Incorporating the terms of a collective bargaining agreement in an employment contract by reference sets the contract’s controlling provisions

Incorporating the terms of a collective bargaining agreement in an employment contract by reference sets the contract’s controlling provisions
Drucker v Hofstra Univ., App. Div., Second Dept, 279 A.D.2d 472

The Drucker case demonstrates the fact that if the terms of a collective bargaining agreement have been incorporated by reference into an employment contract between the individual and his or her employer, the courts will hold the parties to the controlling provisions set out in the collective bargaining agreement.

Hoftra University said that it was terminating Susan J. Drucker from her position as Chair of the Department of Speech Communication and Rhetorical Studies "for good cause" .

The reason given by Hofstra for Drucker's dismissal: she had failed to maintain "an effective communication climate" with her faculty in violation of Hofstra University's Faculty Policy.

Drucker appealed, contending that her termination was unlawful because she had been employed "unconditionally."

The Appellate Division affirmed a lower court's dismissal of her petition, commenting that the University's action was not arbitrary, capricious, or irrational.

Instead of being hired "unconditionally," the court said that the collective bargaining agreement was "incorporated by reference into [Drucker's] contract of employment...."

The collective bargaining agreement provided that Drucker could be removed for "good cause" upon the filing of a petition signed by two-thirds of the membership of her department, followed by a meeting between the dean and the department membership.

Finding that the record demonstrated that the University had followed the procedures set out in the collective bargaining agreement and that Drucker "had ample opportunity to present her side of the case," the Appellate Division concluded that there was no basis for nullifying the University's action.

Claiming entitlement to payment for unused vacation and sick leave credit upon resignation

Claiming entitlement to payment for unused vacation and sick leave credit upon resignation
Sherwood v Town of Lancaster, 2010 NY Slip Op 06057, Decided on July 9, 2010, Appellate Division, Fourth Department

Richard J. Sherwood “abruptly resigned” from his position of Town Attorney, Town of Lancaster, “in order to avoid his imminent termination.”*

Sherwood subsequently filed a petition pursuant to CPLR Article 78 seeking credit for unused vacation and sick leave accrued as of the date of his retirement from his position as Town Attorney. Supreme Court ruled that Sherwood was ineligible to receive a credit for unused vacation and sick leave that he had accrued and he appealed.

The Appellate Division noted that the controlling provision set out in a collective bargaining agreement** addressing the liquidation of accrued but unused vacation days in Sherwood’s situation provided that "[i]f an employee is separated from Town service for any reason except termination for cause or resignation on less than ten working days' notice, he/she shall be paid in full for any unused vacation to which he/she is entitled."

It was undisputed that Sherwood gave less than 10 working days' notice of his resignation. The Appellate Division said that Sherwood would have been entitled to a credit for unused vacation days that he accrued had he not resigned and simply awaited the Town Board's decision not to reappoint him. “As he instead chose to resign effective immediately, he is not entitled to that credit.”

However, said the court, Sherwood also contended that he was entitled to “a credit for accrued but unused sick leave pursuant to Article 5 of the [collective bargaining agreement].” Section 5.4.1 provides of the CBA provides that "[p]rior to the retirement, the employee may apply to the Town Board for a lump sum payment of sixty (60%) percent of the cash value of his or her accumulated sick leave as of the date of retirement."

The Appellate Division said that Supreme Court erred in determining that "[s]ection 5.4 of the [CBA] renders eligible only those employees who have actually applied for retirement through the NYS Employee's Retirement System to receive a lump sum payment for accrued sick time." Under the facts regarding Sherwood’s leaving town service, the Appellate Division concluded that the CBA provisions concerning retirement unambiguously apply him” and thus he was a credit for unused sick leave that he accrued.

The court modified the lower court’s decision by reinstating Sherwood's claim for unused sick leave credit under the CBA as well as Retirement and Social Security Law §41(j)*** for the period running from the date of his appointment as Town Attorney effective January 1, 1996, through the date of his retirement, and remitted the matter to Supreme Court to determine “the number of accumulated sick days or hours, if any,” for which Sherwood is entitled to credit.

* Sherwood’s resignation on January 7, 2008 was precipitated by his learning that the Town Board, meeting later that same day, would not reappoint him to the position of Town Attorney.

** The Town Board had earlier adopted a resolution making the provisions of the collective bargaining agreement between the Town and Civil Service Employees Association for the Town's employees in the "White Collar Unit" applicable to unrepresented employees such as Sherwood.

*** Retirement and Social Security Law §41(j) provides for an “Allowance for unused sick leave for members in the employ of the state.” §2.8 of the Retirement and Social Security Law defines the term “employer” as “The state, a participating employer, and any other unit of government or organization obligated or agreeing, under this article, to make contributions to the retirement system on behalf of its employees.”

The decision is posted on the Internet at:
http://www.courts.state.ny.us/reporter/3dseries/2010/2010_06057.htm

A name clearing hearing available if adverse allegations are shared with another agency or administrator without the assurance of confidentiality

A name clearing hearing available if adverse allegations are shared with another agency or administrator without the assurance of confidentiality
Vandine v Greece Cent. School Dist., 2010 NY Slip Op 06059, Decided on July 9, 2010, Appellate Division, Fourth Department

Douglas W. Vandine commenced filed a petition pursuant to CPLR Article 78 seeking a court order directing the Greece CSD to hold a name-clearing hearing with respect to allegations associated with his termination from his probationary position with the district.

