Overtime accruals excluded in calculating narcotics bureaus investigator’s retirement allowance

Overtime accruals excluded in calculating narcotics bureaus investigator’s retirement allowance
Source: Findlaw’s Weekly Government Benefits Newsletter – A Thomson Company, Copyright ©2010 by Findlaw, redistributed with permission. For subscription information go to: http://newsletters.findlaw.com/nl/

Stevenson v. Bd. of Ret. of the Orange County Employees' Ret. Sys. , California Court of Appeal, 07/07/2010

In plaintiff's petition for administrative mandate challenging the decision of the Board of Retirement of the Orange County Employees Retirement System (Board), excluding his overtime in calculating his pension allowance, trial court's denial of the petition is affirmed as the administrative record contains substantial evidence showing plaintiff's grade or class within the meaning of section 31461 was that of investigator, and as such, the overtime he worked that was unique to investigators in the narcotics bureaus was properly excluded from his "compensation earnable".

[Click on Case Cite to read the full decision (Free registration required)]

An administrative determination will be sustained by the court unless it is shown to be arbitrary or capricious and without a rational basis

An administrative determination will be sustained by the court unless it is shown to be arbitrary or capricious and without a rational basis
Pereira v Nassau County Civ. Serv. Commn., 2010 NY Slip Op 51209(U), Decided on June 14, 2010, Supreme Court, Nassau County, Judge Thomas Feinman, [Not selected for publications in the Official Reports]

The Nassau County Civil Service Commission disqualified Victor Pereira for appointment as a Police Officer after he had passed the written test for the position. Claiming that the Commission’s decision “was made in violation of lawful procedure, was arbitrary and capricious, as abuse of discretion, and effected by law, and not supported by substantial evidence, Pereira as the court to vacated the Commission’s action.

The basis for the Commission’s action was that Pereira failed to meet the physical agility examination for the position.

Pereira was in an age group of applicants that were required to complete 35 sit-ups in one minute in order to avoid disqualification and move on to the final test, a1.5 mile run.

However, Pereira examiner determined that he only completed 28 sit-ups in the necessary and correct form, and therefore, he was disqualified from further evaluation for the appointment as a police officer. Pereira, on the other hand that he had completed 44 sit-ups and that the monitor failed to give him the appropriate credit for his performance.

Judge Feinman said that the Commission’s determination is subject to review under the "arbitrary and capricious" standard of CPLR §7803(3). In applying this standard, said Judge Feinman, an administrative determination will not be disturbed unless the record shows that the agency's action was "arbitrary, unreasonable, irrational or indicative of bad faith."

"Arbitrary action is without sound basis in reason and is generally taken without regard to the facts" and the court's inquiry is limited strictly to a determination of whether a rational basis exists for the agency's actions.

After considering the evidence presented by the Commission concerning the administration and rating of Pereira's sit-ups during the physical agility test, the court ruled that the Commission’s determination was neither arbitrary nor capricious and had a rational basis for its determination and dismissed Pereira’s petition.

The decision is posted on the Internet at: http://www.courts.state.ny.us/reporter/3dseries/2010/2010_51209.htm

Changes in New York State’s Personnel Management Manual: Part 2000 Probation

Changes in New York State’s Personnel Management Manual: Part 2000 Probation
Source: The New York Department of Civil Service Transmittal Memorandum No. 67

The New York Department of Civil Service has distributed Transmittal Memorandum No. 67 updating its State Personnel Management Manual materials addressing “probation.”

The revised or new material clarify that:

A probationer who is transferred may not have the probationary period waived.

Upon cover-in to the appropriately classified service position in accordance with Civil Service Law §45(2) and as determined by the Civil Service Commission, an incumbent is required to serve a probationary period consistent with §4.5 (4NYCRR) for the Classified Service.

The appointing authority’s and the Department of Civil Service’s responsibilities concerning the administration of the probationary process.

Other changes include:

An additional example of probation being appropriately extended rather than terminated;

Explaining that under certain circumstances, service in same-level and lower-level positions now to count toward completion of probation in the position from which the employee is on leave;

Illustrate a situation in which a trainee may have a probationary period extended.

