An officer or employee must possesses the appropriate license or permit only if he or she is performing duties that require such a license or permit

An officer or employee must possesses the appropriate license or permit only if he or she is performing duties that require such a license or permit

Ricket v Mahan, 2012 NY Slip Op 05773, Appellate Division, Third Department

One of the issues considered by the Appellate Division in this appeal was the allegation that the Town of Colonie appointed an individual to the office of Commissioner of Public Works who was unqualified for the position.

In this instance the court found that the individual appointed to the position of Commissioner of Public Works was selected based on his "administrative experience and qualifications for the duties of the office” and that  he was not required to possess a specific license or engineering degree to perform the duties of the position to which he had been appointed.

Noting that an investigation conducted by the State's Education Department determined that the Commissioner had not engaged in the practice of engineering while serving in the position, the Appellate Division concluded that the challenged appointee “has not engaged in nor was he required to practice engineering while holding this position."

This ruling reflects "the law of the case" set out in Matter of Martin as Administrator (Lekkas), 86 AD2d 712.

In Lekkas an Assistant Clinical Physician holding a permanent appointment with the Office of Mental Retardation and Developmental Disabilities was terminated from his position without notice or hearing because he did not obtain a license to practice medicine issued by the Education Department (Education Law §8522) set out in the minimum qualifications for appointment to the title Assistant Clinical Physician.

The issue arose after the Education Law was amended to require persons previously appointed as physicians to obtain a license to practice medicine. Lekkas had been appointed to the position Assistant Clinical Physician prior to the amendment but had not obtained a New York State license to practice medicine within the prescribed time period.

Affirming the lawfulness of summarily discharging an employee without notice and hearing if the worker is unable to produce his or her required license or permit necessary to perform the duties of the position when requested to do so, the Appellate Division ruled that summary termination was permitted only if the duties actually being performed required the possession of the license or permit.

Lekkas, however, was performing administrative duties rather than “practicing medicine.” 

Ruling that no license was mandated by law to perform administrative duties, notwithstanding Lekkas’ title of  “Assistant Clinical Physician,” the court concluded that his removal from his position was subject to the notice and hearing provisions of §75 of the Civil Service Law.

The Ricket decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://www.courts.state.ny.us/reporter/3dseries/2012/2012_05773.htm

Examination for Fire Lieutenant prepared by the New York State Department Civil Service held job related

Examination for Fire Lieutenant prepared by the New York State Department Civil Service held job related

M.O.C.H.A. Soc'y, Inc. v. City of Buffalo, US Circuit Court of Appeals, Second Circuit,  No. 11-2184 – [The following case summary was prepared by Findlaw]

In a Title VII suit against the City of Buffalo (City) claiming race discrimination in the administration of the 1998 and 2002 promotional examinations for the position of fire lieutenant, district court's judgment in favor of the defendants is affirmed where:

1. On plaintiffs' disparate impact challenge to the 1998 examination, the district court did not clearly err in finding that the defendant carried its burden to demonstrate that the examination's job relatedness by showing that the test derived from a valid statewide job analysis indicating the fire lieutenants across New York performed the same critical tasks required the same critical skills and in finding that the [New York State] Civil Service Department exercised reasonable competence in designing the examination and that the examination was both content related and representative;

2. On plaintiffs' disparate treatment challenge, the district court correctly concluded that plaintiffs could not re-litigate questions of job relatedness and business necessity decided against them at the bench trial of their disparate impact claims and that plaintiffs had not established a genuine material of fact that the City intentionally discriminated against African Americans by using the 1998 test results; and

3. On plaintiffs' Title VII challenge to the 2002 examination, the district court correctly relied on collateral estoppel to grant summary judgment in favor of the City because the only matters in dispute had been resolved in the earlier challenge to the 1998 examination and there was sufficient identity between the plaintiffs in both suits.

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://www.ca2.uscourts.gov/decisions/isysquery/cbf9a517-2698-41d9-a045-210a717001bc/1/doc/11-2184_10-2168_complete_opn.pdf#xml=http://www.ca2.uscourts.gov/decisions/isysquery/cbf9a517-2698-41d9-a045-210a717001bc/1/hilite/

An individual may not rely on the actions of another party to toll the running of the Statute of Limitations for filing a timely Article 78 petition

An individual may not rely on the actions of another party to toll the running of the Statute of Limitations for filing a timely Article 78 petition
Portnoy v Board of Educ. of City School Dist. of City of N.Y., 20 Misc.3d 1119(A)

This decisions sets out some of reasons that a court may consider in rejecting arguments that actions by another party served to toll the relevant statute of limitations.