Supreme Court dismissed Vandine’s petition but the Appellate Division ruled that this was incorrect.

The Appellate Division noted that in the event "a government employee is dismissed for stigmatizing reasons that seriously imperil [his or her] opportunity to acquire future employment, the individual is entitled to an opportunity to refute the charge” if he or she demonstrates that there "has been a public disclosure by the employer of stigmatizing reasons for the discharge."

Typically, said the court, “the submission of a complaint to the New York State Department of Education (SED) based upon the allegations underlying [Vandine's] termination does not constitute such a public disclosure.”

Here, however, the court decided that although a confidential communication with an authorized governmental administrator or agency does not constitute public disclosure, here SED may determine that, based on allegations in the complaint, there exists a substantial question concerning Vandine's moral character that ultimately could result in the revocation of his teaching certificate. Accordingly the Appellate Division concluded that as 8 NYCRR 83.1 et seq,. the applicable regulations, do not specifically provide for confidentiality, there is a potential for public disclosure sufficient to establish Vandine's entitlement to a name-clearing hearing.

Reversing the lower court’s decision, the Appellate Division explained that a name clearing hearing was justified because under the controlling regulations Vandine would be given a hearing on the complaint submitted to SED by the school district only if a determination is made that the allegations raise a substantial question concerning his moral character.

Accordingly, the Appellate Division ruled that as Vandine is not guaranteed a hearing on the complaint, he may be foreclosed from any opportunity to refute the allegations absent a name-clearing hearing held by the school district.

The decision is posted on the Internet at: http://www.courts.state.ny.us/reporter/3dseries/2010/2010_06059.htm

The three-year statute of limitations for disqualifying an employee pursuant to Civil Service Law §50(4) does not apply in cases involving fraud

The three-year statute of limitations for disqualifying an employee pursuant to Civil Service Law §50(4) does not apply in cases involving fraud
Urciuoli v Department of Citywide Admin. Servs., 2010 NY Slip Op 05876, Decided on July 1, 2010, Appellate Division, First Department

The New York City Department of Citywide Administrative Services advised Gerard Urciuoli that it was retroactively rescinding its approval his application for employment as a New York City police officer and decertifying that he was qualified for such an appointment, thereby effectively terminating his employment. Urciuoli was also advised that he could appeal the Department of Citywide Administration’s determination to the New York City Civil Service Commission.

Instead of appealing to the Commission, Urciuoli opted to file his appeal with Supreme Court. Supreme Court dismissed his petition and the Appellate Division affirmed the lower court’s ruling, explaining that Urciuoli had failed to exhaust his administrative remedies, thus foreclosing judicial review of the matter.

As to Urciuoli claim that “under Civil Service Law §50(4), respondents were required to rescind his application within three years of the triggering event,” the court said that it “declined to review that claim in the interest of justice….” However, said the Appellate Division, as “an alternative holding,” it found that the also lacks merit.

§50(4), said the court, permits the disqualification of an employee beyond three years in the event of an applicant's fraudulent misstatement or omission of material facts. Here documentary evidence amply established that Urciuoli “deliberately concealed his arrest in Jamaica in connection with charges that he possessed, was dealing in, and tried to export a significant quantity of marijuana.”

The Appellate Division said that this “deliberate concealment and omissions of relevant information” were designed to fraudulently ensure that he obtained, and then retained, his employment as a police officer, and justified his termination.

§50(4), in pertinent part, provides that “Notwithstanding the provisions of this subdivision or any other law, the state civil service department or appropriate municipal commission may investigate the qualifications and background of an eligible after he has been appointed from the list, and upon finding facts which if known prior to appointment, would have warranted his disqualification, or upon a finding of illegality, irregularity or fraud of a substantial nature in his application, examination or appointment, may revoke such eligible's certification and appointment and direct that his employment be terminated, provided, however, that no such certification shall be revoked or appointment terminated more than three years after it is made, except in the case of fraud [emphasis supplied].

The decision is posted on the Internet at: http://www.courts.state.ny.us/reporter/3dseries/2010/2010_05876.htm

Determining whether a provision in a collective bargaining agreement is subject to arbitration

Determining whether a provision in a collective bargaining agreement is subject to arbitration
Matter of Village of Johnson City v Johnson City Firefighters Assn., Local 921 IAFF, 2010 NY Slip Op 06034, decided on July 8, 2010, Appellate Division, Third Department

The collective bargaining agreement between the Johnson City Firefighters Association, Local 921 IAFF and the Village of Johnson City included a grievance procedure that provided that disputes "involving the interpretation or application of any provisions of [the CBA]" are subject to binding arbitration.”

Other provisions in the collective bargaining agreement provided that the Village [1] will not "lay-off any member of the bargaining unit" and [2] is not "required to 'back fill' hire additional members to meet staffing level of expired agreement."

When the Village Board voted to eliminate the then vacant position of Assistant Chief, Local 921 filed a grievance and ultimately served a demand for arbitration upon the Village and the Public Employment Relations Board.

