Concerning an individual's standing to challenge an appointment to a position in the public service in instances where the individual "is not personally aggrieved"

Concerning an individual's standing to challenge an appointment to a position in the public service in instances where the individual "is not personally aggrieved"

Matter of Seidel v Prendergast, 2011 NY Slip Op 06132, Appellate Division, Second Department

Michael Seidel and others [Seidel] joined in filing a petition pursuant of Article 78 of the Civil Practice Law and Rules challenging the action of the Town Board of the Town of Orangetown appointing Kevin Nulty to the position of the town's Chief of Police. Supreme Court of Orangetown, Rockland County, dismissed the petition on the grounds that Seidel “lacked standing” to pursue the action. Seidel appealed.

Essentially Seidel contended that Nulty’s appointment was unlawful because no competitive examination had been held for appointment to the position of Chief of Police.

The Appellate Division sustained the lower court’s dismissal of Seidel’s petition, explaining that “In general, persons seeking to challenge governmental actions must demonstrate that they are personally aggrieved by those actions in a manner ‘different in kind and degree from the community generally,'"

In this instance Seidel and his co-petitioners made no attempt to demonstrate they was aggrieved by Nulty’s appointment. Rather, said the Appellate Divisiont, they claim that they "have standing to challenge unlawful and unconstitutional civil service appointments regardless of whether they are personally aggrieved."

The Appellate Division rejected this theory, holding that while the doctrine of common-law taxpayer standing would excuse such lack of personal aggrievement, that doctrine requires the petitioner to establish that "the failure to accord such standing would be in effect to erect an impenetrable barrier to any judicial scrutiny of legislative action."

As Seidel failed to demonstrate that there was an "impenetrable barrier" to judicial scrutiny of the administrative determination resulting in the appointment of Nulty as the Town's Chief of Police, the Appellate Division concluded that the “Supreme Court properly granted the motions to dismiss the petition on the ground that the petitioners lacked standing.”

Out-of-title work

Out-of-title work

Haubert v GOER, 284 A.D.2d 879

In the Haubert case the Appellate Division, Third Department considered the issue of whether or not the assignment of certain additional duties to an individual, or specific changes in an employee's existing duties, constitutes “out-of-title” work. As the decision demonstrates, it all depends on the nature of the changes and the nature of the positions involved.

Section 61.2 of the Civil Service Law prohibits “out-of-title work.” In addition, no credit is given for out-of-title work in order to qualify for a promotion examination.

Ruth A. Haubert appealed the Governor's Office of Employee Relations' [GOER] denial of her out-of-title work grievance. The grievance arose after the State Department of Health changed its procedures with respect to surveying long-term health care facilities to ensure their compliance with State and federal laws and rules.

Initially the surveys were conducted by teams under the supervision of a Consultant Nurse, grade 24. In late 1996 Health revised its procedure and required various employees in grade 19, 20 or 22 specialized clinician positions to serve as the “team facilitator” on a rotating basis in addition to the designated “facilitator” remaining responsible for his or her primary tasks as a team member.

Claiming that the new role of team facilitator required them to perform out-of-title work, Haubert and other employees filed an “out-of-title” work grievance. The grievance was rejected at all steps and an appeal was filed in Supreme Court. Ultimately, the Appellate Division affirmed the Supreme Court's dismissal of Haubert's petition.

The Appellate Division said that not all additional duties assigned to an incumbent constitute out-of-title work. The question is whether the new duties are appropriate to the employee's titles and, or, are they similar in nature to, or a reasonable outgrowth of, the duties listed in the employee's job specifications.

In this instance, the court decided that based upon “the team concept of the survey work, which required coordination and cooperation among all team members, and the high level of expertise required of petitioners in order to qualify for their titles,” GOER rationally concluded that the obligation of a team facilitator to monitor the team's progress to ensure that the team accomplished its mission in a timely fashion “is appropriate to petitioners' titles and, or, constitutes a logical extension of their duties.” 

Determining seniority in a civil division of the State

Determining seniority in a civil division of the State

Turner v Ulster County, 284 A.D.2d 703

Seniority is the key to layoff rights in the public service. Typically seniority is based on the individual's uninterrupted service with the governmental entity in which the layoff takes place measured from the original date of the individual's permanent appointment in the civil service of that entity, regardless of the jurisdictional classification of the position or positions held by the individual.

Police Captain George B. Turner was laid off when the Town of Ulster abolished his position. Turner contended that he had displacement rights based on his seniority in the classified service and thus he could “bump” Donald H. Short, a lieutenant in the Town Police Department. The County personnel officer, Thomas J. Costello, ruled that Turner did not have displacement rights over Short as Short had more permanent service in the relevant civil division -- the Town of Ulster.

According to the decision, Turner was originally appointed as a Deputy Sheriff by the Ulster County Sheriff's Department on January 16, 1978 and was continuously employed there until November 9, 1990. On that date Turner was appointed to a position in the Town Police Department from a civil service open competitive eligible list. Turner was ultimately promoted to the position of police captain.

Short, on the other hand, had continuously served with the Town Police Department since January 1, 1983, and the Ulster County personnel director determined that he had been appointed as a permanent employee prior to Turner's appointment by the Town.

Ulster County Civil Service Rules and Regulations defines “permanent service,” a key element in determining seniority for the purposes of layoff, as “start[ing] on the date of the incumbent's original appointment on a permanent basis in the classified service.” The rules also provide that “[t]he permanent service of any employee who was transferred from another civil division shall start on the date of his/her original permanent appointment in the classified service in the other civil division [emphasis supplied].”

The Appellate Division said that: It is clear that for purposes of seniority, length of time in service is measured from the date of original appointment on a permanent basis in the classified service of the layoff unit where the abolishment occurs. Since petitioner was appointed to the position of lieutenant in the Town Police Department on November 9, 1990 from an open competitive eligible list, this date of appointment marks the commencement of his service in the classified service in the layoff [sic] unit. There is no merit to petitioner's contention that his original appointment in the classified service occurred in 1978 with his appointment to the Ulster County Sheriff's Department since he did not transfer from the Sheriff's Department to the Town Police Department.

The crux of the matter is the meaning of the term “civil division.” Section 2.8 of the Civil Service Law defines “service of a civil division” to “include all offices and positions in the civil division of any subdivision of the state and the term 'civil division' shall include within its meaning a city.”

The Appellate Division agreed with the personnel officer's determination that the Ulster County and the Town of Ulster are different and separate “civil divisions.” As the Court of Appeals said in Chittenden v Wurster, 152 NY 345, the civil divisions of the State are its counties and its towns and its villages. 

Eligibility for reinstatement from a preferred list to a “different” position

Eligibility for reinstatement from a preferred list to a “different” position

Davis v Mills, 285 A.D.2d 703, affirmed 98 N.Y.2d 120

As a general rule, a preferred list must be used to fill a vacancy for the same title, or a position found to be similar to, the position that gave rise to the creation of the preferred list in the first instance. Clearly the preferred list must be certified to fill vacancies having the same title. The determination of a “similar position” for the purposes of such certification is sometimes a less easy task.

School psychologist Maxine Davis was laid off by the Westport Central School District when the district abolished a school psychologist position. She claimed that she was entitled to be reinstated from the preferred list when the district decided to fill a newly created position of elementary counselor.

