Testing for drugs
Roy v City of New York, 685 NY2d 668
How much evidence is sufficient to require an employee to take a drug test? And if the employee refuses to take the drug test, is that grounds for dismissal?
The Appellate Division addressed those questions in the Roy case. The court ruled that an informant’s statement to a police officer that she had observed Gary Roy, a New York City police officer, using drugs on numerous occasions constituted substantial evidence and provided the amount of reasonable suspicion required for an order directing a drug test for cause.
The Appellate Division said the informant’s story was reasonably detailed. The fact that some of information provided by the informant was self-incriminatory also suggested credibility to the court. The Appellate Division also commented that Roy’s termination for refusing to submit to a drug test when ordered to do so, under the circumstances, did not shock its sense of fairness, upholding Roy’s termination.
However, there was a “back pay” issue to be resolved. The Appellate Division said that Roy had been suspended without pay for more than 30 days pending resolution of the disciplinary action. The decision notes that Roy was suspended without pay on May 2, 1996 and dismissed, following the hearing and determination of the charge supporting the suspension, on July 26, 1996.
Since there was no evidence that Roy was responsible for the delay in the determination of the charge beyond the 30 days suspension period permitted by Civil Service Law Sections 75(3), he is entitled to back pay for the period from June 2, 1996 to July 26, 1996, less any earnings he may have received from other sources during that period.
This is somewhat troublesome, however. Sections 75, 76 and 77 of the Civil Service Law originally provided for such an adjustment for earnings received from other sources during a period of suspension without pay in excess of 30 days upon the restoration of the individual to his or her former position.
But these three sections were amended in 1984. Chapter 710 of the Law of 1984 deleted the phrase “compensation which he may have earned in any other employment or occupation....”
These sections now provide that an employee who is acquitted of disciplinary charges or whose reinstatement is directed by a civil service commission or the court is to be “restored to his position with full pay for the period of the suspension less the amount of any unemployment insurance benefits he may have received during such period.” It would seem that the same rationale would be applied in cases where an individual has been suspended without pay for a period in excess of that authorized by statute.
Similar language is used in Education Law Section 3020-a.4(b) with respect to the payment of back salary upon acquittal.
NYPPL
Summaries of, and commentaries on, selected court and administrative decisions and related matters affecting public employers and employees in New York State in particular and possibly in other jurisdictions in general.
ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE [AI] IS NOT USED, IN WHOLE OR IN PART, IN PREPARING NYPPL SUMMARIES OF JUDICIAL AND QUASI-JUDICIAL DECISIONS
Nov 1, 2010
Oct 29, 2010
Whether a retiree may file a grievance alleging a “violation of the collective bargaining agreement” is for the arbitrator to decide
Whether a retiree may file a grievance alleging a “violation of the collective bargaining agreement” is for the arbitrator to decide
Matter of Peters v Union-Endicott Cent. School Dist., 2010 NY Slip Op 07647, decided on October 28, 2010, Appellate Division, Third Department
[see, also, Matter of Union-Endicott Cent. School Dist. v Endicott Teachers' Assn., 59 AD3d 799, http://publicpersonnellaw.blogspot.com/2010/02/absence-of-language-in-collective.html]
The Endicott Teachers' Association, representing its member, Joanne Peters, a teacher employed by the Union-Endicott Central School District, filed a grievance and demand for arbitration alleging the school district refused to provide health benefits pursuant to the collective bargaining agreement between the District and the ETA following her retirement.
Prior to Peters submitting her retirement application, the District and local police authorities commenced an investigation into allegations that Peters was stealing school materials and property and selling such items on the Internet. Peters submitted her application for retirement while under investigation but prior to her subsequent arrest and charge of grand larceny in the fourth degree.
Following her arrest, Peters was suspended from her postion and the District filed disciplinary charges against her pursuant to Education Law §3020-a. The district also delayed action on her retirement application. The hearing officer, however, found that Peters had severed her employment relationship with the District on July 1, 2007. As a result, the Hearing Officer concluded that the disciplinary charges against Peters were moot and granted her motion to dismiss the charges.*
The School Board, relying on the Hearing Officer's determination, adopted a resolution to retroactively terminate Peters effective July 1, 2007.
Ultimately the school district denied Peters demand for retiree health insurance benefits and ETA filed a demand for arbitration of her resulting grievance. Supreme Court denied the District's application to stay the arbitration.**
The Appellate Division said that the issue raised by the second grievance “distills to whether Peters is considered a retiree for purposes of entitlement to health insurance benefits pursuant to the CBA.”