Noting that the four-month period of the statute of limitations begins to run when the determination made by the agency becomes final and binding, Judge Madden said that:

[1] A request for reconsideration of an administrative determination does not toll or revive the statute of limitations, even when the agency reconsiders its determination or negotiates with individual regarding modification of the administrative decision.

[2] A statute of limitations is not tolled should the individual seeks redress through a procedure that subsequently turns out to be unavailable.

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://www.courts.state.ny.us/reporter/pdfs/2008/2008_31933.pdf

Judicial review of disciplinary determination of guilt is limited to considering whether the determination is supported by substantial evidence

Judicial review of disciplinary determination of guilt is limited to considering whether the determination is supported by substantial evidence

Barthel v Town of Huntington, 2012 NY Slip Op 05738, Appellate Division, Second Department

The Director of the Department of Human Services of the Town of Huntington adopted the findings of a hearing officer, made after a hearing pursuant to Civil Service Law §75, which the employee guilty of certain disciplinary charges and terminated the individual's employment with the Town.

The Appellate Division dismissed the individual’s appeal on the merits, explaining that the standard of judicial review of an administrative determination made after a trial-type hearing required by law, at which evidence is taken, “is limited to considering whether the determination was supported by substantial evidence.”

In this instance, said the court, there is substantial evidence in the record to support the determination that the individual was guilty of the subject disciplinary charges.

As to the penalty imposed, termination, the Appellate Division found that dismissal “was not so disproportionate to the offense as to be shocking to one's sense of fairness,” citing Ellis v Mahon, 11 NY3d 754; Rutkunas v Stout, 8 NY3d 897, Waldren v Town of Islip, 6 NY3d 735 and Pell v Board of Education, 34 NY2d 222.

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://www.courts.state.ny.us/reporter/3dseries/2012/2012_05738.htm

Using employer’s computer to store sexually explicit files results in recommendation the employee be terminated

Using employer’s computer to store sexually explicit files results in recommendation the employee be terminated

Human Resources Admin. v. Vila, OATH Index No. 1578/08

OATH Administrative Law Judge Julio Rodriguez recommended termination for a paralegal aide who used the agency computer to store thousands of unauthorized images and video clips, many of which were sexually explicit, as well as other programs and files.

The evidence also showed that the individual was insubordinate and committed multiple time and leave violations.

 

School district not liable for losses suffered by employees participating in its Tax Deferred Annuity Plan

School district not liable for losses suffered by employees participating in its Tax Deferred Annuity Plan
Elmira Teachers' Assn. v Elmira City School Dist., 53 AD3d 757

The Elmira City School District offered its employees an opportunity to participate in a Tax Deferred Annuity Plan pursuant to Section 403(b) of the Internal Revenue Code. The District designated Horizon Benefits Administration, Inc. to act as the third-party administrator of the District's plan. Employees electing to participate in the program, which was voluntary, entered into a salary reduction agreement (SRA) with the District authorizing moneys to transferred to a custodial bank where the funds were then distributed to various vendors of investment products selected by the participants.

In addition to serving as the Plan’s administrator, Horizon offered an “investment option” known as ChoicesUnlimited to participants that gave them access to various mutual funds.

As the result of an investigation by the Ohio Attorney General, Horizon's assets were frozen and the company was eventually liquidated. District employees who had elected to participate in Horizon's ChoicesUnlimited investment account lost money while those electing other investment vehicles processed by Horizon did not suffer any similar loss.

The Teachers’ Association and four teachers that had lost money then sued the District for “breach of contract and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, breach of fiduciary duty, negligent retention, negligent supervision and negligent misrepresentation.”

