A School Board, as the "body corporate" of a School District, not to be deemed to be the School District in the instant litigation

The Hempstead Classroom Teachers Association [Plaintiff] had entered into two settlement agreements with the Hempstead Union Free School District [School District], resolving certain grievances that had been filed by the Plaintiff against the School District. The settlement agreements set out a schedule for the School District's payment of sums due pursuant to arbitration awards entered in favor of the Plaintiff and its members.

In an action to recover damages for breach of contract, Plaintiff appealed a Supreme Court order which dismiss its complaint and denied the Plaintiff's request for leave to amend the complaint to adding the Board of Education of the Hempstead Union Free School District and the Superintendent of Schools of the School District as Defendants [hereinafter "Defendants"]. Defendants had moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that they were not parties to the settlement agreements between the Plaintiff and the School District.

The Plaintiff appeal the Supreme Court's decision. The Appellate Division, noting that generally "[o]ne cannot be held liable under a contract to which he or she is not a party", ruled that the Supreme Court "properly granted dismissal of the complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7)" as the Defendants were not parties to the settlement agreements between the Plaintiff and the School District. 

Citing Roseblum v Board of Educ. Great Neck Union Free Sch. Dist., 231 AD3d 881, the Appellate Division pointed out that "although the settlement agreements were subject to approval by the Board, the settlement agreements did not obligate the Board to perform on behalf of the School District". The Appellate Division explained that the School Board, as the "body corporate" of the School District, is not interchangeable with the School District.

Finding that the Supreme Court had providently exercised its discretion in denying Plaintiff's request for leave to amend the complaint, the Appellate Division pointed out that "the Plaintiff's request was made in opposition to the Defendants' motion to dismiss Plaintiff's efforts to amend the complaint by adding Defendants to the Plaintiff's complaint and not by motion or cross-motion on notice. Further, the Appellate Division observed that the Plaintiff had failed to annex a copy of the proposed amended complaint as required by CPLR 3025(b).

Click HERE to access the decision of the Appellate Division posted on the Internet.

For the purposes of the Freedom of Information Law, the ability of an agency to retrieve a document is distinguishable from whether the description in the request was sufficient to allow the agency to locate it

In an action to obtain certain documents pursuant to New York State's Freedom of Information Law [FOIL], the Court of Appeals, citing Public Officers Law §89[3][a], said to trigger a government agency's obligation to produce records under FOIL the entity seeking the records "must submit to the agency a written request in which the records sought are 'reasonably described'". An agency, upon receiving such a request for records maintained electronically, must retrieve the records if it has the ability to do so "with reasonable effort".

The Petitioner in the instant CPLR Article 78 action had requested all emails between the New York City Department of Education [DOE] and a certain domain name during the period April 2021 to August 2022. DOE responded that the documents sought were "not reasonably described" because it could not "launch an effective search to locate and identify the records sought with reasonable effort." 

In particular, DOE stated that attempts to search its emails "failed to execute" using the parameters provided by Petitioner, and asked Petitioner to focus the request on a narrower timeframe or specific parties or to provide key terms to search. Petitioner declined to do so and DOE deemed Petitioner's FOIL request to have been "withdrawn".

Petitioner filed an administrative appeal. The DOE acknowledged that it "understood" Petitioner was requesting emails having certain domain names but its electronic searches for those emails "failed to execute" whereupon DOE "concluded that the request was not reasonably described". 

Petitioner commenced the instant CPLR Article 78 proceeding seeking a judgment directing DOE to provide access to the documents sought. DOE response indicated "that that all of its attempts to search its emails for the requested records timed out because there were over one million email accounts to search". 

Supreme Court denied the petition and the Appellate Division affirmed the Supreme Court's decision, holding that the documents were not "reasonably described" as required under Public Officers Law §89(3)(a) because "[t]he administrative record and the DOE's proffered affidavits demonstrate 'that the descriptions provided are insufficient for purposes of extracting or retrieving the requested document[s] from the virtual files through an electronic word search . . . [by] name or other reasonable technological effort' " 

The Court of Appeals conclude that DOE and the Appellate Division had "conflated Petitioner's obligation to reasonably describe the documents with the agency's obligation to retrieve the documents if it has the ability to do so with reasonable effort". The Court explained "The requirement that requested records be reasonably described exists to ensure that the responding agency has the ability to locate the records sought". Here, said the Court, DOE concedes that it understands what documents Petitioner seeks and knows they are located in the agency's electronic email database. Further, the record established that the description in the request was sufficient for the DOE to fashion and run electronic searches which, if successful, would have retrieved the records sought. 