Rejecting the district’s argument that public policy prohibits arbitration of the grievance on the basis that a determination as to an employee's employment status is a matter to be left to the board of education, the court held that "issues such as [a school district's] relationship to retired employees [and] whether retirees are covered by the grievance procedure . . . are for [an] arbitrator to decide.”
* N.B. 4 NYCRR 5.3[b], which applies to employees in the Classified Service, in pertinent part, provides that “when charges of incompetency or misconduct have been or are about to be filed against an employee, the appointing authority may elect to disregard a resignation filed by such employee and to prosecute such charges and, in the event that such employee is found guilty of such charges and dismissed from the service, his [or her] termination shall be recorded as a dismissal rather than as a resignation.”
** As to the district’s argument that public policy prohibits conferring contractual benefits upon an employee guilty of misconduct under the "faithless servant" doctrine, Supreme Court said that the record “establishes that Ms. Peters entered a plea of not guilty to a charge of grand larceny and that said charge was ultimately dismissed.” Further, the charges filed against Peters pursuant to Education Law §3020-a “were likewise dismissed without any finding of guilt.”
The decision is posted on the Internet at: http://www.courts.state.ny.us/reporter/3dseries/2010/2010_07647.htm
NYPPL
Matter of Peters v Union-Endicott Cent. School Dist., 2010 NY Slip Op 07647, decided on October 28, 2010, Appellate Division, Third Department
[see, also, Matter of Union-Endicott Cent. School Dist. v Endicott Teachers' Assn., 59 AD3d 799, http://publicpersonnellaw.blogspot.com/2010/02/absence-of-language-in-collective.html]
The Endicott Teachers' Association, representing its member, Joanne Peters, a teacher employed by the Union-Endicott Central School District, filed a grievance and demand for arbitration alleging the school district refused to provide health benefits pursuant to the collective bargaining agreement between the District and the ETA following her retirement.
Prior to Peters submitting her retirement application, the District and local police authorities commenced an investigation into allegations that Peters was stealing school materials and property and selling such items on the Internet. Peters submitted her application for retirement while under investigation but prior to her subsequent arrest and charge of grand larceny in the fourth degree.
Following her arrest, Peters was suspended from her postion and the District filed disciplinary charges against her pursuant to Education Law §3020-a. The district also delayed action on her retirement application. The hearing officer, however, found that Peters had severed her employment relationship with the District on July 1, 2007. As a result, the Hearing Officer concluded that the disciplinary charges against Peters were moot and granted her motion to dismiss the charges.*
The School Board, relying on the Hearing Officer's determination, adopted a resolution to retroactively terminate Peters effective July 1, 2007.
Ultimately the school district denied Peters demand for retiree health insurance benefits and ETA filed a demand for arbitration of her resulting grievance. Supreme Court denied the District's application to stay the arbitration.**
The Appellate Division said that the issue raised by the second grievance “distills to whether Peters is considered a retiree for purposes of entitlement to health insurance benefits pursuant to the CBA.”
Rejecting the district’s argument that public policy prohibits arbitration of the grievance on the basis that a determination as to an employee's employment status is a matter to be left to the board of education, the court held that "issues such as [a school district's] relationship to retired employees [and] whether retirees are covered by the grievance procedure . . . are for [an] arbitrator to decide.”
* N.B. 4 NYCRR 5.3[b], which applies to employees in the Classified Service, in pertinent part, provides that “when charges of incompetency or misconduct have been or are about to be filed against an employee, the appointing authority may elect to disregard a resignation filed by such employee and to prosecute such charges and, in the event that such employee is found guilty of such charges and dismissed from the service, his [or her] termination shall be recorded as a dismissal rather than as a resignation.”
** As to the district’s argument that public policy prohibits conferring contractual benefits upon an employee guilty of misconduct under the "faithless servant" doctrine, Supreme Court said that the record “establishes that Ms. Peters entered a plea of not guilty to a charge of grand larceny and that said charge was ultimately dismissed.” Further, the charges filed against Peters pursuant to Education Law §3020-a “were likewise dismissed without any finding of guilt.”