The School District moved to have the lawsuit dismissed, contending that the “hold harmless provision” in the SRA controlled. The “hold harmless” provision relied upon by the District provided that "[t]he Employee agrees that the Employer shall have no liability whatsoever for any loss suffered by the Employee with regard to his [or her] selection of an insurance company or mutual fund, or the solvency of, operation of, or benefits provided by said insurance company or mutual fund company".*

The Appellate Division agreed with the District, noting that the “hold harmless” provision was clear and unambiguous, and clearly intended to encompass a situation where the plan participants who lost money did so because they selected a particular investment option offered by Horizon in its capacity as a vendor of investment products rather than some other investment vehicle.

The court found it significant that “there is no evidence that the plan participants who selected alternative investment options and deposited their money in funds offered by other vendors suffered losses as a result of Horizon's liquidation even though it was the overall plan administrator.” Accordingly, the Appellate Division concluded that “the hold harmless provision is applicable and precludes [the Teachers’ Association] from asserting causes of action against [District] arising from Horizon's ultimate liquidation.

* See, also, Meirowitz v Bayport-Bluepoint Union Free School Dist., 57 AD3d 858, in which the Appellate Division that a “save harmless clause” barred employees and retirees from recouping Tax Deferred Plan investment losses from the school district.

Comment: Education Law Article 8-c, Special Annuity, addresses tax deferred annuity programs available to certain employees of the State and political subdivisions of the State. Section 299.2, in pertinent part, provides: Neither the state, or a political subdivision thereof, nor an employer shall be a party to any annuity contract purchased or custodial account established in whole or in part with payments pursuant to said agreement, and no retirement, death or other benefit shall be payable by the state, or political subdivision thereof, or by an employer under such agreement or such annuity contract or custodial account.”

The Elmira Teachers’ Association decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://nypublicpersonnellawarchives.blogspot.com/2008/07/school-district-not-liable-for-losses.html

The Meirowitz decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://www.courts.state.ny.us/reporter/3dseries/2008/2008_10136.htm

The Civil Service Law – an 1888 perspective

The Civil Service Law – an 1888 perspective

In 1888 William Harrison Clark wrote a book, The Civil Service Law – A defense of its principles, with corroborative evidence from the works of many eminent American statesmen. It addresses a variety of topics, some of which are still relevant in today’s public personnel law arena.

The text of this historical volume is posted on the Internet at:

http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&id=byoUAAAAIAAJ&dq=%22civil+service+law%22&printsec=frontcover&source=web&ots=MJrGimrom1&sig=3lluAl_cK1D1eryLOpKdBv37Kl4#PPP7,M1

Alaska Supreme Court recognizes a union-relations privilege in confidential union-related communications and statutory protection against unfair labor practices

Alaska Supreme Court recognizes a union-relations privilege in confidential union-related communications and statutory protection against unfair labor practices

Source: Adjunct Law Prof Blog; http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/adjunctprofs/

Reproduced with permission. Copyright © 2012, Mitchell H. Rubinstein, Esq., Adjunct Professor of Law, St. Johns Law School and New York Law School, All rights reserved.

The Alaska Supreme Court recognized a union-relations privilege in Peterson v. State of Alaska, No. S-14233, ___P.3d___, 2012 WL 2947636  (Alaska, July 20, 2012) [A copy of the decision may be downloaded [Download Peterson ]

The Court held that "[b]ased on the strong interest in confidential union-related communications and statutory protection against unfair labor practices, we hold [the state labor relations act] impliedly provides the State's union employees a union-relations privilege."  The reasoning employed by the Court - that "the proper functioning of [a] mandatory grievance and arbitration system . . . requires some protection for confidential communications made for the purpose of facilitating the rendition of grievance-related representative services to the employee" and that recognizing a privilege "harmonizes [the state labor relations act]'s strong public policy in favor of contractual resolution of labor disputes with the civil discovery rules" - should be useful in other states and in other settings where this issue frequently arises.

This is a major decision. It is my hope that other states will follow suit. I wrote a law review article on this topic a few years ago, Is a Full Labor Relations Evidentiary Privilege Developing? 29 Berkeley Journal of Labor and Employment Law 221 (2008), available here. 

Though this decision arose in the public sector, there is no reason why this decision would not be applicable to private employers. The policies behind the Alaska statute and the NLRA are virtually identical and the policies and need for the recognition of this privilege are certainly identical. 