If you wish to print Transmittal Memorandum 67, it is provided in a pdf format at:
http://www.cs.state.ny.us/ssd/pdf/TM_67.pdf

Employee disciplined for making false statements in the course of an administrative investigation

Employee disciplined for making false statements in the course of an administrative investigation
Abbate v Safir, App. Div., First Dept., 279 A.D.2d 260

Not being truthful in responding to questions posed in the course of an official investigation may result in disciplinary action.

New York City police officer Anthony Abbate was found guilty of charges that he "lied at his official interview" when he denied that he had "uttered profanities to another officer," and, in a separate incident, "was discourteous and disrespectful to another officer in uttering racial epithets in an argument." The penalty imposed: dismissal from the force.

Abbate's appeal from the determination and the penalty imposed was dismissed by the Appellate Division. The court said that there was substantial evidence to support a finding that Abbate was guilty of the charges.

As to Abbate's challenge to his dismissal, the Appellate Division decided that in view of Abbate's "poor disciplinary record" the penalty of dismissal satisfied the Pell standard [Pell v Board of Education, 34 NY2d 222]. In the words of the court, "the penalty does not shock our sense of fairness."

Apparently the Appellate Division gave substantial weight to the fact that Abbate had been found guilty of lying in an "official investigation" as the Calhoun case demonstrates.
New York City police officer Gary Calhoun appealed his being found guilty of using racial epithets in the course of making an arrest [Calhoun v Safir, Appellate Division, First Department, 279 A.D.2d 295].

Calhoun had been found guilty of disciplinary charges alleging that he used "excessive force and racial epithets" in arresting a suspected car thief. The penalty imposed: suspension without pay for thirty days as a result.

The Appellate Division, again referring to the Pell doctrine, sustained the Commissioner's determination, commenting that "[T]he 30-day suspension does not shock our sense of fairness and is a minimal penalty in light of the conduct."

A multi-year employment contract between an educator and a school board necessarily binds successor school boards

A multi-year employment contract between an educator and a school board necessarily binds successor school boards
Decisions of the Commissioner of Education, 13958, 13960

School superintendents and their deputies are usually employed pursuant to a written contract that sets out the terms and conditions of their employment. Each time a school board enters into a multi-year contract “it necessarily binds successor boards,” the Commissioner of Education ruled in two cases involving the Mount Vernon City School District in Westchester County.

On June 12, 1997 Mount Vernon City School District’s Board of Education approved resolutions extending its written employment contract with both its superintendent, William C. Prattella and its deputy superintendent, Edward J. Reilly, through June 30, 2000. On July 1, 1997, a newly elected Board adopted a resolution rescinding the former board’s resolutions of June 12.

Both Prattella and Reilly challenged the newly elected board’s action and asked the Commissioner of Education to intervene.

The district asserted that the previous board’s actions were improper and it had the right to rescind the contract extensions because it read Section 2507 of the Education Law as barring a “small city school district” from entering into a written contract with a superintendent or a deputy superintendent.

The Commissioner disagreed with the district’s interpretation of Section 2507. He cited language in Section 2507(1), which applies to superintendents and associate superintendents of small city school districts and Section 2509(3), which covers assistant school superintendents. These provisions authorize the board of a small city school district to contract with such employees for a period of one to five years, he said.

The newly elected board also argued that the action by the previous board was contrary to public policy since “New York courts have held that municipal and governmental boards are not able to bind their successors to long-term contractual provisions.

The Commissioner agreed that “there is venerable authority for the proposition that municipal and government boards should not be able to bind their successors to long-term contractual provisions.” However, he noted, courts have recognized an exception to this general proposition “where a specific statutory provision authorizes a long-term contractual arrangement,” citing Murphy v Erie County, 28 NY2d 80.

Holding that Sections 2507(1) and 2507(3) constituted such statutory provisions, the Commissioner ruled that each time a school board enters into a multi-year “it necessarily binds successor boards.” The Commissioner sustained both appeals.

The Commissioner concluded his opinions in both appeals by commenting that although he was “constrained to recognize the legality of the eleventh hour extension” of the contracts voted by the former Board, he did not endorse the wisdom of its action, “which does not inspire voter confidence in school officials.” This is an example of dicta, a statement of opinion made by a judicial or quasi-judicial official that is not required to resolve the controversy or make a determination.