The decision is posted on the Internet at: http://www.courts.state.ny.us/reporter/3dseries/2010/2010_07647.htm
NYPPL
Grieving alleged out-of-title work assignments
Grieving alleged out-of-title work assignments
Bailey v GOER, 259 AD2d 940
Sometimes a Taylor Law contract will include a provision barring unit members from being assigned to perform “out-of-title” work. Such a provision was included in a collective bargaining agreement between the State of New York and a negotiating unit represented by the Civil Service Employees Association, Local 1000 [CSEA]. As demonstrated by the Bailey decision, courts appear to be quite liberal in analyzing job descriptions when considering allegations of out-of-title work.
Complaints were received by the State Department of Transportation concerning Robert W. Bailey, a Supervising Motor Vehicle Inspector [SMVI]. Bailey was relieved of his normal SMVI duties and was given a “special assignment” while the department conducted its investigation of the complaints. Bailey performed this “special assignment” for 54-day commencing March 20, 1997.
Contending that Bailey’s “special assignment” constituted out-of-title work in violation of the collective bargaining agreement, as well as Civil Service Law Section 61(2), CSEA filed a contract grievance on his behalf. The grievance was denied at the agency level and, upon appeal, by the Governor’s Office of Employee Relations [GOER].
Section 61(2) of the Civil Service Law provides that “no person shall be appointed, promoted or employed under any title not appropriate to the duties to be performed.” CSEA contended that Bailey’s “special assignment” duties were not appropriate to his title - Supervising Motor Vehicle Inspector.
Grievances filed under the out-of-title work provision were not subject to arbitration. Accordingly, when CSEA decided to appeal GOER’s decision, it filed an Article 78 petition [Article 78, Civil Practice Law and Rules] seeking judicial review.
CSEA’s major argument was that the tasks Bailey was assigned while on special assignment were among those performed by employees in a higher position -- Intermodal Transportation Specialist 2 [ITS2]. As additional evidence of out-of-title work, CSEA alleged that the duties of incumbents of ITS2 positions involved supervision. Accordingly, CSEA claimed that Bailey was assigned out-of-title work. NYPPL
The Appellate Division agreed that the ITS2 position was a supervisory position, requiring the management of a unit. It pointed out, however, that Bailey’s special assignment did not involve any supervisory responsibility.
Considering the circumstances involved in Bailey’s situation, the court concluded that the mere fact that there may have been some overlap between the duties of Bailey’s special assignment and those of the higher ITS2 position did not demonstrate any irrationality in GOER’s holding that Bailey was not performing out-of-title work during the period in question.
Another argument made by CSEA in support of its position was that the duties Bailey was assigned while on special assignment involved “streamlining bus inspection forms and revising program guidelines, forms and manuals for the Motor Carrier Safety Bureau.” Such duties, CSEA claimed, did not fall within any of the tasks he had performed as an SMVI.
The Appellate Division commented that the classification standards for the SMVI position included participating in special studies relating to bus safety, preparing of reports and records concerning transportation district program and providing of technical assistance and advice. It apparently decided that Bailey’s special assignment tasks could be encompassed under such “special studies.” The court said the record as a whole provides a rational basis for GOER’s determination that Bailey was not performing out-of-title work and dismissed CSEA’s appeal.
NYPPL
Bailey v GOER, 259 AD2d 940
Sometimes a Taylor Law contract will include a provision barring unit members from being assigned to perform “out-of-title” work. Such a provision was included in a collective bargaining agreement between the State of New York and a negotiating unit represented by the Civil Service Employees Association, Local 1000 [CSEA]. As demonstrated by the Bailey decision, courts appear to be quite liberal in analyzing job descriptions when considering allegations of out-of-title work.
Complaints were received by the State Department of Transportation concerning Robert W. Bailey, a Supervising Motor Vehicle Inspector [SMVI]. Bailey was relieved of his normal SMVI duties and was given a “special assignment” while the department conducted its investigation of the complaints. Bailey performed this “special assignment” for 54-day commencing March 20, 1997.
Contending that Bailey’s “special assignment” constituted out-of-title work in violation of the collective bargaining agreement, as well as Civil Service Law Section 61(2), CSEA filed a contract grievance on his behalf. The grievance was denied at the agency level and, upon appeal, by the Governor’s Office of Employee Relations [GOER].
Section 61(2) of the Civil Service Law provides that “no person shall be appointed, promoted or employed under any title not appropriate to the duties to be performed.” CSEA contended that Bailey’s “special assignment” duties were not appropriate to his title - Supervising Motor Vehicle Inspector.
