Complying with administrative procedural requirements prior initiating litigation seeking information pursuant to the Freedom of Information Law

Complying with administrative procedural requirements prior initiating litigation seeking information pursuant to the Freedom of Information Law

Empire Ctr. for Pub. Policy, Inc. v N.Y.C. Off. of Payroll Admin., 2018 NY Slip Op 01143, Appellate Division, First Department

Supreme Court granted the Empire Center for Public Policy's CPLR Article 78 petition seeking to compel the New York City Office of Payroll Administration [Administration] to disclose certain information it had requested pursuant to the Freedom of Information Law [FOIL]. The court also referred the matter to a special referee to hear and report on the appropriate amount of attorney's fees to be awarded to the Center.

The Appellate Division unanimously reversed Supreme Court's ruling "on the law" without costs and dismissed the Center's Article 78 petition.

The Appellate Division noted that the Center and Administration had corresponded regarding Administration's attempt to comply with the Center's request. Administration indicated it would not be able to compile the date requested until October 2015. On November 5, responding to the Center's inquiry concerning Administration's failure to yet provide all the data it had requested, Administration ask Center for an additional 20 days to provide the requested data.

Acknowledging that in South Shore Press v Havemeyer, 136 AD3d 929, it was held that a failure to provide an approximate date when a petitioner's FOIL request would be granted constituted a constructive denial, the Appellate Division ruled that here the Center's appeal was premature as Administration had not constructively denied the Center's FOIL request in that Administration had provided "most of the information" by November 18."

The Appellate Division, conceding that a custodian of a public record's failure to provide an approximate date when a FOIL request would be granted constituted a constructive denial, found that the Center "did not file an administrative appeal from [the Administration's November 18 response] and thus the Center failed to exhaust its administrative remedies before commencing its Article 78 action.

The decision notes that in Taylor v NYC Police Department, FOIL Unit, 25 AD3d 347, [leave to appeal denied 7 NY3d 714], despite the FOIL Unit's untimely response to Taylor's FOIL request, Taylor improperly institute an Article 78 action "without first taking an administrative appeal" challenging the untimely response to his FOIL request.

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/3dseries/2018/2018_01143.htm

Employer advanced good faith reasons supporting its decision to terminate a probationary employee

Employer advanced good faith reasons supporting its decision to terminate a probationary employee

Cooper v City of New York, 2018 NY Slip Op 01240, Appellate Division, First Department

Supreme Court annulled the New York City Department of Education's determination terminating probationary employee John Cooper's from his position. The Appellate Division reversed the lower court's ruling "on the law."

The Appellate Division held that Cooper failed to establish that he was terminated in bad faith in view of the record demonstrating that his performance during his probationary period was unsatisfactory.

On the contrary, said the court, "the record demonstrates that [the New York City Department of Education] had a good faith reason for its determination" in that there were issues with Cooper's leadership, communication, and project management skills, which not resolved despite Cooper's supervisor's repeated advice that he needed to improve and her efforts to assist him.

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/3dseries/2018/2018_01240.htm

Selected reports posted in Employment Law News by WK Workday

Selected reports posted in Employment Law News by WK Workday

Source: Wolters Kulwer

Selected reports posted by WK Workday February 23, 2018

Click on text highlighted in color to access the full report.

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Federal whistle blower protection against retaliation is not triggered unless the individual complies with the procedures set out in the controlling federal law, rule or regulation

Federal whistle blower protection against retaliation is not triggered unless the individual complies with the procedures set out in the controlling federal law, rule or regulation

Digital Realty Trust, Inc. v. Somers, USSC, No. 16-1276

Both the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, typically referred to as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the 2010 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, generally referred to as the Dodd-Frank Act, shield whistle blowers from retaliation by their employer for "whistle blowing" but they differ in important respects.

Sarbanes-Oxley applies to all "employees" who report misconduct to the Securities and Exchange Commission [SEC], any other federal agency, Congress, or an internal supervisor [see 18 U. S. C. §1514A(a)(1)].

In contrast, Dodd-Frank defines a "whistle blower" as any individual who provides . . . information relating to a violation of the securities laws to the SEC, in a manner established, by rule or regulation, by the SEC [see, generally, 15 U. S. C. §78u– 6(a)(6)].