The Village filed a petition in Supreme Court seeking to permanently stay the arbitration. Supreme Court holding that the grievance filed by the Local was subject to arbitration, denied the Village's application to stay arbitration, and granted the Union's cross claim to compel arbitration. The Village appealed the Supreme Court’s ruling.

The Appellate Division said that a two-part test is used to determine whether a grievance may be arbitrated: [1] Is there is any statutory, constitutional or public policy prohibition against arbitration of the grievance? and [2] Does the CBA indicate that the parties have agreed to arbitrate the dispute at issue?

Applying the first test, the Appellate Division said that contrary to the Village's claim that arbitration of the issue is barred, “Although public employers have the ‘undisputed management prerogative’ to eliminate civil service positions … ‘it is clear that a public employer is permitted to voluntarily agree to submit controversies over staff size or minimum staffing levels to arbitration.’"

Citing its decision in a recent dispute involving the same CBA, Matter of Johnson City Professional Firefighters Local 921 [Village of Johnson City], 72 AD3d 1235, in which it held that no conflict with Civil Service Law §80 or other statutory, decisional, or public policy prohibition barred arbitration of the Local's grievance against the Village's abolition of six firefighters' positions, the Appellate Division said that it found “no reason to conclude otherwise here.”

Turning to the second prong of the test, “did the parties have agreed to arbitrate the dispute at issue," the court said the decision turns on “whether the parties have so agreed is limited to determin[ing] whether there is a reasonable relationship between the subject matter of the dispute and the general subject matter of the CBA."

Pointing out that the elimination of the vacant title of Assistant Chief caused no firefighter to lose employment and that the Local “concedes that the clause in the CBA providing that the Village will ‘not lay-off any member of the bargaining unit’ is not implicated,” the Appellate Division said that it could not agree that there was any "reasonable relationship" between the parties' dispute and any provision of the CBA.

The court also rejected the Local’s theory that eliminating the Assistant Chief position could potentially violate the CBS's out-of-title work provision if the Village assigned a firefighter to carry out the Assistant Chief's duties, holding that such an argument “is entirely speculative on this record.”

In the words of the court: “The CBA requires arbitration of any grievance involving the interpretation or application of any of its provisions. The CBA does not refer, explicitly or implicitly, to the elimination of vacant positions; thus, resolution of the parties' dispute does not involve interpreting or applying any of its provisions, and no breach of the CBA has been effectively alleged. In such circumstances, even a broad clause like the one at issue here cannot be construed to require arbitration.”

Reversing Supreme Court’s granting the Local cross-petition demanding arbitration, the Appellate Divisions said that Village’s application to stay arbitration was improperly denied and granted its petition to stay arbitration.

The decision is posted on the Internet at: http://www.courts.state.ny.us/reporter/3dseries/2010/2010_06034.htm

Any administrative action in the nature of discipline taken against a tenured teacher must be taken pursuant to Education Law §3020-a exclusively

Any administrative action in the nature of discipline taken against a tenured teacher must be taken pursuant to Education Law §3020-a exclusively
Matter of Rosenblum v New York City Conflicts of Interest Bd., 75 AD3d 426

When the New York City Office of Administrative Tribunals and Hearings attempted to conduct an administrative hearing involving Stephen Rosenblum’s alleged infraction of the City’s “conflict of interest” law, Rosenbaum obtained a court order from Supreme Court in the nature of a writ of prohibition.

The Appellate Division affirmed the lower court’s determination, holding that Supreme Court properly ruled that Rosenbaum could seek a judgment prohibiting the enforcement of the conflict of interest law of the City of New York against him through an OATH proceeding as he was a “tenured pedagogue employed by the Board of Education of the City of New York.”

The Appellate Division explained that “the exclusive avenue to discipline a tenured pedagogue is Education Law §3020-a and thus it would be violative of the Education Law to allow an OATH hearing which does not require the same procedural protections as those provided to a tenured educator by §3020-a.

In addition, the decision notes that there was no requirement for exhaustion of administrative remedies as a condition precedent in an Article 78 proceeding “in the nature of a writ of prohibition,” where, as here, the "legality of the [underlying OATH] proceeding itself" was implicated.”

The writ of prohibition is one of a number of the ancient “English common law” writs and is issued by a higher tribunal to a lower tribunal to "prohibit" the adjudication of a matter then pending before the lower tribunal on the grounds that the lower tribunal "lacked jurisdiction."

Other English common law writs include the writ of mandamus, granted by a court to compel an official to perform "acts that officials are duty-bound to perform;" the writ of injunction - a judicial order preventing a public official from performing an act; the writ of "certiorari," compelling a lower court to send its record of a case to the higher tribunal for review by the higher tribunal; and the writ of “quo warranto” [by what authority].

The Civil Practice Law and Rules sets out the modern equivalents of the surviving ancient common law writs.

The decision is posted on the Internet at:
http://www.courts.state.ny.us/reporter/3dseries/2010/2010_05875.htm

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See The Discipline Book, - a concise guide to disciplinary actions involving public employees in New York State. For more information about this 1272 page e-book. Click on http://thedisciplinebook.blogspot.com/

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Continuation of employment in a position upon its jurisdictional reclassification to the competitive class

Continuation of employment in a position upon its jurisdictional reclassification to the competitive class
Matter of Civil Serv. Employees Assn., Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO v Mennillo, 38 A.D.3d 1113

Suzanne Burns was permanently appointed to the noncompetitive position of computer aide by the City of Schenectady in 2000. About four years later the Schenectady County Civil Service Commission jurisdictionally reclassified the position into the competitive class. The Commission then told Burns that she would be required to qualify by competitive examination in order to continue in the jurisdictionally reclassified position.