Davis argued that “because the majority of the duties that she performed as school psychologist consisted of the counseling and other related duties of the newly created elementary counselor position, the two positions are similar within the meaning of Education Law Section 2510.” Thus, she concluded, if the district wished to fill the newly created elementary counselor position, it was required to use the preferred list created as a result of her being laid off.

The Commissioner of Education disagreed and dismissed Davis' appeal after determining that the two positions were in different special subject tenure areas and required different certifications. The Appellate Division, Third Department, sustained the Commissioner's decision.

The court noted that although the abolished “school psychologist position apparently encompassed the duties of the newly created elementary counselor position, the record establishes that the school psychologist position included additional duties beyond those of the elementary counselor position” and which require “skills that were not necessary for the performance of the more limited duties of the elementary counselor position.”

In addition, said the court, the fact that some of the counseling-related duties of the school psychologist position became the duties of the elementary counselor position does not necessarily make the two positions similar.

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The Layoff, Preferred List and Reinstatement Manual - a 645 page e-book reviewing the relevant laws, rules and regulations, and selected court and administrative decisions is available from the Public Employment Law Press. Click On http://nylayoff.blogspot.com/ for additional information about this electronic reference manual.

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Removing a member of a school board

Removing a member of a school board

Matter of Lilker, CEd 14,588

Claiming that there were discrepancies between the published board minutes and audio recordings he made of the same board meeting, Stewart S. Lilker asked the Commissioner of Education to remove members of the Freeport Union Free School District Board of Education and the District Clerk from their respective positions.

As a starting point, the Commissioner noted that Lilker's appeal alleged violations of the Open Meetings Law [Public Officers Law Section 107]. Explaining that the State Supreme Court has “exclusive jurisdiction” over such complaints, the Commissioner said any alleged OML violations could not be adjudicated via an appeal pursuant to the Regulations of the Commissioner, 8 NYCRR 275.

However, said the Commissioner, even if he had jurisdiction, he would dismiss Lilker's appeal on the merits because Lilker “failed to establish facts sufficient to warrant the removal of respondents pursuant to the Education Law Section 306.”

A member of the board of education may be removed from office pursuant to Section 306 when it is proven to the satisfaction of the Commissioner that the board member has engaged in a willful violation or neglect of duty within the meaning of the Education Law or has willfully disobeyed a decision, order, rule or regulation of the Board of Regents or the Commissioner of Education.

Lilker, said the Commissioner, failed to meet his burden of demonstrating that he had “a clear legal right to the relief requested” as well as his burden of demonstrating that board members and the district clerk engaged in willful or intentional misconduct warranting removal from office.

The Commissioner said that the alleged inaccuracies and discrepancies between the published minutes and Lilker's audio recordings are of an administrative nature and do not demonstrate any intentional misrepresentation or attempt to falsify board records.

Authority of the arbitrator to fashion a remedy affecting a party found to have violated the terms of the collective bargaining agreement

Authority of the arbitrator to fashion a remedy affecting a party found to have violated the terms of the collective bargaining agreement
Matter of Merrick Union Free School Dist. v Merrick Faculty Assn., Inc., 2011 NY Slip Op 06128, Appellate Division, Second Department

In this CPLR Article 75 action the Merrick Faculty Association, Inc. appealed an order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County that granted the school district’s petition seeking to vacate the arbitrator’s award and denied the Association’s cross motion to confirm the award. 

The Appellate Division modified the lower court’s order addressing the arbitrator’s award with respect to (1) providing health insurance to individuals in the negotiating unit whose spouses are afforded New York State Health Insurance Program [NYSHIP] coverage where those spouses are employed by a participating agency other than the Merrick Union Free School District, and (2) directed the parties to negotiate a remedy for affected bargaining unit members for the relevant period.

The collective bargaining agreement provided that the district “would provide employees with single or family health insurance coverage under NYSHIP except that the district would not provide NYSHIP dual family coverage to spouses of School District employees who were afforded NYSHIP coverage through the School District or another public employer. 

The New York State Department of Civil Service, which administers NYSHIP, subsequently issued a Policy Memo 133 indicating that participating employers could not enter into collective bargaining agreements that denied dependent health insurance coverage to an otherwise eligible employee based on the fact that the employee's spouse was eligible for NYSHIP coverage through a different employer. 

The Association filed a grievance based on the Memo seeking to obviate the provision in the collective bargaining agreement limiting dual family coverage and “that all employees affected by the Memo be offered the option to obtain NYSHIP dual family coverage or a buyout.”

The grievance was ultimately submitted to arbitration and the arbitrator sustained the grievance, invalidating the health insurance provisions in the CBA to the extent that they denied NYSHIP dual family coverage to employees whose spouses were afforded NYSHIP coverage through public employers other than the School District. 

The Appellate Division said that “An arbitration award may be vacated on one of three grounds: 1. that it violates a strong public policy; 2. is irrational; or 3. clearly exceeds a specifically enumerated limitation of the arbitrator's power.”

Noting that in determining whether an arbitration award should be vacated on the ground that the arbitrator clearly exceeded a specifically enumerated limitation of his or her authority, the court said "[i]t is not for the courts to interpret the substantive conditions of the contract or to determine the merits of the dispute." Rather, an award may be set aside upon this ground only where the arbitrator exceeded the express limitations of his or her powers, as set forth in the agreement itself.

In this instance the court found that the CBA provided that "[i]n the event any provision or provisions hereof are held to be unlawful, the remaining provisions of this [CBA] shall remain in effect and the parties thereto shall meet forth with [for] the purposes of modifying the same to conform with the law and/or negotiating provisions in lieu thereof." 

The Appellate Division ruled that Supreme Court erred in vacating the award on the ground that the arbitrator exceeded his authority in invalidating Article XI (D) of the CBA to the extent it violated Article II (B), explaining that “ Even if the arbitrator misconstrued or misapplied substantive rules of law, his determination did not exceed his authority and is not subject to judicial review.” 

As to the remedy directed by the arbitrator -- "grant health insurance or appropriate buyout compensation to bargaining unit members whose spouses are afforded coverage under the Empire Plan from a participating agency other than the Merrick Union Free School District" and directed the parties to negotiate, for the period from February 1, 2008, to April 30, 2009, a retroactive remedy to affected bargaining unit members”, the court concluded that this remedy was consistent with the broad power given to the arbitrator by the issues the parties agreed to submit to arbitration: (1) "[d]id the District violate Article II, Section B; Article XI, Section D and Article XXIII of the Collective Bargaining Agreement when it denied [NYSHIP] Health Insurance to bargaining unit members whose spouses are afforded [NYSHIP] coverage" and (2) "[I]f so, what shall be the remedy." 

However, said the court, while the parties' stipulation purported to grant the arbitrator unfettered authority to fashion a remedy, the arbitrator's remedial powers are specifically limited by Article XXIII of the CBA, which provides, "[i]n the event any provision or provisions hereof are held to be unlawful, the remaining provisions of this Agreement shall remain in effect and the parties thereto shall meet [forthwith for] the purposes of modifying the same to conform with the law and/or negotiating provisions in lieu thereof." 

The bottom line: the Appellate Division ruled that “The award was proper to the extent it directed the parties to negotiate a retroactive remedy for the period February 1, 2008, to April 1, 2009, as such relief is within the terms of Article XXIII of the CBA.” 

