Vicariously liability for torts committed by an employee acting within the scope of the employment may require determining the employing entity

Vicariously liability for torts committed by an employee acting within the scope of the employment may require determining the employing entity

Gadson v City of New York, 2017 NY Slip Op 08657, Appellate Division, Second Department

In an action to recover damages for negligence, negligent hiring and negligent retention, intentional infliction of emotional distress, prima facie tort, and slander the defendants, City of New York and Department of Education of the City of New York [DOE], moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint. Insofar as relevant to this appeal, the Supreme Court denied the motion and DOE appealed.

The Appellate Division first addressed the claims alleging negligence and negligent hiring and negligent retention. DOE contended that the individual, a janitor, who allegedly insulted the plaintiff's daughter was not an employee of the DOE, but rather, an employee of a nonparty independent contractor identified only as "Temco" and thus DOE could not be held liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior.

The Appellate Division, citing Judith M. v Sisters of Charity Hosp., 93 NY2d 932, said the doctrine hold an employer "vicariously liable for torts committed by an employee acting within the scope of the employment."

In contrast, the general rule is that an employer who hires an independent contractor is not liable for the independent contractor's negligent acts [see Rosenberg v Equitable Life Ass. Soc. of U.S., 79 NY2d 663].

The court noted that "despite some evidence that Temco had been providing services to the subject middle school for more than 11 years," DOE did not submit any signed contract with Temco or offer any other evidentiary proof in admissible form establishing that such a contract exists. Further, said the court, DOE "failed to submit any evidentiary proof in admissible form establishing that the janitor in question was an employee of Temco at the time of the incident."

As DOE failed to establish, prima facie, that the janitor in question was the employee of an independent contractor retained to provide janitorial services to the subject middle school, the Appellate Division ruled that Supreme Court properly denied its motion for summary judgment dismissing the causes of action to recover damages for negligence and negligent hiring and negligent retention.

Addressing Supreme Court denial of DOE's motion for summary judgment dismissing the causes of action to recover damages for intentional infliction of emotional distress, prima facie tort, and slander, the Appellate Division ruled that Supreme Court should have granted those motions. The court explained that to maintain and action to recover damages for intentional infliction of emotional distress, DOE established, prima facie, as a matter of law, that the isolated incident of name calling by the janitor, while unquestionably objectionable, did not rise to the level of extreme and outrageous conduct required to sustain such a cause of action."

Turning to the claims of the plaintiff with respect to recovering damages for slander, the Appellate Division established, prima facie, as a matter of law, that the janitor's statements were nonactionable expressions of opinion, and not facts, about the plaintiff's daughter. Further, said the court, DOE established, prima facie, that the plaintiff did not incur special damages, a necessary element of the prima facie tort cause of action .

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/3dseries/2017/2017_08657.htm

Continuation of health insurance benefits upon retirement

Continuation of health insurance benefits upon retirement
Adamo v City of Albany, 2017 NY Slip Op 08583, Appellate Division, Third Department

Plaintiffs [Adamo] are former police officers and the spouses of former police officers who retired from their employment with defendant at various times who allege the City of Albany [City] breached the collective bargaining agreements [CBAs] that were in existence at the time of the police officers' retirements by refusing to reimburse plaintiffs for the cost of their Medicare Part B premiums.

Significantly, prior to 1985, City participated in the New York State Employee Health Insurance Plan [NYSHIP], which provided health insurance coverage for both active and retired police officers, as well as their spouses and which provided that once a retiree reached the age of 65 and enrolled in the Federal Medicare program, NYSHIP would provide secondary health insurance coverage and defendant would reimburse the retiree for his or her cost of Medicare Part B premiums.

In 1985 the City became self-insured for health insurance purposes and discontinued its participation in NYSHIP. At that point, the unions representing the active police officers negotiated new health insurance coverage and included a "health care provision" [HCP] in each subsequent CBA providing that "[a]ll employees in the bargaining unit shall be eligible for hospitalization and medical insurance for themselves and all of their eligible dependents pursuant to [certain] plan options . . . which provide benefits at the same or higher level as were provided under [NYSHIP]."

Pursuant to the HCP the City continued to reimburse retirees and their spouses for the cost of Medicare Part B premiums for the next 25 years. Effective January 1, 2010 the City said that it would not make such reimbursement payments to individuals "not yet enrolled in Medicare Part B."Adamo commence an action for breach of contract. 

