing or permitted to grieve every comment or statement by his or her employer that he or she may consider a criticism. In contrast, alleged “constructive criticism” may not be used to frustrate an employee’s right to due process as set out in Section 75 of the Civil Service Law, Section 3020-a of the Education Law or a contract disciplinary procedure. In other words, an appointing authority may not frustrate an employee’s right to due process as set out in Section 75 of the Civil Service Law, Section 3020-a of the Education Law or a contract disciplinary procedure by claiming its action was merely “constructive criticism.”

In the Fusco and Irving cases, the Commissioner of Education found that “critical comment” exceeded the parameters circumscribing “lawful instruction” concerning unacceptable performance.

In Fusco’s case, the Commissioner said that “contents of the memorandum” did not fall within the parameters of a “permissible evaluation” noting that the memorandum “contains no constructive criticism or a single suggestion for improvement.” Rather, said the Commissioner, the memorandum focused on “castigating [Fusco] for prior alleged misconduct.”

In Irving’s case, a school principal was given a letter critical of her performance and the next day reassigned to another school where she was to serve as an assistant principal. The Commissioner ruled that these two actions, when considered as a single event, constituted disciplinary action within the meaning of Section 3020-a of the Education Law.

* Bermudez attempt to vacate the award contending that he had been acquitted of criminal charges that had led to the administrative disciplinary action.

============================================
If you are interested in learning more about disciplinary procedures involving public officers and employees, please click here: http://thedisciplinebook.blogspot.com/
============================================
NYPPL

Title VII does not bar the selection of an individual because of the individual’s personal relationship with the appointing authority

Title VII does not bar the selection of an individual because of the individual’s personal relationship with the appointing authority
Fella v County of Rockland, 297 A.D.2d 813

According to the court's decision, the Rockland County Director of Employee Rights and Equity Compliance concluded that Rockland County Commissioner of Hospitals Peter T. Fella had created a hostile work environment by promoting a person with whom he was then having a romantic relationship to a vacant assistant director of nursing position.*

The Director had determined that Fella violated the County's Equal Employment Opportunity Policy [EEOP] because some employees said that they felt uncomfortable at work because Fella had this "romantic relationship" with a co-employee. This, said the Director, constituted a hostile work environment and, as such, violated the EEOP.

As a result, C. Scott Vanderhoef, County Executive of the County of Rockland, suspended Fella from his position without pay for a period of 30 days.

Supreme Court vacated the County Executive's action and the Appellate Division sustained the lower court's ruling.

In its decision the Appellate Division noted that the County's EEOP defined sexual harassment as "unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, sexual demands or conduct of a sexual nature which `had the purpose or affect [sic] of unreasonably interfering with an [affected] person's work performance or creating an intimidating, hostile or offensive work environment.'"

Citing DeCinto v Westchester County Medical Center, 807 F2d 304, the court explained that there is no sexual discrimination or harassment involved "where the conduct complained of by the employee involves an isolated act of preferential treatment of another employee due to a romantic, consensual relationship." Accordingly, said the court, the County Executive's finding that Fella created a hostile work environment in violation of the EEOP was arbitrary, capricious, and without a rational basis, and was therefore properly annulled but the Supreme Court.
NYPPL

Using tape-recorded testimony in an administrative proceeding

Using tape-recorded testimony in an administrative proceeding
Miller v Howard Safir, App. Div., 259 AD2d 337

John Miller, Jr. challenged the New York City police commissioner’s revocation of his designation as a Special Patrolman. The commissioner had determined that Miller was “unfit for the position of Special Patrolman” following an incident during which Miller assaulted an individual.

The Appellate Division noted that the police commissioner’s determination was supported by substantial evidence, including Miller’s own admission that he knocked down the individual’s door and assaulted her.

However, Miller complained that the determination was based on a tape recording by the individual rather than her giving her personally testifying in the presence of the hearing officer.