However, in contrast, the court said that the prospective relief in the arbitration award, which directed the district, as of May 1, 2009, to provide dual NYSHIP coverage or appropriate buyout compensation to bargaining unit members whose spouses are afforded NYSHIP coverage from a participating agency other than the School District, “exceeded the specifically enumerated limitation on the arbitrator's powers set forth in Article XXIII of the CBA,” concluding that Supreme Court properly vacated that portion of the award. 

The Appellate Division remitted the matter to the Supreme Court for an order directing the arbitrator to fashion a prospective remedy consistent with the determination in the arbitration award that (a) the Department of Civil Service’s Policy Memorandum 133 has the force and effect of law and (b) is in accordance with Article XXIII of the CBA.

Decisions concerning Article 75 motions seeking a stay of arbitration

Decisions concerning Article 75 motions seeking a stay of arbitration

Schenectady v Schenectady PBA, 285 AD2d 725

NYC Transit Authority v Amalgamated Transit Union Local 1056, 284 AD2d 466 

The PBA Case

The Schenectady Police Department unilaterally placed police officer Cheryl Flory on medical leave, effective April 10, 2000 to July 3, 2000, pursuant to the Family Medical Leave Act [FMLA].

Flory had been absent on unlimited paid sick leave for more than a year. Flory's union, the Schenectady PBA, grieved and demanded arbitration, contending that the department had violated the collective bargaining agreement. It alleged that the agreement provided “members with unlimited sick leave that guarantee that there will be no reduction in employee benefits or any unilateral changes in past practices.”

The department attempted to obtain a stay of arbitration on the ground that the grievance was not arbitrable because implementation of FMLA, a Federal statute, could not be considered a violation of the terms of the Agreement.*

A State Supreme Court justice denied the stay, finding that the grievance was arbitrable because it did not hinge on an interpretation of Federal law.

Instead, said the court, it simply raised the issue of whether the Agreement's provisions for employee leave time had been violated by department's unilateral imposition of one of the terms of the FMLA -- a mandatory minimum of a 12-week leave without pay -- on Flory's sick leave.

In considering the department's appeal of the denial of its petition for a stay of arbitration the Appellate Division said that, in general, grievances arising under public sector collective bargaining agreements are subject to arbitration where:

1. The Taylor Law authorizes arbitration of the dispute; and

2. The parties have agreed in their collective bargaining agreement to submit such disputes to arbitration.

The Appellate Division found that “[b]oth of these prerequisites for arbitrability are satisfied in the instant matter” since:

1. There is no dispute that the issue of employee leave time is a term or condition of employment; and

2. Although the parties did not agree to arbitrate matters pertaining to FMLA, the Agreement reflects that both parties did express their consent to arbitrate grievances regarding leave time, with “unresolved grievances * * * [to] be submitted to arbitration by either party”.

Accordingly, the court affirmed the Supreme Court's order denying the department's motion for a stay of arbitration.

FMLA entitles eligible employees to a total of 12 workweeks of leave without pay during any 12-month period for “qualifying” personal and family medical reasons. There is nothing in the FMLA barring an employer from deeming an employee to be on FMLA leave while simultaneously retaining the individual in sick leave at full pay status provided it advises the individual of this fact in writing. However, placing an individual on FMLA status does not automatically deprive the individual of other his or her rights under law, rule, or regulation or set out in a collective bargaining agreement.

The Local 1056 Case

The New York City Transit Authority [NYCTA] obtained a stay of arbitration from a State Supreme Court justice. Local 1056 appealed.

The case arose when the NYCTA received a notice from the New York State Department of Motor Vehicles [DMV] that the license of one of its bus drivers, Marvin Moses, would be suspended effective August 3, 1999, because he had allowed his automobile insurance to lapse. DMV subsequently confirmed that Moses's license had been suspended as of August 3, 1999.

Learning that Moses had continued to drive a bus during his suspension, NYCTA, citing Vehicle and Traffic Law Article 19-A, the NYCTA suspended Moses's employment for 64 days, a period equal to that during which he drove with a suspended license.

Local 1056, contending that the suspension of Moses's license was made in error, in that Moses had automobile insurance in effect during the entire period of the suspension, and that Moses was unaware of the suspension because the DMV failed to notify him, grieved the suspension.

NYCTA obtained a stay of arbitration of the denial of Moses's grievance on the theory that “the grievance was not arbitrable because it was merely performing its statutory obligation to enforce the Vehicle and Traffic Law, and that the performance of such a statutory duty was not subject to arbitration pursuant to the parties' arbitration agreement.”

The Appellate Division said that a court may stay arbitration on the ground that the particular claim sought to be arbitrated does not fall within the scope of the parties' arbitration agreement.

In making such a determination, the courts do not to engage in a penetrating analysis of the scope of the substantive provisions of a collective bargaining agreement but merely determine “whether there is a reasonable relationship between the subject matter of the dispute and the general subject matter of the [collective bargaining agreement].”

Here, said the Appellate Division, the arbitration provision is broad and there is a reasonable relationship between the subject matter of the dispute and the general subject matter of the collective bargaining agreement.

The collective bargaining agreement bars the arbitrator from rendering a determination or opinion “limiting or interfering in any way with the statutory powers, duties, and responsibilities of the Authority in operating, controlling, and directing the maintenance and operation of the transit facilities, or with the Authority's managerial responsibility to run the transit lines safely, efficiently, and economically”.

However, “[c]ontrary to the contention of the NYCTA, whether the resolution of the grievance by the arbitrator would violate that prohibition is not a matter for the courts.” Rather, such an inquiry requires the type of exacting interpretation of the precise scope of the substantive provisions of the CBA that is for the arbitrator” to resolve.

Vacating the stay that the NYCTA had obtained from Supreme Court, the Appellate Division commented that fact that submitting the grievance to arbitration “may require the arbitrator to interpret or apply statutes such as Vehicle and Traffic Law Article 19-A does not compel a different result.”

* FMLA entitles eligible employees to a total of 12 workweeks of leave without pay during any 12-month period for “qualifying” personal and family medical reasons. There is nothing in the FMLA barring an employer from deeming an employee to be on FMLA leave while simultaneously retaining the individual in sick leave at full pay status provided it advises the individual of this fact in writing. However, placing an individual on FMLA status does not automatically deprive the individual of other his or her rights under law, rule, or regulation or set out in a collective bargaining agreement.

Unpaid student workers: are they volunteers or employees?

Unpaid student workers: are they volunteers or employees?

Onondaga-Cortland-Madison BOCES v McGowan, 285 AD2d 36

The Onondaga-Cortland-Madison County BOCES attempted to augment the workforce training programs available to public high school students by involving its construction technology students in the actual construction of an office building being built for the West Genesee Central School District.

Under the immediate supervision of their instructors, BOCES student workers erected exterior and interior walls, installed sheet rock and placed insulation. The commercial contractors, using skilled union workers, performed the majority of the construction work, including all plumbing, electrical, foundation, truss and roofing work.

Following a union officer's complaint, the State Labor Department held that the students could not be classified as volunteers in connection with the project and, therefore, they would be considered employees subject to the prevailing wage provisions of Labor Law Section 220.

The Department's conclusion: BOCES had failed to pay the participating students “prevailing wages and supplements.” The amount to be paid to the students was determined to be $44,012. BOCES appealed.