Paul Somers alleged that his employer, Digital Realty Trust, Inc., [DRT] terminated him shortly after he reported suspected securities-law violations by the company to senior DRT management. Somers then initiated litigation against DRT, contending that he had been terminated in retaliation for his "whistle blowing" in violation of Dodd-Frank.

DRT asked the court to dismiss Somers lawsuit contending that Somers was not a whistle blower within the meaning of 15 USC §78u-6(h) because he failed to alert the Security and Exchange Commission of the suspected violations of Dodd-Frank prior to his termination.

The District Court denied the motion, and the Ninth Circuit affirmed. The Court of Appeals concluded that §78u-6(h) does not necessitate recourse to the SEC prior to gaining "whistle blower" status, and it accorded deference to the SEC's regulation, citing Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U. S. 837.

The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Dodd-Frank anti-retaliation provision does not extend to an individual who, like Somers, had not reported a violation of the securities laws to the SEC prior to his or her termination from his or her employment.

The court explained that "When a statute includes an explicit definition, [the court] must follow that definition ...."An individual who falls outside the protected category of “whistle blowers” as defined in the law, rule or regulation is ineligible to seek redress regardless of the conduct in which that individual has engaged. 

With respect to officers and employees of New York State as an employer and its political subdivisions, §75-b of the Civil Service Law provides as follows:

"2. (a) A public employer shall not dismiss or take other disciplinary or other adverse personnel action against a public employee regarding the employee's employment because the employee discloses to a governmental body information: (i) regarding a violation of a law, rule or regulation which violation creates and presents a substantial and specific danger to the public health or safety; or (ii) which the employee reasonably believes to be true and reasonably believes constitutes an improper governmental action. "Improper governmental action" shall mean any action by a public employer or employee, or an agent of such employer or employee, which is undertaken in the performance of such agent's official duties, whether or not such action is within the scope of his employment, and which is in violation of any federal, state or local law, rule or regulation" [emphasis supplied].

In Ringle v Onondaga County, 267 AD2d 1088, in determining Ringle’s and Sawyer’s rights under Section 75-b of the Civil Service Law, the Appellate Division noted that alleged violations of Section 75-b are typically challenged by the individual bringing an Article 78 action [Article 78, Civil Practice Law and Rules].* 

In filing such a petition, said Appellate Division, the individual seeks to vindicate a private rather than a public right. What private right? The right not to be dismissed or otherwise subjected to reprisals because of his or her disclosures to other governmental agencies of the media.

This conclusion meant that both Ringle and Sawyer had fallen into a procedural trap.

The Appellate Division said that because the “Civil Service Law Section 75-b causes of action Ringle and Sawyer brought sought to vindicate only their individual interests their claims were properly dismissed by the lower court because neither had filed a notice of claim as required by Section 50-a of the General Municipal Law Section and Section 52 of the County Law.**

In addition, the court pointed out that Section 75-b does not serve as a shield against disciplinary action being taken against an employee where there is a “separate and independent basis” for discipline the individual.

Finally, the Appellate Division observed that “by commencing actions pursuant to Civil Service Law Section 75-b, Ringle and Sawyer are barred from asserting any other State law cause of action related to the alleged retaliatory discharges.”

* In contrast, in DiGregorio v MTA Metro-N. R.R., 140 AD3d 530, the court ruled that where the collective bargaining agreement so provides, an allegation that the employer violated the “whistle-blower” statute is adjudicated in accordance with the terms of the agreement.

** This ruling implies that where an individual sues a school district or BOCES claiming he or she was dismissed or subjected to punitive action in violation of Section 75-b, he or she must file a notice of claim in accordance with Section 3813(1) of the Education Law. 

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/17pdf/16-1276_b0nd.pdf

 

A governmental entity operating in a public capacity may loose its right to claim sovereign immunity in litigation if it is found that the underlying cause of action involved its acting in a proprietary capacity

A governmental entity operating in a public capacity may loose its right to claim sovereign immunity in litigation if it is found that the underlying cause of action involved its acting in a proprietary capacity

Connolly v Long Is. Power Auth., Court of Appeals, 2018 NY Slip Op 01148

As was indicated in an earlier posting in NYPPL entitled Sovereign Immunity, Absolute Immunity, Qualified Immunity, Use Immunity, Transaction Immunity and Qualified Privilege, since updated to include the Connolly decision,  claims that may be advanced by public officers and employees involved in litigation and, or, administrative hearings, there are a number of theories that may be cited as a defense that will bar or limit legal action being taken, or continued, against an individual.