Incorporating the terms of a collective bargaining agreement in an employment contract by reference sets the contract’s controlling provisions

Incorporating the terms of a collective bargaining agreement in an employment contract by reference sets the contract’s controlling provisions
Drucker v Hofstra Univ., App. Div., Second Dept, 279 A.D.2d 472

The Drucker case demonstrates the fact that if the terms of a collective bargaining agreement have been incorporated by reference into an employment contract between the individual and his or her employer, the courts will hold the parties to the controlling provisions set out in the collective bargaining agreement.

Hoftra University said that it was terminating Susan J. Drucker from her position as Chair of the Department of Speech Communication and Rhetorical Studies "for good cause" .

The reason given by Hofstra for Drucker's dismissal: she had failed to maintain "an effective communication climate" with her faculty in violation of Hofstra University's Faculty Policy.

Drucker appealed, contending that her termination was unlawful because she had been employed "unconditionally."

The Appellate Division affirmed a lower court's dismissal of her petition, commenting that the University's action was not arbitrary, capricious, or irrational.

Instead of being hired "unconditionally," the court said that the collective bargaining agreement was "incorporated by reference into [Drucker's] contract of employment...."

The collective bargaining agreement provided that Drucker could be removed for "good cause" upon the filing of a petition signed by two-thirds of the membership of her department, followed by a meeting between the dean and the department membership.

Finding that the record demonstrated that the University had followed the procedures set out in the collective bargaining agreement and that Drucker "had ample opportunity to present her side of the case," the Appellate Division concluded that there was no basis for nullifying the University's action.

Claiming entitlement to payment for unused vacation and sick leave credit upon resignation

Claiming entitlement to payment for unused vacation and sick leave credit upon resignation
Sherwood v Town of Lancaster, 2010 NY Slip Op 06057, Decided on July 9, 2010, Appellate Division, Fourth Department

Richard J. Sherwood “abruptly resigned” from his position of Town Attorney, Town of Lancaster, “in order to avoid his imminent termination.”*

Sherwood subsequently filed a petition pursuant to CPLR Article 78 seeking credit for unused vacation and sick leave accrued as of the date of his retirement from his position as Town Attorney. Supreme Court ruled that Sherwood was ineligible to receive a credit for unused vacation and sick leave that he had accrued and he appealed.

The Appellate Division noted that the controlling provision set out in a collective bargaining agreement** addressing the liquidation of accrued but unused vacation days in Sherwood’s situation provided that "[i]f an employee is separated from Town service for any reason except termination for cause or resignation on less than ten working days' notice, he/she shall be paid in full for any unused vacation to which he/she is entitled."

It was undisputed that Sherwood gave less than 10 working days' notice of his resignation. The Appellate Division said that Sherwood would have been entitled to a credit for unused vacation days that he accrued had he not resigned and simply awaited the Town Board's decision not to reappoint him. “As he instead chose to resign effective immediately, he is not entitled to that credit.”

However, said the court, Sherwood also contended that he was entitled to “a credit for accrued but unused sick leave pursuant to Article 5 of the [collective bargaining agreement].” Section 5.4.1 provides of the CBA provides that "[p]rior to the retirement, the employee may apply to the Town Board for a lump sum payment of sixty (60%) percent of the cash value of his or her accumulated sick leave as of the date of retirement."

The Appellate Division said that Supreme Court erred in determining that "[s]ection 5.4 of the [CBA] renders eligible only those employees who have actually applied for retirement through the NYS Employee's Retirement System to receive a lump sum payment for accrued sick time." Under the facts regarding Sherwood’s leaving town service, the Appellate Division concluded that the CBA provisions concerning retirement unambiguously apply him” and thus he was a credit for unused sick leave that he accrued.

The court modified the lower court’s decision by reinstating Sherwood's claim for unused sick leave credit under the CBA as well as Retirement and Social Security Law §41(j)*** for the period running from the date of his appointment as Town Attorney effective January 1, 1996, through the date of his retirement, and remitted the matter to Supreme Court to determine “the number of accumulated sick days or hours, if any,” for which Sherwood is entitled to credit.

* Sherwood’s resignation on January 7, 2008 was precipitated by his learning that the Town Board, meeting later that same day, would not reappoint him to the position of Town Attorney.

** The Town Board had earlier adopted a resolution making the provisions of the collective bargaining agreement between the Town and Civil Service Employees Association for the Town's employees in the "White Collar Unit" applicable to unrepresented employees such as Sherwood.