The Appellate Division said that the basic questions are whether the BOCES students should be considered employees of a contractor on the project. Its answer: the students should not be considered employees of the project's contractors for the following reasons:

1. Education Law Section 4606(6) provides that students participating in school-to-employment programs are not employees within the purview of the Labor Law.

2. There is a public policy to exempt unpaid student workers from classification as employees under circumstances where the primary purpose of the work is instructional training for future employment.

3. The BOCES students were not hired, were not paid or otherwise compensated for their work, did not work a regular workday, and performed no work without the direct and constant supervision of their instructors.

4. The students were assigned tasks in order to fulfill the requirements of their technology class and receive credit from their home school districts.

The Appellate Division then annulled the Labor Commissioner's determination.
 

New York State's Human Rights Law bars discrimination against heterosexual individuals

New York State's Human Rights Law bars discrimination against heterosexual individuals

Brennan v Metropolitan Opera Association, Inc, 284 AD2d 66

Martha Ellen Brennan claimed that “on the basis of her [heterosexual] sexual orientation, her former employer, the Metropolitan Opera Association (Met), her former supervisor at the Met, David Kneuss, and the Met's general manager, Joseph Volpe, refused to renew her contract and subjected her to a hostile work environment, in violation of New York City law.”

The essential elements of Brennan's multiple allegations: the Met refused to renew her employment contract and subjected her to a hostile work environment because of her age, her sex and her heterosexual orientation, thereby discriminating against her in violation of:

1. 42 USC 2000e-2[a][1], prohibiting discrimination “because of ... sex”;

2. 29 USC 623[a][1], prohibiting discrimination “because of ... age”;

3. New York's Executive Law Section 296[1][a], prohibiting discrimination “because of ... sex”; and

4. New York City's Administrative Code Section 8-107, prohibiting discrimination because of “actual or perceived ... sexual orientation”.

Following the dismissal of her federal age and sex discrimination claims by the U.S. Court of Appeals, Second Circuit, (Brennan v Metropolitan Opera Association, 192 F.3d 310), Brennan commenced an action in New York State Supreme Court action on her sexual orientation discrimination claims.

The Supreme Court justice, noting that this issue was one “of first impression,” ruled that Brennan “is protected, as a heterosexual female, under the New York City law against employment discrimination based on sexual orientation.” The court explained: The fact that discrimination against heterosexuals is not as pervasive as that found against homosexuals does not change the clear wording of the municipal law nor does it lessen the impact of such prejudices on the individuals involved.

After making this finding, the Supreme Court justice granted the Mets' motion for summary judgment on the grounds that Brennan failed to show that her sexual orientation created a hostile work environment or was the reason for non-renewal of her contract. The Appellate Division affirmed the lower court's determination.

The Appellate Division said that for Brennan to prevail on her claim of a hostile work environment she must show that she was subjected to harassment based on her sexual orientation and that the harassment was so severe or pervasive as to “alter the conditions of [her] employment and create an abusive working environment,” citing Meritor Savings Bank v Vinson, 477 US 57, 67.

The Appellate Division pointed out that “first and foremost is the evidence” and Brennan “simply did not adduce sufficient evidence to sustain her claim that [the Met] created an environment hostile to heterosexuals.”

Brennan's case involved the lack of evidence sufficient to state a prima facie case of discrimination.

In contrast, “unrebutted evidence” of the complainant's prima facie case precludes administrative dismissal of unlawful discrimination charges. In Sauer v NYS Division of Human Rights Appellate Division, 285 AD2d 372, the Appellate Division annulled the New York State's Divisions of Human Rights dismissal of Vincent A. Sauer's age discrimination complaint and remanded it to the Division for an administrative hearing.

The Appellate Division said that Sauer's allegations that he was not hired because of his age and that younger Pan American Airways mechanics with less seniority, whom he specifically identified, were hired by Delta Airlines in his stead, are unrebutted by any evidence in the record.

According to the ruling, “Delta's unsigned and unsworn position statement, submitted in an attempt to settle [Sauer's] complaint,” in which Delta said that Sauer was not hired because he lacked sufficient seniority to be considered, was inadequate for that purpose.

New York City police sergeants not “management” for the purposes of the FLSA and thus entitled to payment for overtime

New York City police sergeants not “management” for the purposes of the FLSA and thus entitled to payment for overtime

Edward D. Mullins, et al v City Of New York, US Court Of Appeals, Second Circuit, Docket No. 09-3435-cv

The Fair Labor Standards Act, subject to certain exceptions, mandates overtime pay for employees who work more than 40 hours per week. Specifically, 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1) of the Act provides that no employer shall employ any of his employees who in any workweek is engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce, or is employed in an enterprise engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce,* for a workweek longer than forty hours unless such employee receives compensation for his employment in excess of the hours above specified at a rate not less than one and one-half times the regular rate at which he is employed."

Noting that the FLSA exempts workers who are “employed in a bona fide executive . . . capacity” from the Act’s overtime requirement, the Second Circuit supported the United States Secretary of Labor’s holding that New York City Police Department sergeants are not “management,” and thus the sergeants “do not qualify for the “bona fide executive” exemption from the overtime pay requirements of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938.”

The sergeants had sued the City, alleging denial of overtime pay under the FLSA to which they were entitled for overtime they worked from April 19, 2001 to the present.

* Presumably the Circuit Court found that the New York City Police Department is an employer “engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce, or is employed in an enterprise engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce.” 


 

Application for unemployment insurance after resignation rejected

Application for unemployment insurance after resignation rejected

Barry v Commissioner of Labor, 284 AD2d 701

Miriam R. Barry, a part-time teacher, applied for unemployment insurance benefits after resigning from her position. The Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board ruled that Barry was disqualified from receiving unemployment insurance benefits because she voluntarily left her employment without good cause.

The Appellate Division found that substantial evidence supported the Board's decision since Barry resigned from her part-time employment as a teacher to avoid possible scheduling conflicts with any potential new employment.

Although Barry was in the process of looking for a new job, she had no firm offer of new employment at the time she resigned. Since she resigned notwithstanding the fact that “continuing work was available,” the court said that it found “no reason to disturb the Board's decision.”

Challenging not being selected for a provisional appointment

Challenging not being selected for a provisional appointment

Cameron v Church, 309 AD2d 747

Is an individual entitled to a court order directing his or her provisional appointment or promotion to a position if there is proof that the reason for the applicant's nonselection was bias on the part of the individual making the employment decision? This was the issue in the Cameron case.

Terence R. Cameron challenged Westchester County's Commissioner of Transportation Marvin Church's appointment of Florence Petronio as a provisional “Program Specialist.” He obtained a court order from State Supreme Court Justice Nastasi directing Church to appoint him to the position.

Although the Appellate Division vacated Justice Nastasi's ordering Cameron's appointment to the position, it upheld the lower court's finding that Church's decision to reject Cameron's promotion request was arbitrary and capricious. The court said that the County failed to introduce any proof to controvert Cameron's evidence that he was denied the requested promotion “because of the personal animosity of Church towards his cousin.”

Although the Appellate Division held that Cameron was not entitled to an order directing that he be given the provisional promotion he wanted, it said that he was entitled to “consideration of his application on the merits, without improper factors” and remanded the matter to the lower court for further action. 