Grievances filed under the out-of-title work provision were not subject to arbitration. Accordingly, when CSEA decided to appeal GOER’s decision, it filed an Article 78 petition [Article 78, Civil Practice Law and Rules] seeking judicial review.
CSEA’s major argument was that the tasks Bailey was assigned while on special assignment were among those performed by employees in a higher position -- Intermodal Transportation Specialist 2 [ITS2]. As additional evidence of out-of-title work, CSEA alleged that the duties of incumbents of ITS2 positions involved supervision. Accordingly, CSEA claimed that Bailey was assigned out-of-title work. NYPPL
The Appellate Division agreed that the ITS2 position was a supervisory position, requiring the management of a unit. It pointed out, however, that Bailey’s special assignment did not involve any supervisory responsibility.
Considering the circumstances involved in Bailey’s situation, the court concluded that the mere fact that there may have been some overlap between the duties of Bailey’s special assignment and those of the higher ITS2 position did not demonstrate any irrationality in GOER’s holding that Bailey was not performing out-of-title work during the period in question.
Another argument made by CSEA in support of its position was that the duties Bailey was assigned while on special assignment involved “streamlining bus inspection forms and revising program guidelines, forms and manuals for the Motor Carrier Safety Bureau.” Such duties, CSEA claimed, did not fall within any of the tasks he had performed as an SMVI.
The Appellate Division commented that the classification standards for the SMVI position included participating in special studies relating to bus safety, preparing of reports and records concerning transportation district program and providing of technical assistance and advice. It apparently decided that Bailey’s special assignment tasks could be encompassed under such “special studies.” The court said the record as a whole provides a rational basis for GOER’s determination that Bailey was not performing out-of-title work and dismissed CSEA’s appeal.
NYPPL
Independent medical examinations
Independent medical examinations
Olivier v Rockland Co., 260 AD2d 482
The Olivier case addresses the question of an employer’s right to require an “independent medical examination” as a condition precedent to its making a determination concerning an employee’s application for disability benefits pursuant to Section 207-c of the General Municipal Law.
Frank Olivier, a corrections officer with the Rockland County Sheriff Department, claimed disability benefits pursuant to Section 207-c of the General Municipal Law as the result of a “work-related illness.” Before the sheriff made any determination concerning providing Olivier with such benefits, Olivier filed an Article 78 action [Article 78, Civil Practice Law and Rules] seeking a court order directing Rockland County to classify his disability as work-related pursuant to Section 207-c and to pay him the benefits mandated by that law.
Olivier contended that he had prima facie established his entitlement to benefits, and therefore should be immediately awarded the benefits provided by law.*
The Appellate Division rejected Olivier’s argument that he was entitled to Section 207-c benefits upon his prima facie showing of a right to such benefits. The court observed that “it is well settled that the County was not required to award benefits based on a prima facie showing of entitlement, but was permitted to order an independent medical examination before making a determination.” It cited the Court of Appeal’s decision in DePoalo v County of Schenectady, 85 NY2d 527, in support of its ruling.
In essence, the Appellate Division held that the employer is entitled to an opportunity to rebut an employee’s prima facie case that he or she is entitled to Section 207-c benefits and it may order the individual to submit to an “independent medical examination” for this purpose.
Presumably the courts will apply the same reasoning to cases involve GML Section 207-a, which provides similar benefits to firefighters injured in the line of duty.
* If a party makes a prima facie case, it will prevail unless rebutted by evidence presented by the other side. In other words, if an individual establishes a prima facie case, he or she will win if no “answer” is made to the allegation by the other party or if the evidence presented against the individual’s claim by the other party is unpersuasive.
Olivier v Rockland Co., 260 AD2d 482
The Olivier case addresses the question of an employer’s right to require an “independent medical examination” as a condition precedent to its making a determination concerning an employee’s application for disability benefits pursuant to Section 207-c of the General Municipal Law.
Frank Olivier, a corrections officer with the Rockland County Sheriff Department, claimed disability benefits pursuant to Section 207-c of the General Municipal Law as the result of a “work-related illness.” Before the sheriff made any determination concerning providing Olivier with such benefits, Olivier filed an Article 78 action [Article 78, Civil Practice Law and Rules] seeking a court order directing Rockland County to classify his disability as work-related pursuant to Section 207-c and to pay him the benefits mandated by that law.