Burns sued, contending that she attained permanent competitive status when her position was jurisdictionally reclassified from the noncompetitive class to the competitive class. Supreme Court ruled that Burns was entitled to continue in her position as a computer aide without examination, despite the jurisdictional reclassification of the position to competitive. The Appellate Division agreed.

The Appellate Division rejected the Schenectady Civil Service Commission’s contention that Burns had to qualify by competitive examination to attain permanent competitive status in the reclassified position. Citing Matter of Bell v County of Warren, 111 AD2d 428, the court said that “Civil service employees, in the noncompetitive class, whose positions are subsequently reclassified into the competitive class may continue in their positions without examination.”*

According to the ruling, the record demonstrated that despite reclassification, Burns' job and responsibilities remained unchanged during her four years in the position.**

Accordingly, the Appellate Division ruled that Burns was entitled to maintain her employment without successfully completing a civil service examination, even though the position has been jurisdictionally reclassified from noncompetitive class to competitive class.

* See, also, Fornara v Schroeder, 261 NY 363. In Fornara the court said that an individual lawfully appointed to a position that is jurisdictionally reclassified to the competitive class is continued in the competitive class position without further examination.

** Jurisdictional classification and jurisdictional reclassification involve determinations placing positions in the classified service in the competitive, exempt, noncompetitive or labor classes [Section 2.10, Civil Service Law]. In contrast, position classification involves the evaluation of the duties and responsibilities of a position and placing it in a group of positions with a common and descriptive title [Section 2.11, Civil Service Law]. Positions in the unclassified service, consisting essentially of elected officials, the members and staffs of legislative bodies, department heads and educators are described in Section 35 of the Civil Service Law

Arbitrator ordered employer to pay a portion of the employee’s costs in defending himself against disciplinary charges characterized as frivolous

Arbitrator ordered employer to pay a portion of the employee’s costs in defending himself against disciplinary charges characterized as frivolous
Board of Education of Florida Union Free School District v DePace, et al.,
301 A.D.2d 521; appeal denied, 99 NY2d 511

The Board of Education of Florida Union Free School District served disciplinary charges on Ronald DePace pursuant to §3020-a of the Education Law.

The §3020-a disciplinary hearing officer, after a hearing, dismissed 13 of the 14 charges filed against DePace as frivolous and ordered the school district to pay 80% of the costs incurred by DePace and the New York State Department of Education in connection with the hearing.

Florida an appeal pursuant to CPLR Article 75 seeking a court order modifying the hearing officers determination. Supreme Court dismissed the petition insofar as it purportedly was asserted against the New York State Department of Education and denied the petition insofar as asserted against Ronald DePace, confirmed the Hearing Officer's determination.

The Appellate Division affirmed the lower court’s determination “with one bill of costs.”

The court said that “ss the Supreme Court correctly determined, the amended petition insofar as it purportedly was asserted against the New York State Department of Education was a nullity because [the school district] failed to comply with the requirements of CPLR 401.

Holding that the Hearing Officer's determination that the school district should pay 80% of the costs incurred by Ronald DePace had a rational basis and was supported by the evidence in the record, the Appellate Division dismissed Florida UFSD’s appeal.

Randall Comments: Another case involving a court awarding attorney fees to the employee in the context of disciplinary action is Perez v Department of Labor, 244 AD2d 844.

Athough Hilton Perez was found guilty of misconduct and terminated from his position following a disciplinary hearing conducted pursuant to §75 of the Civil Service Law, Supreme Court annulled the determination, finding that was no evidence that the hearing officer who presided over Perez’s disciplinary hearing had been so designated in writing by the appointing authority as mandated in §75.2 of the Civil Service Law.

The court directed the department to reinstate Perez to his former position with back salary and benefits. Perez was also awarded legal fees and expenses totaling $19,907.84, $9275 of which reflected his legal expenses attributable to the Section 75 disciplinary action.*

The Department of Labor appealed. However, the Appellate Division rejected the Department’s claim that its failure to designate the disciplinary hearing officer in writing was “a mere technicality” as Perez’s termination was otherwise “substantially justified.”

The Appellate Division also affirmed the lower court’s award of attorney fees and expenses. In addition, the Appellate Division ruled that Perez was entitled to the fees and expenses incurred in connection with the department’s appeal to the Appellate Division challenging the underlying Supreme Court’s decision. It returned the case to Supreme Court for further action concerning this aspect of the case.

* Section 8601 (a) of the Civil Practice Law and Rules provides, in relevant part, that [A] court shall award to a prevailing party ... fees and other expenses incurred by such party in any civil action brought against the state, unless the court finds that the position of the state was substantially justified or that special circumstances make an award unjust.