In Turturro v City of New York, 28 NY3d 469, the Court of Appeals addressed another theory for a defendant claiming immunity in an effort to avoid litigation, a claim that the entity is a governmental body. In Turturro the court explained that a government entity performing a purely proprietary, non-governmental role when its activities essentially substitute for or supplement traditionally private enterprises. In contrast, a government entity will be deemed to have been engaged in a governmental function when its acts are undertaken for the protection and safety of the public pursuant to the general police powers.

The issue before the Court of Appeals in the captioned matter was whether the defendants, the  Long Island Power Authority (LIPA), Long Island Lighting Company (LILCO), and National Grid Electric Services, LLC (National Grid) were, collectively entitled to dismissal of plaintiffs' amended complaints on the rationale that the actions challenged were governmental and discretionary as a matter of law. 

The court rejected the defendants argument that assuming their actions were not discretionary, "plaintiffs' failure to allege a special duty is a fatal defect." Rather, the Court of Appeals ruled that because defendants had not met their threshold burden of demonstrating that the action was governmental in the context of its "pre-answer, pre-discovery CPLR §3211(a)(7) motions," it could not concluded that plaintiffs' complaints fail to state causes of action as a matter of law.

The Court of Appeals also took note of the fact that LIPA was a public authority that was created by the legislature as a "corporate municipal instrumentality of the state . . . which shall be a body corporate and politic and a political subdivision of the state, exercising essential governmental and public powers," and authorized it to operate in LILCO's service area (Public Authorities Law §1020-c [1], [2]).

It then explained that it is "well settled that, "[d]espite the sovereign's own statutory surrender of common-law tort immunity for the misfeasance of its employees, governmental entities somewhat incongruously claim — and unquestionably continue to enjoy — a significant measure of immunity fashioned for their protection by the courts" (Haddock v City of New York, 75 NY2d 478, 484 [1990]). 

The doctrine of governmental function immunity "reflects separation of powers principles and is intended to ensure that public servants are free to exercise their decision-making authority without interference from the courts," citing Valdez v City of New York, 18 NY3d 69. Additionally, said the Court of Appeals, "this immunity reflects a value judgment that — despite injury to a member of the public — the broader interest in having government officers and employees free to exercise judgment and discretion in their official functions, unhampered by fear of second-guessing and retaliatory lawsuits, outweighs the benefits to be had from imposing liability for that injury."

Because the issue in this CPLR §3211(a)(7) motion is whether plaintiffs' complaints have stated a viable claim, the first issue that to be considered "is whether the . . . entity was engaged in a proprietary function or acted in a governmental capacity at the time the claim arose. This is because if the action challenged in the litigation is governmental, the existence of a special duty is an element of the plaintiff's negligence cause of action.

As the court explained in (Matter of World Trade Ctr. Bombing Litig., 17 NY3d 428, "[w]hen the liability of a governmental entity is at issue, it is the specific act or omission out of which the injury is claimed to have arisen and the capacity in which that act or failure to act occurred which governs liability."

Assuming the government entity was acting in a governmental capacity, the court observed that a plaintiff may nevertheless state a viable claim by alleging the existence of a special duty to the plaintiff, citing Turturro, 28 NY3d at 478. 

If the plaintiff establishes the elements of the cause of action, including special duty, the government entity can avoid liability under the governmental function immunity defense by proving the challenged actions were discretionary in nature and that discretion was, in fact, exercised. However, because the governmental immunity defense protects government entities from liability only for discretionary actions taken during the performance of governmental functions, "[t]he . . . defense has no applicability where the [entity] has acted in a proprietary capacity, even if the acts of the [entity] may be characterized as discretionary."

Viewing plaintiffs' allegations in the light most favorable to plaintiffs, "as [the Court of Appeals] must given the procedural posture" of this action, plaintiffs' allegations concern the providing of electrical power by defendants, a service that traditionally has been provided by private entities in the State of New York., nor does LIPA dispute that the provision of electricity traditionally has been a private enterprise which, in the normal course of operations, would be a proprietary function.

Accordingly, the Court of Appeals said that it could not, as "a matter of law based only on the allegations in the amended complaints, as amplified," conclude that LIPA was acting in a governmental, rather than a proprietary, capacity when engaged in the conduct claimed to have caused plaintiffs' injuries.

The decisions is posted on the Internet at:

http://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/3dseries/2018/2018_01148.htm