Olivier contended that he had prima facie established his entitlement to benefits, and therefore should be immediately awarded the benefits provided by law.*
The Appellate Division rejected Olivier’s argument that he was entitled to Section 207-c benefits upon his prima facie showing of a right to such benefits. The court observed that “it is well settled that the County was not required to award benefits based on a prima facie showing of entitlement, but was permitted to order an independent medical examination before making a determination.” It cited the Court of Appeal’s decision in DePoalo v County of Schenectady, 85 NY2d 527, in support of its ruling.
In essence, the Appellate Division held that the employer is entitled to an opportunity to rebut an employee’s prima facie case that he or she is entitled to Section 207-c benefits and it may order the individual to submit to an “independent medical examination” for this purpose.
Presumably the courts will apply the same reasoning to cases involve GML Section 207-a, which provides similar benefits to firefighters injured in the line of duty.
* If a party makes a prima facie case, it will prevail unless rebutted by evidence presented by the other side. In other words, if an individual establishes a prima facie case, he or she will win if no “answer” is made to the allegation by the other party or if the evidence presented against the individual’s claim by the other party is unpersuasive.
Jarema credit and eligibilty for tenure
Jarema credit and eligibilty for tenure
Barbaccia v Locust Valley CSD, 282 AD2d 674
The central issue in the Barbaccia case concerned a teacher’s eligibility for Jarema credit for the purposes of granting tenure. As the decision demonstrates, determining whether an individual qualifies for Jarema credit is not always an easy task.
The case arose when Tori Barbaccia was denied tenure prior to the end of his two-year probationary period. He claimed that he had acquired tenure be estoppel a year earlier as he was entitled to Jarema credit for one and one half years of prior service as a “permanent per diem” substitute teacher with his employer, the Locust Valley Central School District.
Barbaccia had served as a per diem substitute during the 1992-93 and 1993-94 school years. He was then appointed as a part-time four-fifths social studies teacher for the 1993-94 school year. In September 1, 1995, Barbaccia was given a two-year probationary appointment and by letter dated April 11, 1997, was advised that he would not be recommended for tenure. He was terminated effective August 1, 1997.
Claiming that he had acquired tenure by estoppel or acquiescence in February 1997, Barbaccia sued to compel the board to reinstate him to his former position with tenure and back salary on the authority of Section 3012(1)(a) of the Education Law. Section 3012(1)(a), sets a three-year probationary period for teachers, but allows a reduction of the probationary period for up to one year by extending a credit (referred to as “Jarema credit”) for up to two years of “satisfactory service as a regular substitute.”*
The school board argued that Barbaccia did not qualify as a “regular substitute” since he “did not take over the class of another teacher on a permanent basis for any definite time but rather substituted for other teachers on a daily basis or for other short periods of time.” Barbaccia, the district claimed, fell within the category of “itinerant substitute.”
Barbaccia substituted for many teachers and in different subject areas, including his certified area of social studies, but never replaced any teacher for any extended period of time and never for a full semester or term. The Appellate Division, however, said what is controlling is the character of the teacher’s actual service.
The ruling notes that the Commissioner of Education has classified substitute teachers: those performing regular substitute service and those performing itinerant substitute service.
A “regular substitute” is one who takes over the class of another teacher upon a permanent basis, i.e., under circumstances where the regular teacher for maternity reasons, or for sabbatical or sick leave, has been given a definite leave of absence” while the “itinerant substitute” is a person who is called in for half a day, for short periods or for a week or more, to take the place of a teacher who is temporarily absent because of sickness or otherwise.”
An itinerant substitute is paid upon a day rate, is not entitled to membership in the teachers’ retirement system, and receives no recognition by statute for that type of service” (65 NY St Dept Rep 65, at page 67).
In Matter of Spechler, 90 NY2d 110, the Court of Appeals held that whether one falls within the category of “regular substitute” or “itinerant substitute” must be based on the substitute teacher’s actual service. It said that the substitute teacher’s title, rate of pay (per diem or annual salary), and whether the teacher for whom the substitution is made was absent for a definite or indefinite period may be factors to be considered but each alone is not dispositive and “the distinction between definite and indefinite absences should not be rigidly applied.”
The Appellate Division decided that Barbaccia was not entitled to any Jarema credit for the fall 1992 semester because he did not provide services for the entire semester nor for the time he worked as a part time teacher. But since the part time employment was immediately prior to the probationary appointment, the court ruled that he may be entitled to Jarema credit for the time he served as a “permanent substitute” that may otherwise qualify.