Disciplinary penalty vacated as too harsh

Disciplinary penalty vacated as too harsh

Lagala v NYC Police Dept., 286 AD2d 205; Leave to appeal denied, 97 NY2d 605

Courts have consistently ruled that an administrative disciplinary penalty imposed on an individual must be upheld “unless it shocks the judicial conscience and, therefore, constitutes an abuse of discretion as a matter of law.” A leading case setting out this principle: Pell v Board of Education, 34 NY2d 222. In Pell, the Court of Appeals said that a disciplinary penalty “shocks the judicial conscience when it is so graven in its impact that it is disproportionate to the offense.”

In the Lagala case the Appellate Division, First Department, applied the Pell standard and determined that the disciplinary penalty imposed on Lagala -- dismissal -- “shocks the judicial conscience.” The court directed that the matter be returned to the Commissioner for his reconsideration of the appropriate penalty to be imposed.

New York City police officer Anthony Lagala challenged his dismissal after he was found guilty of disciplinary charges alleging that he had (1) improperly issuing summonses for parking violations and (2) used a Department scooter without authorization.

The reasons given by the Appellate Division for vacating the disciplinary penalty imposed on Lagala and remanding the matter to the Commissioner of Police:

1. Lagala's sergeant testified that she never noticed deficiencies in the summonses he wrote, nor did she speak to him regarding the summonses he issued, although she spoke to 30 or 40 other officers about their deficiencies.

2. Lagala's performance evaluation for the period in question rated him between competent and highly competent.

3. The record showed that Lagala could not have taken the scooter without having obtained a supervisor's consent.

4. There is no evidence in the record that Lagala's misconduct involved dishonesty, venality or threat to public safety.

The court, referring to Pell, ruled that considering the relevant circumstances, the sanction of dismissal was so disproportionate to these “minor offenses” as to shock “one's sense of fairness.” 

DiNapoli’s Office Completes School Audits

New York State Comptroller Thomas P. DiNapoli announced his office completed the following audits: the Central Islip Union Free School District; the Eden Central School District; and, the Fonda-Fultonville Central School District..

In addition, Comptroller DiNapoli posted his completed audits of the City of Binghamton; the Town of Elma; the Elmont Fire District; the Town of Farmersville; Orange County; the Town of Orange; the Village of Penn Yan; and, the Village of Sherman.

These audits have been posted on the Internet and may be accessed by clicking on the name of the school district or municipality.

And the winner is….

And the winner is….

Goggle statistics

Goggle Statistics reports that as of August 1, 2011 “Any administrative action in the nature of discipline taken against a tenured teacher must be taken pursuant to Education Law §3020-a exclusively” the most read item posted on NYPPL.

Originally posted on July 13, 2010, it is found at: http://publicpersonnellaw.blogspot.com/2010/07/any-administrative-action-in-nature-of.html

Public policy voids arbitrator’s award

Public policy voids arbitrator’s award

City of New York v. Uniformed Firefighters Assn, 87 AD2d 255, [Revs'd on other grounds, 58 NY2d 957]

When New York City announced it would establish positions of (civilian) Fire Inspection Inspectors, the Firefighters Union objected.

An arbitrator ruled that assigning civilians to perform inspection and fire prevention duties previously performed by uniformed firefighters violated the Taylor Law contract between the City and the Firefighters Union and ordered the City not to make any further such assignments.

The City appealed the arbitrator’s award in favor of the Union to the Court (see Article 75, Civil Practice Law and Rules which sets forth limited grounds for challenging the award of an arbitrator). The Appellate Division ruled that “if an (arbitrator’s) award, such as the award in this case, contravenes the statutory mandate, it violates public policy and the court is required to set it aside....”

The decision noted that the City’s Administrative Code provided that the City determine the “methods, means and personnel by which government operations are to be conducted.” The opinion implies that where the arbitrator fashions an award which violates the mandate of a statute, the arbitrator has exceeded his authority and the award will not be enforced by the court. 

Temporary assignment not the same as appointment to a “position”

Temporary assignment not the same as appointment to a “position”

Miller, et al, v. Braun, Sheriff of Erie County, 89 A.D.2d 787

A number of Criminal Deputy Sheriffs with the Erie County Sheriff’s Department, a position in the competitive class, were “appointed” to the “position” of Special Deputy.

The Erie County Charter permitted the Sheriff to make “temporary assignments” as “Detective Deputy and Special Deputy.” The County eliminated the “Special Deputy” and established a competitive class position of Sergeant.

When former “Special Deputies” failed the test for Sergeant, they were returned to their regular Criminal Deputy positions. They then sued.

With respect to Miller’s claim that a “local law” was required to “reclassify” the position of “Special Deputy” to Sergeant, the Appellate Division ruled that the County had not created the position of “Special Deputy” but merely authorized the Sheriff to make a “temporary assignment” to that status.

The court then concluded “reclassification of the position of Special Deputy to make it competitive...does not effect an abolishment of or change in a position created by the Charter.”

It seems that there was some confusion between the creation of a “position” and the status of a person given a special title while in a position. Under traditional Civil Service classification concepts, the “position” of “Special Deputy”, if properly established, could have been “reclassified” to Sergeant.

In any event, the former “Special Deputies” would not appear to have a claim to permanent status in the Sergeant positions unless they were “permanently appointed” in accordance with law. (See CSEA v. Harrison, 48 NY2 66.)

Discipline to proceed despite pending criminal action involving the same event

Discipline to proceed despite pending criminal action involving the same event

Matter of Mountain, ___ AD2 ___, {1982]

From time to time an agency is faced with the question of what it should do when an employee has been given a notice of discipline and there are criminal charges involving the same event pending in the Court. In Matter of Mountain, the District Attorney, Schenectady County, attempted to get a court order to stop a disciplinary proceeding based on the same facts instituted against Mountain by the City of Schenectady.

The Appellate Division rejected the District Attorney’s argument that a premature disclosure of the testimony of witnesses would imperil the criminal proceeding against Mountain. The Court also noted that a criminal defendant did not have any right to stop a disciplinary proceeding pending the outcome of the criminal trial and the “prosecution has no greater right to protect its case.”

The courts appear to agree that the disciplinary action should not be influenced by the fact that the employee is also facing criminal action as a result of the same event.

Not every criticism is a reprimand

Not every criticism is a reprimand

Port Jefferson Union Free School District v. United Aids and Assistants, PERB decision U-5713

PERB rejected the Unions argument that every written criticism of an employee is a “reprimand” and therefore can only result from “disciplinary action.”

The case arose when, in response to an inquiry from the School Superintendent, the school principal made a number of recommendations including one that suggested “the Association ought not be brought in unless the immediate supervisor cannot or will not resolve the (grievance) problem.” This was viewed as a criticism of an employee.

The PERB decision is consistent with opinions issued by the Commissioner of Education and the Courts to the effect that letters in an employee’s personal file commenting on the employee’s conduct or performance the employer found unsatisfactory is not discipline.

No automatic appointment for substitute teachers

No automatic appointment for substitute teachers

Matter of Susan Daniels, Decisions of the Commissioner of Education #10918

When the incumbent for whom she was substituting died, the School Board, at the request of the Union to fill the position in accordance with the terms of the collective bargaining agreement, granted the substitute teacher a “temporary appointment.”

The Contract provided that a temporary appointment was to be made when the employment as a substitute was to be for more than 40 consecutive days.