The Appellate Division ruled that the tape-recorded evidence, which was sworn testimony, constituted substantial evidence, citing Abdur-Raheem v Mann, 85 NY2d 113 and Butler v Coughlin, 193 AD2d 973 in support of its ruling.
NYPPL

Term appointments of employees in the Classified Service

Term appointments of employees in the Classified Service
Wheeler v Washington Co., 259 AD2d 902

Term appointments are rare in the classified service. The Wheeler case involves such a type of appointment and considers the rights of an incumbent upon the expiration of his or her term of office.

Section 100 of the Highway Law provides that a county Superintendent of Highways is appointed for a four-year term and “may be removed from office for malfeasance or misfeasance before expiration of the term.”*

Kenneth F. Wheeler was initially appointed to the position of Superintendent of Highways for a four-year term in 1987 and was reappointed to an additional four-year term, beginning on January 1, 1993. In 1991, his job title was changed to Superintendent of Public Works. At the conclusion of his term on December 31, 1996, Wheeler was not reappointed but remained as Superintendent until a successor was appointed by the Board of Supervisors on February 3, 1997.

Claiming that his termination was unlawful, Wheeler sued.

According to the decision, Wheeler’s most recent term of office as Superintendent of Public Works commenced on January 1, 1993 and expired on December 31, 1996. The issue, as the Appellate Division saw it, was “whether the rights afforded a permanent, competitive employee under Civil Service Law Section 75 extended to [Wheeler] after the expiration of his term of office.”

Wheeler contended that his position was wrongfully reclassified in 1996 from competitive to “unclassified” or noncompetitive status and that his position did not meet the requirements for “unclassified” status. Relying on his alleged permanent, competitive status in the classified service, Wheeler argued that Section 75 barred his termination except for misconduct or incompetence.

The court said that contrary to Wheeler’s contention, he was not terminated or removed from office but rather, his four-year term pursuant to Highway Law Section 100 merely expired. Since he was not reappointed and his successor had not yet been chosen, the position became vacant at the expiration of his term on December 31, 1996.

However, until his successor took office in February 1996, Wheeler was a holdover and an at-will employee as provided by Section 5 of the Public Officers Law. Therefore, the court concluded, Section 75 was inapplicable and thus Wheeler was not entitled to a review of the County’s decision not to reappoint him after completion of his then current term of office.

As to the question of whether Wheeler’s position was wrongfully reclassified from the competitive class to another jurisdictional classification, the Appellate Division said that the change in jurisdictional classification was irrelevant since Wheeler was not removed from his position prior to the expiration of his term of office.

The decision implies that a person holding a term appointment authorized by law, unless reappointed, is to be deemed terminated upon the expiration of his or her term “by operation of law” notwithstanding the fact that he or she may otherwise be protected against removal except for incompetence or misconduct by the provisions of Section 75 of the Civil Service Law.

* Among others in the classified service holding a “term appointment” is the personnel officer of a county, suburban town, or a city where such a position has been established. Such a personnel officer is appointed for a term of six years [Section 15.1.(b), Civil Service Law].
NYPPL

Termination of employment pursuant to Civil Service Law Section 73

Termination of employment pursuant to Civil Service Law Section 73
Fallon v Triboro. Bridge & Tunnel Auth., 259 AD2d 377

An individual who is terminated pursuant to Section 71 or Section 73 of the Civil Service Law because of his or her absence caused by a disability may decide to sue the employer, claiming the termination was unlawful.* Such was the situation underlying the Fallon case.

The Triboro Bridge and Tunnel Authority terminated Gregory Fallon pursuant to Section 73 of the Civil Service Law after he had been continuously absent in excess of one year. Fallon sued, claiming various violations of his civil rights under federal and state law. The court found that Fallon had been absent on disability leave for 12 years and had never sought to return to work, with or without accommodation, even after he was denied ordinary disability retirement benefits.

The Authority had told Fallon that it would terminate him if he failed to qualify for ordinary disability retirement. This, said the Appellate Division, constituted “adequate pretermination notice,” commenting that “[i]n the context of Section 73 discharges, [due process] amounts to no more than an opportunity for the employee to present opposing views as to whether [he] has been absent for one year or more and whether [he] was able to return to [his] position.”