Mitchell H. Rubinstein

Prohibition against personal use of state property by State officers and employees and other political campaign matters

Prohibition against personal use of state property by State officers and employees and other political campaign matters

Governor Andrew M. Cuomo - Executive Order 8.2*

With partisan political campaigning approaching, State officers and employees should keep in mind the mandates of Executive Order 7.7 promulgated by former Governor David A. Paterson.

Continued in effect by Governor Andrew M. Cuomo via his Executive Order 8.2, former Governor Paterson's Executive Order 7.7 states that "it is the obligation of every State employee and officer to pursue a course of conduct that will not engender public concern as to whether the individual is engaged in acts that may violate his or her public trust; and all State employees therefore must act in a manner consistent with that public trust, and must not take any actions that are intended, or appear to be intended, to achieve personal gain or benefit; State supplies, equipment, computers, personnel and other resources may not be utilized for non-governmental purposes, including for personal purposes or for outside activities of any kind."

Significantly, E.O. 7.7 declares that "The designation ‘personal’ on agency stationery means only that the contents are meant for the personal viewing of the addressee and not that the sender is acting unofficially. All letters and other written materials printed on such official stationery are considered official, and thus the designation ‘unofficial’ has no meaning and may not be used." Presumably this means that any such writing will not enjoy any privilege preventing disclosure of its contents.

Further, E.O.7.7 cautions that "any violation of this order may result in dismissal or other appropriate sanction as determined by the appointing authority of the individual committing such violation."

* Governor Cuomo’s Executive Order 8.2, which continues in force a number of Executive Orders issued by former Governors of New York State, is posted on the Internet at:

http://www.governor.ny.gov/executiveorder/2

NOTE: Executive Order 8.2 indicates that this is the 2nd Executive Order issued by Governor Cuomo.  Executive Orders issued by previous governors are designated 1.xx, 2.xx, 3.xx, etc., commencing with Executive Order 1.1 issued by the late Governor Nelson A. Rockefeller.

Dismissal of action to place employee on involuntary Section 72.1 leave recommended

Dismissal of action to place employee on involuntary Section 72.1 leave recommended

Housing Auth. v. Anonymous, OATH Index No. 1867/08

Oath Administrative Law Judge Joan Salzman recommended dismissal of the Housing Authority’s petition seeking to place a housing assistant on involuntary leave pursuant to Section 72 of the Civil Service Law.

Although the employee has a seizure disorder, and has had seizures while at work, the ALJ ruled that the Authority did not prove that his condition rendered him currently unfit to perform his duties.

The ALJ noted that the individual has only recently been given a correct diagnosis and treatment and that he demonstrated a continuing ability to perform his job.

As the Court of Appeals held in Matter of Sheeran v New York State Dept. of Transp., 18 NY3d 61 [Decided with Birnbaum v NYS Department of Labor], the procedural safeguards set out in Civil Service Law §72.1 are available to an employee if employer bars his or her return to work from sick leave.

A summary of the Court of Appeals’ ruling is posted on the Internet at:

http://publicpersonnellaw.blogspot.com/2011/11/procedural-safeguards-set-out-in-civil.html

A false statement of fact is a necessary element in proving a cause of action alleging defamation

A false statement of fact is a necessary element in proving a cause of action alleging defamation

Goldberg v Levine, 2012 NY Slip Op 05613, Appellate Division, Second Department

Supreme Court dismissed Barry Goldberg’s petition seeking to recover damages for alleged defamation based upon certain written and oral statements allegedly made about him by the Steven Levine at town board meetings and in a local newspaper. Goldberg appealed.

The Appellate Division affirmed the lower court’s ruling, explaining that in determining whether a complaint states a cause of action to recover damages for defamation, “the dispositive inquiry” is whether a reasonable listener or reader could have concluded that the statements were conveying facts about the complaining party.

Falsity, said the court, is a necessary element in a defamation cause of action and only facts are capable of being proven false. Accordingly, it follows that “only statements alleging facts can properly be the subject of a defamation action.”

Characterizing certain of Levine’s statements that Goldberg alleged were made at Town Board meetings and in a local newspaper as “rhetorical hyperbole” and expressions of “individual opinion,” the court said “accepting these allegations in [Goldberg’s] complaint as true … they fail to state a cause of action to recover damages for defamation.”