When the substitute was notified that she was not under consideration for permanent appointment, she sued claiming that she should be deemed to be a probationer in the vacant position “by operation of law.”

Accordingly, she argued, she could not be removed unless the provisions of Section 3020-a of the Education Law were met.

Following a series of administrative and Court proceedings, the question was returned for consideration by the Commissioner of Education.

After finding the appeal untimely. the Commissioner dismissed the appeal on the merits, indicating that although the Board has no authority to make other than probationary appointments to fill permanent vacancies, a teacher may waive the statutory entitlement.

The Commissioner then found that the bargaining agreement provision (with which the Board had complied at the request of the Union) constituted such a waiver and Daniels could not now challenge that action by the School Board.

Unit determinations and substitute teachers

Unit determinations and substitute teachers

In the Matter of North Syracuse Central School District, PERB Decision C-2367

The 1981 amendment to the Taylor Law providing for representation of per diem substitute teachers (Chapter 814, Law of 1981) has required PERB to consider a number of “unit” questions.

The Board ruled that per diem substitutes whose employer gives them reasonable assurance of continuing employment should not be placed in “fractionalized units” within a school district depending on the frequency or infrequency of their employment.

PERB indicated that the authors of amendment “saw no difficulty in multiple representation of (such) per diem substitute teachers who hold ... substitute teaching positions” with a number of school districts.

Finally, the decision indicates that “the status of per diem substitutes who did not receive a reasonable assurance of continuing employment was not changed by the 1981 amendment. (See Section 201.7(d) of the Civil Service Law.)

An alternative to a principal for each school

An alternative to a principal for each school

Matter of Mennella, Decisions of the Commissioner of Education #10851

Although the Regulations of the Commissioner of Education provide that each school in a District shall have a qualified principal assigned to it, waivers may be obtained (8 NYCRR 100.3).

An example of this is found in the Commissioner’s decision in Mennella.

One issue in this appeal to the Commissioner of Education was Mennella’s attempt to obtain an order to restore funds for an abolished position of principal. The District had decided to administer its two smallest elementary schools by assigning one principal and two assistant principals to them.

The Commissioner rejected the claim that the District could not do so, noting the he had earlier granted the District the required exemption. Both of the Assistant Principals held valid elementary principal certificates and were qualified to perform the duties assigned to them according to the determination.

Employer must reinstate employee absent on Workers’ Compensation Leave upon the certification by civil service commission’s medical officer that the individual is fit to perform the duties of his or her position

Employer must reinstate employee absent on Workers’ Compensation Leave upon the certification by civil service commission’s medical officer that the individual is fit to perform the duties of his or her position

Matter of Lazzari v Town of Eastchester, 2011 NY Slip Op 06125, Appellate Division, Second Department

Richard Lazzari, the Town of Eastchester’s Assistant Building Inspector and Deputy Building Inspector was on Workers’ Compensation Leave pursuant to §71 of the Civil Service Law. A medical officer appointed by the County of Westchester Department of Human Resources certified that Lazzari was physically and mentally fit to perform the duties of his former positions.

Supreme Court denied the Town’s petition seeking a copy of the medical officer’s report and directed the Town to reinstate Lazzari to his position with back salary.*

The Appellate Division held that Supreme Court properly determined that the County of Westchester Department of Human Resources (hereinafter the DHR) fully complied with Civil Service Law §71 in directing the Town of Eastchester to reinstate Lazzari to his former positions.

The court noted that §71 provides that an employee “who has been "separated from the service by reason of a disability resulting from occupational injury or disease as defined in the workmen's compensation law," may be reinstated to his or her former position if, after an independent medical examination conducted by a medical officer selected by the municipal commission "having jurisdiction over the position last held by [the employee]," such medical officer certifies that the employee is "physically and mentally fit to perform the duties of his or her former position."

The court rejected the Town’s contention that the Westchester Human Resources had to first provide it with the medical officer's certification that Lazzari was medical fit or the medical report on which the medical officer based the certification.

In addition, the Appellate Division held that Supreme Court was also correctly determined that Lazzari was entitled to back pay, retroactive to December 18, 2007, pursuant to Civil Service Law §77.

* In addition, the court awarded Lazzari and Paula Redd Zeman, as Commissioner of the Westchester County Department of Human Resources, the Westchester County Department of Human Resources, and the County of Westchester, one bill of costs payable by the Town of Eastchester and the Town Board of the Town of Eastchester.

======================

The Spring 2011 issue of Municipal Lawyer, Vol. 25, No.2, published by the New York State Bar Association’s Municipal Law Section, contains an article entitled Leaves of Absences for Disability Pursuant to Civil Service Law Sections 71 and 72.  To order a copy telephone the Bar Association at 518 487-5671 or 518-487-5672 or via  E-mail at newsletters@nysba.org

The Union's duty of fair representation

The Union's duty of fair representation

UFT Local 2 v NYC Board of Education, 34 PERB 4553

John Zito, a New York City teacher, was served with a notice of discipline pursuant to Section 3020-a of the Education Law while he was on an “extended sick leave” of absence without pay. He was told that he was to be suspended with pay pending resolution of the charges in accordance with Section 3020-a. The charges: excessive absenteeism and neglect of duty.

The problem: according to the decision, Zito refused to terminate his “leave of absence without pay for restoration of health,” a condition precedent to his being placed on leave with pay in connection with his being suspended in accordance with Section 3020-a. In the words of an internal union memorandum concerning the situation: “Zito wants to receive his salary while on a leave of absence without pay.”

Despite the union's position that there was no merit to Zito's seeking to have the Section 3020-a charges dismissed, he filed a grievance alleging the district's action violated various provisions of the collective bargaining agreement.

UFT Local 2, after consultation with its attorneys and others, had declined to process Zito's grievance seeking dismissal of the disciplinary charges to “Step 3”.* Local 2 concluded that insofar as relief sought by Zito -- restoration to the payroll while continuing on sick leave without pay -- “no contractual provision governed Zito's situation and that a grievance would, therefore, not be meritorious.” Zito response to the Local's decision: he filed charges with PERB alleging that the union had violated its duty of fair representation.

PERB's Administrative Law Judge [ALJ] Philip L. Maier ruled that the evidence did not demonstrate that the UFT acted in an arbitrary, discriminatory or bad faith manner when it refused to move Zito's grievance to Step 3. Further, said Maier, even if the UFT's decision not to process the grievance to Step 3 was incorrect, “this mistake would not in and of itself rise to the level of a violation of the [union's] duty of fair representation.” The test announce by the ALJ to be used to determine if a union has violated its duty of fair representation: A union violates its duty of fair representation if a charging party's interpretation of the merits of the grievance is “the only possible interpretation,” but the union nevertheless refuses to process the grievance, since such action amounts to arbitrary conduct.

Concluding that Zito's interpretation of the contract clauses he contended had been violation was not the only possible interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement, Maier dismissed the improper practice charge filed against Local 2.

* The collective bargaining permitted an employee to process a grievance at Steps 1 and 2; only the UFT could process a grievance to Step 3.

Concerning filing a timely Article 78

Concerning filing a timely Article 78

Budihas v Board of Education, 285 AD2d 549

Bonilla v Board of Education, 285 AD2d 548

When does the four-month Statute of Limitation to file a timely Article 78 petition begin to run? This critical issue involving the State's adjective law is explored in the Budihas and Bonilla cases.