To resolve the issue, the court remanded the question of whether Barbaccia qualified for Jarema credit to Judicial Hearing Officer Marie G. Santagata.
* "Jarema credit" is named after the bill's sponsor, Assemblyman Stephen J. Jarema.
NYPPL
Barbaccia v Locust Valley CSD, 282 AD2d 674
The central issue in the Barbaccia case concerned a teacher’s eligibility for Jarema credit for the purposes of granting tenure. As the decision demonstrates, determining whether an individual qualifies for Jarema credit is not always an easy task.
The case arose when Tori Barbaccia was denied tenure prior to the end of his two-year probationary period. He claimed that he had acquired tenure be estoppel a year earlier as he was entitled to Jarema credit for one and one half years of prior service as a “permanent per diem” substitute teacher with his employer, the Locust Valley Central School District.
Barbaccia had served as a per diem substitute during the 1992-93 and 1993-94 school years. He was then appointed as a part-time four-fifths social studies teacher for the 1993-94 school year. In September 1, 1995, Barbaccia was given a two-year probationary appointment and by letter dated April 11, 1997, was advised that he would not be recommended for tenure. He was terminated effective August 1, 1997.
Claiming that he had acquired tenure by estoppel or acquiescence in February 1997, Barbaccia sued to compel the board to reinstate him to his former position with tenure and back salary on the authority of Section 3012(1)(a) of the Education Law. Section 3012(1)(a), sets a three-year probationary period for teachers, but allows a reduction of the probationary period for up to one year by extending a credit (referred to as “Jarema credit”) for up to two years of “satisfactory service as a regular substitute.”*
The school board argued that Barbaccia did not qualify as a “regular substitute” since he “did not take over the class of another teacher on a permanent basis for any definite time but rather substituted for other teachers on a daily basis or for other short periods of time.” Barbaccia, the district claimed, fell within the category of “itinerant substitute.”
Barbaccia substituted for many teachers and in different subject areas, including his certified area of social studies, but never replaced any teacher for any extended period of time and never for a full semester or term. The Appellate Division, however, said what is controlling is the character of the teacher’s actual service.
The ruling notes that the Commissioner of Education has classified substitute teachers: those performing regular substitute service and those performing itinerant substitute service.
A “regular substitute” is one who takes over the class of another teacher upon a permanent basis, i.e., under circumstances where the regular teacher for maternity reasons, or for sabbatical or sick leave, has been given a definite leave of absence” while the “itinerant substitute” is a person who is called in for half a day, for short periods or for a week or more, to take the place of a teacher who is temporarily absent because of sickness or otherwise.”
An itinerant substitute is paid upon a day rate, is not entitled to membership in the teachers’ retirement system, and receives no recognition by statute for that type of service” (65 NY St Dept Rep 65, at page 67).
In Matter of Spechler, 90 NY2d 110, the Court of Appeals held that whether one falls within the category of “regular substitute” or “itinerant substitute” must be based on the substitute teacher’s actual service. It said that the substitute teacher’s title, rate of pay (per diem or annual salary), and whether the teacher for whom the substitution is made was absent for a definite or indefinite period may be factors to be considered but each alone is not dispositive and “the distinction between definite and indefinite absences should not be rigidly applied.”
The Appellate Division decided that Barbaccia was not entitled to any Jarema credit for the fall 1992 semester because he did not provide services for the entire semester nor for the time he worked as a part time teacher. But since the part time employment was immediately prior to the probationary appointment, the court ruled that he may be entitled to Jarema credit for the time he served as a “permanent substitute” that may otherwise qualify.
To resolve the issue, the court remanded the question of whether Barbaccia qualified for Jarema credit to Judicial Hearing Officer Marie G. Santagata.
* "Jarema credit" is named after the bill's sponsor, Assemblyman Stephen J. Jarema.
NYPPL
Appellate Division reconsiders the disciplinary penalty imposed on an employee after finding the employee would not lose pension rights
Appellate Division reconsiders the disciplinary penalty imposed on an employee after finding the employee would not lose pension rights
Kennedy v. Bennett, 26 AD3d 334; reconsidered and revised, 31 AD3d 764; motion for leave to appeal denied, 7 NY3d 718
Brian M. Kennedy was found guilty of two of the three charges of misconduct filed against him and dismissed him from the New York Division of State Police.