*** Retirement and Social Security Law §41(j) provides for an “Allowance for unused sick leave for members in the employ of the state.” §2.8 of the Retirement and Social Security Law defines the term “employer” as “The state, a participating employer, and any other unit of government or organization obligated or agreeing, under this article, to make contributions to the retirement system on behalf of its employees.”

The decision is posted on the Internet at:
http://www.courts.state.ny.us/reporter/3dseries/2010/2010_06057.htm

A name clearing hearing available if adverse allegations are shared with another agency or administrator without the assurance of confidentiality

A name clearing hearing available if adverse allegations are shared with another agency or administrator without the assurance of confidentiality
Vandine v Greece Cent. School Dist., 2010 NY Slip Op 06059, Decided on July 9, 2010, Appellate Division, Fourth Department

Douglas W. Vandine commenced filed a petition pursuant to CPLR Article 78 seeking a court order directing the Greece CSD to hold a name-clearing hearing with respect to allegations associated with his termination from his probationary position with the district.

Supreme Court dismissed Vandine’s petition but the Appellate Division ruled that this was incorrect.

The Appellate Division noted that in the event "a government employee is dismissed for stigmatizing reasons that seriously imperil [his or her] opportunity to acquire future employment, the individual is entitled to an opportunity to refute the charge” if he or she demonstrates that there "has been a public disclosure by the employer of stigmatizing reasons for the discharge."

Typically, said the court, “the submission of a complaint to the New York State Department of Education (SED) based upon the allegations underlying [Vandine's] termination does not constitute such a public disclosure.”

Here, however, the court decided that although a confidential communication with an authorized governmental administrator or agency does not constitute public disclosure, here SED may determine that, based on allegations in the complaint, there exists a substantial question concerning Vandine's moral character that ultimately could result in the revocation of his teaching certificate. Accordingly the Appellate Division concluded that as 8 NYCRR 83.1 et seq,. the applicable regulations, do not specifically provide for confidentiality, there is a potential for public disclosure sufficient to establish Vandine's entitlement to a name-clearing hearing.

Reversing the lower court’s decision, the Appellate Division explained that a name clearing hearing was justified because under the controlling regulations Vandine would be given a hearing on the complaint submitted to SED by the school district only if a determination is made that the allegations raise a substantial question concerning his moral character.

Accordingly, the Appellate Division ruled that as Vandine is not guaranteed a hearing on the complaint, he may be foreclosed from any opportunity to refute the allegations absent a name-clearing hearing held by the school district.

The decision is posted on the Internet at: http://www.courts.state.ny.us/reporter/3dseries/2010/2010_06059.htm

The three-year statute of limitations for disqualifying an employee pursuant to Civil Service Law §50(4) does not apply in cases involving fraud

The three-year statute of limitations for disqualifying an employee pursuant to Civil Service Law §50(4) does not apply in cases involving fraud
Urciuoli v Department of Citywide Admin. Servs., 2010 NY Slip Op 05876, Decided on July 1, 2010, Appellate Division, First Department

The New York City Department of Citywide Administrative Services advised Gerard Urciuoli that it was retroactively rescinding its approval his application for employment as a New York City police officer and decertifying that he was qualified for such an appointment, thereby effectively terminating his employment. Urciuoli was also advised that he could appeal the Department of Citywide Administration’s determination to the New York City Civil Service Commission.

Instead of appealing to the Commission, Urciuoli opted to file his appeal with Supreme Court. Supreme Court dismissed his petition and the Appellate Division affirmed the lower court’s ruling, explaining that Urciuoli had failed to exhaust his administrative remedies, thus foreclosing judicial review of the matter.

As to Urciuoli claim that “under Civil Service Law §50(4), respondents were required to rescind his application within three years of the triggering event,” the court said that it “declined to review that claim in the interest of justice….” However, said the Appellate Division, as “an alternative holding,” it found that the also lacks merit.

§50(4), said the court, permits the disqualification of an employee beyond three years in the event of an applicant's fraudulent misstatement or omission of material facts. Here documentary evidence amply established that Urciuoli “deliberately concealed his arrest in Jamaica in connection with charges that he possessed, was dealing in, and tried to export a significant quantity of marijuana.”

The Appellate Division said that this “deliberate concealment and omissions of relevant information” were designed to fraudulently ensure that he obtained, and then retained, his employment as a police officer, and justified his termination.

