Free speech does not protect individuals using epithets

Free speech does not protect individuals using epithets
Charles Williams v Town of Greenburgh, et al, 535 F.3d 71

A governmental entity may be sued for allegedly suppressing an individual’s Constitutional protected Freedom of Speech.

In the Williams case, the Second Circuit addressed, among other things, Williams’ allegation that the Town of Greenburgh’s actions against him were taken in retaliation for his exercising his right to free speech when it expelled him from a town facility and prosecuted him for trespass.

In addressing this aspect of Williams’ petition, the Second Circuit explained that it has “described the elements of a First Amendment retaliation claim in several ways, depending on the factual context, comparing Curley v. Village of Suffern, 268 F.3d 65, 73 (2d Cir. 2001) (requiring a private citizen who sued a public official to show: “(1) [the plaintiff] has an interest protected by the First Amendment; (2) defendants’ actions were motivated or substantially caused by his exercise of that right; and (3) defendants’ actions effectively chilled the exercise of his First Amendment right”), with Johnson v. Ganim, 342 F.3d 105, 112 (2d Cir. 2003) (requiring evidence of “adverse employment action” where plaintiff was a public employee), and Gill v. Pidlypchak, 389 F.3d 379, 380 (2d Cir. 2004) (requiring, in the prison context, an adverse action by defendants and a causal connection between the adverse action and the protected speech).

Regardless of the factual context, said the court, it has required a plaintiff alleging retaliation to establish that his or her speech was protected by the First Amendment.

Citing Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, the Circuit Court noted that “There are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention and punishment of which have never been thought to raise any Constitutional problem. These include the lewd and obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the insulting or “fighting” words — those that by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace. It has been well observed that such utterances are no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality.”

Resort to epithets or personal abuse is not in any proper sense communication of information or opinion safeguarded by the Constitution, and its punishment as a criminal act would raise no question under that instrument.

The court concluded that because Williams could not show that his speech was either silenced or chilled — i.e., that his right to free speech was actually violated — his claim failed as a matter of law and sustained the district court’s granting the Town’s motion for summary judgment dismissing his petition.

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://caselaw.findlaw.com/us-2nd-circuit/1124970.html

A so-called “Zipper Clause” bars considering the terms of a stipulation of settlement resolving grievances brought under an earlier CBA

A so-called “Zipper Clause” bars considering the terms of a stipulation of settlement resolving grievances brought under an earlier CBA
Local 2841 of N.Y. State Law Enforcement Officers Union, AFSCME, AFL-CIO v City of Albany, 53 AD3d 974

A stipulation of settlement was entered into by Local 2841 and the City of Albany to resolve a number of grievances filed under the then Collective Bargaining Agreement [CBA]. By its terms, the stipulation “could not be modified or rescinded absent a subsequent writing of the parties.”

Subsequently the Local and the City negotiated and executed a successor CBA.

In the course of resolving a grievance brought under the new CBA, the arbitrator found that the stipulation made under the earlier CBA had not been modified or rescinded by any writing of the parties. Further, the arbitrator deemed the stipulation of settlement to be a rule of the Albany Police Department and, therefore, concluded that the City violated the terms of the CBA by not complying with its provisions.

The Appellate Division disagreed and vacated the arbitrator’s award.

The court said that “inasmuch as the successor CBA represents the entire agreement between the parties, it was not proper for the arbitrator to rely on the ‘stipulation of settlement’ flowing from the earlier CBA in resolving the instant grievance.”

“Accordingly,” ruled the Appellate Division, “the arbitrator exceeded his power in amending the terms of the CBA by considering that stipulation of settlement in contravention of an expressed term of the CBA which prohibited amending, modifying or deleting any provision thereof,” presumably viewing a term in the successor CBA as constituting “a subsequent writing of the parties” modifying or rescinding the terms of the stipulation of settlement entered into under the earlier CBA.