However, said the Court of Appeals, "The fact that those searches timed out or failed to execute using the DOE's software is not determinative of the legal sufficiency of the request". Noting that "Whether the DOE can retrieve those documents with reasonable effort is a separate question". The Court of Appeals said it declined "decide that question today" and if DOE "can retrieve the documents with reasonable effort, it must do so."

Citing Matter of Data Tree, LLC v Romaine (9 NY3d 459, the Court of Appeals held that "if the records are maintained electronically by an agency and are retrievable with reasonable effort, that agency is required to disclose the information". The Court explained that it had articulated the reasonable effort requirement not as a facet of a petitioner's requirement to reasonably describe the documents sought, but as a requirement of the agency in responding to a written request in which the documents sought are reasonably described. 

The Court of Appeals also cited Chapter 223, §6 Laws of 2008, noting that "the legislature codified aspects of Data Tree, including the reasonable effort requirement, in Public Officers Law §89(3)(a)".

Opining that "On its face, the reasonable effort language, as codified, applies to all instances where an agency is asked to make electronic records available and is best understood as providing that the responding agency must 'retrieve or extract a record or data maintained' in a computer system unless doing so requires the agency to undertake unreasonable efforts".

In the words of the Court of Appeals, "The amendment conforms with FOIL's consistent employment of a reasonableness standard in setting forth the myriad obligations of government agencies ... and balances the importance of open government in a free society ... with the logistical complications encountered by agencies in making electronic records available upon request. Nothing suggests that the legislature, in amending the statute, intended to modify the reasonable description requirement."

Evaluating the reasonable description and reasonable effort requirements separately the Court opined should alleviate the confusion that the combined test has produced. Whether a requestor has reasonably described an electronic record does not turn on the degree of effort necessary to retrieve it, and the inability of an agency to retrieve a document with reasonable effort does not implicate whether the description in the request was sufficient to allow the agency to locate it.

Again, if a responding agency can retrieve the requested documents with reasonable effort, it must do so. What constitutes reasonable effort is necessarily a case-specific determination, and efforts are not unreasonable solely because the agency declined to execute the requestor's preferred document retrieval method. 

While FOIL imposes no obligation on the agency at the administrative level to describe its efforts to retrieve the requested records, the Court suggested that an agency might find it beneficial to describe its efforts in its correspondence with the requestor, since in a challenge to an agency's denial of access to the documents on this ground, the agency [1] has the burden to demonstrate that it cannot retrieve the requested documents with reasonable effort and [2] has the burden to establish that requested documents fall within a claimed statutory exemption.

While the DOE's claimed inability to retrieve the documents is not determinative of whether the request reasonably describes those documents, the Court observed that such an inability may bear on whether the DOE has the ability to retrieve the documents with reasonable effort. 

The Court of Appeals, concluding that the matter should be remanded to the DOE for a new determination using the proper standard, reversed the Appellate Division's order, with costs and ordered "further proceedings in accordance with the Court of Appeals' instant opinion.

Click HERE to access the opinion of the Court of Appeal posted on the Internet.

Settling a disciplinary action subject to compulsory arbitration by entering into a "Last Chance Agreement"

Plaintiff, a tenured teacher employed by a New York State school district [Employer] was served with  disciplinary charges alleging Plaintiff had failed to accurately document speech services during the 2016-2017 and 2017-2018 school years. 

Plaintiff and the Employer subsequently entered into a "Last Change Agreement" [LCA] to settle the disciplinary action whereby the parties mutually agreed that "if, at any time prior to the last day of the 2021-2022 school year following written notice and a 45-day period to cure", Plaintiff was determined by a hearing officer "after a hearing pursuant to Education Law §3020-a to have engaged in similar neglect, the [Employer] would be entitled to terminate the [Plaintiff's] employment."

On April 5, 2021, the Employer notified the Plaintiff that she was not in  compliance with the LCA due to her failure to accurately document speech services during the 2020-2021 school year and directed her to cure the deficiencies within 45 days.