A broad arbitration clause still must satisfy the “reasonable relationship test” for a court to grant a petition to compel arbitration

A broad arbitration clause still must satisfy the “reasonable relationship test” for a court to grant a petition to compel arbitration
Matter of Johnson City Professional Fire Fighters Local 921 v Village of Johnson City, Proceedings I and II, 2010 NY Slip Op 06029 [Appeals were consolidated by order of the Court]

In response to the Village’s initiating disciplinary action against certain members of Local 921, the Local filed a grievance demanding arbitration of an alleged breach of the collective bargaining agreement based on the Village’s unilateral selection of a hearing officer to preside over the disciplinary hearings.

On June 19, 2009 State Supreme Court Judge Ferris D. Lebous entered an order that, among other things, granted the Unions application to compel arbitration with respect its contract grievance concerning the selection of hearing officers [Proceeding No. 1].* On August 18, 2009, Judge Lebous entered an order denying the Village’s application for a permanent stay of arbitration [Proceeding No. 2], ruling that the issue was “referable to arbitration. The Village appealed both rulings.

The Appellate Division said “Whether a grievance may be arbitrated is decided by determining whether any statutory, constitutional or public policy prohibition bars arbitration of the dispute at issue and, if not, whether the parties agreed to arbitrate it.”

Citing Civil Service Law §75.2, the court said that the Village is statutorily vested with the power to designate a hearing officer in disciplinary proceedings.** However, this statutory power may be modified or superseded through collective bargaining or negotiation and a public employer may agree to submit disciplinary procedures to arbitration.

The Village argued that modification of such a statutory power must be voluntarily undertaken as the result of "a conscious choice" and that there was no such agreement.

The Appellate Division said that the CBA provides for arbitration of any dispute "involving the interpretation or application of any provisions of [the CBA]," a provision that the court had earlier described as broad. It then noted that "the court is limited to determin[ing] whether there is a reasonable relationship between the subject matter of the dispute and the general subject matter of the CBA."

In this instance the Appellate Division concluded that no such reasonable relationship existed between the CBA and the parties' dispute regarding the selection of a hearing officer. The Appellate Division explained that “The CBA does not mention the selection of disciplinary hearing officers; its sole reference to disciplinary proceedings is a requirement that any reprimand be conducted privately, in a manner to avoid embarrassment.”

In response to the Local’s assertion that that the CBA reflects the parties agreement to "follow [the Public Employment Relations Board's] rules of procedure for dispute resolution," which, in the Local’s view, "precluded the Village from unilaterally selecting a hearing officer."

However, said the court, the Local’s analysis would require the arbitrator to engage in contractual interpretation not only of the CBA, but also PERB's rules while the CBA despite the fact that the CBA limits the arbitrator's authority to disputes "involving the interpretation and application of any provisions of this agreement.”

In addition, the Appellate Division commented that the CBA's reference to the Public Employment Relations Board's rules of procedure is not pertinent as its applicability is expressly limited to disputes "involving the interpretation or application of any provisions of this agreement."

Reversing both Supreme Court’s rulings, the court said that “Even a broad arbitration clause is not unlimited in its scope; to satisfy the reasonable relationship test, a contractual interpretation must be 'at least colorable …. ' As no colorable interpretation of the CBA brings the selection of a disciplinary hearing officer within its general scope, we cannot conclude that the parties agreed to arbitrate their dispute on this subject.”

The practical effect of the ruling: The Appellate Division vacated the decision granting Local’s petition regarding the selection of a hearing officer [Proceeding No. 1} and granted the Village’s application to stay arbitration [Proceeding No. 2].


* The order enjoining further disciplinary proceedings and compelled arbitration of the grievance.

** Civil Service Law §76.4 provides that such statutory power may be modified or superseded through collective bargaining or negotiation whereby “such sections may be supplemented, modified or replaced by agreements negotiated between the State and an employee organization pursuant to Article 14 of the Civil Service Law.” Civil Service Law §75.2 has been relied upon for similar authority with respect to political subdivisions of the State while Education Law §3020-a provides the authority for disciplinary charges filed against an educator in the unclassified service to be considered by an arbitrator or arbitration panel and subject to the provisions of Article 75 of the Civil Practice Law and Rules.

The decision is posted on the Internet at:
http://www.courts.state.ny.us/reporter/3dseries/2010/2010_06029.htm

Six-month need for intermittent leave rendered employee unfit for duty

Six-month need for intermittent leave rendered employee unfit for duty
Source: The FMLA Blog - http://federalfmla.typepad.com/fmla_blog/
Copyright © 2010. All rights reserved by Carl C. Bosland, Esq. Reproduced with permission. Mr. Bosland is the author of A Federal Sector Guide to the Family and Medical Leave Act & Related Litigation

Charlene Wisbey was employed by the City of Lincoln, Nebraska as an emergency dispatcher. The position required Wisbey to receive calls for emergency services and dispatch emergency service units on a regular basis. Because of the potential life-saving aspect of her position, the City Expected Wisbey to function accurately while working under considerable pressure and to think and act quickly and calmly in emergency situations.

During January-February, Wisbey used a significant amount of sick leave for an upper respiratory infection, for which she received a letter of warning. To avoid further discipline, the City recommended that Wisbey apply for intermittent FMLA leave, which she did. The medical certification supporting her request for intermittent FMLA leave cited recurring cycles of depression and anxiety that interfered with her sleep, energy level, motivation, and concentration. It also stated that Wisbey was unable to perform the essential functions of her job. The certification concluded that Wisbey would need to take time off intermittently over the next 6 months or longer.