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://www.courts.state.ny.us/reporter/3dseries/2008/2008_06421.htm

Termination of employee for poor attitude and aggressive behavior recommended

Termination of employee for poor attitude and aggressive behavior recommended

Triborough Bridge & Tunnel Auth. v. Bell, OATH Index No. 1635/08

 

A Bridge and Tunnel Officer drew his firearm and pointed it at a customer after the customer reached into a bag during a dispute at the Queens Midtown Tunnel tollbooth.

OATH Administrative Law Judge Alessandra Zorgniotti found that the employee’s use of his firearm was reasonable but recommended his dismissal because the incident stemmed from his proven discourtesy and unexplained refusal to process the customer's toll.

The ALJ found that the respondent's significant history of customer complaints relating to his poor attitude and aggressive behavior made him a threat to public safety.

The Doctrine of Maintenance and Cure provides seamen with a workers’ compensation type of benefit

The Doctrine of Maintenance and Cure provides seamen with a workers’ compensation type of benefit

Messier v Bouchard Transp., USCA, 2^nd Circuit, Docket #10-5181

The Doctrine of Maintenance and Cure has been compared to workers’ compensation benefits in that the duty arises from employment and “does not rest upon negligence or culpability on the part of the owner or master.” As the Second Circuit said in Weiss v. Cent. R.R. Co. of N.J., 235 F.2d 309, maintenance and cure has been called “a kind of nonstatutory workmen’s compensation” benefit.

Under the Doctrine, the owner of the vessel is obligated to provide food, lodging, and medical services to a seaman while in he or she is in service. The Doctrine entitles an injured seaman to three remedies —maintenance, cure, and wages. The general rule is that “maintenance and cure” is available for any injury or illness that occurs during a seaman’s service.

A seaman filed a complaint in federal district court asserting claims for negligence under the federal Jones Act* and for "maintenance and cure under general maritime law."** Ultimately he withdrew all claims other than those for “Maintenance and Cure.”

Reversing the district court’s dismissal of the seaman’s petition, the Circuit Court of Appeals said that “Maintenance” compensates the injured seaman for food and lodging expenses during his medical treatment. “Cure” refers to the reasonable medical expenses incurred in the treatment of the seaman’s condition while lost wages are provided in addition to maintenance on the rationale that “maintenance compensates the injured seaman for food and lodging, which the seaman otherwise receives free while on the ship.”

“The obligation to provide maintenance and cure payments,” however, “does not furnish the seaman with a source of lifetime or long-term disability income.” An eligible seaman is entitled to maintenance and cure only “until he [or she] reaches maximum medical recovery,” i.e., “until such time as the incapacity is declared to be permanent.”

Citing Farrell v. United States, 336 U.S. 511, the Circuit Court noted that the Supreme Court ruled that … “where a seaman has reached the point of maximum medical cure and maintenance and cure payments have been discontinued, the seaman may nonetheless reinstitute a demand for maintenance and cure where subsequent new curative medical treatments become available."

The Circuit Court than cautioned: “The analogy to workers’ compensation, however, can be misleading, because maintenance and cure is a far more expansive remedy. First, although it is limited to 'the seaman who becomes ill or is injured while in the service of the ship,' it is not restricted to those cases where the seaman’s employment is the cause of the injury or illness. '[T]he obligation can arise out of a medical condition such as a heart problem, a prior illness that recurs during the seaman’s employment, or an injury suffered on shore'.”

Further said the court, “the doctrine is ‘so broad’ that ‘negligence or acts short of culpable misconduct on the seaman’s part will not relieve the shipowner of the responsibility.’” Accordingly, the doctrine may apply even if a seaman is injured or falls ill off-duty or while on shore leave, so long as the seamen is “in the service of the ship,” which means he is “generally answerable to its call to duty rather than actually in performance of routine tasks or specific orders.”

Another difference pointed out by the court: a seaman may be entitled to maintenance and cure even for a preexisting medical condition that recurs or becomes aggravated during his or her service.