The Appellate Division decided that substantial evidence supported the hearing officer’s findings that Kennedy was guilty of two of the charges filed against him but that the penalty imposed by the appointing authority, dismissal, “was so disproportionate to the offenses as to be shocking to one's sense of fairness,” citing Matter of Pell v Board of Education of Union Free School Dist. No. 1 of Towns of Scarsdale & Mamaroneck, Westchester County, 34 NY2d 222.
State Police filed a petition seeking “leave to appeal” this unanimous decision by the Appellate Division to the Court of Appeals or, in the alternative, approval to reargue the case before the Appellate Division.
The Appellate Division denied the Division of State Police’s request to appeal the ruling to the Court of Appeals but granted its motion to reargue the matter.
This time the court unanimously decided that “the penalty imposed by the [appointing authority] is not so disproportionate to the offenses as to be shocking to one's sense of fairness” as Kennedy, who had not yet achieved 20 years of service, “will not lose his pension as a result of this termination,” citing Retirement and Social Security Law Section 381-b[b][3].*
However, there are situations where the employee’s termination could result in a forfeiture of the individual’s retirement allowance.
For example, Section 13-173.1 of the Administrative Code of the City of New York requires an employee subject to its provisions to "be in service" on the effective date of his or her retirement or vesting of retirement benefits. If the employee is not "in service" on that date, he or she forfeits his or her retirement benefits.
The Court of Appeals addressed the impact of Section 13-173.1 in Waldeck v NYC Employees' Retirement System, 81 N.Y.2d 804, decided with Barbaro v NYC Employees' Retirement System. Waldeck and Barbaro challenged the forfeiture of their retirement benefits on the ground that they had not been advised of the effective dates of their respective discharges from employment after being found guilty of disciplinary charges filed against them. Both Waldeck and Barbaro had been terminated prior to their intended dates of voluntary resignation. Did this meant that they could not vest their retirement benefits and thus those benefits would, in effect, be forfeited? In a word -- yes!
The Court of Appeals said that Section 13-173.1 of the Administrative Code contains no requirement that employees receive notice of their discharge from employment, nor does any other statutory source and thus the fact that neither Waldeck nor Barbaro were aware that they had been terminated prior to the effective date of their respective resignations "has no relevance to the effective date of termination from employment under Section 13-173.1."
According to the decision, “there is no legislative requirement for notice affecting the effective date of discharge for purposes of determining whether a pension has vested within the meaning of Section 13-173.1 of the Code.”
Castro v Safir, 291 AD2d 212, is another case in which one of the issues before the court concerned the forfeiture of a retirement allowance.
Castro was terminated from his position following his "second arrest." According to the decision, Castro was discharged after he had applied for ordinary disability retirement but before he was actually retired for disability. The Appellate Division ruled that Castro had forfeited his disability retirement allowance as he was discharged before he retired on ordinary disability, i.e., he was not in service on the effective date of his retirement.
* Retirement and Social Security Law Section 381-b[b][3] provides as follows: (3) Upon attainment of the mandatory retirement age without completion of twenty years of such service, each such member shall receive a pension which, together with an annuity for such years of service as provided in paragraph four of this subdivision, shall be equal to one-fortieth of his final average salary for each year of creditable service in such division. Every such member shall also be entitled to an additional pension equal to the pension for any creditable service rendered while not an employee of the division as provided under paragraphs three and four of subdivision a of section three hundred seventy-five of this article. This latter pension shall not increase the total allowance to more than one-half of his final average salary.
NYPPL
Kennedy v. Bennett, 26 AD3d 334; reconsidered and revised, 31 AD3d 764; motion for leave to appeal denied, 7 NY3d 718
Brian M. Kennedy was found guilty of two of the three charges of misconduct filed against him and dismissed him from the New York Division of State Police.
The Appellate Division decided that substantial evidence supported the hearing officer’s findings that Kennedy was guilty of two of the charges filed against him but that the penalty imposed by the appointing authority, dismissal, “was so disproportionate to the offenses as to be shocking to one's sense of fairness,” citing Matter of Pell v Board of Education of Union Free School Dist. No. 1 of Towns of Scarsdale & Mamaroneck, Westchester County, 34 NY2d 222.
State Police filed a petition seeking “leave to appeal” this unanimous decision by the Appellate Division to the Court of Appeals or, in the alternative, approval to reargue the case before the Appellate Division.