The Budihas Case

On April 8, 1998, Stephen J. Budihas was told that his employment as a probationary principal would be terminated “as of the close of business on May 1, 1998”. Ultimately, the decision to terminate Budihas was sustained by the Chancellor of the Board of Education of the City of New York on April 8, 1999.

On July 30, 1999, Budihas filed a petition pursuant to Article 78 of the Civil Practice Law and Rules seeking to overturn the Chancellor's decision. The Appellate Division, Second Department, affirmed a Supreme Court decision holding that Budihas' petition was untimely.

The court pointed out that “a determination to terminate probationary employment becomes final and binding on the date the termination becomes effective,” citing Frasier v Board of Education, 71 NY2d 763. Accordingly, said the court, Budihas' petition, filed on July 30, 1999, is clearly time-barred.

Courts, usually in cases involving employee timeliness claims in civil rights litigation, have ruled that the Statute of Limitations commence to run when the decision to terminate an employee is communicated to the individual rather than the effective date of the termination. The leading case addressing this issue: Delaware State College v Ricks, 449 US 250.

The Bonilla Case

 

The Bonilla case, however, in addition to the issue of the “timeliness” of an Article 78 challenging an employee's dismissal, concerned the timeliness of an appeal from an administrative decision affirming the unsatisfactory performance evaluation underlying the employee's termination.

On June 26, 1998, New York City teacher Carmelo Bonilla was terminated from his position as a provisional [sic] science teacher. Bonilla had received an unsatisfactory rating of his teaching performance.

However, the final decision sustaining Bonilla's unsatisfactory performance rating was not issued by the Chancellor of the Board of Education until March 25, 1999. On July 20, 1999, Bonilla filed an Article 78 petition seeking to have his unsatisfactory rating annulled and an order directing his reinstatement to his former position with back pay and benefits.

The Supreme Court dismissed Bonilla's petition in its entirety as time-barred, ruling the Statute of Limitations began to run on the date Bonilla's employment was terminated in June 1998. The Appellate Division disagreed in part with this ruling, holding that the “Supreme Court erred in dismissing the entire proceeding on the ground that it was barred by the Statute of Limitations.”

Clearly, said the court, an Article 78 proceeding against a public body or officer must be commenced within four months after the determination to be reviewed becomes final and binding. Thus that part of Bonilla's Article 78 petition seeking a review of determining to dismiss him effective June 26, 1998, is barred by the four-month Statute of Limitations because this determination became final on the effective date of his discharge.

In contrast, said the court, that part of Bonilla's Article 78 petition challenging the March 25, 1999 determination by the Chancellor, sustaining Bonilla's unsatisfactory rating was not time barred.

Bonilla, explained the Appellate Division, had a right to administrative appeal his unsatisfactory evaluation as well as a hearing to test that determination. The hearing panel's recommendation did not become final until the Chancellor issued a decision acting upon it. Accordingly, the determination that Bonilla's teaching performance was unsatisfactory did not become final and binding until the Chancellor denied his appeal and sustained the rating.

The court annulled Bonilla's unsatisfactory rating “since the [Board of Education conceded] that it was not preceded by an inspection of [Bonilla's] work and a consultation with him by the appropriate official.”

As Bonilla's Article 78 attack on the Chancellor's determination has survived [and assuming his was a probationary, in contrast to holding a provisional appointment], he may ultimately prevail in his quest for reinstatement if he can demonstrate that the performance evaluation underlying his termination was arbitrary or capricious or was otherwise materially defective.

If, on the other hand, Bonilla was, in fact, appointed as a provisional employee, presumably any further proceeding would be solely in the nature of a “name-clearing” hearing.

Union's right to obtain information

Union's right to obtain information

Schuyler-Chemung-Tioga Educational Asso., 34 PERB 3019

The Public Employment Relations Board concluded that it was an improper practice for the Schuyler-Chemung-Tioga BOCES to refuse to provide the Educational Association with information it said it required in connection with its investigation of a possible grievance.

Although PERB noted that it had ruled that a refusal to provide information may result in a charge alleging “a refusal to negotiate” under Section 209-a.1(d) of the Taylor Law, such a refusal may also constitute a violation of Section 209-a.1(a) of the Act.

In the words of PERB “[t]he [employer's] denial of a reasonable demand for information which is relevant to collective negotiations, grievance adjustment, the administration of a collective bargaining agreement, or the resolution of an impasse ... impairs the union's ability to effectively represent the interests of employees in the unit.

The duty of the employer to provide the union with such information is not unlimited, however. The duty to provide information in the context of a grievance procedure is circumscribed by the “rules of reasonableness,” including the burdensomeness of the request, the availability of the information through other sources, the relevancy of the information and its necessity.

Dismissal of correction officer found guilty of failure to act in situation involving an inmate-on-inmate assault recommended

Dismissal of correction officer found guilty of failure to act in situation involving an inmate-on-inmate assault recommended

Dep’t of Correction v. Connell (in PDF), OATH Index No. 1598/11

OATH Administrative Law Judge Tynia Richard found that a correction officer assigned to a mental observation unit permitted an inmate-on-inmate assault inside a cell, passively stood by as inmates entered and exited the cell, failed to properly perform lock-in/lock-out procedures, failed to report the assault, and failed to obtain medical attention for the injured inmate.

ALJ Richard found “convincing video evidence also showed the officer participating in the assault, although he did not strike the inmate.”

ALJ Richard recommended termination of employment, in part due to the failure of the officer, a long-term employee, to testify and offer an explanation for his actions or any mitigation evidence.

Filing an election of a retirement option

Filing an election of a retirement option

Matter of Leisten, 285 AD2d 897, Motion to appeal denied, 97 NY2d 605

If nothing else, the Leisten decision serves as a reminder that it is the responsibility of the member of the retirement system to file the form designating his or her beneficiary and the form required for the selection of the retirement option he or she desires with the retirement system.

Faced with a terminal illness, David Leisten filed a request for an estimate of retirement benefits which would be payable under the joint allowance-full option, naming his wife, Pearl Leisten, as his intended beneficiary. In response to his request, the New York State Employees' Retirement System [ERS] sent Leisten an estimate of amounts payable under the various retirement options together with a blank option election form that was to be completed and filed with ERS within a specified time. The form specifically noted that if an option election is not timely filed, “the law requires that you be retired under the cash refund contributions option”.

The joint allowance-full option Leisten indicated he wished to elect in his request to take early retirement would have entitled his widow to monthly payments of $880 for the remainder of her life. ERS, however, could not find a completed option election form in its files. Accordingly, ERS told Pearl Leisten that it was bound to apply the cash refund-contribution option, entitling her to receive only a full ordinary death benefit: $49,000.

The court said that “while an employee is authorized to elect from several retirement payout options ... such election must be received and filed prior to the retiree's death to be effective.” As the record contained testimony highlighting the difference between the naming of an intended beneficiary in an early retirement request and the designation of a beneficiary in a legally effective option election, the Appellate Division sustained ERS's decision that Pearl Leisten was only entitled to an ordinary death benefit as supported by substantial evidence.

The lesson here: members must make certain that a timely designation of beneficiary and the benefit option the member wishes upon retirement is on file with the retirement system. 