§50(4), in pertinent part, provides that “Notwithstanding the provisions of this subdivision or any other law, the state civil service department or appropriate municipal commission may investigate the qualifications and background of an eligible after he has been appointed from the list, and upon finding facts which if known prior to appointment, would have warranted his disqualification, or upon a finding of illegality, irregularity or fraud of a substantial nature in his application, examination or appointment, may revoke such eligible's certification and appointment and direct that his employment be terminated, provided, however, that no such certification shall be revoked or appointment terminated more than three years after it is made, except in the case of fraud [emphasis supplied].

The decision is posted on the Internet at: http://www.courts.state.ny.us/reporter/3dseries/2010/2010_05876.htm

Determining whether a provision in a collective bargaining agreement is subject to arbitration

Determining whether a provision in a collective bargaining agreement is subject to arbitration
Matter of Village of Johnson City v Johnson City Firefighters Assn., Local 921 IAFF, 2010 NY Slip Op 06034, decided on July 8, 2010, Appellate Division, Third Department

The collective bargaining agreement between the Johnson City Firefighters Association, Local 921 IAFF and the Village of Johnson City included a grievance procedure that provided that disputes "involving the interpretation or application of any provisions of [the CBA]" are subject to binding arbitration.”

Other provisions in the collective bargaining agreement provided that the Village [1] will not "lay-off any member of the bargaining unit" and [2] is not "required to 'back fill' hire additional members to meet staffing level of expired agreement."

When the Village Board voted to eliminate the then vacant position of Assistant Chief, Local 921 filed a grievance and ultimately served a demand for arbitration upon the Village and the Public Employment Relations Board.

The Village filed a petition in Supreme Court seeking to permanently stay the arbitration. Supreme Court holding that the grievance filed by the Local was subject to arbitration, denied the Village's application to stay arbitration, and granted the Union's cross claim to compel arbitration. The Village appealed the Supreme Court’s ruling.

The Appellate Division said that a two-part test is used to determine whether a grievance may be arbitrated: [1] Is there is any statutory, constitutional or public policy prohibition against arbitration of the grievance? and [2] Does the CBA indicate that the parties have agreed to arbitrate the dispute at issue?

Applying the first test, the Appellate Division said that contrary to the Village's claim that arbitration of the issue is barred, “Although public employers have the ‘undisputed management prerogative’ to eliminate civil service positions … ‘it is clear that a public employer is permitted to voluntarily agree to submit controversies over staff size or minimum staffing levels to arbitration.’"

Citing its decision in a recent dispute involving the same CBA, Matter of Johnson City Professional Firefighters Local 921 [Village of Johnson City], 72 AD3d 1235, in which it held that no conflict with Civil Service Law §80 or other statutory, decisional, or public policy prohibition barred arbitration of the Local's grievance against the Village's abolition of six firefighters' positions, the Appellate Division said that it found “no reason to conclude otherwise here.”

Turning to the second prong of the test, “did the parties have agreed to arbitrate the dispute at issue," the court said the decision turns on “whether the parties have so agreed is limited to determin[ing] whether there is a reasonable relationship between the subject matter of the dispute and the general subject matter of the CBA."

Pointing out that the elimination of the vacant title of Assistant Chief caused no firefighter to lose employment and that the Local “concedes that the clause in the CBA providing that the Village will ‘not lay-off any member of the bargaining unit’ is not implicated,” the Appellate Division said that it could not agree that there was any "reasonable relationship" between the parties' dispute and any provision of the CBA.

The court also rejected the Local’s theory that eliminating the Assistant Chief position could potentially violate the CBS's out-of-title work provision if the Village assigned a firefighter to carry out the Assistant Chief's duties, holding that such an argument “is entirely speculative on this record.”

In the words of the court: “The CBA requires arbitration of any grievance involving the interpretation or application of any of its provisions. The CBA does not refer, explicitly or implicitly, to the elimination of vacant positions; thus, resolution of the parties' dispute does not involve interpreting or applying any of its provisions, and no breach of the CBA has been effectively alleged. In such circumstances, even a broad clause like the one at issue here cannot be construed to require arbitration.”

Reversing Supreme Court’s granting the Local cross-petition demanding arbitration, the Appellate Divisions said that Village’s application to stay arbitration was improperly denied and granted its petition to stay arbitration.

The decision is posted on the Internet at: http://www.courts.state.ny.us/reporter/3dseries/2010/2010_06034.htm