Plaintiff failed to timely to cure alleged failure as required by the terms of the LCA and the Employer filed disciplinary charges against Plaintiff.

In the course of the Education Law §3020-a disciplinary action which followed, Plaintiff contended that the charged misconduct was not substantially similar to the misconduct giving rise to the LCA "because she had been assigned additional duties and responsibilities due to the COVID-19 pandemic and that she did enter the required information to accurately document the services she provided".

The hearing officer permitted the Employer to rebut Plaintiff's assertions by demonstrating that the additional entries submitted by Plaintiff "were entered after the 45-day period to cure and that prior to the COVID-19 pandemic, she had failed to document her sessions during the 2019-2020 school year, which was outside of the charged period". 

The disciplinary hearing officer issued a determination which sustained the charges and specifications alleged by the Employer and authorized the termination of Plaintiff's employment. Plaintiff appealed the hearing officer's decision in an effort to have it vacated, contending that the [disciplinary] arbitration did not conform with Education Law §3020-a. Supreme Court denied the Employer's motion to dismiss Plaintiff's appeal and ultimately granted Plaintiff's petition. The Employer appealed the Supreme Court's judgment.

The Appellate Division reversed the Supreme Court' ruling and granted the Employer's motion to dismiss Plaintiff's petition; explaining:

1. "The standard of review mandated by Education Law §3020-a (5)(a) is that of CPLR article 75, which provides that an arbitration award may be vacated only on a showing of misconduct, bias, excess of power, or procedural defects";

2. Where, as here, the obligation to arbitrate arises through statutory mandate, the hearing officer's determination is subject to closer judicial scrutiny than it would receive had the arbitration been conducted voluntarily;

3. The award in a compulsory arbitration proceeding must have evidentiary support and cannot be arbitrary and capricious; and

4. In addition, CPLR Article 75 reviews questions whether the decision was rational or had a plausible basis.

Citing Matter of Harvey v Board of Educ. of the Uniondale Union Free Sch. Dist., 221 AD3d 899, the Appellate Division then observed that "When reviewing compulsory arbitrations in education proceedings such as this, the court should accept the hearing officer's credibility determinations, even where there is conflicting evidence and room for choice exists" and concluded that the determination recommending the termination of the termination of Plaintiff's employment was rational, had evidentiary support, and was not arbitrary and capricious.

The Appellate Division's decision also observed that a "last chance agreement constituted a valid, binding contract, and the neglect complained of [in the instant action], to wit, the failure to accurately document speech services during the 2020-2021 school year, was identical to the previously charged conduct".

Click HERE to access the Appellate Division's decision posted on the Internet.

Disability included in New York State's Aging Law and Policy

On October 8, 2025, Albany Law School's Government Law Center and the Office of the Chief Disability Officer of the State of New York [OCDO] hosted Albany Law School's Nancy M. Sills 76th Memorial Lecture. 

Leaders and advocates from the OCDO discussed the intersections of disability and aging and efforts being made to include the needs of individuals with disabilities in New York State's aging laws and policies.

Click HERE to access the Podcast of the presentation posted on the Internet.

Amending an application for Workers' Compensation benefits to include alleged consequential injuries

Claimant for Workers' Compensation benefits appealed the Workers' Compensation Board's [Board] decision disallowing Claimant's request to amend his earlier established claim to include consequential injuries.

Claimant had established a claim for workers' compensation benefits based upon an exacerbation of a preexisting chemical sensitivity and Claimant's employer reassigned Claimant to work at a different location. Subsequently, Claimant's treating physician advised Claimant's employer that Claimant's reassignment to the new location had resulted in "a complete resolution" of Claimant's symptoms and requested that the reassignment be made permanent. Claimant continued to work at the new location until January 2020 when he took a leave of absence to care for his ailing mother and commenced working from home. 

Claimant subsequently complained of certain mental health difficulties to his treating physician, asserting that, while working from home while on leave, he was harassed by his supervisor concerning his work. Claimant's physician diagnosed Claimant with a number of psychological conditions related to those complaints and Claimant then sought to amend his established chemical sensitivity claim claim "to include anxiety, depressed mood, major depressive disorder and insomnia as consequential injuries".

A Workers' Compensation Law Judge [WCLJ] found that Claimant had not demonstrated that his psychological injuries were a direct or natural consequence of his initial chemical related injury and disallowed the claim for "consequential injuries". The Workers' Compensation Board affirmed the WCLJ's findings, and Claimant appealed the Board ruling.