Concerned about her ability to perform her job as an emergency dispatcher, the City directed Wisbey to undergo a fitness-for-duty exam (FFD), which she did. The FFD concluded that Wisbey suffered from chronic relapsing depression which intermittently interfered wit her ability to function at full capacity at work, and that she was not fit for duty, especially regarding her ability to concentrate and her ongoing propensity to miss work. The City terminated Wisbey as unfit for duty. Wisbey filed suit alleging violations of the ADA and FMLA.

With respect to the ADA, the Court rejected Wisbey's argument that the City did not have a legitimate, non-discriminatory business necessity to require her to submit to the FFD. Citing a decision of the Second Circuit in Gajda v. Manhattan &Bronx Surface Transit Operating Autho., 396 F.3d 187 (2d Cir. 2005), the Eighth Circuit agreed that representations made in an employee's FMLA medical certification that the employee is unable to perform the functions of his or her position may serve as a legitimate, non-discriminatory basis for employer to require an FFD.

With respect to the FMLA, the Court rejected Wisbey's claim that the City interfered with her FMLA rights, noting that she was never denied FMLA leave. Significantly, quoting prior Eighth Circuit opinions, the Court noted that the FMLA "does not provide leave for leave's sake, but instead provides leave with an expectation an employee will return to work after the leave ends," Throneberry v. McGhee Desha County Hosp., 403 F.3d 972, 978 (8th Cir. 2005), and that "the FMLA doe snot provide an employee suffering from depression with a right to unscheduled and unpredictable, but cumulatively substantial, absences or a right to take unscheduled leave at a moment's notice for the rest of her career. On the contrary, such a situation implies that she is not qualified for a position where reliable attendance is a bona fide requirement." Spangler v. Fed. Home Loan Bank of Des Moines, 278 F.3d 847, 853 (8th Cir. 2002).

Because Wisbey requested "intermittent leave" for "six months or longer," the Court concluded that she did not have a right to FMLA leave. Without the right to FMLA leave, the City "could not have interfered with Wisbey's rights under the FMLA." The Court also rejected Wisbey's FMLA retaliation claim, finding that the decision to terminate her was not casually related to her request for FMLA leave a month before, but was due to the results of the FFD.

Mr. Bosland Comments: Long-term intermittent absences with little predictability or notice is the bane of employers who need employees present to get the work done. Of course, from the perspective of the employee who needs intermittent leave due to their own serious health condition or to care for a family member with a serious health condition, this is why the FMLA exits- to protect the employee from having to make a choice between their job and caring for their own or a family members medical needs.

For my money, the Eighth Circuit went too far by stating that an employee who needs intermittent FMLA leave for "6 months or more" somehow forfeits the right to take FMLA leave. The statement is flat out wrong. If an eligible employee meets all of the criteria, the FMLA affords the employee the right to take up to 12 weeks of intermittent FMLA leave for their own serious health condition, or the serious health condition of a covered family member, over the course of a 12-month leave year. Except perhaps in the Eighth Circuit, an employer that denied an eligible employee intermittent FMLA leave after six months - even though they have a certification stating that they needed intermittent leave for more than six months - relying on Wisbey would, in my estimation, interfere with that employee's FMLA rights. That could cost the employer big time in an FMLA interference suit.

What employers should take away from Wisbey is that an employee who needs intermittent FMLA leave long-term or forever may not be qualified for their position. Obviously, this will depend on the job duties of the position, including whether regular and predictable attendance is required. If they are not fit for the position because of their FMLA-covered condition, employers do not have to continue to employ the individual. The fact that, if employed, the individual would have the right to take intermittent FMLA leave is not controlling. Think of it this way: the FMLA entitles an employee to leave. If the same FMLA covered-condition that entitles an employee to take leave also interferes with the employees’ ability to adequately perform their job when they are at work, the FMLA does not protect the employee from discipline for poor performance for the job they did when at work.

Employers would be well advised to proceed with caution in applying Wisbey. Other courts may less quick to find that an employee needing intermittent FMLA leave is unfit for duty and, therefore, may be terminated -particularly where the employee has not exhausted his or her annual entitlement to FMLA leave.

The decision is available at:
http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/opns/opFrame.html

Sustaining an injury driving to work in agency vehicle not a performance of duties injury for the purposes of eligibility for GML §207-c benefits

Sustaining an injury driving to work in agency vehicle not a performance of duties injury for the purposes of eligibility for GML §207-c benefits
Matter of Cady v County of Oneida, Supreme Court, Oneida County, 14 Misc3d 1234(A), Affirmed 38 AD3d 1320

David Cady, a Deputy/Investigator for the Oneida County's Sheriff's Department, was assigned an unmarked Sheriff's vehicle. He was authorized to keep the vehicle at his residence and use it to transport himself to and from his work site. Cady was involved in an automobile accident while he was driving to work.* The accident occurred about 10 minutes before Cady was scheduled to be at work.

Cady was injured in the accident and applied for and received worker's compensation benefits. He also applied for disability benefits pursuant to §207-c of the General Municipal Law. His application for §207-c benefits was denied by the County.

