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July 01, 2010

Is there a right to §207-c benefits if an individual refuses to perform light duty?

Is there a right to §207-c benefits if an individual refuses to perform light duty?
Matter of Park v Kapica, 8 N.Y.3d 302

John Park, a police officer employed by the Town of Greenburgh, underwent surgery in June 2002 after sustaining an injury in the line of duty. He requested, and was approved for, General Municipal Law §207-c(1) benefits.

In March 2003, the Town of Greenburgh’s medical examiner said that Park could return to work in a sedentary capacity. Accordingly, Parks was told to report for light duty starting April 21, 2003.

Park objected and submitted a report from his treating physician indicating that he had a “permanent total disability”* and requested a hearing on the issue of his ability to return to work.

A hearing was scheduled and a hearing officer was designated. Park, however, objected, contending that “any hearing had to be conducted before the Town Board pursuant to the Westchester County Police Act [WCPA].”** Supreme Court denied Park's application to stay the hearing. Park, however, refused to participate and the hearing was held in absentia.

The Hearing Officer concluded that Park (1) was fit to return to light duty, (2) that his refusal to do so was without justification, and (3) that the Town could recoup any §207-c benefits it paid to Park from April 21, 2003 until such time as he returned to work.

Rather than return to work, Park retired on August 26, 2003.

Park then filed a second lawsuit, seeking, among other things, the annulment of the Hearing Officer's determination that the Town could recoup §207-c benefits paid to him.

Supreme Court granted the petition, ruling that the Town had no authority to recoup payments made to Park prior to the Hearing Officer's finding that he was fit for light duty and the Appellate Division affirmed the lower court’s ruling.

Ultimately the Court of Appeals was asked to review these rulings.

The court initially observed that:

1. The continued receipt of §207-c disability payments is not absolute, however. A municipality is entitled to its own medical examination of its employee and if, in that physician's opinion, the officer can perform “specified types of light duty,” payment of the full amount of salary or wages may be discontinued should the officer refuse to return to work if a light-duty assignment “is available and offered to him”

2. The right to receive §207-c disability payments constitutes “a property interest giving rise to procedural due process protection, under the Fourteenth Amendment, before those payments are terminated,” and a due process hearing is triggered when an officer on §207-c status submits evidence from his treating physician supporting the officer's claim of “continued total disability.”

In response to Park's claim that the Town should have provided for his §207-c hearing in accordance with §7 of the WCPA, the Court of Appeals said that §7 applies to disciplinary actions and because Park was not subject to discipline or to the threat of termination for contesting the medical examiner's light-duty determination, neither it, nor Civil Service Law §75, applied in this situation.

It ruled that the Appellate Division “erred in stating that Civil Service Law §75 should be read in conjunction with General Municipal Law §207-c, a holding that implies that all due process hearings pursuant to §207-c must comply with Civil Service Law §75.”

Such is not the case, said the court. It was only concerned with whether Park was afforded due process in contesting the Town’s medical examiner's determination, which bears no relation to a disciplinary proceeding. However, the court did affirm the Appellate Divisions order “because the procedure employed by the Town concerning Park's challenge to the medical examiner's light-duty determination comported with procedural due process.”

In the absence of a statutory prescription with respect to conducting such hearings or a procedure established by collective bargaining pursuant to the Taylor Law for this purpose, the Court of Appeals said that “the Town was free to fashion a hearing remedy so long as its procedure afforded Park due process.”

Finding that Park's interest in the continued receipt of disability benefits was adequately protected by the Town's due process procedure, the court ruled that while he elected not to participate in the hearing, Park was, nevertheless, given the opportunity to contest the Town’s medical examiner's light-duty determination by presenting his own witnesses and cross-examining the Town's witnesses.

As to the Town’s right to recoup §207-c payments made to Park between April 21, 2003, the date he was initially directed to begin his light-duty assignment, and August 4, 2003, the date he was directed to begin his light-duty assignment after the Hearing Officer affirmed the medical examiner's findings, the Court of Appeals ruled that there was no such right available to the Town.

In the words of the court: “There is no provision in §207-c allowing the recoupment of disability payments made to an officer who is later found to be able to work.”

In contrast, a municipality may discontinue disability payments once its medical examiner finds that the officer can perform a light-duty assignment and the officer “refuse[s] to perform” that duty.” Should an officer refuse to return to work and fail to provide medical proof that he is unable to do so, the medical examiner's opinion is dispositive and §207-c disability payments may be discontinued without a hearing.***

However, a municipality is not permitted to recoup §207-c payments where, as here, the officer avails himself of due process protections by challenging the appointing authority’s medical examiner's determination because such a challenge cannot be equated to his or her refusal to return to duty.

* §207-c(2) provides, in pertinent part, that “Payment of the full amount of regular salary or wages, as provided by subdivision one of this section, shall be discontinued with respect to any policeman who is permanently disabled as a result of an injury or sickness incurred or resulting from the performance of his duties if such policeman is granted an accidental disability retirement … If application for such retirement allowance or pension is not made by such policeman, application therefore may be made by the head of the police force or as otherwise provided by the chief executive officer or local legislative body of the municipality by which such policeman is employed.”

** Section 7 of the Westchester County Police Act, entitled “Discipline and charges,” states that no member of a police department “shall be fined, reprimanded, removed or dismissed” until the charges have been investigated, and further provides that the trial of those charges “shall not be delegated and must be heard by the town board or the full board of police commissioners.”

*** The Court of Appeals noted that its decision was based “solely” on it reading of the applicable statutes and it should not be viewed as suggesting that “there would be any constitutional bar to a recoupment of benefits in a situation like this one, had the Legislature so provided.”

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