The Appellate Division sustained the Board's determination, noting:

1. Substantial evidence supported the Board's finding that Claimant's alleged psychological injuries did not result from a fear of being assigned to work at his original location;

2. Claimant "has not demonstrated that the asserted psychological injuries resulted directly and naturally from his prior chemical insensitivity disability so as to establish a consequential injury"; and

3. Claimant's allegations with respect to harassment, "were too remote to establish a causal nexus to the prior disability, even if the actions could constitute a separate and distinct claim for work-related stress.

The Appellate Division said its "review of the record as a whole" found no basis to disturb the Board's determination that Claimant failed to demonstrate, "by competent medical evidence, a causal relationship between his established disability and his alleged consequential injuries", and held that the Board's decision to reject Claimant's alleged consequential injuries was supported by substantial evidence.

Click HERE to access the Appellate Division's decision posted on the Internet.

Selected items posted on blogs during the week ending October 17, 2025

How AI-Powered Agents Streamline State and Local Service Delivery Explore how AI agents can help state and local governments handle routine tasks, streamline operations, and give staff more time for complex issues. DOWNLOAD

Preparing Utilities & Local Governments for a Paperless World The paperless future is here. Is your utility or local government ready? From rising postage costs to time-consuming manual processes, the shift to digital billing and payments is no longer optional — it’s essential. This resource explores how utilities can embrace a paperless future to cut costs, improve operational efficiencies, and meet modern demands. DOWNLOAD

Transparency in Motion: Real-Time Data for Safer Streets and Stronger Communities Public safety agencies are under pressure to do more with less -- respond faster, operate more efficiently, and remain accountable to both leadership and the communities they serve. This paper explores how telematics and in-vehicle data are helping agencies meet those expectations and deliver measurable results.   DOWNLOAD

Human-Guided Automation: Smarter, Safer Endpoint Security Autonomous endpoint management keeps humans in control while boosting compliance, speed, and resilience.  READ MORE

Secure by Design: A Plan for Ransomware Defense From real-world examples of emerging extortion tactics to actionable guidance on vulnerability scanning, 24/7 detection, and incident response planning, this paper is a must-read for every government IT leader committed to safeguarding digital infrastructure and public trust. DOWNLOAD

When Disaster Strikes, Coordination Keeps Recovery Moving Who restores critical connections after natural disasters? See the teamwork behind recovery and the need for close coordination to speed recovery efforts. Watch the film.

Natural Disaster, National Attention Public Records Request Management Steps Up in Time of Need READ MORE

Key elements of the Court of Appeals' decision addressing the Even Year Election Law (Laws of 2023, Chapter 741) to consolidate certain elections for county and town offices with even year elections for state and federal offices.

In 2023, the Legislature enacted the Even Year Election Law (Laws of 2023, Chapter 741) to consolidate certain elections for county and town offices with even year elections for state and federal offices. The Plaintiffs, including several counties with charter provisions setting local elections for odd-numbered years, challenge the constitutionality of the Even Year Election Law, claiming the statute violates the home rule provisions of Article IX of the State Constitution. 

The Court of Appels held that "there is no express or implied constitutional limitation on the legislature's authority to enact the Even Year Election Law" [hereinafter EYEL] and affirmed the ruling of the Appellate Division.

[*1]County of Onondaga, et al., Appellants,

v

State of New York, et al., Respondents, et al., Defendant. (And Other Actions.)

Decided on October 16, 2025

No. 66

In the words of the court: 

"The issue for this Court is whether article IX limits the power of the legislature in such a way as to make the EYEL an unconstitutional exercise of legislative authority. We conclude that it does not.

"Plaintiffs first challenge the constitutionality of the statute under section 1, arguing that, because of the rights detailed in section 1 as implemented by the Municipal Home Rule Law, counties have a constitutional right to set the timing of county elections and terms of office. In other words, because counties are authorized to adopt alternative forms of government (NY Const, art IX, §1 [h] [1], and because those counties that do so are instructed by the Municipal Home Rule Law to provide for 'the manner of election' and 'terms of office' of its officials in those charters (Municipal Home Rule Law §33 [3] [b]), that statutory instruction from the Municipal Home Rule Law is transformed into a constitutional right barring the legislature from interfering with the manner of election or terms of office for local officials. Nothing in the text of these provisions, or in our jurisprudence, supports that view. Indeed, only the right to form an alternative form of government is guaranteed by section 1 (h) (1), that right does not implicitly include a right to set terms of office or timing of elections, and the authority delegated to local governments in the Municipal Home Rule Law is statutory. Nothing in the EYEL infringes the rights provided by article IX's 'bill of rights.'