Employees disciplined for insubordination after failing to report co-worker's misbehavior

Employees disciplined for insubordination after failing to report co-worker's misbehavior

Hoey v PERB, 284 AD2d 633

Teacher aides employed by the Cayuga-Onondaga Board of Cooperative Educational Services [BOCES] were given specific instructions to report any concerns about classroom matters -- they were immediately to bring them to the attention of the supervisor of special education or the school principal.

According to the decision, the aides becoming aware that a teacher had engaged in bizarre and inappropriate behavior of a sexual nature with one of the students. About a month later, they reported the teacher's suspected conduct to one of their union representatives rather than BOCES's management. Two days later the union representative told BOCES of the aides' report.

Cheryle Hoey and a number of other aides were terminated after being found guilty of insubordination -- failing to comply with directives given to them directing them to report "concerns involving classroom matters." Hoey and the others challenged their dismissal, contending that they had been disciplined because of their engaging in protected union activities and filed improper practice charges with PERB.

PERB rejected the complaint and held that BOCES had not engaged in any improper practice in firing the aides. The Appellate Division sustained PERB's determination. The court ruled that the evidence amply supported PERB's findings that the aides had not been terminated for engaging in a protected activity but, rather, for failing to follow a supervisor's directive and jeopardizing the safety of a child under their supervision by failing to timely report suspected child abuse.

Although PERB agreed that the aides had engaged in a protected activity when they consulted with representatives of their union, it further determined that BOCES was not improperly motivated but, rather, had legitimate business and educational reasons for terminating Hoey and the other aides.

Freedom of Information requests

Freedom of Information requests

Chittenden v Novack, NYS Supreme Court, Westchester County, [Not selected for publication in the Official Reports]

In Chittenden, the court considered a number of issues concerning a union president's request for certain records under the Freedom of Information Law [FOIL]. Responding to a number of issues presented by the union's demand for information and records pursuant to FOIL, the court said:

1. A grievance procedure under the collective bargaining agreement was not the proper procedure for appealing the denial of FOIL requests.

2. A FOIL request for the names of all members of the police department who have been on chronic sick leave, with six questions regarding each member, is not a specific request for records.

3. Records disclosing the medical history of employees or applicants are exempt as an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy under the Public Officer's Law Section 89(2)(b)(i).

4. Attendance records or time sheets for employees that are redacted as to the medical reason for the absence are not an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.

5. Records containing statistical data, such as the amount of sick time or vacation time accumulated or used, dates or times of an employee's attendance or absence, notations that sick leave or vacation time was charged, are relevant to public accountability and subject to disclosure.

6. Public inspections of portions of employment records or applications, which reveal an existing medical condition and/or treatment for disabilities is exempt from disclosure as “medical histories.”

7. A records access officer is not required to answer questions or analyze information on behalf of individuals or organizations making the request.

8. The agency must supply appropriate records upon its receipt of a proper request, provided such records exist, but is under no obligation to furnish records, which do not exist.

9. Intra-agency materials not subject to disclosure under FOIL. According to the ruling, “opinions, advice, evaluations, deliberation, proposals, policy formulation, conclusions or recommendations are exempt from public access” under FOIL, as are a government agency deliberative functions.

NYC Department of Sanitation employee acquitted of disciplinary charges

NYC Department of Sanitation employee acquitted of disciplinary charges

Dep’t of Sanitation v. Gonzalez (in PDF), OATH Index No. 1915/11

An OATH Administrative Law Judge found that the New York City Department of Sanitation failed to prove that a sanitation worker solicited money from an apartment building superintendent in order to remove broken furniture.

Judge John B. Spooner found that several factors, including the passage of time, an investigator’s failure to preserve a clear contemporaneous account from the complainant, and the complainant’s apparent confusion about another incident with a different worker two days later, undermined the Department’s proof and warranted dismissal of the charges. 

Contacting a party in an administrative proceeding using his or her last known address

Contacting a party in an administrative proceeding using his or her last known address

NYS National Organization for Women v Pataki, CA2, 261 F.2d 156

Courts sometimes provide insights into administrative due process procedures in the course of considering a case that essentially focuses on a completely different issue. In the National Organization for Women [NOW] case, which concerned due process in the adjudication of alleged violations of an individual's civil rights, one of the ministerial issues considered by the Circuit Court of Appeals, Second Circuit, was an administrative agency's duty to “track down” an individual.

In this “class action,” NOW sued the NYS Division of Human Rights [Division] on behalf of individuals who, since October 15, 1990, “had filed [or will file] complaints of discrimination with the Division and whose complaints have not been, or will not be, finally administratively adjudicated or otherwise substantively resolved within three years of the date of the filing of the complaint.” NOW alleged that the Division violated the class members' Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process rights as a result of its:

1. protracted delays in processing their discrimination claims that prejudiced such claims; and

2. deficiencies in notifying certain individuals that their claims were to be dismissed for “administrative convenience.”

One of the arguments advanced by NOW was that certain class members were not advised that the Division had dismissed their claims for “administrative convenience” because the Division was unable to locate them. It appears that these individuals had moved after filing their complaint but never advised the Division of their new address.

Was the Division incorrect when it dismissed discrimination complaints for “administrative convenience” because the Division was unable to locate the individual? The court said that the Division's use of the U.S. Postal Service to send the notice to complaints “at the last address furnished to the Division comports with due process.”

Sometimes such a “lack of notice” will become an issue in connection with a disciplinary hearing that has been conducted “in absentia.”

In “in absentia” disciplinary adjudications a hearing is held despite the employee's failure to appear at the hearing and his or her absence is unexplained. Typically the agency is required to prove its case against the employee to the hearing officer or arbitrator notwithstanding the absence of the employee or his or her representative.

Before holding a disciplinary hearing in absentia the employer or the hearing officer should make a reasonable attempt to locate the individual and determine the reason why he or she has not appeared at the hearing. It may be that the employee has a valid excuse for his or her nonappearance such as a family emergency or personal illness that would justify the hearing officer granting an adjournment of the hearing.

If the employee is found guilty of the charges and later challenges the determination, or the penalty imposed, on the grounds that he or she never received any notice of the time and place of the hearing because the notice was not sent to his or her “new address,” it seems clear that the courts will not be too sympathetic to such an argument unless the individual can show that he or she advised the employer of his or her new address and the employer neglected to note the change of address in its records.

Portal to portal pay

Portal to portal pay

Manners v State of New York, 285 A.D.2d 858, [Appeal dismissed, 97 N.Y.2d 637]

Charles W. Manners, Jr., a State Officer of General Services [OGS] construction superintendent asked the Court of Claims to direct OGS to pay him overtime compensation pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards Act (29 USC 201). Manners contended that OGS, by “requiring” him to use a State vehicle to commute to and from his assigned workstation, is obligated to pay him overtime for his commuting time.

The Court of Claims dismissed his claim [183 Misc 2d 382]. The Appellate Division, Third Department agreed, holding that although “the Fair Labor Standards Act [FLSA] requires employers to pay employees for all work performed, under the Portal-to-Portal Act (29 USC 251), time spent by an employee commuting to and from work, even in an employer-provided vehicle, is not compensable”

The court noted that there was no dispute that Manners was not engaged in any work-related activity while commuting to and from his assigned work station and thus the Court of Claims properly determined that this travel time was not compensable.