As to any post-termination rights, the Authority “in language tracking the provisions of Civil Service Law Section 73,” had written Fallon advising him of his termination and “that he could apply for a medical examination within a year of the termination of his disability, and if found fit, could apply for reinstatement.” This, said the court, was sufficient to meet due process requirements.

The Appellate Division also ruled that Fallon failed to make a prima facie case of disability-based discrimination under the Vocational Rehabilitation Act (29 USC Section 794) because the Authority “is not a recipient of federal funds.”

Fallon also contended that the Authority had violated the Americans with Disabilities Act. The court determined that his ADA rights had not been violated “since he makes no allegation that he requested an accommodation for his alleged disability and was refused.”

In view of this, the court ruled, “there is no ground to conclude that [the Authority] violated the New York State Human Rights Law (Executive Law Section 296), prohibiting disability-based discrimination” and dismissed Fallon’s appeal.

* Section 71 provides for leave in connection with a work-connected injury or disease. Section 73 provides for the termination of an individual who is on leave pursuant to Section 72, which mandates leaves of absence in the event an employee is unable to work because of an injury or disease that did not result from a work-related incident.
NYPPL

Maryland Police may not claim a "privacy shield" when making a “traffic stop”

Maryland Police may not claim a "privacy shield" when making a "traffic stop”
Source: AELE Law Enforcement Legal Center, http://www.aele.org/, Reproduced with permission. Copyright © 2010 AELE

”A motorist stopped by two Maryland state troopers recorded his interaction with the officers without informing them he was doing so. The recording included both video and audio. He later posted the recordings on the YouTube website. He was subsequently arrested and then indicted on charges that included, among other things, making the recordings of an oral private conversation.”

The trial judge ruled that the recorded audio exchange between the arrestee and the officers was not a private conversation as intended by the provisions of a state wiretap statute.*

In the words of the court: "There is no expectation of privacy concerning a traffic stop on a public street. The law is clearly established that a traffic stop is not a private encounter."

"Charges concerning making and disseminating the recording were dismissed, while charges concerning traffic violations arising from the same incident will go forward."

"Those of us who are public officials and are entrusted with the power of the state are ultimately accountable to the public. When we exercise that power in public fora, we should not expect our actions to be shielded from public observation." State of Maryland v. Graber, #12-K-10-647 (Circuit Court, Harford County, Md. 2010).”

* The relevant Maryland Statutes, Section 10-402(a)(1) and 10-402(a)(2) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, provide as follows:

1. Section 10-402(a)(1): Except as otherwise specifically provided in this subtitle it is unlawful for any person to wilfully intercept, endeavor to intercept, or procure any other person to intercept or endeavor to intercept any wire, oral, or electronic communication."

2. Section 10-402(a)(2) defines oral communication as: "... any conversation or words spoken to or by any person in private conversation."
NYPPL

Unemployment Insurance claims

Unemployment Insurance claims
Prusch v Shenendehowa CSD, 259 AD2d 877, Motion for leave to appeal denied, 93 NY2d 816

As a general rule, criticism of an employee’s job performance by a supervisor or receipt of a negative performance evaluation does not necessarily constitute good cause for leaving employment for the purpose of establishing eligibility for unemployment insurance benefits. The same is true with respect to an individual resigning in anticipation of his or her dismissal.

These are the lessons of the Prusch case.

John E. Prusch was employed by the Shenendehowa Central School District as a teacher of foreign languages. He resigned from his position effective April 25, 1997 and applied for unemployment insurance benefits. Prusch indicated that he resigned because he was “stressed out” and because he had received an unsatisfactory rating on a performance review, which recommended that he not be rehired for the upcoming school year.

The Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board rejected Prusch’s claim, ruling that he was disqualified from receiving benefits because he had voluntarily left his employment without good cause. Prusch appealed only to have the Appellate Division affirm the board’s determination.

Although Prusch alleged that he resigned based upon advice from his psychologist that he quit as soon as possible because of stress caused by his negative evaluation, the court commented that the record indicated that he “nevertheless chose to remain, continuing his employment for another month, and his resignation letter contained no reference to a physician’s recommendation.”
NYPPL