"Next, plaintiffs argue that the EYEL is unconstitutional under article IX, section 2 (b) (2) because the legislature is only empowered to act in this manner pursuant to general law or a duly enacted special law and, in their view, the EYEL is neither. This is incorrect. As defined by article IX, §3 (d) (1), a general law is one 'which in terms and in effect applies alike to all counties, all counties other than those wholly included within a city, all cities, all towns or all villages.' This Court has long held that a statute remains a general law where it is 'cast in general terms' but affects a smaller category of counties, and is "no less general because it classifies the [counties] affected on the basis of population or some other condition and extends its benefits only to" certain counties, so long as 'the classification be defined by conditions common to the class and related to the subject of the statute' (Uniformed Firefighters Assn. v City of New York, 50 NY2d 85, 90 [1980]; see also Rozler v Franger, 61 AD2d 46, 51 [4th Dept 1978], affd 46 NY2d 760 [1978] [that Village Law exempts chartered villages does not 'make it any less a general law,' because the 'exception . . . is based on a reasonable classification and the law applies uniformly to all other villages throughout the state']). The EYEL, as the Appellate Division held, is a general law because it applies to all counties, with reasonable exceptions, and has an equal impact on a 'rationally defined class similarly situated' (238 AD3d at 1540-1541 [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]; see also Hotel Dorset Co. v Trust for Cultural Resources of City of N.Y., 46 NY2d 358, 373 [1978] [where a law 'has an equal impact on all members of a rationally defined class similarly situated, the law is thus a general' law]). While the EYEL contains exemptions, its terms are general, and the category of counties and offices it affects is defined by common conditions and related to the statute's purpose.

"Finally, plaintiffs challenge the EYEL on the basis that it runs afoul of the clause in article IX, §3 (b), which provides that the provisions of article IX 'shall not affect any existing valid provisions of acts of the legislature or of local legislation.' This language simply made clear, as the Appellate Division held, that existing local laws remained in force following the adoption of article IX, and expressly accounts for change through legislative action by stating that existing local provisions continue 'in force until repealed, amended, modified or superseded' (see 238 AD3d at 1541 [article IX, §3 'clarifies that the adoption of Article IX did not itself invalidate then-existing legislation . . . and does not preclude the Legislature from adopting a law such as the EYEL']).

"Nothing in article IX limits, expressly or by implication, the otherwise plenary authority of the legislature to mandate the timing of certain elections, as the EYEL does (see Matter of Burr v Voorhis, 229 NY 382, 388 [1920] ([T)he legislature is free to adopt concerning (voting) any reasonable, uniform and just regulations which are in harmony with constitutional provisions"]). Consequently, without any such constitutional limitation, the EYEL is a proper exercise of that authority.

"The order of the Appellate Division should be affirmed, without costs.

"Opinion by Judge Garcia. Chief Judge Wilson and Judges Rivera, Singas, Cannataro, Troutman and Halligan concur."

Footnotes

Footnote 1: The EYEL exempts offices whose terms are specified in the Constitution, offices for which elections must occur in odd numbered years pursuant to the Constitution, offices with a three-year term before January 1, 2025, offices in towns coterminous with villages, and offices in counties located in New York City (L 2023, ch 741, §§ 1-4; see also NY Const, art XIII, §§ 8, 10, 12, 13, 17).

Footnote 2: Individual voter plaintiffs' complaint alleges that the EYEL's consolidation of local elections with even-year elections "increases the burdens associated with casting a vote, fundraising, and generating support for candidates, among other essential campaigning activities, while contributing to voter fatigue due to higher numbers of issues and/or candidates on the ballot" and that "[w]ith more candidates on the ballot and higher turnout numbers, voters will face longer ballots, longer voting lines, voter fatigue, and 'ballot drop-off' or 'roll-off.' " These are not traditional voter suppression claims.

Click HERE to access the decision of the Court of Appeals posted on the Internet.