However, Supreme Court, finding that the language of the HCP in the CBAs "unambiguously did not apply to retirees," dismissed the action and Adamo appealed. The Appellate Division held that Adamo's reliance on the language of the HCP was misplaced. and the City's practice of reimbursements from 1985 to 2009, maintain that they stated a cause of action for breach of contract.*

Citing Agor v Board of Educ., Northeastern Clinton Cent. Sch. Dist., 115 AD3d 1047, the court explained that "In determining the obligations of parties to a contract, the threshold determination as to whether an ambiguity exists is a question of law to be resolved by the court."** As relevant with respect to the CBAs here, "[o]nly when a contract is ambiguous can the interpretation placed upon it by the parties, as shown by their conduct, be considered in determining their intent, and even then, the parties' practices are 'merely an interpretive tool and cannot be used to create a contractual right independent of some express source in the underlying agreement.'"

The Appellate Division found that the HCP:

[1] Unambiguously failed to grant retirees the right to reimbursement for the cost of Medicare Part B premiums" by limiting its provisions to "employees in the bargaining unit";

[2] Made no reference to retirees or to health care benefits to be paid in retirement; and

 [3] Retirees are no longer part of the bargaining unit upon their retirement and, therefore, "employees in the bargaining unit" cannot be read to encompass retirees.

The bottom line: Although NYSHIP obligated City to reimburse retirees for the cost of Medicare Part B premiums and the HCP provided for the "same or higher level" of benefits, the Appellate Division concluded that the plain language of the HCP is susceptible to only one reasonable interpretation — namely, that it does not provide for any reimbursement to retirees for the cost of Medicare Part B premiums" and thus the City's past practice in this regard may not be considered.

* The Appellate Division noted that "Recently, in a proceeding commenced by active employees of defendant to annul a determination of the Public Employee Relations Board, this Court found that defendant's actions in providing reimbursements to retirees for 25 years constituted a past practice that could not be unilaterally discontinued pursuant to the Taylor Law (seeMatter of Albany Police Officers Union, Local 2841, Law Enforcement Officers Union Dist. Council 82, AFSCME, AFL-CIO v New York Pub. Empl. Relations Bd., 149 AD3d 1236" and then pointed out that "a different standard applies when considering past practices in the Taylor Law context," citing Matter of Aeneas McDonald Police Benevolent Assn. v City of Geneva, 92 NY2d at 332-333) and, thus, its holding in that case has no bearing on whether Adamo stated a cause of action for breach of contract in this action.

** In the words of the Appellate Division, an "[a]mbiguity exists if the language used lacks a definite and precise meaning, and there is a reasonable basis for a difference of opinion."

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/3dseries/2017/2017_08583.htm

Application seeking the removal of an employee of a School District

Application seeking the removal of an employee of a School District

Decisions of the Commissioner of Education, Decision No. 17,274

A resident and taxpayer of the school district petitioned the Commissioner of Education to remove the school district's physical education director and/or athletic director pursuant to §135.4 of the Commissioner’s regulations. 

The Commissioner denied the taxpayer's application, explaining that the Commissioner lacks the authority to grant the relief requested as the individual targeted for removal is an employee, not an officer subject to removal under Education Law §306. 

In the words of the Commissioner: "I lack jurisdiction to do so.  Education Law §306 authorizes the Commissioner to remove school officers under appropriate circumstances.  For purposes of §306, "school officers" include trustees, members of boards of education, clerks, collectors, treasurers, district superintendents, or "other school officer[s]."  An athletic director, however, is a school district employee, not a school officer, and is thus not subject to removal under Education Law §306."

Addressing a number of fatal procedural defects, the Commissioner noted that even if the targeted individual were a school officer subject to her jurisdiction under Education Law §306 the defective notice of petition submitted by the taxpayer would warrant denial of the application. 

The Commissioner further explained that the notice accompanying a removal application must specifically advise a school officer that an application is being made for his or her removal from office. In this case, the petitioner failed to give such notice and, instead, used the notice prescribed under 8 NCYRR §275.11(a) for appeals brought pursuant to Education Law §310. 

Further, said the Commissioner, "A notice of petition which fails to contain the language required by the Commissioner’s regulation is fatally defective and does not secure jurisdiction over the intended respondent. It is the notice of petition that alerts a party to the fact that he or she is the subject of removal proceedings, and the failure to comply with 8 NYCRR §277.1(b) necessarily results in a jurisdictional failure and requires dismissal."

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://www.counsel.nysed.gov/Decisions/volume57/d17274