The Appellate Division also observed that “the documentary evidence submitted by [Levine] demonstrated that the Levine's statements … were substantially true” and  "Truth is an absolute defense to an action based on defamation."

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://www.courts.state.ny.us/reporter/3dseries/2012/2012_05613.htm

Attorney may not withdraw from an OATH hearing without his or her client’s permission

Attorney may not withdraw from an OATH hearing without his or her client’s permission

Health & Hospitals Corp. (Lincoln Medical & Mental Health Center) v. Wolf, OATH Index No. 2153/08

Under rules of the New York City’s Office of Administrative Trials and Hearings, an attorney who has filed a notice of appearance may not withdraw from representation without the client's permission or as delineated in the Code of Professional Responsibility.

OATH Administrative Law Judge Ingrid Addison denied an attorney's motion to withdraw based on the accused employee's failure to appear at the hearing and the attorney's inability to contact him.

The ALJ found no indication that the attorney had taken steps to avoid prejudice to the employee, including giving due notice of her intention to withdraw.

The hearing continued not withstanding the employee's absence.

A “citizen action” challenging the State’s settlement of earlier litigation involving payment of damages by the State dismissed

A “citizen action” challenging the State’s settlement of earlier litigation involving payment of damages by the State dismissed
Santora v Silver, 20 Misc.3d 836, Modified and Affirmed, 61 A.D.3d 621, Motion to appeal denied, 13 N.Y.3d 704

This “citizen taxpayer action” pursuant to State Finance Law Section 123 et seq., sought money damages from Assembly Speaker Sheldon Silver and his former chief legal counsel, James Michael Boxley for the sum paid by the State of New York in settlement of a prior action entitled Jane Doe v The New York State Assembly, et al, Sup. Ct., Albany County, Index No. 33 14/04 (the Jane Doe action).

Ultimately The Jane Doe action was settled for $507,500 with the State of New York paying $500,000, conditioned on the approval of all appropriate state officials in accordance with the provisions for indemnification under Section 17 of the Public Officers Law.*$7,500 was paid contributed by Boxley, who was represented by private counsel in that litigation.

In this action, Joseph J. Santora sued in an effort to obtain a court order directing “restitution to [the State] from Silver and Boxley of the ‘$480,000’ that was paid by [the State] in settlement of the Jane Doe action.” In addition, Santora sought “money damages for the value of the legal services provided by the Attorney General in connection with his defense of Silver in the Jane Doe action, and argues that the Attorney General must be prevented from appearing in the present action on behalf of Silver.”

Judge Goodman dismissed the complaint filed by Santora against Silver and Boxley for the following reasons:

1. The complaint fails to allege any illegal or wrongful expenditure of state funds on Silver’s behalf, even if Silver had demonstrated leadership that would have led to an entirely different and more acceptable outcome. “A claim that state funds are not being spent wisely is patently insufficient to satisfy the minimum threshold for standing under the [relevant] statute.”

2. The Attorney General’s representation of public officers does not entail the expenditure of public funds within the meaning of the State Finance Law … and [the Court is powerless to undertake] judicial scrutiny of statutorily-mandated non-fiscal activity of the Attorney General.”

3. Boxley was represented by private counsel in the Jane Doe action; and he was personally responsible for $7,500 of the total settlement paid to Jane Doe.

* Section 18 of the Public Officers Law permits political subdivisions of the State to elect to provide for representation and indemnification of its officers and employees sued as the result of the performance of, or the failure to perform, official duties.

The Supreme Court’s decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://www.courts.state.ny.us/reporter/pdfs/2008/2008_31995.pdf

The Appellate Division’s decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://www.courts.state.ny.us/reporter/3dseries/2009/2009_03456.htm

An official significantly involved in the prosecution of a disciplinary action brought against an employee should not participate in making the final determination

An official significantly involved in the prosecution of a disciplinary action brought against an employee should not participate in making the final determination

Ashe v Town Bd. of The Town of Crown Point, N.Y., 2012 NY Slip Op 05693, Appellate Division, Third Department

The Town Board of the Town of Crown Point filed disciplinary charges against one of its employees pursuant to Civil Service Law §75.