The reason advanced by the County: GML §207-c provides benefits for injuries to a deputy sheriff who has been injured in the performance of his duties and that at the time of the accident Cady had not commenced his work duty shift and therefore was not in the performance of his duties.

Cady appealed. The hearing officer concluded that Cady was not entitled to GML §207-c benefits because he was not injured in the performance of his duties. The hearing officer’s determination was adopted by the County. Cady sued, seeking a court order overturning the County’s determination.

Cady argued that he was in the performance of his duties because he is "on call" twenty-four hours a day and could be dispatched to emergencies or to investigate criminal acts. In addition, he claimed, he was directed to be observant for accidents and criminal activity while en route to work using the assigned car. Cady also contended the he was assigned a "take-home" vehicle for the Department's benefit.

The County claimed its conclusion that “Cady was not in the performance of his duties at the time the accident occurred” was neither irrational nor an abuse of discretion. It said that Cady conceded that during his drive to work on the day of the accident he was not dispatched to conduct any investigation nor did he observe any criminal activity.

Supreme Court Judge Grow ruled that the County’s determination that Cady does not qualify for GML §207-c benefits is not irrational, not based on an error of law, not arbitrary, capricious, nor an abuse of discretion, and confirmed the Hearing Officer's determination.

* According to the decision, Cady was not at fault.

The decision is posted on the Internet at: http://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/3dseries/2006/2006_52585.htm

Expanding exemptions from FOIL to protect "technology assets used to maintain public information"

Expanding exemptions from FOIL to protect "technology assets used to maintain public information"
Chapter 154 of the Law of 2010

The Governor has signed into law a bill amending the State’s Freedom of Information Law [Public Officers Law §87]. The bill, which amends Paragraph (i) of subdivision 2 of Section 87* is intended to providing agencies with authority to withhold disclosing of certain records when responding to FOIL requests.

Subdivision 2.1. now reads: (i) if disclosed, would jeopardize [an agency's] the capacity of an agency or an entity that has shared information with an agency to guarantee the security of its information technology assets, such assets encompassing both electronic information systems and infrastructures”

The amendment was proposed by the State’s Office of Cyber Security and Critical Infrastructure and takes effect immediately.

* Deleted language in [brackets]; new language in italics.

Appeal to the Commissioner of Education dismissed for failure to name a necessary party

Appeal to the Commissioner of Education dismissed for failure to name a necessary party
Appeal of J.S. from action of the Board of Education of the Jordan-Elbridge Central School District and Superintendent Marilyn Dominick regarding a transfer.
Decision No. 16,077

J.S. served as the district’s elementary school principal of the Jordan-Elbridge Central School District and was granted tenure in the tenure area of “administrator.”

On June 8, 2009, the board authorized an investigation of complaints concerning the district’s elementary school and on the following day J.S. was transferred to the position of Special Project Administrator.

Contending that the transfer was made for disciplinary reasons in violation of the due process rights afforded her under Education Law §3020-a, J.S. asked the Commissioner to direct that the district to reinstate her as Elementary School Principal and that all references to the transfer be expunged from district records.

The Commissioner dismissed the appeal “for failure to join a necessary party.” Commenting that “A party whose rights would be adversely affected by a determination of an appeal in favor of a petitioner is a necessary party and must be joined as such.

The Commissioner explained that the remedy sought by J.S. is “reinstatement to her previous position as Elementary School Principal and that position is currently held by Elizabeth Primo, the interim Elementary School Principal, Primo’s rights would be adversely affected by a determination in [J.S.’s] favor.” Thus Primo is a necessary party and the appeal must be dismissed because of the failure of J.S. to name, and serve her, in the appeal.

In addition, the Commissioner stated that the appeal “must also be dismissed as untimely.” An appeal to the Commissioner must be commenced within 30 days from the making of the decision or the performance of the act complained of, "unless any delay is excused by the Commissioner for good cause shown." The record indicated that J.S was reassigned to the Special Project Administrator position on June 9, 2009 but her petition was not served until October 13, 2009.

Finally, the Commissioner said that J.S.’s appeal, absent the above noted procedural defects, would have been dismissed on the merits.

In an appeal to the Commissioner, the petitioner has the burden of demonstrating a clear legal right to the relief requested and the burden of establishing the facts upon which he or she seeks relief.

The Commissioner said that a board of education has "broad discretion in assigning members of its professional staff, so long as the employee’s tenure rights are not infringed upon." In this instance, said the Commissioner, notwithstanding J.S.’s claim that she was reassigned for disciplinary reasons and she was not accorded the due process protections of Education Law §3020-a, he did not find that J.S. had adequately demonstrate that her transfer was for disciplinary reasons and J.S. did not offered any evidence that disciplinary action was being contemplated prior to the reassignment.

The decision is posted on the Internet at: http://www.counsel.nysed.gov/Decisions/volume49/d16077.htm

Supplements to an official’s salary

Supplements to an official’s salary
Informal Opinions of the Attorney General, 98-16

A county Industrial Development Agency is authorized to issue bonds and grant tax exemptions as a means of providing financial assistance to business projects approved by the Agency. The employment contract between the Niagara County Industrial Development Agency [NCIDA] and its executive director provided that the director was to be paid an annual salary of $69,000 and, in addition, “would receive 1.5% of the agency fees” collected by NCIDA for “bond projects.”