Accordingly, the Circuit Court remanded the matter to the district court to “proceed to trial on the amount of maintenance and cure due” the seaman.

* 46 United States Code 883.[See, in particular, 46 USC 30104, Personal injury to or death of seamen.]

** A seaman who is required to sue a shipowner to recover maintenance and cure may also recover attorney fees [Vaughan v. Atkinson, 369 U.S. 527].

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://www.ca2.uscourts.gov/decisions/isysquery/cd687548-b977-4833-8f81-7edb94f3058a/2/doc/10-5181_opn.pdf#xml=http://www.ca2.uscourts.gov/decisions/isysquery/cd687548-b977-4833-8f81-7edb94f3058a/2/hilite/

Retired teacher ruled entitled to enroll new spouse in the District’s health insurance plan under the terms of the collective bargaining agreement

Retired teacher ruled entitled to enroll new spouse in the District’s health insurance plan under the terms of the collective bargaining agreement

Bower v Board of Educ., Cazenovia Cent. School Dist., 53 AD3d 967

Retired from his teaching position with Cazenovia Central School District, at which time he was enrolled as an individual participant in the district's group health insurance plan, the retired teacher subsequently married and asked the District to change his health insurance to family coverage so that his wife would be covered. The district refused, contending that a retired teacher is not permitted to change his or her health insurance coverage.

The retiree sued, arguing that (1) the applicable collective bargaining agreement permitted him to change his coverage and (2) the district's refusal violated the statutory moratorium against reducing health insurance benefits of retirees unless there was a corresponding reduction for active employees.

Supreme Court held that retiree had the right under the terms of the collective bargaining agreement to change his health insurance coverage to include his new spouse. The District appealed, only to the Appellate Division affirm the lower court’s ruling.

The Appellate Division noted that Article XXII of the agreement provided that "[a]ll bargaining unit personnel currently employed or retired from [the district] who are legally eligible may participate in the . . . health insurance program," and that Appendix G to the agreement, sets forth individual coverage and family coverage as the "two types of enrollment" available, pointed out that a section in the agreement entitled "ENROLLMENT CHANGES" recognized that "[c]hanges in your family status may make it necessary or desirable for you to change the coverage for which you are enrolled," and states, in relevant part, that "[y]ou may request a change from individual coverage to [f]amily coverage . . . [t]o provide coverage for a newly acquired spouse."

As there is nothing in the collective bargaining agreement to indicate that "you" in this provision was not intended to include retired employees, the Appellate Division said that “Reading the relevant provisions as a whole, we agree with Supreme Court that the agreement permitted the retiree to add his spouse to his health insurance.”

The full text of the decision is posted at:

http://www.courts.state.ny.us/reporter/3dseries/2008/2008_06418.htm

Appointing authority’s decision to terminate an employee found guilty of misconduct may not be set aside if supported by substantial evidence

Appointing authority’s decision to terminate an employee found guilty of misconduct may not be set aside if supported by substantial evidence
Guerrero v Scoppetta, 53 AD3d 615

The New York City Fire Commissioner, adopting the recommendation of a hearing officer, found a New York City Fire Department Emergency Medical Technician [EMT] guilty of a number of charges of misconduct and terminating his employment.

The Appellate Division said that the finding that finding that the employee was guilty of the charges was supported by substantial evidence.

Substantial evidence, said the court, is "less than a preponderance of the evidence, overwhelming evidence or evidence beyond a reasonable doubt" and here New York City Fire Department records, the testimony of numerous witnesses and the EMT, and a videotape of the incidents on which the determination was based, provided "such relevant proof as a reasonable mind may accept as adequate"

Judicial review of an administrative determination made after a hearing required by law is limited to whether the determination is supported by substantial evidence. The Appellate Division dismissed the EMT’s appeal, holding that as the Commissioner’s determination was supported by substantial evidence, it may not be set aside.

The full text of the decision is posted at:

http://www.courts.state.ny.us/reporter/3dseries/2008/2008_06375.htm