The Appellate Division denied the Division of State Police’s request to appeal the ruling to the Court of Appeals but granted its motion to reargue the matter.
This time the court unanimously decided that “the penalty imposed by the [appointing authority] is not so disproportionate to the offenses as to be shocking to one's sense of fairness” as Kennedy, who had not yet achieved 20 years of service, “will not lose his pension as a result of this termination,” citing Retirement and Social Security Law Section 381-b[b][3].*
However, there are situations where the employee’s termination could result in a forfeiture of the individual’s retirement allowance.
For example, Section 13-173.1 of the Administrative Code of the City of New York requires an employee subject to its provisions to "be in service" on the effective date of his or her retirement or vesting of retirement benefits. If the employee is not "in service" on that date, he or she forfeits his or her retirement benefits.
The Court of Appeals addressed the impact of Section 13-173.1 in Waldeck v NYC Employees' Retirement System, 81 N.Y.2d 804, decided with Barbaro v NYC Employees' Retirement System. Waldeck and Barbaro challenged the forfeiture of their retirement benefits on the ground that they had not been advised of the effective dates of their respective discharges from employment after being found guilty of disciplinary charges filed against them. Both Waldeck and Barbaro had been terminated prior to their intended dates of voluntary resignation. Did this meant that they could not vest their retirement benefits and thus those benefits would, in effect, be forfeited? In a word -- yes!
The Court of Appeals said that Section 13-173.1 of the Administrative Code contains no requirement that employees receive notice of their discharge from employment, nor does any other statutory source and thus the fact that neither Waldeck nor Barbaro were aware that they had been terminated prior to the effective date of their respective resignations "has no relevance to the effective date of termination from employment under Section 13-173.1."
According to the decision, “there is no legislative requirement for notice affecting the effective date of discharge for purposes of determining whether a pension has vested within the meaning of Section 13-173.1 of the Code.”
Castro v Safir, 291 AD2d 212, is another case in which one of the issues before the court concerned the forfeiture of a retirement allowance.
Castro was terminated from his position following his "second arrest." According to the decision, Castro was discharged after he had applied for ordinary disability retirement but before he was actually retired for disability. The Appellate Division ruled that Castro had forfeited his disability retirement allowance as he was discharged before he retired on ordinary disability, i.e., he was not in service on the effective date of his retirement.
* Retirement and Social Security Law Section 381-b[b][3] provides as follows: (3) Upon attainment of the mandatory retirement age without completion of twenty years of such service, each such member shall receive a pension which, together with an annuity for such years of service as provided in paragraph four of this subdivision, shall be equal to one-fortieth of his final average salary for each year of creditable service in such division. Every such member shall also be entitled to an additional pension equal to the pension for any creditable service rendered while not an employee of the division as provided under paragraphs three and four of subdivision a of section three hundred seventy-five of this article. This latter pension shall not increase the total allowance to more than one-half of his final average salary.
NYPPL
Oct 28, 2010
Governor Paterson approves layoff plan that will reduce the State’s workforce by an additional 2,000 employees
Governor Paterson approves layoff plan that will reduce the State’s workforce by an additional 2,000 employees
Source: Office of the Governor
On October 28, 2010, Governor Paterson said that New York State is facing more than an $8 billion deficit next year and more than a $30 billion deficit over the next three years.
In response to this “stark reality,” the Governor said that he had approved the implementation of a layoff plan to reduce the State’s workforce by an additional 2000 employees, including some “898 layoffs to be effected at year's end.”
Governor Paterson said that his plan will result in a reduction in the State workforce by more han 11,000 employees -- “a reduction greater than 8 percent for the workforce under Executive control.”
NYPPL
Source: Office of the Governor
On October 28, 2010, Governor Paterson said that New York State is facing more than an $8 billion deficit next year and more than a $30 billion deficit over the next three years.
In response to this “stark reality,” the Governor said that he had approved the implementation of a layoff plan to reduce the State’s workforce by an additional 2000 employees, including some “898 layoffs to be effected at year's end.”
Governor Paterson said that his plan will result in a reduction in the State workforce by more han 11,000 employees -- “a reduction greater than 8 percent for the workforce under Executive control.”
NYPPL
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NYPPL Publisher Harvey Randall served as Principal Attorney, New York State Department of Civil Service; Director of Personnel, SUNY Central Administration; Director of Research, Governor’s Office of Employee Relations; and Staff Judge Advocate General, New York Guard.
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