There may have been some question concerning paying the director additional compensation based on a percentage of the fees received by NCIDA as the contract also provided that “in the event the additional payment was held unenforceable or in conflict with State Legislation, a minimum additional payment of $3,000 per year would be paid ... in place of the percentage payment.”

When asked if either of these provisions violated State Law, the Attorney General advised the Niagara County Attorney’s office that in his view, both provisions constituted violations of Section 858-a(1) of the General Municipal Law. The Attorney General first noted that the granting of the percentage of the agency fee collected by the Agency was “contingent upon the granting of financial assistance,” and thus violated the statute. He then observed that the alternative formula for supplementing the director’s salary -- the additional payment of $3,000 per year -- was unlawful for the same reason. The Attorney General viewed the supplement as being contingent on NCIDA’s collecting fees for its financial assistance, commenting that “[p]resumably, if [such payment] was unrelated to financial assistance to clients of [NCIDA], it would be a fixed amount that is part of the base salary of the executive director.”

The County Attorney’s office also wanted to know what NCIDA should consider doing if the Attorney General decided that its arrangement with its executive director violated the General Municipal Law. The Attorney General said that “contract provisions that are contrary to statutory requirements intended to protect the public and prevent fraud are void and unenforceable [and] [t]herefore the unlawful payments may be recoverable.”

Workers’ compensation leave pursuant to Civil Service Law Section 71

Workers’ compensation leave pursuant to Civil Service Law Section 71
Bryant v City of New York, App. Div., 3rd Dept, 252 A.D.2d 777, Motion for leave to appeal denied, 92 N.Y.2d 813

Section 71 of the Civil Service Law, commonly referred to as “workers’ compensation leave,” requires a public employer to give an employee who is injured on the job and as a result is unable to perform his or her duties a leave of absence for at least one year unless he or she is permanently disabled. The standard applied: the employee’s disability must result from an occupational injury or disease as defined in the Workers’ Compensation Law [WCL].

Many Taylor Law agreements provided for workers’ compensation leave, incorporating by reference the provisions of Section 71 of the Civil Service Law. However, not every injury or disease suffered at work that prevents an individual from performing the duties of the position is an “occupational injury or disease” within the meaning of WCL. As the Court of Appeals held in Mack v Rockland County, 71 NY2d 1008, for the purposes of determining eligibility for workers’ compensation benefits, “an occupational disease derives from the very nature of the employment, not a specific condition peculiar to the employee’s place of work.”

The Bryant case illustrates the fact that not every disease or injury arising in the work place is an occupational injury or disease for the purposes of receiving workers’ compensation benefits and thus such a claim does not automatically trigger eligibility for workers’ compensation leave.

Meridie Bryant, a word processor employed by the City of New York, applied for workers’ compensation benefits claiming that neck, shoulder and back ailments she suffered were caused by the physical layout of her work site and the chair in which she sat while at work. The Workers’ Compensation Board rejected her application on the grounds that she had not suffered an occupational injury or disease within the meaning of the Workers’ Compensation Law.

Byrant’s appeal from the Board’s ruling was rejected by the Appellate Division.

The court, citing the Court of Appeals’ decision in Mack, said that in order to be eligible for workers’ compensation benefits, the applicant “was required to demonstrate a recognizable link between the disease from which [he or] she allegedly suffers and some distinctive feature of [his or] her employment.”

The Appellate Division decided that Byrant’s condition related to her particular work area and not the “very nature of her employment.” Accordingly, the court upheld the Board’s determination rejecting Byrant’s workers’ compensation claim and dismissed her appeal.

The practical effect of this for the purposes of Section 71, however, is not as drastic as it might appear. Section 71 leave is provided as a leave without pay, although the employee may be continued on the payroll using his or her leave credits in order to continue to be paid.

If the individual viewed as being on workers’ compensation leave by the employer is later found not to have suffered an occupational injury or disease as was the situation in Bryant’s case, all that need be done is to amend the employee’s personnel record to show that he or she is on Section 72, rather than Section 71 leave.

Section 72 leave is available to an employee who is unable to perform his or her duties because of a disability other than a disability resulting from an occupational injury or disease as defined in WCL. Again employees are entitled to such a leave of absence without pay as a matter of law. As is the case in a Section 71 situation, “an employee on such leave of absence shall be entitled to draw all accumulated, unused sick leave, vacation, overtime and other time allowances standing to his [or her] credit” while on such leave.

There is, however, one significant difference between Section 71 leave and Section 72 leave. The one-year leave period allowed under Section 71 is determined on the basis of the individual’s cumulative absence while the minimum leave period under Section 72 is based on the employee’s consecutive absence for one year.

In other words, under Section 72, the employee may be terminated pursuant to Section 73 of the Civil Service Law if he or she has been absent from work for an uninterrupted period of at least one year. On the other hand, an employee absent on Section 71 leave may be terminate after he or she has been absent for a cumulative total of at least one year, even if such absences are intermittent whereby the employee returns to work and then goes on Section 71 leave again because of the same injury or disease.

It should be remembered that under both Section 71 and Section 72, separating an employee from service after the employee has been absent for the minimum period mandated for such leave is discretionary and the appointing authority is not required to terminate the employee.