The Board conducted the hearing rather than appointing a hearing officer hear the charges and make findings of fact and a recommendation as to the disposition of the charges. The Town Supervisor was the primary person to present proof in support of the charge.

Ultimately the employee was, a divided vote found guilty of misconduct and terminated from his employment with the Town Supervisor participating in the Board’s voting on the charge and penalty. The Supervisor voted in favor of the prevailing determination to find the employee guilty and terminate his employment with the Town.

The employee challenged the Board’s action.

As to the role of the Town Supervisor in the proceeding and adjudication, the Appellate Division, citing Matter of Baker v Poughkeepsie City School Dist., 18 NY3d 714, noted that "Although '[i]nvolvement in the disciplinary process does not automatically require recusal,' . . . individuals 'who are personally or extensively involved in the disciplinary process should disqualify themselves from . . . acting on the charges.'"

Finding that the Town Supervisor “was extensively involved as she presented virtually all of the proof in support of the charge,” the court concluded that the Town Supervisor should have disqualified herself from voting on the final determination.

Considering a procedural challenge made by the Town concerning the employee’s appeal, the Appellate Division commented that although an objection to a particular hearing officer generally must be timely asserted at the hearing to preserve the issue for appeal, it is incumbent upon a person who has been extensively involved in the disciplinary process to "disqualify himself or herself from [involvement in] rendering a final determination," [emphasis supplied].

Finding that the Town Supervisor was extensively involved in the disciplinary proceeding but did not recuse herself from participating in the determination, the Appellate Division ruled that the determination must be annulled and the matter remitted to Town Board for a de novodetermination based on the record.

On this last point, the court noted that it appeared that the Board considered events that occurred after the misconduct alleged in the charges and the hearing. Accordingly, it said, the Board’s determination should not consider any such post-hearing events.

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://www.courts.state.ny.us/reporter/3dseries/2012/2012_05693.htm

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The Discipline Book, - a concise guide to disciplinary actions involving public employees in New York State. This more than 1500 page e-book is now available from the Public Employment Law Press. Click on http://thedisciplinebook.blogspot.com/for additional information concerning this electronic reference manual.

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Free speech does not protect individuals using epithets

Free speech does not protect individuals using epithets
Charles Williams v Town of Greenburgh, et al, 535 F.3d 71

A governmental entity may be sued for allegedly suppressing an individual’s Constitutional protected Freedom of Speech.

In the Williams case, the Second Circuit addressed, among other things, Williams’ allegation that the Town of Greenburgh’s actions against him were taken in retaliation for his exercising his right to free speech when it expelled him from a town facility and prosecuted him for trespass.

In addressing this aspect of Williams’ petition, the Second Circuit explained that it has “described the elements of a First Amendment retaliation claim in several ways, depending on the factual context, comparing Curley v. Village of Suffern, 268 F.3d 65, 73 (2d Cir. 2001) (requiring a private citizen who sued a public official to show: “(1) [the plaintiff] has an interest protected by the First Amendment; (2) defendants’ actions were motivated or substantially caused by his exercise of that right; and (3) defendants’ actions effectively chilled the exercise of his First Amendment right”), with Johnson v. Ganim, 342 F.3d 105, 112 (2d Cir. 2003) (requiring evidence of “adverse employment action” where plaintiff was a public employee), and Gill v. Pidlypchak, 389 F.3d 379, 380 (2d Cir. 2004) (requiring, in the prison context, an adverse action by defendants and a causal connection between the adverse action and the protected speech).

Regardless of the factual context, said the court, it has required a plaintiff alleging retaliation to establish that his or her speech was protected by the First Amendment.

Citing Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, the Circuit Court noted that “There are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention and punishment of which have never been thought to raise any Constitutional problem. These include the lewd and obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the insulting or “fighting” words — those that by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace. It has been well observed that such utterances are no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality.”

Resort to epithets or personal abuse is not in any proper sense communication of information or opinion safeguarded by the Constitution, and its punishment as a criminal act would raise no question under that instrument.

The court concluded that because Williams could not show that his speech was either silenced or chilled — i.e., that his right to free speech was actually violated — his claim failed as a matter of law and sustained the district court’s granting the Town’s motion for summary judgment dismissing his petition.

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://caselaw.findlaw.com/us-2nd-circuit/1124970.html